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Note from the Editor

The publication of this issue got delayed by longer than I expected or can rationally explain. Yet again, the reasons are personal failures. On the last day of last year I ended my contract with the Eastern University and stepped into the unknown. Although planned earlier, the end felt rather abrupt and the disruption got compounded by the change of my residence within the next weeks to another part of the city more than ten kilometres away. Perhaps, both these factors took their tolls on me physically and particularly on my psyche. In my changed setting I found it difficult to concentrate on the rather taxing job of editing an academic journal. My apologies, once again.

That I shall be ending my teaching career was hanging on me for sometime now. Most of my cohort, here in Bangladesh and elsewhere in the world, has already called it quits from their jobs. But a teacher is always a teacher, there is nothing called a “retirement” for us. Many of my “retired” colleagues are continuing their teaching, albeit in a temporary capacity, teaching a course here or advising a graduate student there. As much as I hate the title of a “part-time” teacher, I too may at some point in the future take to temporary teaching, if only for keeping myself involved in the university setting. But for now, after 43 years of teaching, I need the rest.

I got to teaching almost by default. Because of my rather “good” performance in the university examinations, it was more or less expected that I would pursue a career in teching. Nor was I given much of a choice as on the very next day after my Master’s resuts were published the Head of the Sociology Department wanted to know if I would be interested in teaching. Without having time to give much thought to it, I agreed. Little did I know at the time that I was committing “my life” to teaching!

Nor was I in any way aware of the economy, politics or even the sociology of such a commitment, not what it entailed for me, my life, my work, my family, friends, community or even the country. Probably no one is, at such a juncture of life. That one’s life would revolve around just an unthoughtout commitment is rather a scary deal. These days few stick to “one job” for life. But in those days one was considered very fortumnate to land a government job and a job at the government funded University of Dhaka was among the top jobs on the list. Indeed, a teaching job at the University of Dhaka was not only very prestigious but it also opened other doors and for some it was just a prelude to a more lucrative job of a civil servant. So, well thought out or not, it was not a bad choice after all, other options still on the card.

I was somewhat familiar with the culture of teaching. Teaching was not unknown in my family, my father taught for a while in a college, two of my uncles taught in schools, and I had previously tutored a few school students during my undergraduate days so I thought that I would blend in easily. But the sociology,
economics or even the politics of teaching caught me totally unprepared. The sociology hit me first, and continued to ruffle me for the rest of my life.

Even before I received the first month’s salary, the sociology of the job was all over me. In a society where teaching has been one of the most, if not the most, respected professions, I was suddenly elevated to a high status. Even in my family of teachers, I was the first “university teacher” and that put me on a higher pedestal, even in the eyes of my father who was till then little impressed by my other “achievements”. But my first sense of dignity was bestowed on me by my friends, a few junior friends I used to hangout with. Within days of my appointment one of them told me point blankly to stop hanging out with them. I was shocked till they explained the reason, “You see, we cannot smoke if you are around.” Such respect in my society is reserved for the elderly, parents, uncles, “teachers” and all grades of senior people. These friends who were often using obscene language even yesterday suddenly became very formal and respectful.

That respect in those days was plentiful in the society at large. Whereever I was introduced as a teacher of the university and that too of the University of Dhaka, the oldest and most prestigious, a certain amount of reverence would always follow. I remember situations where in a bus or on a train people, total strangers, even older people, would offer me their seat. But with that kind of veneration also came a host of expectations. Let alone speak foul language, I even had to refrain from the colloical and native accents and begin talking in a very formal language both in and outside the class room; walk straight, head high, exude confidence, look scholarly, whether I had it in me or not; family, friends and the community expected the same from me and I had to live upto it for the rest of life, a slip would not be excused.

The most demanding place was the classroom where beside the fact that from day one I had to be the scholar, who had studied all there is to know for fifty years and ready to answer all questions. I was expected to be the role model for students who were barely a few years younger than me. “The scholar” or not, fortunately, this is where I excelled. I was not their “teacher”, I did better. Even in the last class I taught, I was their “friend”. I participated in sports, performed on stage, went on picnics and study tours and was always ready to “hangout” with them. I was never annoyed, never lost my cool, never shouted at any one in the classroom. Not that I was a saint but forced myself to suppress all such emotions and offer a smile instead. I was often surprised by my own stoicism. Yet, perhaps, because of the cultural norm, students always maintained a discrete distance and the admiration and veneration was always there, even when I was “one of them.” Generations upon generations of students and in classes in diverse settings, in and outside the universities, or in different countries, I succeeded beyond my own estimations to connect with the students. Hundreds, if not thousands of my students, often publicly, express their “debts”, that I made a “difference” in their lives. That, undoubtedly is the only reward a teacher ever wants and I have had plenty of it!
Of course, these came at a tremendous cost. Hours spent in the library, rush for publications, days spent in seminars, conferences and giving my heart out to the university exacted their price. That my family life suffered beyond telling, was only part of the predicament. Two marriages failed, children got estranged and finally I ended up living all alone for twelve years, an incredible occurrence in my culture. But that’s another phase of my life I had to endure quietly, though could not much hide from the public gaze. The light at the end of the tunnel is the unimaginable kindness of an expatriate lady who has of late so graciously decided to stand beside me as a life partner.

Over these many years my life got increasingly confined to the campus and I generally went out of circulation, lost friends and acquaintances while my circle of relatives dwindled down to the siblings only. Today, I know very few people outside the academic settings and few, if anyone, in the external world knows me. Being disheartened by the politics in the country (more on this later), I stopped reading the local newspapers and watching television a long time ago, so that when colleagues talk of “dignitaries” or of “major happenings”, even scratching my head does not produce any knowledge of them. I have concealed myself inside a cocoon and live a blissful life all on my own, as far as that is possible.

The economics of my career hasn’t worked out any better either. No one, anywhere, expects to make millions by teaching but at the beginning of my teaching career, as noted above, it was not considered a bad job. With a couple of bonuses at the start, I was earning a handsome salary. Salary was the only source of income for nearly all professionals then and the cost of living at the time allowed a comfortable living. But the economy was changing fast and by the 1990s that salary began to feel inadequate. More importantly, salaried jobs were no longer the coveted occupations, businesses of all sorts and jobs with the multinational companies were soon offering much heavier purses, which was fine for the country, except that the cost of living continually soared beyond reach for me and living was no longer comfortable as most goods and services went beyond my reach. Living single then helped but not by much.

The most unfortunate factor of this new economy for me is that “money” has become the standard bearer of life in this society where only fifty years ago pursuing money was considered to be a very lowly act, only people of “lower class” engaged in making money. Nor was there much money to be made either. There was very little outside of petty tradings. Business people were not considered worthy of companionship or social association. The educated and the professionals were the ones at the top of the status ladder in the country. Earning a few extra bucks through consultancy was always on the card but I would rather spend that time in my own studies and I did manage my accounts at some respectable level for a while. But by the end of the last century all had began to change rapidly, social position began to be allotted in terms of economic positions. If you do not earn in the higher brackets of six figure or even seven figure salaries, if you do not own a house, an apartment or a car, preferably a factory or a large business, you are an object
of pitty in most circles today, even to the lower classes! As one of my acquaintances once noted, “If you do not own a car you are a proletariat.” At the end of my teaching career, may be I am. My new landlord was visibly perturbed by my “retired professor” status in renting out the apartment and was shocked to learn that I shall not be using the car parking space that came with the apartment.

The politics of the profession was an equally daunting challenge that, I feel, I also failed to live upto. That I had to be part of the politics on campus was not a part of my early realization. During the student days I managed very well by not indulging in what passed for “student politics” then but joining the faculty almost automatically propelled one to have and express a political opinion. In those tumultuous early days after the independence of the country a university teacher was “expected” to “have a say”, at the very least to “take a position” on any issue of national importance. I tried to stay away from all that, not because I was not aware of the expectations, or lacked an opinion but my studies took precedence at the time and soon left for higher studies abroad. Completed my PhD from the USA and unlike the rest of the 99% who goes abroad, I returned to the country. But upon my return and by the mid 1980s I could not ignore the plight of the nation under a military dictator and like the rest of the community often took to the street to protest and finally got entangled in the in-campus politics as well.

As enunciated by Edward Said and others, and as I wrote elsewhere, the role of the intellectual is “oppositional”, to oppose injustices wherever they may occur. The dictum served me well to legitimize my own position in campus politics. The nation soon overthrew the dictator and democratic practice ensued from the 1990s, a very fortunate happening for the country but it drew the intellectuals of the country to their demise as hoards upon hoards, largely lured by the few lucrative positions on campus, even a promotion or a scholarship, and often getting rewarded, simply divided themselves up into pro this or pro that party and began towing “their” government lines, as the two major political parties alternated in ruling the country. Today, there is hardly any one left to perform the “oppositional” role of the intellectual. For a while I tried to stand against the tide, failing which I withdrew completely, forsaking my own role as an intellectual. Another failure on my card!

Student politics on campus also took a similar turn. Though pockets of sanity may still be detected among the student community (and, perhaps, a few teachers) the whole academic atmosphere has been seriously tarnished by now. Some students seek to make a career in politics and the universities are their training grounds. They too get remunerated for upholding and fighting (often physical battles) for the government and eventually get inducted into the national politics, which has its own rewards, financial and others. There is, thus, much incentive to become “full time" politicians on campus rather than full time students.

What added to the disintegration of the academics further was the transition to Bengali as the medium of instruction at all levels, which has left whole generations of students without the functioning knowledge of
English. The transition is definitely laudable for the country where people have given their lives for the language. But the country was ill-prepared, there was hardly any plan to sustain such a move and little was done to build the requisite resources for university level education in terms of translating books and imparting knowledge in general, as a result, much of the world knowledge, now easily available on the internet, remains outside the reach of these students. Hundreds of thousands of books in the university library, written in English and were acquired for an earlier generation of students and teachers, are now gathering dust as successive generations of students, even those who take up teaching, have no need for these. Even this journal, the only one representing sociology in Bangladesh, is unread. I was, hence, not much surprised when during an oral examination of over two hundred sociology Master's students, some of whom would soon become teachers, unashamedly confessed that they had not read a single book!

Some serious students, of course, stay out of politics and do learn English but then they leave for higher studies abroad, never to return. For the majority of students, however, attaining a degree to get a job seems to be the only objective of higher education, acquiring knowledge in the process has become an outmoded concept. The jobs are also mostly in the business sector and require little or no knowledge of science and technology or even of the arts and humanities. Teachers have also given in to accommodate such demands, increasingly compromising their standards or level of expectation. Those who failed to comply found fewer and fewer students taking their courses, which turned out to be my fate. The more serious students, afraid that they will get a bad grade, would skip my course while the poorer ones who had no choice but sit for my courses were not good enough to rise to my level of challenge, often 80% or more failing my course. So that, I made little or no contribution to their careers.

As a result, and as a colleague once put it very succinctly, I had become “redundant”!

This redundancy, more than politics or transition to Bengali, prompted me by 2006 to quit teaching in public universities. Fortunately for me, options had opened up in the private sector. As a few dozen universities had opened up by the beginning of the 21st century and I was invited to teach in one of the older and better organized ones. The medium of instruction was English and politics had no room there so I found the situation ideal and to my liking. I also found some better equipped students who had English medium schooling and had passed exams under London or Cambridge university. Some of my graduate students there were far better than any I had taught at the University of Dhaka in the past fifteen or twenty years. So I put my soul to it and with the active support of the then Vice Chancellor, who unfortunately, died too soon thereafter, I was able to build up a school of arts and the social sciences. I thought I had finally found my niche, but it was not to be! Unknown to me, the university had by then passed a law which restricted contractual appointments to four years and I had overstayed my welcome by two years already.

At this juncture of my career, at a rather late age, I joined a research organization, thinking that I had enough of teaching. But the "office environment" there proved to be so alien that within weeks I decided to
move out, although after completing one year of my contract. Another private university, aware of my success at the previous university, invited me on a three year contract to set up a social science faculty there. I accepted the invitation whole heartedly and set up the curricula for the faculty with three social science departments, including sociology, and a general education cell. But redandency soon caught up with me there too as due to some technical difficulties the university could not acquire permission from the government and the subjects could not be opened to the students.

Within months I found that I had no courses to teach, other than an introductory sociology course, required by some “business” students. Responding to the supposed “demand of the market,” most of the nearly hundred or so private sector universities today teach primarily “business” subjects. Eighty percent students, or more in some universities, read only these subjects. Few, if any of these universities have a fullfledged department of physics, chemistry, history or political science, let alone the humanities or the arts. Some are opening up sociology departments but with only a handful of students opting for it, far from making them “viable”. Sociology did not make much of a headway in the public universities and there does not seem to be any immediate prospect in the private universities either. I, therefore, decided not to extend my contract any further and quit.

So, redandency has not only crippled me, it has engulfed sociology in Bangladesh too. I hope to write more on this in the next issue. And, though I began my teaching career with, so to say, a “bang”; with lots of promises, expectations, aspirations, and a dream of being “the scholar”, “the intellectual”; it ended with a whimper and I stepped into my “retirement” ever so quietly, far, far away from the clamour of the intellectual world. I did achieve some measure of success, opening up departments, changing the curricula, promoting sociology wherever possible, and beside my own development I did mentor some students, not the many I expected to, but by the end of my career, I had no promising student to teach, nor did the discipline reach any perceptible height. Failure seems to be the order of the day. This journal is the only beacon of success both in my life and career and of sociology in Bangladesh!
Indian Anthropology: A Plea for Pragmatic Appraisal

N.K.Das

Abstract: Anthropology in India is divided into various phases and located at various levels. Despite a long ethnographic tradition, there is hardly any notion reflecting ‘Indianness’. This is not to undermine however, numerous laudable works of Indian scholars. Sadly, some works, despite their contemporary theoretical relevance, remained unnoticed. Included among these are numerous noteworthy ethnographic monographs produced by Indian universities and anthropological survey of India (ASI), which are not assessed appropriately. This article briefly elucidates some such works, which have both theoretical bearing and applied relevance. It is argued that there is need for a holistic appraisal of anthropological works including works of applied nature. This is specially so because, in the absence of knowledge about numerous admirable works, critiques seem to be too unkind towards entire Indian anthropology. In Indian anthropology the growth of ethnography itself is a fascinating subject. This article discusses relevance of ethnography in India, historically. It also discusses the ‘ethnographic’ uniqueness of people of India study in postcolonial era which suffers from misinformation campaigns. Lastly it is argued that anthropologists need to ensure best utility of their research. There are limits and they have to decide how far to advocate politically, balancing wisely between ethnographic pragmatism and political activism.

Introduction
This article describes some trends in Indian anthropology and highlights the modest growth of ethnographic tradition. It also discusses lack of pertinent research output, especially in the arena of applied/development anthropology and need for appropriate appraisal of existing works. Taking clue from various critiques of Indian anthropology (Debnath, 1999, Das 2002, Rao, 2012, Berger, 2012 and Guha, 2017) this article picks up a few issues and tries to locate them in relevant perspectives. It deals with comparative analysis of ‘ethnographies’ conducted over decades, including works of anthropological survey of India (ASI). Indian scholars have variously contributed in various sub-fields of anthropology, rather admirably, although some commentaries remain little too downcast. Long ago Debnath (1999) had shown concerns for anthropology and discussed crisis within Indian anthropology. Guha (2017) has argued that anthropologists have ignored research on issues of land alienation/acquisition and dispossession. He has argued that Indian anthropologists have especially failed to produce scientific data on the biocultural impact of land acquisitions and particularly on food insecurity and its subsequent impact on health and nutrition. He critiques lack of appropriate social impact study vis-à-vis land acquisition issues. This article, which briefly addresses such apprehensions, elucidates works of Indian anthropologists and argues that on account of lack of due publicity many a significant works have remained unrecognised, which have both theoretical and applied bearing. While pleading for pragmatic assessment of works of

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anthropological colleagues, this article examines the discourse of ethnographic pragmatism vis-à-vis political activism, in a larger perspective. It eventually proposes some points for future research.

Indian anthropology and Indian anthropologists have been criticised, in general, for imitating the ‘western’ masters. Several decades ago, Surajit Sinha had exposed the academic patronage of Western Gurus and Guru-Bhais in shaping anthropological enterprise in India (Sinha, 1971). This patronage endures in Indian anthropology since Indian universities pursue a syllabus which centres on western theories. Felix Padel has indicated that in Indian anthropology the mainstream analysis of tribal cultures still tends to understand them in terms of ‘primitiveness’ or ‘backwardness’ – a view basically established by colonial anthropology, that was geared towards controlling and ‘civilizing’ India’s ‘savage tribes’ (2014). The latest ICSSR survey (2009) shows, that Indian anthropologist overwhelmingly adhere to study of tribes (Srivastava and Chaudhury, 2009: 92). Under land-alienation and bonded labour category only three studies are cited for last two decade period in ICSSR review of Indian anthropology (Srivastava and Chaudhury, 2009: 64). We cannot trace any specific study on ‘poverty’, even though one scholar mentioned that poverty among tribes was 44% in 1999-2000 compared to 16 per cent among non-tribes (A.R.N.Srivastava 1988). Land alienation was not an area of research even though B.D. Sharma had alerted the Indian Prime Minister that land alienation was a serious issue (Srivastava and Chaudhury, 2009: 86). Anthropology, since the 1980s, has rededicated itself to development, indigenous rights, and conflict issues; yet we find little initiatives in these fields in India. Some anthropologists like B. D. Sharma and B. K. Roy Burman tried to combine research with activism and aimed at political emancipation of the tribal groups from neo-imperialism and capitalism. Anthropologist Felix Padel has analysed the Adivasi land acquisition as human rights issue.

**Anthropology in India: History, Research and Teaching**

Anthropology has been criticized for its role in imperial invasion. Anthropologists gained the trust of natives using their linguistic proficiency in order to assist the colonial state in the implementation of policies that ultimately led to oppression and disempowerment (Pels and Salemink, 1999). Even today, anthropology is found to be ‘morally dubious because of its entanglement with colonialism right up to the present, - - - , its aims questionable, its ethnographic method doubtful, and its epistemological assumptions naïve’ (Prakash 1992: 262). From theoretical-methodological perspectives, colonial ethnography and postcolonial ethnography of India need to be distinguished. Value-loaded narratives and ‘racial’ prejudices were replete in colonial ethnography. As one scholar puts it:

*By the late nineteenth century - - - the colonial state in India can be characterized as the ethnographic state - - -. The ethnographic state was driven by the belief that India could be ruled using anthropological knowledge to understand and control its subjects. (Dirks 2001: 43n)*
Over the last six decades, trained anthropologists have conducted extensive ethnographic fieldwork in India. In India, like in other Asian–African countries, structural functionalism was introduced to initiate ethnographic studies, in postcolonial era. M. N. Srinivas is regarded as a major representative of the structural-functionalist camp of British social anthropology. His ‘Village India’ is a classic example of an account of “social structure.” The dominant caste fulfils, in his view, a unifying function for the village as a whole (Berger, 2012). India, the postcolonial era witnessed focus on “village studies,” from the 1950s onwards, and then works devoted to the “transactionalist” and “structuralist” perspectives of the 1960s, mostly undertaken by European specialists. From the 1970s onwards, “ethno sociology” was promoted by American anthropologists. The 1980s saw a “historical turn” and Berger (2012) has discussed multiple variants of historical approaches.

Louis Dumont’s Homo Hierarchicus was one of two books that ultimately signalled the end of the village studies era, the other being Mandelbaum’s Society in India. These books were influenced by village studies carried out in the 1950s and 1960s. Mandelbaum’s two volumes are encyclopaedic, inductive, descriptive, and easy to read, Dumont’s book is analytic, deductive, theoretical, and at times difficult to digest, as Berger rightly argues. Society in India is written within a functionalist framework describing family, jati, and village, and the different “roles” of actors. Caste ranking is perceived as an extreme form of “stratification,” and “pervasive inequality” is indicated as a key feature of the caste system (Mandelbaum 1970: 6). Frederick G. Bailey was mainly interested in the political aspects of social life. He is a staunch critic of the “idealistic” approach proposed by Dumont. In his book Stratagems and Spoils: A social anthropology of politics, he fully develops his transactional and interactionist vision of society (Bailey 1969). It was in post-World War II era that American universities in particular initiated well-funded research programmes to study Indian “civilization” from a grass-roots empirical perspective. Robert Redfield and Milton Singer, both of the University of Chicago, edited a series of broad social-scientific research projects called ‘Comparative Studies of Cultures and Civilizations’.

There are many classifications of the history of anthropology in India, such as colonial and postcolonial. However no critical comparative assessments of contributions of various periods are available. Vasavi (2011) identifies 1920 as the beginning of anthropology of India. In 1921, S.C. Roy made the call for incorporating ‘Indianness’ into anthropology in India and established the journal, Man in India. Apart from M.N. Srinivas’ coinage of the terms ‘sanskritisation’ and ‘dominant caste’, no other concept could be generated in relation to Indian society. Carroll (1977) has made a critical assessment of ‘sanskritisation’. Nirmal Kumar Bose and Irawati Karve indeed emerge as true ‘indigenous anthropologists’ with pioneering contributions, at all-India level. When Gopala Sarana (2007) was asked to write on Indian anthropology, he chose the works of D.N. Majumdar, Irawati Karve, Louis Dumont, M.N Srinivas, André Béteille, S.C. Dube, and Nirmal Kumar Bose. V.K. Srivastava (2000) has observed that traditional areas of research viz. kinship, religion, myths beliefs, and cosmology hardly attract students. Research in economy and polity has also declined in anthropology. IIAS, Shimla, organized a national seminar on ‘urgent research in social
anthropology' calling to develop a 'model of Indian society' (Abbi and Saberwal 1969). Yet, after forty-five years, issues raised remain unaddressed.

There are about forty university departments of anthropology of highly differing quality, of which only six are composite departments. The UGC classifies anthropology departments in three categories, viz. integrated, fragmented, and composite. The integrated departments are those where all the main branches of anthropology are taught and researched (Srivastava, 2000). If Indian anthropology has any future it is essentially in terms of a composite and integrated discipline. It is heartening to see that ASI continues to espouse ‘integrated anthropology’ and it has also promoted allied disciplines like human geography, linguistics, folklore and psychology. We also witness proliferation of ‘cultural study’ and ‘tribal study’ departments in Indian universities, which follow anthropological trends. Historians, largely following the ethno- historical approach, have in recent years focused on ‘adivasi study’, even though term ‘adivasi’, much like term ‘tribe’, remains contentious.

People of India Study: Colonial and Postcolonial Versions

It is construed that the ethnographers of the British Empire, meticulously recorded the biological and cultural diversities of the Indian populations, such as H H Risley, author of 1915 People of India volume (Guha, 2017). Compared to colonial version, according to Jenkins (2003), cited by Guha (2017), the “postcolonial study of People of India” is an ethnographic account- ‘almost in the fashion done by H H Risley’. In reality, the multi-volume People of India series of books published by ASI are more detailed than the ethnological surveys of the British Raj, which laid much emphasis on anthropometry. The intent of ASI study has been to produce an anthropological study of the differences and linkages between all communities. H.H. Risley’s (1915) People of India was actually a rehash of the census report of 1901. Chapter on ‘caste, tribe and race’ written by Risley in 1901 census report (co-authored with Edward Gait), formed the main component of colonial ‘People of India volume’. Included also are other chapters (including ‘animism’), most of which were written by Gait and language chapter written by George Grierson. Risley’s People of India was first published in 1908 and reissued as ‘memorial’ edition in 1915. There were two publications on people of India in colonial India. John Forbes Watson and John William Kaye compiled an eight-volume study entitled The People of India (1868 and 1875), which contained 468 annotated photographs of the native ‘castes and tribes’.

H.H. Risley, the colonial ethnographer, was obsessed with the racial typology of people, ignoring occupational classifications; not least because of his unwavering faith in the classification of “castes and tribes” by the “nasal index” (Pinney 1990: 265). Risley focused only on British controlled India and a few
princely states, not entire India. Further, ethnographic information contained in colonial era works including the gazetteers have been replete with value loaded narratives, inserted in a perfunctory way.

The postcolonial People of India (PoI) study of ASI was necessitated by the fact that there existed an information-gap about a very large number of communities. The People of India project was launched by ASI on 2nd October, 1985 to cover entire human surface of India for the first time, using scientific methodology. It corrected many inaccuracies of colonial classification. People of India project for the first time concentrated on ethnonyms, surnames and internal articulation of identity of people of India, which was missing in colonial ethnography (Das 2006C).

The postcolonial People of India study is not the product ‘solely’ of the ASI. As many as 26 universities and research institutes had actively participated in the project in collection of data and writing the community reports. Over 40 per cent ‘community’ reports of PoI are written by university scholars. Most importantly, the renowned scholars of Indian universities edited the state volumes of PoI project. For example, Bihar/Jharkhand volume is edited by Surendra Gopal and Hetukar Jha; West Bengal by Shekhar Bandyopadhyay; Kerala by T. Madhava Menon, Manipur by M. Horam, Nagaland by Lima C. Imchen, Meghalaya by B. Pakem; Tripura by Jagadish Ganchaudhuri and S. Sailo, Mizoram by C. Nunthra, and Arunachal by Parul Dutta, to name a few. ASI scholars were made associate editors only. The expertise and understanding of these university scholars have gone in shaping the state volumes. Madhav Gadgil, his team and ASI scholars have used PoI data of ASI to write papers for reputed journals.

K.S. Singh, the director-general, ASI, and general editor of the PoI volumes coined the maxim ‘human surface of the entire country’. Walter Hauser (2006) believes that it is a mind-boggling concept that had embedded within (combination of) the methodology of historical research and anthropological fieldwork. M.N. Srinivas, stated that, “if compared with British era ethnographic survey, one departure of this project is the attempt to understand the process of changes that have taken place in each of 4635 communities of India”. Summarizing salient features of PoI study, M. N. Srinivas further stated that,

“In India the regional identities in every part of India show themselves in language, material culture, food habits, folklore, ritual, local forms of religion etcetera. 83 percent of the population of India lives within the linguistic and political boundaries. It is seen that people of India are generally immigrant. As a result most of the Indians are bilingual. Cultural exchange, co-existence and tolerance are part of Indian ethos. These are revealed”.

“The concept of unity and diversity has become a political cliché. We should first ask for acceptance of diversity and then we should say that this unity goes beyond what we have thought. - - -It may be argued that caste itself is a model of unity in the sense that we all accept cultural diversity. We are a tolerant society because of the caste system. India, however, comprises both horizontal unities based on caste and vertical unities based on region, language, religion, and sect and so on, which these data show”.

“Rarely has a project as important as this from the national point of view and from the scholarly point of view been pursued with such determination, vigour, attention, and speed, and I must congratulate Dr. Singh, his colleagues and collaborators. (M. N. Srinivas, Foreword, People of India- Volume I, Delhi: Oxford University Press 2002).
There have been many evaluations of the PoI project. One of the more balanced evaluations, according to Walter Hauser (2006), comes from the cultural anthropologist Christopher Pinney of the University College, London, who said, “These volumes were assembled by an extraordinary man as part of a remarkable project. K.S.Singh is one of a long tradition of administrators turned anthropologists. The circumstances of the project’s inception help make sense of these volumes” peculiar qualities—social idealism mixed with an uneasy legacy of Victorian social science against the background of statistical giganticism’ (Christopher Pinney, The Times Higher Education Supplement, 2 September 1994, cited in Walter Hauser, 2006). The PoI project has been criticized for relying too heavily on colonial categories, what Pinney may have had in mind when he referred to a ‘legacy of Victorian social science’. This is a major misconception since the project constantly used the term ‘community’ to describe the castes, tribes and minorities in a particular state. In many instances the categories of “scheduled” castes or tribes are not used blindly. Ethnonyms and historical growth of identities are critically investigated and noted. One Naga scholar has acknowledged how the ethnographic report prepared ‘exclusively’ on Pochury tribe (by N.K.Das under PoI project) had helped the community to seek recognition as an ‘independent tribe’, which was ultimately granted. Use of the term ‘community’, in PoI project, also helped study the status of speakers of minority languages in a state. Thus Bihari, Nepali/Gorkhali, Bengali and Assamese, for example, are studied as ‘communities’ in all states of northeast.

There is a futuristic angle about PoI project. K.S.Singh had surmised that “we have laid the groundwork for a more comprehensive ethnography of the people of India that needs to be continually updated and built upon by successive generations of researchers and scholars” (Note on the Series - POI, Introduction, Vol. 1, 2002, p. xxvii). Supporting such perception, Walter Hauser (2006) wrote that, “... (It) strikes me as a legitimate goal, and if the published and computer data bases of the PoI project builds on the many data bases of its colonial and Indian predecessors, it will be a boon to many generations of historians and anthropologists, among other social scientists. I speak here as a historian of modern India, who with many generations of students has benefited from the data bases left by the British and their Indian successors. Anyone who has spent time in libraries, archives and record rooms working long hours with pre-computer pencil and paper in the revenue materials, settlement reports, gazetteers, and census records, will perhaps understand and appreciate what Kumar Suresh Singh and his colleagues have wrought”. Hauser (2006) also observed that K.S.Singh’s latest book ‘Diversity, Identity, and Linkages’ is indeed the final reflection on the massive People of India project, reinforcing, as he would want, the idea that India is a complex and diverse social and cultural space, but that within that diversity there is found an inherent connectedness. That connectedness or unity was for Suresh Singh the ultimate definition of what it meant to be Indian. Walter Hauser also wrote that Suresh Singh was a rare combination of historian, anthropologist and civil servant, which had resulted in his classic The Indian Famine, 1967: A Study in Crisis and Change (New Delhi: People’s Publishing House, 1975).
Indic Civilization, State Formation and Tribal Movements

Since its beginning in 1945, ASI focused on ‘tribes’ in remote areas. Teams comprising cultural and physical anthropologists, psychologists, biochemists, and linguists visited those areas, with photographer. ASI, once a ‘big’ organization, has been suffering on account of steady curtailment and non-filling of vacant positions. K.S. Singh was practically the last director-general of ASI. In ASI, major academic changes were introduced in 1960s. In this period, N. K. Bose had launched the All India Material Traits Survey, conceiving Indian Civilization in terms of ‘culture zones’ which he argued did not coincide with the linguistic zones. Bose and Surajit Sinha both coordinated the project in which data were collected from 313 districts. It involved the mapping of distribution of material traits and sketching of artefacts. The summarised result of this national survey was published under the title ‘Peasant Life in India: A Study in Indian Unity and Diversity’ (Bose, 1961). Through the publication of this work Bose had facilitated the decolonization of Indian anthropology and shaped the indigenization of anthropology, which was further pursued in Pol study of ASI in 1990s. Bose was a multi-faceted personality. He was an anthropologist and an outstanding Gandhian. Besides N.K. Bose and K.S. Singh, Surajit Sinha is another eminent anthropologist who headed the ASI and made important contributions. Sinha was associated with the larger project of comparative studies of civilizations initiated by Robert Redfield and Milton Singer. Thus, Sinha, pursuing the Indic civilization approach proposed the concept of ‘tribal-peasant/caste continuum’ and argued that tribespeople once entering into service relations with other jatis, started incorporating certain Hindu deities and the elements of Hindu cosmology (Sinha 1965). Gradually, the little tradition of the tribes became a part of the great tradition of the Hindus (Sinha, 1958). The other significant method of the tribal absorption was seen by Sinha (1962) in terms of state formation. State formation has been a major area of research of ASI scholars. Besides Surajit Sinha and K.S. Singh, ASI scholar Thushu used the concept of state formation in his study of Gond kingdom. N.K. Das and R. K. Saha discussed the tribal state formation in northeast India. Das (1993) has also pioneered study of ‘segmentary lineage system’ vis-à-vis stateless/acephalous tribe. H. Kulke (1993) has traced processual model of integrative state formation in Odisha relating tribal family deities with Jagannatha, the rastradevata of the “imperial” Gajapati king of Puri. He also observed that Risley was first to have proposed the Rajputisation model, when he narrated the mobility of “leading men of an aboriginal tribe” to the rank of Maharajas and their recognition as Nagbansi Rajputs (Kulke, 1993).

During late 1970s the ASI launched a composite study of the tribal society in order to assemble data on tribal laws, tribal economy and tribal movements. The then director K.S. Singh conceived and guided this work. Specific teams were formed and scholars conducted fieldworks to gather data on these themes. This exercise led to several national seminars. The first seminar on tribal movements was inaugurated by Rani Gaidinliu in 1976. This exercise led to publication of Tribal Movements in India, Vols I and II (Singh, 1982, 1983), which became very popular. K. S. Singh’s earlier book ‘The Dust Storm and the Hanging
Mist' (1966) had established Birsa Munda as a cult, which inspired folk literatures, and most significantly, according to Alpa Shah, Singh's Birsa study formed the basis of Ranajit Guha's (1983) Elementary Aspects of a Peasant Insurgency and thus the foundation for subaltern studies (Shah, 2014). The second all-India study dealt with tribal economy. ASI scholars presented their case studies in national seminar inaugurated by Ramakrishna Mukherjee. A. R. Desai, Fürer-Haimendorf, B.K. Roy Burman and L.K. Mahapatra were other presenters in the seminar. This seminar led to publication of popular book 'Economies of the Tribes and their Transformation' (Singh 1983). The third publication in this sequence was “Tribal Ethnography, Customary Law and Change” (Singh: 1993). These three sets of ASI books continue to remain compulsory reference text in university circles.

Rethinking Tribes, ‘Hindu India’, Syncretic Discourse and Cultural Pluralism

Following colonial era approach, anthropologists in post-independence era remained obsessed with phenomenon of ‘Hinduisation of tribes’. They used western theories such as little/great tradition and acculturation and wrongly looked at culture change among tribes as a one-way phenomenon. N. K. Bose (1941) thus pointed to tribes being absorbed into Hindu society. Ghurye (1963:205) described tribes as ‘backward Hindus’. Kosambi (1956) highlighted tribal elements being fused into the general Hindu society. Tribal religions remained eternal elements of Hinduism in the writings of anthropologists belonging to Chicago School. Singer thus subsumed within widespread “popular Hinduism” many beliefs and practices observed among tribes, including the worship of numerous godlings, animal sacrifice, witchcraft and magic (Singer 1972: 45). Singer placed "Sanskritisation" at par with model of “Hindu method of tribal absorption” proposed by N K Bose. Surajit Sinha, another product of Chicago School, saw the tribal culture as a "folk" dimension of the "little tradition" of Hindu civilisation (Sinha 1958).

In fact branding variously pre-existing religions of tribal communities as "essential ingredients of Hinduism" had only reflected the prejudices of anthropologists who were blind to realities. In fact, denial of autonomous existence of tribal religion, which came to be revived often, was advanced only to bluntly justify the "acculturation" theory and concepts of great /little traditions, which were "imposed" without appreciating the unique Indian culture characterized by syncretised religiousness (Das, 2003, 2006a). Regrettably Indian anthropologists continue to pursue concepts of great /little traditions and acculturation. The problem with concept of ‘acculturation’ is its linearity. Indeed elsewhere anthropologists have discarded the superficially defined ‘acculturation’ mainly, on account of its excessively monochromatic implications. In reality very seldom it is possible to trace culture change in such a unidirectional and one-dimensional way (Chance, 1996, Gutmann, 2004, Das 2006b).

It is obvious that culture-change in tribal areas of India have been studied from the Hindu-centric perspective ignoring the pervasive syncretistic coexistence of multiple religious traditions (Das 2003, 2006). Syncretism is combination of attributes and elements from two or more religious traditions,
ideologies, or value systems. In Indian context, it emerges as a most ideal concept to describe the composite culture, cultural pluralism and blending of religions as a result of culture contact, as this author has proposed (Das 2003, 2006a, 2006b). This author has pleaded to adopt 'syncretism' as a viable field of study, by discarding the theory of acculturation (Das 2006b). It is argued that on account of various levels of culture-contact, the tribes of India had often borrowed material-cultural traits and religious practices of various sects and major religions such as Buddhism, Hinduism and Christianity. However, the tribespeople perpetually adhered to many aspects of native religion even after their adoption of new faith. In his many publications focusing on syncretism (Das 2003, 2006) this author has narrated the 'continued existence of many elements of tribal religion', often as vibrant as ever, despite embrace of many cultural/religious traits of Hinduism on part of tribes of peninsular India and Brahmaputra valley.

In 2004, ASI launched its first national project on 'syncretism in India'. ASI Scholars were asked to study both tribal and non-tribal scenarios, including Hindu-Muslim syncretised interaction and facet of Sufism. Being the coordinator of this project this author was entrusted with organizing an international seminar on theme of 'syncretism' to display findings of ASI, including photographic coverage. On advice of Prof. T.N. Madan, the seminar title was rephrased as 'Identity and Cultural Pluralism in South Asia'. Presentations were made by scholars representing all South Asian nations, including five European scholars. Keynote address was delivered by T.N. Madan and T. K. Oommen made the first academic presentation by elucidating themes of identity and cultural pluralism in entire south Asia. Ten ASI scholars made presentations. The papers of the seminar are included in the volume 'Identity, Cultural Pluralism and State: South Asia in Perspective', (N.K.Das and V.R. Rao with Foreword by T. N. Madan, 2009). T. N. Madan has called this contribution as a 'substantial' contribution of ASI.

Bio-Cultural Profile and Kinship Studies

ASI's objectives, modified via policy resolutions of 1985 and 2002, led to study of bio-cultural profile of all people of India, mapping of intangible cultural heritage including bio-cultural diversity and making ethnographic films. Anthropologists of ASI have published about 300 monographs and over 2000 research papers. These are other than Encyclopaedic People of India Volumes. ASI has been conducting research on physical growth and development of India's children, including nutritional background and growth of infants since 1971. Besides all-India studies on nutrition and public health, a mammoth bio-anthropological survey had led to around thirty major region-wise publications.

Kinship as an area of study has indeed declined elsewhere, but ASI scholars such as B. Mukherjee, B.B. Goswami, N. K. Shyam Chaudhury, D. Danda and N.K.Das took up the study of kinship, particularly in Northeast India. Dipali Danda's work among the Dimasa led to exploration of double descent. The monograph 'Kinship politics and law in Naga society' has elucidated segmentary lineage system, age-set
system and customary law in a south Nagaland tribe called Zounuo-Keyhonuo (Das 1993). In this book, this author observed that jural status of the daughter/married women are visible through the dual inheritance of two categories of property, such as Pazuopu and Tepumi-Kitsa, the former being a matrilineally inherited property which is transmitted only in the female line, and second being ‘patrilineal inheritance’. This dual pattern of filiation gives rise to the bilateral extension of kinship ties. In his review of this ASI monograph, F. K. Lehman finds it striking that,

“in spite of fairly strict agnatic descent as the principle of the clan and lineage organization, daughters inherit, though in a manner less irrevocable than do sons. Moreover, while on the one hand a woman is said to be transferred to membership of her husband’s lineage, on the other she retains a distinct claim on land and other property of her natal family as well as on possible residence there, so that ‘we find a nice instance of a principle common to asymmetrical marriage systems (in Southeast Asia) namely, that the more a woman seem to be transferred at her marriage, the more it is because what is really transferred is her status as a member of an affinal lineage, a principle Edmund Leach was unclear about with regard to Lushai, Lakher, and Kachin instances’ (F.K. Lehman Anthropos 92, 1997).

From this standpoint then the Naga data indeed provide an empirical illustration to add and even improve upon former theoretical postulates of ‘alliance’ and ‘descent’ models.

Reorienting Anthropological Methodologies:

Adivasi Land Rights/ Land Alienation and Tribal Movements:

Felix Padel has stated that entry of the private capital to the resource rich tribal societies has intensified debates on the political economy of dispossession, displacement and tribal rights. Hence, there is need to reorient anthropological studies to fit into the domain of indigenous rights (2014). On theme of indigenous rights this author has organised three international panels within IUAES congress in three countries. Felix Padel’s book, ‘The sacrifice of human being’ (1995), had provided the pioneering analysis of the colonial power structure imposed over a tribal people. The issues of land, forest and development-induced displacement are ingredients of current tribal movements which are now being studied by anthropologists. These are the issues discussed by anthropologists in a new book ‘Dissent Discrimination and Dispossession’ (Misra and Das, 2014). In this book Behera reviews the issue of land alienation critically and discusses tribal rights by examining land policies. Felix Padel, in his paper, discusses land acquisition by situating the tribal resistance in terms of ‘cultural genocide in an age of investment induced displacement’ (2014). The issue of tribal livelihood and resistance is discussed by Walter Fernandes. Lidia Guzy, Binay Kumar Pattnaik and Amiya Das have discussed the impact of industrialization on tribes and pattern of tribal resistance and capitalist expansion in Odisha. Lianboi Vaiphei and N.K.Das have studied the land and forest related marginalization of tribes in northeast, with special reference to illegal logging.

Poverty, Land Acquisition and New ‘Land Acquisition Act’: Safeguards for Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes
A major cause of poverty is lack of access to productive assets and financial resources. India’s new land acquisition Act called ‘Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013’ (RFCTLA-RR Act 2013) came into force on 01.01.2014 by repealing the Land Acquisition Act, 1894. This law, praised by some and despised by others, is a complex piece of legislation, which remains misunderstood by many. The operation of this Act falls under the purview of state governments and indeed some states like Tamil Nadu have made suitable amendments already. The new law is meant to ensure that the extent of land for any acquisition is the bare minimum land required for the project. Appropriate governments are empowered to take steps for exemption from “Social Impact Assessment” and “Special Provisions for Safeguarding Food Security”. The Bill enables the government to exempt five categories of projects from the requirements of ‘Social Impact Assessment’, ‘Restrictions on acquisition of multi-cropped land’, and ‘Consent for private projects and public private partnerships (PPPs) projects’. The five categories of projects are: Infrastructure including PPPs where government owns the land, Industrial corridors, Affordable housing, rural infrastructure, and Defence related projects. Changes in the provisions of the RFCTLARR Act 2013 is said to be intended to facilitate farmers to get better compensation and rehabilitation and resettlement benefits in lieu of land compulsorily acquired by the appropriate Government (http://indianlawwatch.com/practice/legal-developments-in-land-acquisition-2015/). Congress leader Jairam Ramesh, who had contributed towards enactment of the original land law, has argued that the 2013 law has not been disturbed but several states such as Telangana, Gujarat and Tamil Nadu have already taken recourse to clause-254 (2) and have considerably weakened the consent and social impact assessment system provisions provided by the 2013 law.

Under the Land Act 2013, no land can be acquired in scheduled areas. It also ensures that all rights guaranteed under such legislation as the PESA (Panchayat (Extension to Scheduled Areas) Act, 1996, and the Forest Rights Act 2006 are taken care of. Special safeguards meant for weaker sections are as under:

- Safeguards against displacement: no dispossession unless all payments are made and alternative sites declared.
- Compensation for livelihood losers: Bill provides compensation also to those who are dependent on the land being acquired for their livelihood.
- Consent: Prior-consent shall be required from 70% of land losers and those working on government assigned lands only in the case of public-private partnership projects and 80% in the case of private companies. Included is consent about compensation amount.
- Time-bound social impact assessment: The Bill mandates completion of social impact assessment within six months.
- Higher land-for-land area for SCs/STs: In every project SC and ST will be provided land equivalent to land acquired or two-and-a-half acres, whichever is lower (this is higher than those of non-SC/ST affected families).
• Additional amounts: In addition to a subsistence amount of rupees 3000 per month for a year (to affected families), the SC and ST people displaced from Scheduled Areas shall receive an amount equivalent to rupees 50,000 (http://www.livemint.com/Politics/FXZ9CrJApXRowyzLd8mb2O/All-you-wanted-to-know-about-new-land-acquisition-Bill.html).

Theoretically indeed it appears that robust safeguards for scheduled castes and scheduled tribes are provided. Nevertheless, it is doubtful if in reality all benefits will be passed on to weaker sections.

_Shrinkage of Forest Rights Act, 2006 meant to Empower Tribespeople: Intrusion of Prime Minister’s Office_

Tens of millions of India’s tribespeople depend on forests for their livelihoods, gathering leaves, fruits, flowers, and fuel wood. Yet, India’s 80 million tribespeople had been forced to live like “encroachers” on their own land, since the British era. In this backdrop, the Forest Rights Act, 2006 (the Scheduled Tribes and Other Traditional Forest-Dwellers (Recognition of Forest Rights) Act, 2006) arrived as an historic landmark. The Act came into force on December 31, 2007 and since then it led to some positive achievements. However, as a review suggests the implementation of the FRA, 2006, has not led to any real change on the ground for the poor forest dependent tribes. There are other overlapping laws that negate the spirit of FRA (https://socialissuesindia.wordpress.com). To worsen the scenario further, in December 2012, the Prime Minister’s Office issued a directive watering down the FRA Act. At the heart of the matter is whether tribal people should be able to veto projects, like mines and dams, on their lands. It is broadly acknowledged that the Forest Rights Act has certain lacunae, yet it remains “the best instrument that exists for protecting the rights of India’s Adivasi people. Hence, watering it down, in the interests of industry, is a dangerous violation of the rights and must be stopped” (https://www.survivalinternational.org/about/fra).

_Misunderstanding surrounding ‘Social Impact Assessment’ Studies:_

Anthropologists have studied the impact of industrialization in tribal areas. Compared to such studies, Social Impact Assessment (SIA) or Socio-Economic Impact Assessment Study (SEIAS) is an intricate matter. In reality ‘impact studies’ are a job of multidisciplinary specialists and professionals such as economics, geography, sociology, anthropology, development studies, policy planning, and management. SIA Reports prepared under SIA are to be shared with local Panchayat officials in their ‘local language’ along with a summary. In India, SIA has been generally carried out as part of the Environment Impact Assessment (EIA) clearance process (Council for Social Development, August 2010). The SIA relies on both primary data and secondary data including government census data, land records, including records of land transactions and other administrative records. SIA needs to be undertaken at various levels such
as cultural impacts; demographic impacts; economic and fiscal impacts; gender impacts; health and mental health impacts; impacts on indigenous rights; including psychological impacts. It is beyond the capacity of any university department or ASI to undertake such studies.

Landlessness and Marginalization among Weaker Sections - Dalits, Tribes and Others

There are numerous studies/publications of ASI on socio-cultural subjectivities of landlessness with a focus on marginalization, involving access and ownership to land resources, land alienation and landlessness. Among the major studies on Dalit/SC and OBC communities, mention may be made of national project on weaker sections which resulted in publication of ‘Anthropology of Weaker Sections’ (Sinha, Bhattacharya and Das, 1993). The ASI under the guidance of Surajit Sinha in late 1970s had conducted this comprehensive study of economic marginalisation of the Dalits in 24 villages spread in 16 states. ASI scholars examined the organisation of caste, relationship of castes, position of dominant caste, and the network of relationships centered in the village and beyond it. What is unique is that these studies represent the first anthropological study of the Dalit communities/Dalit villages at all-India level, with focus on their weak resource base, their low position in social hierarchy, their relative lack of access to facilities provided by developmental programmes and their inadequate participation in governance institutions. Since Sinha had left ASI, the reports could not be published for long fifteen years. K.S.Singh, director-general ASI, retrieved the material for fresh analysis and papers were put together for publication. He wrote the introduction by updating the poverty backdrop of Dalits in India. This author was entrusted to finally edit and critically review the earlier reports with present scenario and contribute a concluding chapter. The material published constitutes a solid bench-mark for Dalits in 24 villages (Sinha, Bhattacharya and Das, 1993).

‘The Scheduled Castes’ is the ASI National Volume of People of India which depicts the status of Dalit communities in 1990s, including their 445 segments and 306 territorial units. This is the most comprehensive account ever of the Dalit castes, which comprise 15.75 per cent of India’s population. Data presented are based on first-hand surveys conducted using ethnographic method supported by exhaustive questionnaires and household survey. This volume presents an accurate list of India’s Scheduled Castes, which are spread across the country and which are mainly landless, with little control over resources such as land, forest and water. It also shows the persistence of ‘untouchability’ in many pockets, and the ‘minimal’ success in achieving equality. It reveals that Dalits have been increasingly involved in modern occupations, such as service in government departments wherever traditional industries have declined. As a consequence, a new sense of self-respect is in the air, gradually replacing some of the old myths which sought to legitimize their degradation (Singh, 1995).
A fresh national project on problems of Dalit communities launched in 1996 allowed ASI scholars to conduct in-depth intensive research in single villages having sizeable Dalit populations. A special issue of ASI Journal contained detailed reports of this project, depicting the landlessness and marginalization of Dalits. Under this project, this author had studied the Satnamis of Chhattisgarh in a village called Kugada. Satnamis, kept outside the realm of pauni (jajmani) system, emerged as marginal farmers. Few Dalit families could eke out livelihood exclusively through self cultivation (7.45). ASI also brought out an Illustrated 'Atlas of Scheduled Castes' based on 1991 census. It shows the distribution pattern of 478 communities. The atlas has 31 plates.

In his study of rural Bengal, Sinha revealed that articulation of Bhadralok-Chhotolok is deep-rooted and was not a by-product of British Raj. It was a simplified version of distinction between the "unclean' Sudra and the upper castes. It is a 'caste-styled' system of stratification since it recognizes castes as component units and the stratification 'roughly approximates' the varna order. Although the essence of Bhadralok-Chhotolok hierarchy has to be defined in terms of 'style of life' and 'status stratification' in Weberian sense, one also finds remarkable congruence of the dimensions of class and power within this category of status stratification (Sinha and Bhattacharya, 1969).

A national project of ASI, on social exclusion, discrimination and stratification in tribal societies, enabled scholars to conduct 24 ‘village Studies’. Findings of these studies are included in the volume 'Exclusion, Discrimination and Stratification: Tribes in Contemporary India' (Das, 2013). The tribes represented divergent economies such as hunting-gathering (Chenchus), shifting-cultivation (Lanjia Saora, Koyas), shifting –plus- terrace cultivation (Riangs), wet plough cultivation (Lepcha), terrace cultivation (Noctes) and settled agriculture (Lalung, Santal, Bedia). Pastoral tribes (Gujjars, Todas) and artisan tribes (Mahali) were also studied. These village studies show how the tribes have been subjected to multiple processes of discrimination and social exclusion. Even though there are provisions of affirmative action, tribes in many places could not avail the benefits. In most cases tribal families, lived in the periphery of the village settlements, away from settlements of caste people; and were discriminated as landless agricultural labourers. The bulk of tribal families with land often are just the marginal and small farmers. The tribespeople are broadly differentiated into cultivators, agricultural labourers, white-collar/salaried workers and even shopkeepers/traders and industrial workers. Tribes are disadvantaged in terms of access to education, income/wealth, and political power and so on (Das, 2013).

Agenda for ‘Anthropology of Future’

'Indian society is traditionally pluralistic and the same spirit is embodied in the Indian Constitution. The recent debate on ‘multiculturalism’ of the western societies is a non-issue in the Indian context. In the Indian context cultural pluralism and the issues related to identity of all the sections of society should be value free. It may be argued that issues related to culture should be treated as part of the broader development issues. The policy of promotion and protection of diverse forms of culture needs to be re-
contextualised and must consider issues beyond folk forms of music and dance. The role of the State is not expected to be only that of the facilitator of cultural programmes’.

The above statements are part of the ‘recommendations’ prepared by the panel of anthropologists constituted during International Conference on Identity, Cultural Pluralism and State, organised by ASI at India International Centre, New Delhi from 27 February to 1 March 2006. The Panel consisted of T. N. Madan, Chairman, A. C. Bhagabati, D. K. Bhattacharya, K. K. Chakravarty, T. K. Oommen, M. N. Panini, George Pfeffer, T. B. Subba, A. K. Danda, N. K. Das, S. Goonatilake, Lidia Guzy, L. Khubchandani, L. K. Mahapatra, K. C. Malhotra, D. P. Mukherjee, R. Mukhopadhyay, M. Srinathan and A. K. Singh and V. R. Rao as Member-Secretary. The panellists unanimously recommended that appropriate inter-ministerial dialogue be organised involving the Ministry of Culture, Ministry of Environment and Forests, Ministry of Science and Technology and Ministry of Tribal Affairs. Such dialogue may be through a forum, which should also include representatives of the universities and concerned research institutes. Recommendations were sent to the government of India under the signatures of chairman and member-secretary. There is need to pursue this effort and see that the present government takes up the recommendations for compliance.

The recommendations also articulated an agenda for anthropology of future. Some relevant points of the agenda are as follows:

- It was felt that when we discuss people’s cultures (often described as folk cultures) we come across syncretic traditions that bring together traditions drawn from different sources.
- Certain nomenclatures are used to denote the disadvantaged sections. Moreover, the terms ‘tribe’ ‘caste’ as used have no biological basis. It was recommended that India should rather adopt some value free and neutral term like “community” to describe all categories of people of India. Nevertheless, the positive discriminations and the constitutional safeguards should remain in place.
- It was felt that the State has not taken adequate notice of all vanishing cultural traditions. Indigenous knowledge systems are fast losing their relative isolation; it is essential that people’s knowledge related to biodiversity, the intangible cultural heritage, and the folk knowledge of sustainable development are combined with broader development issues. There is need to strengthen these age-old knowledge systems. Anthropologists might play an important role in identifying, documenting and conserving different forms of intangible cultural heritage.
- It was felt that the State should not only protect minority cultures, but minority languages as well. The erosion of language diversity in the country is a matter of concern.

Concluding Remarks
Among the major criticisms levelled against Indian anthropology/Indian anthropologists are conformity to Western trends, use of simplistic frames to study complex societies, and the failure to influence administrative
structures and practices (Gopala Sarana, 2007). Sarana and other scholars have highlighted the need for an integrated approach that constructs a bridge between academic circle, government, development realm and aesthetic principles, so as to aptly face the new crises of globalization. Some scholars, as we discussed above, have raised issues of poverty, land acquisition, displacement, discrimination and pitiable implementation of regulations and laws meant for weaker sections. Under these circumstances, the prime task of the anthropologists in India today should be to commit themselves more sincerely in order to generate a reliable database through fieldwork pertaining to impact of development initiatives and democratization processes meant for empowering the weaker sections including the womenfolk. Such endeavour should include study of effects of large- and small-scale land acquisitions in tribal and non-tribal areas and gather people’s own versions of narrative of sufferings. Since new land and forest laws are in place and demands for transparency are growing steadily, anthropologists in India are well suited today to undertake studies of poverty, health issue, food security, landlessness and other maladies, more proactively. Notwithstanding, apprehensions of all sorts about crisis and insolvency in Indian anthropology (Debnath, 1999, Guha 2017), substantial relevant works surfacing within Indian anthropology need to be duly accredited. The evaluation above has pointed at deficits; yet it showed certain hopefulness for resurgence and rededication on part of Indian anthropologists to indulge in meaningful researches.

Some Indian anthropologists have focused rather on urgency and need for genuine re-focus on contemporary issues instead of critiquing anthropology/anthropologists (Rao, 2012; Das, 2002). It is argued that greater need is to provide good training to students, and carry out research relevant to the contemporary society. Rao cites Firth (1992) who said that, “Much has been written about what anthropology can do, little has been shown of what anthropology has done. We need to document this, project this, and make use of it, with the objective of developing an outlook for future”. Future exists for anthropology and there is no reason for cynicism (Rao, 2012).

The “crisis of representation”, heralded by the critiques of anthropology in 1980’s was part of the post-modern turn. Since then anthropologists have accepted the modern challenges and moved beyond such talk of “crisis of representation”. Anthropologists, in India or elsewhere, have prime duty towards their informants. Yet they are bound by their own ethical imperatives. Anthropologists need to ensure ultimately that their research is used in a precise manner. There are limits and they have to decide how far to advocate politically, balancing between ethnographic pragmatism and political activism.

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Problems of Development in Bangladesh: Causes and Remedies

Taha Husain

Abstract: The word development has become a blazing topic in the milieu of scholars, think tanks and civil society in Bangladesh for the last few years. Even some development experts claimed to have modified the present development approaches in Bangladesh. The purpose of this paper is to identify the problems of the conventional development system in Bangladesh and to provide a model of development that will serve the people best. To address the aims of this study both qualitative and quantitative methods are used, where primary and secondary data are utilized. After analyzing the data, this paper argues that a number of flaws remain in the conventional growth based development system in Bangladesh. Such as, not all growths are positive, an increase of personal income does not translate into well-being, and absence of inclusive development. In addition, the faults can be eradicated by introducing freedom of choice, because if freedom of choice ensues then the inclusive development, human development, as well as good governance, would ensue in Bangladesh.

Keywords: development, human development, freedom of choice, good governance

Introduction

The word development has much air in the current era of global economy, where the development of a country is measured by the amount of GDP and GNP. That means the developed states must have high GDP, GNP and per capita income as well. The happiness, prosperity, and development of people are measured by some numbers and statistics. To measures development with those numbers and statistics of GDP, GNP or per capita income, has some fundamental problems. Firstly, development is seen as economic growth where all growth is seen as positive, for example, the growth of tobacco product, the growth of arms and ammunition. On the contrary, household work of women or even some productive work of women does not count in the GDP. Secondly, income is seen as an indicator of happiness and prosperity, not as an input. Thirdly, this type of thinking overlooks the pocket poverty of a country. Fourthly, it does not represent all residents of a country. For example, in Bangladesh, the control of its 90% of GDP lies in the hands of only 8%-10% of its residents. Therefore, the purpose of this study is to explore the above-mentioned problem in the context of Bangladesh. Also, to propose another development approach, which contradicts the so-called growth based development and gives greater emphasis on inclusive development and freedom of choice.

To meet the objectives of the study a combination of both quantitative and qualitative approach is used, which appears to be the best fit as one approach would supplement the other for a comprehensive understanding of the problem at hand. Thus, this study is conducted through mixed methodology. Mixed methods research takes advantage of using multiple ways to explore a research problem. For the quantitative approach, the data collection method followed the questionnaire survey and for the qualitative

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approach in-depth interviews. The respondent of the survey consists of final year or the graduate students who have studied a course in development studies, and on the other hand, the interviews are taken of the rickshaw pullers, slum dwellers and the middle-class people of Dhaka city. The respondents selected for this study is based on convenient sampling, because the population is just too large and access to all is impossible. Despite that, the findings of this paper, after taking into consideration the concerned policy makers, will be able to suggest better and sounder policy in this area.

**Literature review**

While searching the discourses and vital intellectual tradition of development, we found two patterns of development discourse. The development approaches initiated during the cold war period and after the cold war period. For example Todaro (1997), in his books revealed the traditional development system. Likewise, the other scholars during the cold war also viewed development as the amount of the gross domestic product (GDP), gross national product (GNP) and per capita income (PCI). The amount of PCI appears as the final standard of national progress and prosperity. Many scholars like Szirmai (2005) supported this line of thought and opined that development denotes the capacity of the national economy to generate and sustain an annual increase of its GNP at rates of perhaps 5 to 7 percent or more. However, few Scholars like Stiglitz et al., (2009), did not agree with them. Similarly, other traditional scholars like Hicks & Streeten, (1979) also opposed that view. They claimed that, the scholars who adhered to the GDP, GNP, PCI philosophies, actually judged development by looking at some statistics only. They try to calculate the economic activity, not development. Development is a broad term, it cannot be confined within some numbers and statistics.

Later, when the cold war concluded, the notion of the welfare state became popular. Throughout the world, liberalization of economic activities, free trade area, open market and the tariff barrier free economy came into focus. Gradually the earlier notion of development changed, and instead included new and creative thoughts on development. Scholars like David, (1979), Haq (1995), Sen (1999) and Van der Gaag (2011) brought new ideas of development. They included better nutrition and health services, greater access to knowledge, more secure livelihoods, better working conditions, security against crime and physical violence, satisfying leisure hours, and a sense of participating in the economic, cultural and political activities of their communities as the indicators of development. So, during this period most of the prominent scholars focused rather on human development (HD). In most studies conducted abroad as well as in Bangladesh, research in this area is absent. Thus, this paper will try to meet this research need and give greater emphasis not only on human development but also on inclusive development and development viewed as freedom of choice.

**Operational definitions**
**Development**

Generally, development, as we mentioned in the previous section, is thought of as economic growth expressed in total numbers and statistics (Griliches, 1990). The well-being of people or development is measured in monetary terms (Campbell, 1976), where country’s development is measured as GDP, GNP and per capita income (Kormendi & Meguire, 1985). The GDP is the sum of all goods and services produced within a country’s territory, and GNP is the total production of all its citizens wherever they live (Robinson, 1979; Streeten, 1979; Hoogvelt, 1982; Callen, 2008). However, this paper will present development as inclusive development that will be more comprehensive, participatory, innate, and coherent. Thus, this connotation of development will carry people’s freedom choice.

**Human development**

The idea of human development (HD), as we discussed in the literature review, was introduced in United Nations by Mahbub-ul-Haq (Haq, 1995), theorized and operationalized by Amartya Sen (Sen, 2000; Fukuda-Parr, 2003). Moreover, it gained popularity through the initiation of Human Development Index (HDI) by United Nation since 1990 (McGillivray, 1991). It aimed at challenging the traditional growth-based economy and the development policies dictated by Washington consensus in the 1980s (Gore, 2000). Generally, human development is composed of indicators of income, health, and education (Noorbakhsh, 1998). The human development visualized for this paper is the people’s freedom of choice along with income, health, and education.

**Freedom of choice**

The term freedom of choice is not well-defined in the academic arena (Klemisch-Ahlert, 1993). It has diverse meaning to different scholars in different societies (Dowding & Van Hees, 2009). Economist Amartya Sen stated that enhancing our freedom should be the object and the means to achieving development and hence welfare (Sen, 1999; Sen, 2005). Thus, there are varied purposes of freedom of choice; instrumental versus intrinsic, axiomatic (Puppe, 1996; Klemisch, 1993). However, for the Pattanaik and Xu (2000), freedom of choice rather indicates the opportunity for preference. In spite of those varieties, this paper will look to the intrinsic meaning of freedom of choice, that is, power to take a decision, an authority to improve inclusiveness and set up pluralism in Bangladesh.

**Conceptual framework**

The following conceptual framework is hypothesized; this is not a clear-cut description, rather it guides the discussion of this paper.
Problem of Development Approach in Bangladesh

Why

Not all growth are positive
Income indicator is not the only end
Absence of inclusiveness in decision-making

Remedies

Promote Freedom of choice

Increase Inclusive Development
Enhance Human Development
Establish Good Governance

**Figure 1: Conceptual Framework of Causes and Remedies on the Problems of Development Approach in Bangladesh**

Problems of development in Bangladesh
Not all growths are positive
Bangladesh follows the traditional ways of Development. That means the development of economic growth or monetary development, where all growths are considered positive. The problem with this view is that it never differentiates economic growth from the negative and positive points of view. Rather it takes a close look at some numbers and statistics of GDP and GNP. If the GDP and GNP rate is high it proves that the country’s development is going well. For example, the Asian Development Bank’s chief economist Shang-Jin Wei opined that high economic growth in Bangladesh indicates the country’s continuing improvements in political and business environment (Saha, 2014). That means they assess the final happiness, prosperity, definitive satisfaction, thriving, even sadness and poverty, of the people based on those statistics. For instance, the planning ministry of Bangladesh claimed that in the fiscal year of 2016/17 the country’s GDP growth would hit a record 7.24 percent and the National Economic Council remarked that this would beat all previous record of development in Bangladesh (The Daily Star, 2017).

However, the significant issue of such speculation is that the GDP of Bangladesh would hike up even from the money or income from negative sources such as income from tobacco (cocaine, heroin, Dauphine, ganja) and from destructive objects (arms, ammunitions, other military equipments, explosives, all harmful to the human body). Interestingly, in Bangladesh Hakimpuri Jorda (a tobacco product) owner, Kaush Mia came to the limelight in the country over the last three years as a top taxpayer (Karmakar, 2016). Besides there are ten to twelve tobacco companies with thousands of factories in Bangladesh which also contribute to the growth of GDP (LCW, 2015). Everyone knows how devastating these are. With blind eyes, we accept those products as indicators of development. Besides the above-mentioned indicators, the income indicator includes the cost of leisure and relaxation (TV, Cinema, Air condition, tourism, mobile, laptop). Yet, valuable work at home, family unit work of poor women, or as volunteer work in families such as rearing and raising children, or serving family will not quantify as development because these sorts of work do not create cash!

Income indicator is not the only end
Another problem of conventional understanding of the term development is that it eventually measures the prosperity, happiness, success, joy and wellbeing looking at income and salary. That means more income is perceived as more happiness or better salary seen as more satisfaction. However, income does not translate automatically into happiness and prosperity (Palley, 2005). Rather income is input only, not the end. For instance, increase in personal income in Bangladesh does not always prove a woman’s access to resources or her personal consumption. So, this growth-based development does not take into account non-monetary deprivation of women. Besides, it is not true that if my salary is double-digit and your one is four digits so that I am half as happy or cheerful as you are. For example, the rickshaw pullers often earn five to seven hundred BDT on a day but said they are happy with these earnings (A. Mazid and H. Ali, personal communication, April 12, 2017). On the contrary, some diagnosis center owner in their interview claimed that after earning five to ten thousand a day they are not happy and satisfied (O. Gani and M.
Begum, personal communication, May 5, 2017). These two groups of people live in the same city with different occupations; their earnings are different and has a huge discrepancy. Despite the fact, happiness varies. Thus, the idea of more income bring more happiness is lame. Rather happiness, prosperity, and well-being depend on the freedom of choice.

Absence of inclusiveness in decision making

This type of conventional growth-based development does not represent all residents of a country. If we look at the concept behind large donor-funded or government-subsidized undertakings in this country, such as projects of large bridges, power plants, and flyovers, it is found that the government takes the decision to build them not knowing or much caring for the public needs. In spite of those large and expensive development constructions, there are thousands of people living in the slums. Over 1.5% people of the country live in slums across the country, a total of 2.23 million people live in slums (The Dhaka Tribune, 2015). One can see both the largest flyover and slums in Dhaka city. For example, 54.9% slums are located in Dhaka city as well as 90% of the flyovers (Islam et al., 2009). These scenarios reveal the two opposite conditions of a country. That means the growth based conventional development overlooks the pockets of poverty of a country.

The scholars and economist like Dr. Mohammad Yunus opined on several occasions that in Bangladesh 90% of its GDP is controlled by merely 8%-10% of its people (Yunus, 2016). Thus, it creates social imbalance and hardship. For example, the country’s 160 million people are divided into two segments. One is a small number of extremely powerful people, no more than one million and another is extremely powerless people comprising of 159 million (Barkat, 2016). This situation is better explained by an ordinary slum dweller, who opined that the people of this country have one foot on the chunk of ice and another foot on the burning coal. No one focuses on the plight of the poor people. They are the exploited ones (S. Mia, personal communication, April 24, 2017).

According to the latest survey the Gross Domestic Product per capita in Bangladesh is 972.88 US dollars (Trading Economics, 2017). This amount is increasing day by day. This national income trickles down from those 8% individuals of this country. For example, Business tycoon Salman F Rahman has been placed on the billionaire’s list of Hurun Global, with assets worth about $1.3 Billion (Dhaka Tribune, March 9, 2017). Therefore, the per capita income is increasing because of the income of men like them. The GDP does not change the lifestyle of rest of the populace of Bangladesh. However, a nation's GDP of some number of dollars does not generally say anything clear in regards to any of the citizens of that country. Therefore, the number and statistic of measurement do not automatically translate into well-being because those total figures do not explain the unequal wealth distribution.
Remedies: Freedom of choice

Inclusive development

In Bangladesh, the demand for inclusive development is well accepted. The survey of this study found that among the respondents 70% are in favor of inclusive development. Rest of the 30% respondents who opposed the inclusive development mentioned three reasons for opposing it. First, 61% of the respondents who opposed the inclusive development believe that most people are uneducated, they do not have enough idea about the development, while 27% of the respondents thought that if every time the government takes decision from the populace, then the opposition political parties will take this chance to jeopardize the development projects. On the other hand, 9% of them thought that the inclusive development will increase bureaucratic complexity in Bangladesh. Rest of the respondents mentioned other difficulties like procrastination and that the opinion of a member of parliament is the opinion of people itself.

From the above-mentioned survey result, two things are clear; the majority of the respondents are in favor of inclusive development, and the people who opposed it lack the knowledge about inclusive development. Generally, the word inclusive means covering everyone of a certain place (Malinowski, 1994). In addition, literally, it denotes including all the services, facilities, or items normally required (Merriam-Webster Dictionary). There is, however, no agreed and common definition of inclusive development available in the academic arena (Rauniyar and Kanbur 2010). The term is understood by some scholars as development combined with equal opportunities. That means the idea of inclusive development consists of economic, monetary, social and institutional dimensions and entails a process of shared prosperity (Conceição et.al, 2001).

The strength of this inclusive development distinguishes it from other development thoughts. Reasonably, it is pro-poor and comprehensive development. It is pro-poor because it reduces income poverty, for example, it removes the lower-income inequality and the increment of income accrues disproportionately (Rauniyar and Kanbur 2010). Thus, inclusive development brings a better environment to human beings and conveys better system for individuals. However, it also ensures the flexibility in decision-making that means the freedom of choice. The inclusive development and freedom of choice are mutually reinforcing because freedom of choice in decision-making also guarantee equal opportunities, irrespective of people's power and background. Therefore, a multi-dimensional process facilitates the active contribution of every member of the society in all aspects of life, including civic, social, economic, political, and decision-making. That is why if Bangladesh takes this strategy then the development will benefit the whole community regardless of gender and class. In addition, it will ensure inclusion, equal opportunity and enhance the ability of all members of the society.

Human development
Human development is multidimensional (Alkire, 2002). However, the existing human development indicators do not meet the growing challenges of gender disparity. For instance, a report in 1975 by ILO had found that while women and girls make up almost 50% of the total population, 33% of official labor force, and covers 66% of working hours, they receive just one-tenth of the world’s pay. This was during the cold war when the golden age of growth-based economy ruled the world. Almost a quarter century later, United Nation’s UNDP Human Development Report 1994 found that, despite advances in labor force participation, education and health, women still constitute 66% of the world’s illiterates, hold less than half of the employments available on the market, and are paid half as much as men for work of equal esteem (Jahan et.al, 1996). Bangladesh needs human development that focuses on inclusiveness. In the current human development milieu the family context is absent. Nevertheless, the linkages between family and human development are substantial (Bronfenbrenner, 1986). Because the family factors such as, daycare, peer groups, school, social networks, the place of work, all of these need to ensure human development. In addition, this decision is dependent on individual’s freedom of choice. If an individual is not able to uphold these issues to decision makers then how could human development be possible?

**Good governance**

Even though the term governance is as old as humanity, it has become the center of intellectual debates among researchers when UN-related thoughts as decolonization and human rights came to the limelight after the Second World War (Weiss, 2010). Thus, the broad concept of governance is applied in different contexts in global, national, institutional and community levels (Graham et.al, 2003, p. 4). Later, poor governance is reasoned as the most important cause and imperative reason of state failure and underdevelopment (Ciborra et.al, 2010). Kofi Anan had appropriately enunciated that good governance is perhaps the single most vital factor in eradicating poverty and advancing development. Transparency and accountability are the central components of good governance (Santiso, 2001).

However, the inclusive development or freedom of choice has a good connection in ensuring good governance, because inclusive development helps to maintain transparency and accountability. It acknowledges the bottom-up approach, which implies choice originating from the grassroots level, where common populace chooses what they require and what they do not need. Therefore, in light of their choice government will take up the formative tasks and developmental projects. For example in Bangladesh when the administration takes their development projects, every time, it faces common people’s uprising, whether it is nuclear electric power project or metro rail ventures or the recent public protest against the Rampal electric power plant, which attracted criticism from abroad as well. Several protests have been held in Dhaka and other Bangladeshi cities. The protesters were showing their disapproval of a new coal-fired power plant at Rampal. They claimed that it poses threats to the nearby Sundarbans mangrove; the largest mangrove forest in the world, as well as to the health of thousands of local residents (Erickson-Davis, 2017). Similarly, the protest over building a new mega international airport
in Arial Beel area of Munshiganj also came in the limelight because the village people took up arms to protect their agricultural land (Islam & Tusher, 2011). Many feared displacement and expressed unwillingness to sacrifice the wetlands (Ray, 2011). Thus, people revolted to protect the Arial Beel. The battle highlighted that the rural-agrarian periphery would not like to be ordered by the urban political center to swallow a mega project (Morshed, 2011). These two examples indicate that the inclusive development or the bottom up approach is best suitable in Bangladesh. That’s how the good governance can be maintained.

Moreover, another important element of good governance is the practice of democracy and protection of human rights. Democracy is all about freedom of choice. If one wants to establish democracy (vote-based system), one need to establish freedom of choice first. Between democracy and freedom of choice, a direct causal relation exists. On the other hand, human rights encourage uniformity of people regardless of their race, color, sex and nationality. The inclusive development additionally has the same value. For example, inclusive development gives an opportunity to decide what one wants. Human rights also contain the same value of equal opportunity for all. This is how the two ingredients: freedom of choice and inclusive development help to establish democracy and human rights and hence, good governance.

**Conclusion**

Development is a necessary component for the wellbeing of a country because it signifies progress and growth. The mismanagement of development approach is a major factor why developing countries are lagging behind. As a developing country, Bangladesh also faces the same reality. The development system Bangladesh follows has some problems that increase the bureaucratic complexity as well as the people is deprived the necessary services. In Bangladesh the money from harmful production is included in GDP and GNP but the productive work of women at home is not considered. The per capita income is considered as the indication of happiness but happiness does not lie in income only. Moreover, the major problem of this development system is the lack of inclusiveness. The decision makers have little connection to the general people; the large development projects are taken based on a decision made by the elite society of the country for their own benefit.

In concluding it can be said that, the practice of freedom of choice would be appropriate to remove the barriers to development in Bangladesh, because it can enhance inclusive development, human development as well as good governance in Bangladesh. Based on the public perception of this study in supporting inclusive development, further study on how to initiate the inclusive development needs to be conducted, where the detail direction should be placed so that the policy makers can use it and implement projects smoothly.
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Democratic Consolidation and Good Governance in Africa: Assessing the Incidences of Poverty and Corruption in Four African States

Ademola Azeez

Abstract: There are exciting – yet daunting – times to assess democratic countries in Africa. After years of democratic experiment and its familiar contours, the democratic revolutions of the last decades have challenged observers to think anew about the conditions creating and sustaining democracy. Paradoxically, even as countries that have been ruled for over a decade with democratic institutions, the political-economic challenges epitomized by poverty and corruption has put their democracy on the radii of assessment. Rather than being assuaged, it has accentuated disloyalty, disunity and insurgency against the states. With countries like Zambia, Kenya, Ghana and Nigeria in focus, the democratization in Africa has been illusory than fundamental. The transition had been more of patrimonialism and confrontational than the promise of abasement of poverty and institutional corruption. With extensive review of secondary data and statistical reports from international organizations, the paper assesses the incidences of corruption and poverty in these countries through a Simple Discriminant Analysis (with Linear Regression, Correlation Co-efficient and Co-efficient of determination). It helps to appreciate the sensibility of the people to their democratic institutions and framework of representative participation in governance. The paper concludes that the rising incidences of militancy and insurgency against the state are not unconnected to democratically induced poverty and public sector corruption in African countries.

Keywords: Democracy, Good governance, Poverty, Corruption, Africa

Introduction

There are exciting - yet daunting – times to assess democratic countries in Africa. After years of democratic experiment and its familiar contours, the democratic revolutions of the last decades have challenged observers to think anew about the conditions creating and sustaining democracy. The evidence of democratic governance’s usefulness, in spite of its anomalies had been prevalent through opportunities for economic transformation, self-actualization and development, as well as making these countries veritable players in the world politics because of the dominance of democracy over any other known or yet to be discovered systems of governance.

Paradoxically, even as countries that have been ruled for over a decade with democratic institutions, the political-economic challenges epitomized by poverty and corruption has put their democracy on the radii of assessment. Rather than getting the challenges assuaged, it has accentuated disloyalty, disunity and insurgency against the states. Some scholars and observers, such as Michael and Nicholas de Walle (1992), even argue that democratization in Africa “has been more illusory than fundamental”, because the

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transition had been that of neopatrimonialism, even from patrimonialism. Some inherent domestic problems and contradictions in the political economy of some of these African states had made the challenges facing this experiment tagged “democracy and good governance” project in Africa many and complex (Obi and Svard, 2006).

Even though the project was part of the gradual but concerted efforts of Africans to reverse the trend of political despair and disillusionment, which hitherto characterized political life in Africa especially in the 1980s. The despair had manifested in the long years of political misrule and bad governance, exemplified by personalized political regimes and ruthless dictatorships had left most African states politically demobilized and economically decapacitated with an immiserised population ravaged by poverty, illiteracy and all sorts of evils. It would have been a welcome development if the experiment had been sustained and consolidated, but regrettably Africa continues to harbor the highest stock of the world’s poorest people and the political life of the people was not better than previously (Bratton, Mattes and Gyimah-Boadi, 2005).

Similarly, in the attempt to unravel the dynamics of democratic practice in the African states, we saw that the underlying persistence of the West’s inclinations to engage in democracy promotion in the third world nations is based more on economic and political rationales than on true devotion to democracy (Azeez, 2006a). Despite efforts by western nations to conceal ulterior motives, their deeds often give the lie to their intentions. Although official western rhetoric seems to suggest a goal of improving conditions in third world countries by striking some sort of balance between individual rights and the responsibilities of the state, the reality is baffling at best. There are grounds to doubt the sincerity of western countries that claim to want to promote good governance, aid the growth of democracy, and thereby promote economic growth, social progress and combat poverty. What matters to the western powers in the developing nations is not democracy and its potential virtues, but the policy goal of making them politically more stable, economically more secure, and safer for financial investment.

In the word of Lynder Chalker, the Tory British Minister of Overseas Development from 1989 to 1997:

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\text{(good governance) is not neo-colonialist or neo-imperialist. (it) cannot be imposed on developing countries, but their efforts can be sustained and helped effectively only through a just and democratic system of good governance, in a world, which interests are served by a healthy global economy and open trading environment. (Cox, 2000: 9) (emphasis mine)}
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Therefore, the “divine mandate” to democratize the third world countries has a troubling resemblance with the colonialism of the nineteenth centuries. According to Georg Sovensen, in his article titled The Impasse of Third World Democratization: Africa Revisited, “western countries pursue their own agenda, irrespective of broader consequences for democracy.” (Sovensen, 2000: 9).
With countries like Zambia, Kenya, Ghana and Nigeria in focus, the paper looks at good governance in Africa, with emphasis on corruption and associated poverty (measured through the Human Development Index, HDI) with a view to examining the prospect of democratic consolidation in the region. It examines the rate of change and the corresponding effect of the independent variable (corruption) on the dependent variable (poverty/HDI).

- **Hypothesis 1:** There is no corresponding rate of change between corruption and human development

- **Hypothesis 2:** The trend of influence of corruption on poverty is not similar in the four African countries

With extensive review of literature to answer these hypotheses, the paper also engages the reports from both Transparency International and United Nations, to statistically quantify and assess incidences of public sector corruption and poverty, using a Simple Discriminant Analysis (with Linear Regression, Correlation Co-efficient and co-efficient of determination). The statistics examine the trends, pattern and variations in the performance of these countries on these global measuring instruments.

**Conceptual Clarification**

**Good Governance**

The term ‘Governance’ has three dimensions: form of political regime, the process by which authority is exercised to manage a country’s economic and social resources and the capacity of government to formulate and implement its policies and to discharge its functions. Thus governance has three spheres political, economic and administrative. By saying ‘Good governance’ I mean a system for establishing and maintaining accountability, transparency and efficiency in all spheres of governmental and administrative machinery. Good governance is not something to be desired by the government delegating some of its powers and functions to the informal organs but a formal outcome of a new social configuration of institutions resulting in a new social contract (an ideology) and redefining the pluralistic state in the Constitution.

It is believed that these features of good governance can most effectively address the social ills of poverty and corruption. Good governance doesn't only aim to maintain economic stability and attaining higher economic growth rather it also means to take measures to provide public safety, maintenance of law and order which would make it possible to stimulate the economy to raise output and employment. Three main features of good governance can be discussed here as the remedial of poverty and corruption. Accountability and transparency are the pertinent features of good governance. Public officials should be
held accountable for poor performance or delayed actions. Such accountability ensures better performance of the officials and also the appropriate use of public resources.

Good governance also ensures transparency in government operation like how major political parties function, sources of their fund, the routes to leadership, the way in which the cabinet system works and the checks and balances containing the power of the Presidents. It is argued that greater accountability and transparency of the public sector can make the state more responsive to the needs of the poor; it enables the poor to raise their ‘voice’ to influence service provision. Lack of accountability and transparency also encourages corruption. Because corruption means 'abuse of public power for private gains' corruption does have a long term impact on the poor.

**Democratic Consolidation**

By democratic consolidation, we refer to how the practice of democracy will become so entrenched in the minds and psyche of the people that its smooth operation and effective functioning would be taken for granted. To scholars these democratic practices involves healthy competition for all governmental position of power, mass participation by the adult population in the processes and procedures for choosing leaders and governments, and enjoyment of certain fundamental freedoms that are *sine qua non* to the exercise of the right to participate in the choice of leaders and policies (Schedler, 1998; 91-107). It is this arrangement to consolidate that Diamond (1994:6) observed would “involve such political challenges as constructing strong procedural commitment to constitutionalism and the rule of law, which lead people to value democracy even when it does not perform well economically”. He believes the deliberate cultivation of the requisite attitudinal disposition towards democracy can deepen it in the minds of the people and thus ensure that its operation become institutionalized to the extent that it becomes ‘the only game in town’ (Linz and Stepan, 1996; 16).

Whereas the acceptance is contingent upon the democratic system satisfying the basic needs and expectations of the people such as welfare needs, food security, provision of adequate security for life and property, provision and maintenance of essential modern infrastructure, guarantee of economic rights, and respect for fundamental human rights and basic freedoms. These, in the current African political parlance represent the dividends they expect to derive from democratic rule.

The critical question to ponder is whether Africa’s current romance with democratic ideas noting its differences and incongruence with African norms and practices, has any chance of surviving or enduring beyond the level of mere infatuation. If not, then the dangers of reversal are ever present.

**Corruption**

It is not intrinsically useful to make qualitative distinctions between corruptions in various parts of the world. At the end of the day it often means the same thing: the abuse of public office for private gain. However, this can be broken up into petty corruption, grand corruption and looting. Petty corruption involves relatively
minor amounts of money or gifts changing hands where one of the parties is themselves a relatively minor official in the organization or system within which the transaction takes place. For example, it’s a common thing to see policemen in Nigeria demanding as little as N20 from motorists to ignore the fact that their car’s license has expired. Grand corruption most often involves businessmen and government officials of senior rank and the figures involved are significant. Examples of these are kick-backs paid to officials on government public works contracts.

The third type of corruption is ‘looting’ and has recently been described by some commentators as large-scale economic delinquency. It differs slightly from petty and grand corruption, however, and is sadly prevalent in the developing countries where institutions of governance are particularly weak. It usually involves the kind of scams whose figures are so huge that when they are successfully concluded they have macroeconomic implications fairly quickly - they cause banks to collapse, inflation to rise and the exchange rate to decline. The impetus for looting is often political and it happens under the direction or with the acquiescence of important political players in a given country. It often involves, for example, the printing of currency to fund fictitious projects, using public revenues to award enormous contracts to individuals who never supply the goods or the services. The primary movers in the companies behind these scams don’t just cream off 10 or 20 percent with a cut within that for the higher-ups. In these deals the cut can be as high as 100 percent and most of the cash goes to the higher-ups. These resources fund election campaigns and pay for private militias in many African countries. Another important distinction between grand corruption and looting is that in cases of grand corruption a minister may take a kickback of $100,000 on a government road construction contract worth a million dollars. The road is built but its quality does not reflect its cost. Looting on the other hand is a much more premeditated activity because it often entails the deliberate creation of a government project for which resources will be allocated and spent but the project is not meant to be completed from the outset.

Poverty

Although, a concise and universally accepted definition of poverty is elusive, this is largely because it affects many aspects of the human condition, including the physical, moral and physiological conditions. But different criteria have been adopted in the extant literature in order to arrive at a basic, if not intrinsic conception of poverty. To some, it is conventionally a result of insufficient income for securing basic goods and services; others view it, in part, as a function of education, health, life expectancy, child mortality etc. While to others, it has to do with the levels of consumption and expenditure (Ajakaiye and Adeyeye 2001:8-40). But, for the purpose of this work, the World Bank perception of poverty shall be appropriate because of its comprehensiveness, which sees poverty in very broad terms, such as being unable to meet “basic needs” – (physical – food, health care, education, shelter etc., and non-physical-participation, identity etc.) requirements for a meaningful life (World Bank 1996). According to the report, poverty can be the outcome of insufficient use of common resources. This may result from weak policy environment, inadequate
infrastructure, weak access to technology, credit etc. It may also in some cases be due to certain groups using certain mechanisms in the system to exclude “problem groups” from participating in economic development, including the democratic process.

Good Governance and Democratic Consolidation in Four African Countries

As earlier stated, the challenges facing democratic rule in Africa are many and complex. To Julius Ihonvbere (1996) and John Mbaku (1998), these include entrenching constitutionalism and the reconstruction of the post-colonial state, preventing military intervention in politics, instituting structures for effective management of ethnic diversity, promoting sustainable development and well enforced property right regimes, nurturing effective leadership, combating the HIV/AIDS pandemic, empowering women, managing globalization, protecting the youth, safeguarding human rights and the rule of law.

In this work however, attention would be given to poverty and corruption and their effects on engendering good democratic governance, popular participation of Africans with a view to achieving democratic consolidation. To the extent also that corruption in the public sectors had been the major cause of poverty among Africans (Azeez, 2006b). Luke Amadi (2012) observed that in five decades of political independence of most African countries, the major challenges of corruption in Africa became poverty, inequality and lack of economic well-being. Whereas, most countries of East Asia have transformed to developmental states (Young, 1990), it was observed that the only two African states whose macro-economic statistics come close to matching Asian norms are Botswana and Mauritius, the only countries to enjoy democratic rule and least corruption index throughout the post-independence period (Collier, 2007). Corruption, studies have revealed constitutes a major problem in most of the developing world. It tends to hamper investment and economic growth, aggravates problems of underground economies, exacerbates the difference between rich and poor, creates obstacles to economic and political reforms, and can in the long run cause very considerable losses of human welfare (Azeez, 2011). To the Transparency International, poorly equipped schools, counterfeit medicine and elections decided by money are just some of the consequences of public sector corruption. Bribes and backroom deals don’t just steal resources from the most vulnerable – they undermine justice and economic development, and destroy public trust in government and leaders (http://www.transparencyinternational.org).

To start with, the debilitating poverty of the people accentuated by economic crisis and bad governance seems to have provided a basis and indeed, a common platform in the demand for frequent change of leadership by the people. The extent of agitation for regimes changes because of the frailties and uncertainties of a viable democratic rule and good governance had made mess any attempt to stick to democracy despite its significances. While majority of the would-be electorate live in abject poverty in the face of plenty, the leaders were busy engaging themselves in the looting and scavenging public fund to
satisfy both their selfish interests and the yearnings of their foreign sponsors. This has in many ways reduced the confidence in the leadership, and followship had degenerated into compulsion and patriotism elusive in the mind of the people. By implication good governance that democracy requires to be consolidated had in many occasion in Africa suffer company (Dike, 2005).

Researches conducted across Africa had shown lack of commitment to democratic ideals and values by Africans who ordinarily would have been jubilating for their deliverance from long years of military misrule, but as a result of poverty and corruption, they find themselves at limbo in the choice of better procedure for ensuring good governance. To the researchers, good governance requires public accountability of government officials, transparency in government procedures, rule of law and public sector management (Olukoshi, 1992; Nunnekkamp, 1995). The World Bank adds that the process of evolving good governance especially in Africa require also the shrinking of the state and engendering support for non-state actors (civil society) (World Bank, 1994:2).

Reports of the studies conducted across Africa however gave a complete departure from any attempt at good governance and its attendant democratic consolidation. For example, the 1999 national opinion survey conducted in Zambia by Afro barometer (Simutanyi, 2002) to measure public attitude to democratic and economic reforms gave an indication of lack of trust in the democratic experiment, despite their little nostalgia for the former one-party regimes. The report indicated the apathy of the electorate to the electoral process due to their precarious living standard. Despite the inauguration of democratic rule in their country in the 1990s, their lives remain almost the same or even worsen. In fact, the few voters who usually turn-out to vote in elections, majority of them do so because of the fact that they have at one time or the other received “motivational payment” from the candidate(s) contesting in the election, thus, votes in favor of their ‘benefactor’, not minding whether such a candidate has their interests in mind or not. This is just a replica of effects of poverty on democracy in most African countries, Nigeria, Ghana, and Kenya etc inclusive.

Apart from poverty level of the Zambians, Zambians have very low levels of trust in their political institutions because of relatively high perceptions of the levels of corruption. In Zambia, democracy is frequently understood in terms of civil liberties, freedoms and participation in decision making. Zambians are fairly cynical with regard to official corruption, according to research carried out, over 50% stated that “almost all” or “most” officials in government are involved in corruption (Uslaner, 2007). Ordinary civil servants are also viewed in quite a negative light (50%), followed by Local Government officials (42%), and about 40% of Zambians, sees significant corruption among parliamentarians. Thus, sadly enough, Zambians are not very optimistic about the positive impact of voting or the importance of who holds power.

Also, a survey undertaken by Transparency International (TI) on Zambia on perception of corruption in the electoral process indicates that the level of corruption was as extremely high as was respondents’ tolerance of it. Electoral corruption erodes one of the fundamental pillars of good governance – ethical leadership.
So, Zambians hold the believe that as long as politicians are allowed to bribe their way to victory, leaders will be elected for no better reason than the number of chitenges (local currency) they hand out.

Moreover, the situation in Kenya is in no way different from other African countries. Kenya had for long been an island of peace and good sense in an otherwise turbulent region. And of course this had impacted positively on its economy, although many would argue that this is still largely driven and dominated by Whites and Asians and that much of the prosperity is witnessed only in the expatriate community. Regardless of this, Kenya appeared to have organized its politics in a fairly decent manner that insulated it from the earlier epidemic of military take-over in the continent or the latter phenomenon of election-related violence, civil war and failed state (Githong, 2006).

The struggle against corruption in Kenya, like most African countries is economic because it deepens poverty, exacerbates inequalities and makes for economies whose very structure is skewed. It is also political because corruption breeds impunity and undermines vital governance institutions sustaining shadow power structures. The fight against corruption in the country is also social and cultural because where impunity with regard to corruption prevails, one finds the corrupt transformed into latter day heroes and the principles of honesty and hard-work become unattractive (ACEG, 2000).

In similar vein, poverty is endemic and corruption is widespread and very disturbing in Ghana. In Ghana, poverty has two dimensions: income poverty and non-income/human poverty. Income dimension refers to a state of earnings that are too small to buy the basic necessities of life. Non-income/human dimension of poverty includes lack of access to education, health, lack of empowerment, participation etc. The two dimensions in Ghana invariably make the people poor and unequal. Studies revealed that more than 50% of the country's total population lives below poverty line though income poverty rate has been declining modestly. In the case of human poverty also Ghana seems to have achieved impressive gains particularly in terms of mortality reduction, decline in child malnutrition, increased rate of literacy and school enrollment etc. Despite these achievements, the level of human development is still very low in Ghana. In Human Development, Ghana ranks very low. There are also notable failures in some areas such as maternal health, child nutrition, food security, access to safe water, sanitation and electricity and overall safety of the masses.

Similarly, corruption is widespread in Ghana even among the religious sector. The concern of government officials is how best they can squeeze funds for their personal benefits and it has become institutionalized. Development projects with huge funds are undertaken every year but failing to achieve the goals. Officers are more concerned about their monetary gains from the projects than the greater benefit to the nation. Corruption also manifested through bribery, loan default, evasion of taxes and customers duties, nepotism in appointments, negligence of duties, and politicization of administration. The country is being seen as one of the corrupt countries of the world. Causes of such widespread corruption include low wages of public
servants, centralized decision making, inefficient rule application, misuse of power by the political and administrative elites and non-transparent administration.

Expectedly, the country has a bright future with its potentialities if poor governance could be replaced by good governance, massive corruption and poor management skill as well as dysfunctional leadership could be replaced by transparent and skilled management, 'out of control' law and order situation could be replaced by a controlled one. What the conscious people still see: politics and political practices are of wonder: deteriorating law and order situation, insecure public life, first in corruption for some years in row, politicized campus and distressful education situation, disappointing human rights and human development, incapability of economic policy and development infrastructure to alleviate mass poverty, unfriendly tax policy hindering industrialization, indiscipline in the industrial sector has made the most of the industries sick or closed, pretends and neglected agricultural sector and slow trend of its modernization, lack of investment friendly environment, massive bribery in the government offices, absence of a pro-poor health policy, arsenic contamination in ground water etc.

On the political scene in Nigeria, the supposed giant of Africa, the situation is worse. In fact Nigeria has been wracked by sporadic, often very sadly, economic crises even in the face of abundance owing to corruption and mismanagement of public fund by public servants; the electoral process which should ordinarily open up the democratic space to the vast majority of the people so that they can control and influence their own political destinies is actually deliberately configured to marginalize them. What is foisted on Nigerians in the name of democracy was a version of liberal democracy reduced to the crude simplicity of multi-party elections, (and) voting that never amounts to choosing, freedom which is patently spurious and political equality which disguises higher unequal power relations (Smith, 2006).

The entire electoral process in Nigeria, is manipulated through a plethora of ingenious and less than subtle devices such as outright and bare-faced rigging, pre-election ballot stuffing, ballot box disappearance or substitution, destruction of ballot boxes and disruption of voting in opponents’ strongholds, intimidation of voters, bribing of electoral officials, deployment of terror tactics and violence (Fawole, 2005: 150). It is not surprising however, that many of these electoral irregularities are addressed by the Courts and the outcome mostly overturned by the tribunals.

In terms of poverty and corruption, Nigeria is prominent. In fact, it is extremely difficult if not impossible to conduct any election in Nigeria without manipulation, because of the benefits accrue to various political offices which no other civil endeavor or occupation in the country enjoy. Once somebody securely ascend to the corridor of state power through whatever means, the holder operates arbitrarily without much input from or even consideration for the wishes, sentiments and aspirations of the electorate, and without ever being accountable to them, it is an opportunity to get rich quickly and escape the scourge of poverty that pervades the entire nooks and crannies of the country; enjoy the sharing of the national cake which ‘ordinary’ citizen do not have access to. Asuquo (2011) established in his study that poor governance,
mismanagement of resources, corruption as well as poor execution of economic development policies and plans were all linked to political leadership in Nigeria. For instance, Nigeria’s very poor governance standards of the Jonathan’s administration stands alone and apart. The problem was monumental corruption which robs vital actors of funding, and also incompetence in governance. It is the type of corruption that allows as much as N2.6 trillion to be stolen from a single sub-head in a single year that has deprived the nation of funds to tackle the insecurity in the country (Mo Ibrahim, 2013). With failure in security due to corruption, it has prevented the country from making any meaningful progress in education, provision of healthcare services, development of infrastructure as well as all aspects of human and material developments.

**Corruption Perception Index**
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Human Development Index Trends, 2005 – 2013

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Source: United Nation, Human Development Index

GHANA

\[
\begin{array}{ccccccc}
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39 & 0.544 & -1.8333 & -0.0092 & 0.0174 & 3.3609 & 0.000085 \\
41 & 0.556 & 0.1667 & 0.0025 & 0.0004 & 0.0277 & 0.000006 \\
39 & 0.566 & -1.8333 & 0.0125 & -0.0229 & 3.3609 & 0.000156 \\
45 & 0.571 & 4.1667 & 0.0175 & 0.0729 & 17.3614 & 0.000306 \\
46 & 0.573 & 5.1667 & 0.0195 & 0.1008 & 26.6947 & 0.000380 \\
245 & 3.321 & 0.4165 & 84.8329 & 0.002739 & \\
\end{array}
\]

\[
\bar{x} = \frac{245}{6} = 40.83
\]

\[
\bar{y} = \frac{3.321}{6} = 0.55
\]

\[
b = \frac{\Sigma(x-\bar{x})(y-\bar{y})}{\Sigma(x-\bar{x})^2}
= \frac{0.4165}{84.83} = 4.91
\]

\[
r = \frac{\Sigma(x-\bar{x})(y-\bar{y})}{\sqrt{\Sigma(x-\bar{x})^2(y-\bar{y})^2}}
= \frac{0.4165 \sqrt{84.8329}}{0.002739 \times 0.4165 \sqrt{0.2324}} = 0.86
\]

\[
r^2 = 0.74
\]
ZAMBIA

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\( \bar{x} = \frac{191}{6} = 31.83 \)

\( \bar{y} = \frac{3.164}{6} = 0.53 \)

\( b = \frac{\Sigma(x-\bar{x})(y-\bar{y})}{\Sigma(x-\bar{x})^2} \)

\( = \frac{0.762}{116.84} = 6.52 \)

\( r = \frac{\Sigma(x-\bar{x})(y-\bar{y})}{\sqrt{\Sigma(x-\bar{x})^2(y-\bar{y})^2}} \)

\( = \frac{0.762}{\sqrt{116.84}} \times 0.0059 = 0.92 \)

\( r^2 = 0.85 \)

KENYA

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\( \bar{x} = \frac{139}{6} = 23.17 \)
\( \bar{y} = 3.102/6 = 0.52 \)

\[ \begin{align*}
    b &= \Sigma(x-\bar{x})(y-\bar{y})/\Sigma(x-\bar{x})^2 \\
    &= 0.20/44.84 = 0.004
\end{align*} \]

\[ \begin{align*}
    r &= \Sigma(x-\bar{x})(y-\bar{y})/\sqrt{\Sigma(x-\bar{x})^2}(y-\bar{y})^2 \\
    &= 0.20/\sqrt{44.84} \times 0.002224 = 0.20/\sqrt{0.0997} = 0.63
\end{align*} \]

\[ r^2 = 0.40 \]

**NIGERIA**

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<td>-0.001</td>
<td>0.11</td>
<td>0.000004</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24</td>
<td>0.496</td>
<td>-0.33</td>
<td>0.006</td>
<td>-0.002</td>
<td>0.11</td>
<td>0.000036</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27</td>
<td>0.500</td>
<td>2.67</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>0.027</td>
<td>7.13</td>
<td>0.0001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25</td>
<td>0.504</td>
<td>0.67</td>
<td>0.014</td>
<td>0.009</td>
<td>0.45</td>
<td>0.000196</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>146</td>
<td>2.941</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.121</td>
<td>43.34</td>
<td>0.000785</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\( \bar{x} = 146/6 = 24.33 \)

\( \bar{y} = 2.941/6 = 0.49 \)

\[ \begin{align*}
    b &= \Sigma(x-\bar{x})(y-\bar{y})/\Sigma(x-\bar{x})^2 \\
    &= 0.121/43.34 = 0.003
\end{align*} \]

\[ \begin{align*}
    r &= \Sigma(x-\bar{x})(y-\bar{y})/\sqrt{\Sigma(x-\bar{x})^2}(y-\bar{y})^2 \\
    &= 0.121/\sqrt{43.34} \times 0.000785 = 0.121/\sqrt{0.034} = 0.66
\end{align*} \]

\[ r^2 = 0.44 \]

**Summary of Findings**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>b = Regression</th>
<th>r = correlation</th>
<th>r² = determination</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ghana</td>
<td>4.91</td>
<td>0.86</td>
<td>0.74</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
**Interpretation**

The rule of thumb for co-efficient of determination is 60:40, such that 0.6 (60%) determination co-efficient is the minimum acceptable $r^2$ (co-efficient of determination) for high value of $r^2$, which is suggestive of the fact that the independent variable (X) is the real, actual or main inducer or determinant of the dependent variable (Y). Also, 0.4 (or 40%) and below determination co-efficient interpret low value of $r^2$, meaning that the independent variable (X) is not the real or actual inducer of the dependent variable (Y). So, to this extent, the researcher should consider some other factors to ascertain the actual inducer of the dependent variable. Not only that, $r^2$ of 0.5 (or 50%) suggests that the independent variable may or may not be the inducer of the dependent variable.

Consequent upon this, the determinant co-efficient of 0.74 and 0.85 for Ghana and Zambia respectively suggest that in both countries, corruption (independent variable - X) is the main inducer of poverty, measured through Human Development Index (HDI) (dependent variable – Y). This is supported by the strength of relationship between corruption (X) and HDI (Y) of $r$ equals 0.86 and 0.92 respectively in the two countries. Furthermore, it was revealed that the rate of change between corruption and HDI in both countries are 4.91 and 6.52 respectively, which imply that a unit change in corruption will produce 4.91 and 6.52 unit change in HDI for Ghana and Zambia respectively. By the positive nature of the correlation co-efficient and the rate of change (b), it shows that the nature of relationship between corruption and poverty in both countries is positive. Hence, the higher the corruption rate, the higher the poverty level and the lower the human capital development, and vice versa.

However, the determinant co-efficient of 0.40 and 0.44 determines that corruption is not the main inducer of poverty or lower HDI in Kenya and Nigeria respectively. This does not mean that there is no relationship between the two variables, as their correlation co-efficient ‘r’ suggests a high strength of relationship of 0.63 and 0.66 respectively. But, that corruption is not the main inducer of poverty is clearly evident by the rate of change between corruption index and HDI in both countries, which show that a unit change in corruption rate will produce 0.004 and 0.003 unit change in HDI of both countries respectively. That is, it is only 1,000 unit change in corruption index that can bring about 4 and 3 units change in HDI of Kenya and Nigeria respectively.

**Conclusion**

It is obvious from the preceding analysis that there is a relationship between corruption and poverty. Like in most other countries in Africa, the study has clearly revealed that corruption has been the cankerworm that has bedeviled democratic governance and development in these four African states. However, it was discovered that, though corruption is prevalent, some other variables had to be factored
in to determine the actual determinant of poverty and its associated malaise in some of the studied countries.

References


The Rise of Multi-Party Governance in South Africa’s Political Spectrum: An Age of Coalition and Party Alliances

TS Masipa¹

Abstract: Since the dawn of democracy, South Africa’s politics has been gradually moving from the prevalence of one-party dominance to a multi-party system. The failure of the ANC to maintain its political dominance gave rise to other political parties such as IFP, UDM, DA, COPE and EFF, just to mention the few. These parties have gained more support and as a result, coalition governance is likely to become permanent feature of South African politics. This was witnessed in 2016 local government elections where a number of municipalities and metros are co-governed by various political parties. The purpose of this paper is therefore to contextualise South Africa’s political spectrum and locate the challenges and opportunities of coalition governance thereof. To this end, an attempt was made to present an analytical account on various types and theories of coalition and a detailed examination of multi-party political systems. From the analysis, the paper argues that multi-party governance plays a key role in shaping the agenda of the government and as well as in terms of suggesting policy alternatives. Though party coalitions are likely to become a permanent feature to South African politics, the paper however acknowledges that most opposition parties are still struggling with ideological identity, and lack of a clear vision on how to manage the affairs of the country. This if not addressed might impose a serious impediment to a multi-party government. Furthermore, the paper recommends a need for parties building coalition to take into cognisant the risks emanating from multi-party government.

Keywords: Coalition, party-alliance, multi-partyism, politics, governance, South Africa

Introduction

South Africa held its first democratic elections in 1994, and since then, the country’s political landscape has gradually moved from one-party dominance led by the ANC to a multi-party governance. This was witnessed in the 2016 local government elections where by number of municipalities and metros are co-governed by various political parties. Political scientists and scholars alike allude that the emergence of political parties like IFP, UDM, DA, COPE and EFF, signals the strengthening and maturity of South Africa’s democracy, (Brooks, 2004; Kadima, 2006; Kadima & Owuor, 2012; Bogaards, 2013; & Kadima, 2014). These scholars advocate for a need for strong political parties that can compete in elections and keep the ruling party accountable and for democracy to remain healthy. It is partly against this backdrop that this paper seeks to provide a scholarly argument and insights on ‘future’of coalition era within South African polity. It is, however, worth noting that despite a considerable number of researches made, various aspects of party coalitions are largely under studied, particularly in Africa. It is within this context that this paper aims to provide an analytical framework surrounding the theories, challenges and opportunities that may ascend when coalition and multi-party governments are formed particularly in emerging democracies like that of South Africa.

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Apart from the introduction, the paper begins by providing conceptual views of party coalitions and alliances. The next section discusses various theories of party coalition with the view to demonstrate the opportunities and challenges that arise when building party-coalitions and multi-party government. The fourth section outlines the types of party coalitions. Section five looks at South Africa’s political journey since the first democratic elections in 1994. Lastly, section six presents the conclusion and recommendations based on the implications of theories, challenges and opportunities of party coalitions.

**Conceptualisation of multi-partyism, coalitions and alliances**

Given their similarities, these concepts, multi-party governance, coalition and party-alliances are often and generally used interchangeably, hence it is important to differentiate them in terms of their unique features. Bogaards, (2013) posits that multi-party governance is one of the primary channels for building accountable and responsive government by providing a link between ordinary citizens and their political representatives. Hence, he emphasises that multi-party governance represents broader political constituencies and integrate the society into the democratic process and form the basis of stable political coalitions and hence governments. Warwick (1994) also acknowledges the importance of a multi-party government as he argues that such political parties play an essential role in the functioning of every modern democracy. According to Warwick (1994), the notion of coalition governance as he argues that opposition parties provide a support that makes democracy to work effectively and that they mediate between the demands of the citizenry, thus aggregating the diverse demands of the electorate into coherent policy. In order to form a stable government, Kadima (2014) posits that it is necessary for a party to secure at least 51% of legislative seats. Where no single party enjoys an absolute majority, party coalitions are formed. This particularly true of proportional representation electoral systems when no party has an absolute majority. He further reiterates that where no single party enjoys an absolute majority in Parliament, party coalitions are formed. According to Kadima (2014), the idea behind forming the coalition is that it gives smaller parties an opportunity to make a difference and to hold the ruling party accountable for its actions. He further suggests that party-coalition should preserve diversity, a dynamic range of opinions and approaches. In addition, Brooks (2004) on the other hand argues that in a democratic states party coalition are formed with the purpose of securing enough votes or combining a sufficient number of parliamentary seats to govern. Brooks (2004) further points out that some party coalitions have undoubtedly contributed to consolidating countries’ initial steps towards democracy and peace, through power-sharing arrangements, others have however been characterised with ideological identities and unprincipled. As indicated, party-coalitions and party-alliances are often used interchangeably. Wyatt (1999) cited in Kadima (2006) however proclaims that the distinction between an alliance and a coalition is that the former is formed before an election and the latter is built on the basis of the election outcomes. Established from Wyatt’s (1999) argument, party alliance can therefore be defined as the coming together of political parties prior to elections in order to maximise their votes, whereas coalition refers to the agreement between political parties to work together in government on the basis of the election outcomes.
Theories of party coalitions and alliances

As cited in Kadima (2006), theories of party coalitions are essentially based on the experiences of European countries and have focused mainly on explaining the models of government forming parliamentary democracies. Therefore, it is worth inquiring their relevance and applicability to the African context and if they are relevant, in what ways might they need modification? Office-driven theory is based on the assumption that the main goal of the political parties is to access power. This theory is also known as the ‘office-seeking’ or ‘office-oriented’. The advocates of these theories (Bazazel & Deemen, 1989; Warwick, 1994 & Kadima, 2006) argue that formation of government is a win-lose situation in which cabinet portfolios are the ultimate payoffs. The office-driven theory was later refined by Bazazel and Deemen (1989) who proclaim that the largest party in the legislature is central in coalition negotiations and cannot easily be excluded from office. This was termed the ‘minimal winning hypotheses’. According to the minimal winning hypothesis, government coalitions should comprise of as few political parties as possible. De Swaan (1973) cited in Kadima (2006) equally advocates for the hypothesis, arguing that political parties will form a minimal winning coalitions with the smallest ideological range, which then positions the hypothesis of compact minimum winning coalition.

Michael and Schofield (1990) also support the notion of a minimum winning theory, arguing that the prospective government seek to minimise the number of parties involved in the coalition because it is easier to reach consensus. Michael and Schofield (1990) further modified the minimum winning hypothesis by introducing the "policy-oriented theory". Firstly, they argue that if parties are not interested in the office but only in the implementation of their preferred policies, the party controlling the median legislator will become a kind of a policy dictator and will definitely get into government. Secondly, they proclaim that the ideological differences within political opposition may be as relevant to the viability of minority itself. Similarly, Axelrod (1970) cited in Warwick (1994) noted that the policy-oriented theory is based on the assumption that party coalitions are justified by policy goals. He however argues that ideologically diverse governments tend not to survive because of the greater policy compromises that coalition party members have to make. In the early 1980s, the role of size and ideological differences in explaining the formation of party coalitions led to the rise of "institutional theories" which emphasise the variety of institutional procedures in structuring the formation of coalitions and its survival (Baron, 1993). According to Baron (1993), this theory is a common practice in Scandinavian politics. Another hypothesis for coalition government is termed, "formateur procedure". The procedure is based on the assumption that the potential parties to form a multi-party government are given a choice to either accept or reject formateur proposals. This allows the multi-party government to influence the ideological composition of the coalition in its favour (Stevenson, 1997). From the preceding theories, it is can be noted that these theories have some shortfalls because they assume that political parties behave unitarily and that they don’t differ when it comes to strategic decision making. The other issue relates to the ideological differences of parties forming coalition as this may cause challenges when it comes to policy making. The figure below further outlines some of the opportunities and challenges of party-coalitions:
Table 1: Opportunities and challenges of Party coalitions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Opportunities</th>
<th>Challenges</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• By combining forces and resources with others, parties can increase their</td>
<td>• To find a common ground with partners, each party must to some extent compromise on its own</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>influence and accomplish goals they could not achieve on their own.</td>
<td>priorities, principles and ideology.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Parties can broaden their appeal and increase their vote share by combining</td>
<td>• Parties may lose some control over decision-making and may find it difficult to maintain a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>forces with others. This may create an opportunity to secure legislative</td>
<td>distinct profile that distinguishes them from their coalition partners.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>seats to form a government and achieve their specific political goals.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• The public may see coalition-building as an admirable effort to consider</td>
<td>• The need to consult and reach agreement among coalition partners can make government</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>other points of view and seek compromise</td>
<td>decision-making more complex and slower.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Coalition parties can learn from each other and thus strengthening their</td>
<td>• Poor communication between individual parties on coalition goals, objectives and benefits can</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>individual parties based on those experiences.</td>
<td>sometimes fuel tensions and cause divisions.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Coalition can provide opportunities to broaden participation in government</td>
<td>• The public may feel that party leaders have abandoned their principles by coalescing with</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>other parties.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Notwithstanding, the challenges and opportunities of building party coalitions, the NDI (2015) identified the following weaknesses of political parties in transitional countries;

• Political parties are often poorly institutionalised, with weak policy capacity

• They are organisationally thin, coming to life only at election time.

• They often lack a coherent ideology.

• They often fail to stand for any particular policy agenda.

• They often fail to ensure disciplined collective action in Parliament.

Another challenge is the process of succession of leaders within party coalition. Certain parties might impose their own preferred candidates’ political party driven agendas not for the interest of the entire nation. These challenges might seem few, however, their ramifications might have serious implications on policy making and actions taken by the multi-party government. In addition, there is a general consensus that trust is an important element and precondition for building party coalition. The National Democratic Institute further developed the four main pillars which need to be part of the arrangements that coalition partners discuss and agree upon.

Firstly, communication, party leaders must communicate with their members and supporters to the objectives of the coalition. Leaders who regularly monitor how coalition is affecting their individual
parties and how it is being perceived by their supporters are likely to take remedial actions that may be needed to address the issues and discontent of its members. Partners should have a clear agreement on how decisions in coalition are taken. Depending on the type of coalition, a coordinated public outreach program may be necessary to inform the public about the goals and accomplishments of coalition (NDI, 2015). Secondly, consultation, a successful coalition-building requires individual parties to make effort to seek and understand each other’s points of view. This can help set the stage for consensus and compromise. Even when consensus and compromise are not possible, having a clear idea of each partner’s priorities and interests can be helpful in managing the expectations of all parties involved in a coalition (NDI, 2015).

Thirdly, consensus: Consensus-building involves finding a common ground among parties involved in coalition. When consensus has been reached, all partners are see their views reflected in the final outcome. The more areas of consensus that coalition partners can find, the stronger their partnership will be. However, consensus-building often requires significant time and effort. Moreover, it may not be possible for coalition partners to reach consensus on every single issue, compromises will then be required (NDI, 2015). And lastly, compromise: The ultimately objective of compromising should be to create win-win situation among the various parties involved in coalition. Decisions reached by the group should involve concessions from each individual party (NDI, 2015). In short, these four pillar serves a guideline for parties building coalition. It is therefore imperative for parties building coalitions to take into cognisance of the discussed, the challenges and opportunities and mitigate their risks thereof. This would also help the coalition party to achieve a common goal.

**Typologies of party coalitions**

It worth noting that the below discussed typologies of coalitions are mainly based in European electoral systems. It is, therefore, necessary to test their relevance and applicability in African context. This would serve as a guideline to African democracies on the type of coalition which best suit their political system.

**Electoral Alliances:** The main aim of an electoral is to combine the resources of two or more parties to improve the electoral outcomes for the members of the alliance. This may involve uniting behind common candidates or agreeing not to compete against each other in elections (Schonhardt, 2014). According to Schonhardt (2014), the ultimate goal of this type of alliance is to win election by attaining majority in the legislature and to form the next government. For instance, Kadima and Owuor (2012), shows that in 2002 Kenya’s election, opposition leaders combined their votes to defeat the Kenya African National Union (KANU). Fourteen parties together with the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP coalesced into the National Alliance Party of Kenya (NAK) and reached an agreement to form a coalition called the National Rainbow Coalition (NARC). Each member party signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) detailing their agreement (Kadima & Owuor, 2012).

**Coalition Governments:** According to Jaffrelot (2014), coalition governments usually occur when no single political party wins a clear majority in the parliament. The largest party in the parliament reaches agreement with other parties to form a cabinet. Based on the agreement, the cabinet consists of
representatives from different member parties. In India, the United Progressive Alliance (UPA) and the National Democratic Alliance (NDA) have governed India for the three decades, (Jaffrelot, 2014). Dagenborg (2014) shows that in Norway, the Conservative party, the Progress Party, the Christian Democratic Party and the Liberal Party reached an agreement to form a coalition government.

**Grand Coalitions:** This occurs when a country’s main political parties unite in a coalition government. Coalition between these parties can be difficult given the traditional rivalry between them (Barry, 2014). In addition, Sanner (2013) argues that grand coalitions may be formed during moments of national political crisis. In Germany, Sanner (2013) noted that between 1966 and 1969 Social Democrats and Christian Democratic Union (CDU) came together to form a government and constituted 95% of the seats in Parliament.

**Legislative Coalitions:** Ruin (2000) noted that this type of coalition involves the agreement to pursue specific legislative goals without a division of cabinet or executive responsibilities. In Mexico, the Institutional Revolutionary Party, the National Action Party and the Democratic Revolution reached an agreement for a common legislative agenda. The agreement would become known as the Pact for Mexico *(Pacto pro Mexico)* (O’Day, 2004). Lastly, as discussed from the preceding types of coalition, coalitions can take many forms. Political parties have a wide range of reasons and objectives of forming a coalition. Some of these reason ranges from the electoral alliances where parties negotiate conditions to form the government to legislative reasons where party form a coalition to purse a particular legislative framework. All these types of coalition are important, but each party will choose to build coalition on the basis of its objectives.

**The ANC’s election journey since 1994**

In a democratic system like that of South Africa, political parties mobilize support of the voters from the general public. They do this by critiquing each and presenting alternative policies to that of the ruling party. This competition of ideas encourages each party to refine its own policies in order to win the hearts of voters. The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa requires a candidate to win an absolute majority in order to be elected president of the country or premier of a province. In order to receive a majority of the votes and govern, coalitions of political parties are formed when no candidate has secured 51% or more, (Lodge 2004). Table 2 demonstrates the election outcomes for the ANC since 1994.
Table 2: The ANC election results since 1994

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>% Votes</th>
<th>No. of votes</th>
<th>No. of Seats</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1994</td>
<td>62.65</td>
<td>12 237 655</td>
<td>252</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999</td>
<td>66.35</td>
<td>10 601 330</td>
<td>266</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>69.69</td>
<td>10 880 915</td>
<td>279</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>65.9</td>
<td>11,650,748</td>
<td>264</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2014</td>
<td>62.15</td>
<td>11,436,921</td>
<td>249</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2016 (LGE)*</td>
<td>53.9</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

LGE* Local Government Elections  

Since the first democratic elections in 1994, South African politics have been clearly characterised by the existence of one dominant party, and thus the ANC. From Table 2, it can be denoted that the ANC has enjoyed majority of votes since 1994. In 1994, the ANC won 62.5% which equates to 252 number of seats in a national assembly. The biggest victory of the ANC was in 2004 where the party won 69.69% resulting to 279 seats. However, since 2009, the party has suffered huge losses scoring only 65.9% in national elections. This perhaps owes to the general outcry of lack of service delivery, scourges of corruption, collapsing economy and lack of job creation which is usually blamed to ANC led government. Voters demonstrated anger and dissatisfaction for the ruling party as most of them opted to vote for other parties and others boycotting elections, and this was witnessed in 2016 local government election where the ruling party only scored 53.9% of votes, which is their worst ever since 1994. As a result, the ANC lost some of the major metros such Tshwane, Johannesburg and Nelson Mandela. This suggests that the ANC party is failing to maintain its dominance.

Though this paper intends not to make predictions for the future election outcomes, but by observing the current political dynamics, it can be safely said that the country is gradually moving towards multi-party governance. Hence the paper argues that party coalition is likely to become a permanent feature of South Africa’s political landscape. Similarly, Friedman, (1999) points out that South Africa is formally a multiparty system in which one party is dominant and thus the ANC. He however noted that it is not a ‘given’ that the dominant party can rely on its continued dominance. Friedman, (1999) succinctly outlines that the issue of being able to retain dominance therefore acquires added importance. Under the circumstances in which continued dominance is not inevitable, Matlosa and Karume, (2004) recommend that, the dominant party must position itself strategically within the society and strategize against its opposition. Kadima (2014), however, argues that the absence of a credible opposition raises concerns over how to ensure that government remains accountable to its citizens. Though it is demonstrated that South Africa is moving towards multi-party governance, it is however important to acknowledge that other parties who are not yet exposed to governance might understand their political parties’ role in governance.
Conclusion and recommendations

Though this paper intends not to make pessimistic predictions of future election outcomes particularly for the ANC, the 2016 local government elections were, however, an indication that party coalitions and multi-party governance are likely to become permanent features of South Africa’s political system. The purpose of this paper was therefore to contextualise South Africa’s political system and locate the theories, challenges and opportunities of coalition governance thereof. Various theories of party coalition and alliance were explored. As indicated, these theories are primarily based on the European context, therefore, their applicability and relevance in African politics, including South Africa might be difficult because of the country’s diverse political and socio-economic aspects. Another challenge is the ideological differences of various political parties, and lack of a clear vision on how to manage the affairs of the country. This if not addressed might impose a serious threat to a coalition government. Apart from the identified challenges, the paper, however, suggests a need for a coalition as this ensures accountability and represents a broader political constituencies and integrate the society into the democratic process. Since multi-party governance is relatively new in South Africa’s politics, there is need to broaden the understanding of political parties’ role with respect to governance. This calls for the support political parties through workshops, training and capacity-building to redress deficiencies in their organization to ensure effective multi-party governance.

References


The Effects of Higher Education Policy on Transformation: Equity, Access and Widening Participation in Post-apartheid South Africa

Shadrack T Mzangwa¹

Abstract: Before 1994, some higher education institutions (HEIs) in South Africa seem not to value social inclusiveness of various groups in higher education, particularly people from disadvantaged backgrounds. As a result, access and widening participation are viewed as problematic and difficult to sustain since it has to involve students from poor and underrepresented social backgrounds. The perception of restricting access from a social justice point of view presupposes the inequalities based on the segregation policies of the apartheid era. Transformation in higher education is considered an indicator of social progress. It relates to a process of absolute overhaul of social thinking and resulting meaningful social transition. In 2002, a major policy decision was taken via the National Plan on Education as a means to approach transformation of the higher education system in South Africa. Attempts of amendments in policy on higher education have not translated into material benefits for the majority of previously disadvantaged black people in South African society in terms of access, equity and participation in higher education. This paper aims to provide an overview of the conditions resulting from the policy on transformation in the context of higher education. It draws attention to the significant aspects which had been used in the development of HEIs. The paper concludes that improving access could be achieved through offering equal and standardised educational programmes [curriculum] in all universities. The paper further suggests that a need to introduce one common or dominant language such as English as the only medium of instruction at HEIs could be helpful in eradicating the dominance of a language such as Afrikaans which is replete with negative memories.

Keywords: higher education institutions, transformation, widening participation, equity, access and policy

Introduction

Since 1994, when South Africa became a democratic country, attempts have been made by the democratic government to revisit and amend policy in higher education, yet these amendments in policy have not translated into material benefits for the majority of previously disadvantaged black people in South African society in terms of access, equity and participation in higher education. Instead, the rich continue to afford and gain access to Higher Education whilst the poor majority, consisting mainly of black people, seem not to benefit from the introduction of policies aimed at transforming higher education in South Africa (Bunting, 2004). This is owing to a number of possible reasons, among them, poor implementation of policy and a lack of monitoring in respect of compliance with the current policies, resulting in a decided lack of success in redressing and transforming the higher education system.

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This paper seeks to analyse policy on higher education in South Africa with specific reference to the implementation and practice of higher education institutions’ (HEIs) policy at the national level. The aim is to examine to what extent policy on higher education in South Africa have had an impact on equity, affirmative action, access and widening participation. In an attempt to address some of the issues associated with an analysis of higher education policy on transformation in South Africa, issues of language, culture (transformation) and meritocracy as practised in the higher education sector in South Africa are highlighted as they form part of the debate around the stance and situation of South African HEIs. Throughout the paper, issues around the use of language in higher education are noted because it is not easy to disassociate issues of language from discussions about policy on transformation in a South African context. For this reason, and to provide some perspective, a global dimension is introduced as a point of reference, by briefly looking at the HEI system in such countries as the United Kingdom (UK), the United States of America (USA), Tanzania and Ghana, amongst others.

While the higher education system in South Africa experienced some growth after 1994, concerns regarding student access, participation rates and issues of equity (affirmation action) have been at the core of urgent debate (Odendaal & Deacon, 2009; Mathekga 2012; Cloete, 2014). In an attempt to address these issues and to look into the effects of policy on transformation in higher education, the paper will be arranged as follows: An introduction is presented in Section 1. Section 2 provides a discourse on the higher education system and transformation from a global perspective. Section 3 elaborates discussion on a policy analysis approach in higher education. A conceptual framework and synthesis of the policy on higher education is presented in section 4. Section 5 will provide a discussion on the transformation of HEIs in South Africa. Then higher education policy in the South African context, looking at the past and present, is discussed under section 6. Implications and effects of the higher education policy on transformation in post-apartheid South Africa will be explained under Section 7, while Section 8 provides a conclusion and further recommendations.

Higher education system and transformation in a global perspective

Higher education refers to educational institutions which offer and award advanced qualifications such as diplomas or degrees in a specific field or discipline (Benjamin & Dunrong, 2010). According to the World Bank report, for a number of decades, ministers and clergy taught in HEIs, and, later, the leaders in civil society began to have a say in what was taught (World Bank, 2009). It was in this shift from clerical leadership to lay leadership that self-made men influenced and shaped higher education’s existence and purpose. Issues of equity and access are tied to the ideological and philosophical streams that define the values reflected in the educational system. Mkude (2011) is of the view that, worldwide, HEIs have in one way or another contributed to the development of society and thus played a major part in promoting social inclusiveness in the development of the nation. Mkude (2011) further argues that amongst other areas of concern regarding nation-building and development played by HEIs is the
matter of equity which forms part of defining or measuring development. In HEIs, the advocacy of equity as a measure of development entails encouraging wider participation, inclusiveness of previously disadvantaged groups in society, and a shared allocation of resources relating mainly to access (World Bank, 2006).

While the affirmative action issue will be discussed extensively in section 4 of this paper, it is appropriate to point to Modisha’s (2008) view that, at this stage, equity and affirmative action in countries such as South Africa were aimed at decolonising or attempting to deal with colonised principles such as the exclusion of black people from the better labour market jobs, education and investment through active policy. Policies in the colonised system were meant for whites only, at least in African countries such as South Africa, Ghana, Nigeria and Uganda. In South Africa, affirmative action was aimed at recognising participation and advancing education and professional skills in the black majority which had been neglected during the years of apartheid (Bentley & Habib, 2008). Although the discussion in this paper focuses primarily on the South African situation, examples from countries such as the UK, the USA, Ghana and Tanzania have been cited in reference to issues of access, equity and participation (Te Velde, 2005; Watts, 2011; Onwuegbuzie et al., 2012).

Table 1: The stance of higher education in selected countries

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Aspects/ factors</th>
<th>Access</th>
<th>Equity</th>
<th>Language</th>
<th>Participation</th>
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<tr>
<td>Country</td>
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<tr>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>selective</td>
<td>Inequality exist</td>
<td>English dominant</td>
<td>Selective and average</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United States of America</td>
<td>selective</td>
<td>Inequality exist</td>
<td>English dominant</td>
<td>Selective and average</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Africa</td>
<td>selective</td>
<td>Inequality exist</td>
<td>Multilingual and selective</td>
<td>Low</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tanzania</td>
<td>Selective</td>
<td>Inequality exist</td>
<td>English dominant and selective</td>
<td>low</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ghana</td>
<td>selective</td>
<td>Inequality exist</td>
<td>English dominant and selective</td>
<td>Selective and low</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Author's own comparison table

A report compiled by Morley et al. (2010), on ‘Widening Participation in Higher Education in Ghana and Tanzania’ reveals a complex relationship between higher education institutions and issues of equity in Ghana and Tanzania, both developing countries. Tanzania was among other African countries in the 1960s and 1970s which began transforming its HEIs according to an African policy agenda which
sought to make HEIs Afrocentric and which took into account issues supposedly having more appeal for Africans (Makhanya, 2017). Makhanya (2017) further states that, complex as it is, transformation of HEIs entails institutional change with specific reforms such as culture, equity inclusiveness (access) and language, amongst other aspects. The aspect of equity is in many instances an item connected to the issue of economic growth and standard of living in many African countries, as argued by scholars such as Odendaal & Deacon (2009) as well as Mkude (2011) who agrees that economic growth, development and equity are the determining factors for a well-educated and well-governed stable society.

Countries such as Tanzania had social policies which since the 1960s and 1970s were mainly inclined towards its development, growth and equity. This implies therefore that the social status of Tanzania was unequal and policies had to be developed to balance or to maintain equity (Planning Commission, 2000). As part of developing Tanzania and bringing about equity standards based on the Tanzania Development Vision 2025 as contained in the Planning Commission (2000), Tanzania aimed to be a well-educated society, with good governance and a competitive economy capable of producing sustainable growth. Just as in the case of South Africa, equity and transformation of HEIs were firmly established by government in an attempt to address the issue of access by all or many, widening participation and equity of opportunity in higher education. Commissions and statutory bodies in South Africa such as the Higher Education Quality Committee and the Council on Higher Education (Odendaal & Deacon, 2009) were formed to closely monitor and oversee implementation of policy priorities. In Ghana, Tanzania and South Africa, Commissions on Higher Education have been formed to address aspects related to higher education access and equity amongst which the policy associated with the transformation of HEIs was the key agenda (Morley et al., 2010; Akoojee & Nkomo, 2011; Mkude, 2011). And in the US, according to Weber (2002), issues of racial discrimination form a widely debated argument. Weber (2002) maintains that in the USA in the 1990s, black people were not expected to progress or complete their educational levels comparative to their white peers. There are obvious correlations here between some states in the US and the apartheid regime. Mkude (2011) elaborates that in developing countries, HEIs are not only important instrumental institutions to uplift social mobility but, more so, these institutions form part of building economic prosperity.

Kirst (2007) strongly argues that the socioeconomic background is a determining factor in students’ access and participation in higher education. Students from poor social background in African countries such as South Africa are often from a particular race, mainly black, and find it difficult to gain access to some HEIs. The few students who manage to gain access find it difficult to participate up to an acceptable level since they are usually ill-prepared as the result of poor high school education and the less resourced background from which they come. This then raises the question of the quality of education received by students from poor social backgrounds versus those who are from a well-resourced and good social background. Naidoo (1998: 374) therefore citing from the NCHE (1996) is of the view that the pursuit of quality relies on ‘maintaining and applying academic and educational standards, both in the sense of minimum expectations and requirements that should be complied with,
and in the sense of ideals of excellence that should be striven for’. Amongst other challenges which hinder access and participation of students from poor social backgrounds is the fact that there is a skewed ‘standardisation’ of languages applied across HEIs while meritocracy remains highly intact in South Africa (Mathekga, 2012).

**Policy analysis approach in higher education**

According to Weber (2002) policies are formulated and implemented mainly to provide some level of benefit to society, particularly to redress inequalities in the disadvantaged group to avoid further discrimination. This is applicable in policies which are formulated for fundamental human and equal rights in society. In democratic states such as the USA, Ghana, Tanzania, South Africa and other countries which practise democracy, the rules governing social and public institutions such as educational institutions are expected to be fair and not favour only one side. In fact, impoverished societies in terms of living and social standards are deemed to benefit the most from non-discrimination. Policies are mainly formulated and implemented to address these types of issues.

By definition, policy analysis may literally be defined as a theoretical and procedural terrain aimed to give methodological and professional support for the production of relevant information (Secchi, 2016). In applied sciences or human sciences, policy analysis is used to recommend solutions to social or economic problems and is often normative or multidisciplinary in form. There is a variety of policy analysis approaches such as narrative policy analysis, participatory policy analysis, interpretive policy analysis and critical policy analysis which mainly emanate from the post-positivist approach. The traditional practice which derives from economic principles applies tools such as cost-effective analysis and cost-benefit analysis which are rooted in the positivist approach also known as the rationalist policy analysis (Secchi, 2016).

Deliberative or argumentative policy analysis is a type of policy analysis approach consisting of a set of processes and techniques for recommending and endorsing a particular policy which aims to address and tackle social problems resulting from public participation and deliberations (Fischer, 2007; Fischer & Gottweis, 2012). Scholars such as Fischer and Gottweis (2012), as well as Secchi (2016), are of the view that there is no particular process or technique which remains independent from other factors. Secchi (2016: 98) contends that ‘argumentative policy analysis borrows qualitative methods from social sciences, ethnography and linguistics to build and convey conflicting narratives, argument maps and use deliberation among political actors’. Furthermore, in argumentative policy analysis, collective wisdom from particular experts in a certain discipline or field may be used to recommend a policy with little specific requirement to prove evidence other than valid arguments (Secchi, 2016). In this paper a narrative policy analysis approach will be followed since it describes and defines policy within the context of how it is applied in a specific country or environment. Policy analysis could be explained as a prescriptive activity applied in the public fraternity or as a recommended approach to tackle social problems as determined by decision makers.
As Bourdieu and Passeron (1977) argue, social class is one of the ‘causes’ of educational inequality. Apart from the fact that family background can influence choices of young adults to enroll or not to enroll at one of the HEIs, the social context and social policies in a country is a major influence in the determination to attend or not to attend university, as research reports suggest (Diane et al., 2001). Educational policies form distinctions between rich, poor and middle class (Lane, 2013). Based on this argument, most students who happen to gain access to HEIs are from the middle class and/or elite group. Most of those from a poor background are unable to reach university level due to social class background and/or the types of schools attended (in the case of South Africa, these could be of poor quality and lower class status). When the debate of inequality in HEIs, particularly in developing countries, takes place, issues of access and participation take a lead and are always cited as the main cause of educational inequalities (Atuahene & Owusu-Ansah, 2013).

Following Barbieri’s (2015) analytical approach of policy analysis whereupon a narrative-interaction approach is applied, the conceptual framework and synthesis of policy in higher education should be discussed with reference to the global perspective. Abbot (1992) elucidates the narrative-interactionist approach in policy analysis as explaining the need and causes which led to the inception or process of a particular policy. Furthermore, this approach explains the events which may have influenced the process of transforming the policy into practice. It is mainly on this basis that the approach is referred to as a narrative-interactionist approach (Barbieri, 2015). In analysing policy on transformation of higher education, debates will revolve around the key factors namely, equity, access and widening participation in the HEIs, focusing on South Africa.

**Conceptual framework and synthesis of policy on higher education**

Literature, documents, and social media reports show that South Africa is a diverse and stratified society with mainly four racial groups (white, black, Indian and coloured people) which are diverse in their socio-economic status (Bunting, 2004; Naidoo, 2004; Kubler & Sayers, 2010; Hill, 2016). As a response to the country’s divisive history, the Council on Higher Education (CHE) was assigned by the then Minister of Education, Professor Kadar Asmal, in 1999, to assess and restructure the HEIs according to a more just and accurate representation of the majority of South Africans. According to the findings of the CHE, South African HEIs were too great in number and ‘divisive’ in terms of race and geographic design with differing levels of administration resulting in a high level of unequal standards (CHE, 2000). This finding by the CHE led to the programme for the transformation of higher education and policy which aimed to bring about developments and changes to the HEIs in South Africa, meeting socioeconomic needs, access and equity (Gibbon & Kabaki, 2004).

One of the functions of HEIs (universities) is to be ‘agents of social justice and mobility’ (Boulton & Lucas, 2008: 4). In tackling the issue of widening access, two principal ways have often been used by HEIs in many parts of the world. One approach is to provide financial aid to students from families of low economic status. The second approach is to manipulate admissions policies and selection criteria, that is, to be sensitive to a student’s socio-economic background. This is sometimes referred to as
affirmative action. ‘Although affirmative action programmes are rather contentious, even from the legal point of view, they seem to work well in contexts where they are used to put an end to legislated inequalities’ (Mkude, 2011: 367).

**Equity and affirmative action**

HEIs are perceived by various groups in society as centres of knowledge. Thus, part of their major role in society is to engage, lead and implement transformation. The value of HEIs is to bring about positive change in society such as visionary leadership, and accessibility of all social classes and races to education should be led by universities beginning with their admission and enrolment criteria (Mkude, 2011 and Makhanya, 2017). In a South African context, Ndentlyana (2008) defines affirmative action as a constitutional right supported by the Labour Relations Act (Act 66 of 1995) as fair discrimination applied to previously disadvantaged groups. Affirmative action in Ghana and Tanzania, for instance, as black race-dominated countries, inclined more to gender than race, as has been the case in South Africa (Effah, 2011).

Amongst other widely debated issues in North America, affirmative action is understood to be dominant and aimed at enhancing previously disadvantaged groups simply because its common purpose is to address social inequalities (Lane, 2013). Zamani and Brown (2003) suggest that affirmative action specifically ‘sets out procedures and guidelines so that eligible and interested citizens receive equal opportunity to participate’ in social activities which uplift their standard in social life. Similar to the South African context, affirmative action in the United States of America was primarily about addresses discriminative principles against the vulnerable and racially segregated society through policies of access and participation in HEIs (Lane, 2013).

As a driving principle, equity/affirmative action is often justified on the basis of redressing imbalances of the past (Mkude, 2011). Equity aims to do justice to a previously disadvantaged group in society and to address appropriate measurable standards which advocate for equal distribution of ‘resources’ considering differences in social background, class, race and even gender in some instances (Weber, 2002). Mathekga (2012) is of the view that it is a myth that equity should be viewed as a hindrance to academic excellence and that it drags higher education to a lower standard of performance. Attached to this myth is the view that the practice of affirmative action measures to uplift levels of access of students from disadvantaged social backgrounds into HEIs forms part of degrading standards. Following this argument, one could draw on Woodrow’s (1999) argument that as a way of discouraging widening participation in HEIs, the internal policies of these institutions discourage measures to widen access since these are deemed non-viable in economic terms.

The issue of equity is aimed at redress and mainly serves to benefit historically disadvantaged groups in South Africa under the apartheid regime. Naidoo (1998) maintains that the intended purpose of the Commission on Higher Education in 2000 was to look at the issue of transformation in South African HEIs. Weber (2002) holds to the view that equity is associated with the introduction and implementation
of alternative principles and standardised measures to allow a large number of people in society to have access, engage, participate and be treated in the same way when conducting social activities, including use of language, resources and culture.

Access and widening participation

Several HEIs in the United Kingdom have attempted to widen participation, focusing particularly on students from low socioeconomic backgrounds (DfES, 2006 and David, 2009). According to Mathekga (2012), the shift in educational policy in Britain refers to access as widening participation beyond mere entry to higher education by increasing the spread of enrolments across the spectrum of different academic programmes, particularly those which lack a diversified student population. Mathekga (2012: 36) claims that ‘widening participation is therefore about attainment, and about helping more people from under-represented groups, especially those from low socioeconomic groups, to participate successfully in higher education’. In this regard equity is associated with equality, claiming equity to be in line with access to HEIs in other terms.

In Ghana and Tanzania, as argued by Mkude (2011), there has been reluctance towards inclusive and wide participation of the disadvantaged groups in HEIs, as revealed by research on the relationship between HEIs and equity measures. Effah (2011) further argues that when aiming to address inequalities in HE systems by allowing widening participation this could be challenging because elements of compromised quality could emerge. In this regard, an expansion of academic infrastructure, experienced and well qualified academic staff, including appropriate facilities, must be supplied. It therefore requires the role and involvement of government to intervene for the supply and demand of additional resources and extra required funding.

Before 1994, some HEIs seemnot to value social inclusiveness of various groups in higher education, particularly people from disadvantaged backgrounds, as in the case of South Africa. As a result, access and widening participation were viewed as problematic and difficult to sustain since it had to involve students from poor and underrepresented social backgrounds (Woodrow, 1999). The South African population statistics show that whites at 17% were dominant in gaining access to universities against a figure of 69% representing blacks, Indians and coloureds who were denied university access even during the 1990s (Naidoo, 2004). In an attempt to bring about ethical standards and uplift the diverse sociocultural value of HEIs, recruitment of students from various social backgrounds is beneficial for socioeconomic development. While access is important to functionalists, it is selective access that dominates how society is conceptualised and the manner in which it functions, since it apparently functions effectively if there are differences in rewards (a merit based argument). Therefore, work done by various groups such as the medical professions, carpenters, scientists and others is rewarded differently and on the basis of the quality of their contribution (Te Velde, 2005). Certainly, people's success in life depends primarily on their talents, abilities, and efforts which implies meritocracy as a social system (Mathekga, 2012). Issues of meritocracy and language play significant roles in the discourse of HEIs and transformation.
Language and meritocracy

By definition, meritocracy is a social system in which people's success in life depends primarily on their talents, abilities, and efforts (Mathekga, 2012). The idea of a meritocracy has served as an ideology through the argument that social inequality results from unequal merit rather than prejudice or discrimination. The selection criteria for admission at HEIs are mainly based on meritocracy. In South Africa, the criteria for university admission differ from one university to the other. This is mainly informed by the apartheid legacy where former white universities used meritocracy and historically disadvantaged institutions applied affirmative action - the latter perform relatively poorly while the former have far better performance rates, but this is a form of access and participation that is driven by social background.

According to the Department for Education and Skills (DfES) (2004), merit could mean admitting applicants or students who achieved the highest examination scores above the average mark, or it could mean comparing applicants' achievements and rewarding the potential of the best achievers. The issue of meritocracy in this regard then becomes highly contentious in instances where some HEIs could apply meritocratic principle while others could apply affirmative principles based on social background and class distinctions between students. Although the majority might agree on the application of meritocracy as a principle by which to make a selection of those qualifying to be placed at a certain level in terms of high or low performance, when one takes into account a higher education system which, in the past, deliberately discriminated against particular classes, races or social backgrounds, and which in the present, lends itself to privileging certain classes, races and social backgrounds, meritocracy as a determining factor for access may hinder access for entry into some HEIs to some students particularly those from the historically disadvantaged poor economic backgrounds.

Among other tensions of economic and political interest within society, culture is understood to be an aspect which may stimulate collective mobilisation (Barbieri, 2015). In this regard, culture and religion cannot easily be separated when it comes to how a society is identified (World Bank, 2009). White Afrikaners in South Africa are an example of this. When the Afrikaners took power and controlled larger parts of South Africa including the years of the formation of the African Union in 1910, perpetuation of apartheid principles gained power (Bunting, 2004). The Apartheid regime used power to discriminate against black people, forming a very strong racial boundary embedded in culture and language. Culture and language are the most significant aspects which affect higher education and those concerned with equity and access must pay attention to determinants of students' access and equity that are tied to these aspects (World Bank, 2009).

Du Plessis (2006) points out that in a context of multilingualism and the South African government's appropriate stance and clear standpoint on the issue of languages as a medium of instruction at university level, the use of Afrikaans in some former or traditionally Afrikaans-medium HEIs is an
inappropriate compromise between accepting and implementing English entirely or being bilingual through adopting Afrikaans as a medium of instruction and research writing (Du Plessis, 2006). This favourably predisposes Afrikaans-speaking whites who also benefitted from apartheid as opposed to the previously disadvantaged back majority for whom Afrikaans may be at best a third language. Moreover, it entirely neglects the other nine official languages used in South Africa. On fighting the battle to introduce one common language in the education system, it took young black South African students to confront the apartheid school system as they rioted in 1976 to abolish Afrikaans as a medium of instruction at school level. This suggests that language is not just a barrier but could also be deemed an oppressive tool particularly if such language usage is compulsory in the education system (Weber, 2002).

In the USA and the UK where English remains the dominant language, the language used as a medium of instruction is not a major factor which derails the offering of teaching and learning as is the case in South Africa where a minority of white Afrikaners are of the view that Afrikaans is not only a language suited to teaching but advice that it must be used as medium of instruction at those HEIs where it is not a common language widely used as English is (Alexander, 2000; Van der Merwe, 2014; Phaahla, 2015). Thus the English language, since it is commonly used by all races and the larger part of society in South Africa, is a more practical way for use in teaching and learning in the South African education context and as a common language to be used at HEIs. As Phaahla (2015) argues: 'only a few indigenous people make use of their indigenous African language in their essential daily transactions'. For this reason, English as a common language is a rational option rather than multilingualism which is largely unaffordable.

This is a complex issue in South Africa with its eleven official languages. Other African countries such as Zimbabwe and Malawi have an easier choice. In Zimbabwe, Shona is the official language of teaching and in Malawi, Kiswahili is the chosen language particularly for basic education. More globally, China and Germany use Mandarin and German respectively across the country and apply these languages for teaching particularly at the HEIs. These languages are used by the majority of the country’s population at 90% or more. Such is the case with the larger parts of the USA and the UK where English is used nationally at the HEIs. This is not the case in South Africa where 42% of South Africans speak Nguni language (Statistics South Africa, 2011) as their first or home language with is Zulu at 23% of the total enrolled university students, as reported in 2000. One could concur with Taylor’s (2006) view that mother-tongue language should be mainly used as a medium of instruction only at basic or primary education level. After that, one commonly used language should be instituted at the HEIs, such as English in the case of South Africa. The use of one common language could help ease access and a more equal application of standards applied in the HEIs thereby supporting transformation programme in the HEIs.
The transformation of HEIs in South Africa

The perception of restricting access from a social justice point of view presupposes the inequalities based on the segregation policies of the apartheid era. According to Nkomo, Akoojee & Motlanhe (2005), transformation in higher education is considered an indicator of social progress. It refers to a process of absolute overhaul of social thinking and results in meaningful social transition (Akoojee & Nkomo, 2011). Transformation in the South African context refers to the need to ensure that the barriers to access are completely removed so that the higher education system becomes more inclusive, achieving widening access, improved throughput rates and participatory outcomes. The new democratic government led by the African National Congress (ANC) through the Government of National Unity (GNU) disbanded the structure of tertiary education which used to have universities separated from technikons, colleges and technical colleges (Mathekga, 2012). Both the technikons and the technical colleges absorbed a lot of South African matriculants especially those who had an interest in studying skills-related courses as opposed to enrolling at universities. It appears that the new government has failed to figure out the actual problem of students’ access to higher education but has rather confused the matter of student access with the disparities in the manner in which higher education institutions were structured and managed by the apartheid government before 1994.

The merging of HEIs which have taken place since 2002 and the establishment of Universities and Universities of Technology was an attempt by the South African democratic government to bridge the gap between racial and territory-based HEIs and to make these institutions accessible, inclusive and reach certain standards of equity (Chetty, 2010). The National Plan for Higher Education (NPHE) (Department of Education, 2001) articulating the vision of the Education White Paper 3 (1997) identified the Ministry of Education’s main aim which was ‘to promote equity, access and fair chances of success to all who are seeking to realise their potential through higher education, while eradicating all forms of unfair discrimination and advancing redress of past inequalities’ (Mathekga, 2012: 49). The government authorities seem not to have seen the danger of limiting choices for those students who would have preferred to study at the former technical colleges and former technikons. The likelihood is that, with the existence of a variety of HEIs such as technical colleges and technikons, as was the case in the South African system before 2002, students would have had chosen skills careers at their competency level and better access to higher education would have been achieved overall, as opposed to the current situation which relies solely on university structured education.

When the new government took over in South Africa in 1994 a decade prior to the incorporation and merging of other HEIs in 2004, the impression made in terms of administration of higher institutions was that a changed (transformed) HE environment would effectively displace social disorders in the South African socioeconomic and educational system (Badsha & Cloete, 2011). An assumption was made by a number of people and communities that the triple challenges of inequality, poverty and unemployment could be reduced by investing on a better and equal standard higher education system (Subotzky, 2005). However, this was not the case as later evidenced by the fact that even after introducing policy aimed at transforming HEIs, not a lot has changed for the better (Cloete, 2002). A lot more pragmatic
action still needs to take place to overcome imbalances in terms of access, wider participation and language margins created in the past (Lundall, 1998 and Muller, 2005).

A university’s level of access is managed through enrolment planning determined by the university and the government based on a three-year plan which spells out the projected numbers of students envisaged to enroll in a particular university or Universities of Technology. The previously disadvantaged groups in South Africa are then victims since their performance might be poor due to the poor schooling they have received and are thus unprepared to study at university level (high schools, being feeders for HEIs, are implicated). This defeats the purpose of the White Paper on transformation (White Paper, 3 1997) as the founding document drafted by the CHE to guide and execute implementation of transforming higher education policy. The Commission’s report puts emphasis on the fact that academic standards are incorporated under the concept of quality, yet the practice of ‘quality’ may be applied in different forms depending on the group and probably race where services or education are being granted (NCHE, 1996).

Higher education policy in the South African context: past and present

The history of apartheid reveals its highly discriminative principles whereby universities and technikons were segregated and where white universities were well-resourced and black institutions were deliberately limited, kept remotely from wealth and far from well-supported centres. Teaching and learning, two of the major functions of a university, were less resourced in historically black institutions than the more advanced white institutions (Morrow, 2008). As a result of the apartheid legacy, the HEI system in South Africa was structured according to a highly stratified ‘dual’ system informed by racial segregation (Naidoo, 1998). Based on this history, therefore, South Africa is a country with a legacy of divided social orders based on race, class, gender and location which are major challenges and a contributing factor to social inequalities (Deacon et al., 2010).

At the present time, higher education institutions in South Africa are regulated and monitored by legislative principle and procedure as contained in the Higher Education Act, 1997 (Act 101 of 1997) which states that: ‘It is desirable for the HEIs to enjoy freedom and autonomy in their relationship with the state within the context of public accountability and the national need for advanced skills and scientific knowledge’. While autonomy is granted, the government, through the Ministry of Education, monitors, support and regulates processes and policies applied in the HEIs since such policies must be in compliance with the administrative governance of the state (National Plan, 2001).

Currently, there seems to be a lack of clear standpoint by government in South Africa regarding the use of language in the HEIs and whether a ‘common’ official language must be used as opposed to the use of nine, three or only two official languages (Unterhalter, 2003; Cele, 2004). Universities are at liberty to apply their own policies in respect of which language to select for teaching purposes, and depending on the geographical area in which they are located, but even with this choice, African languages are used minimally since no subject, module or course other than an African language course, is taught in
the local languages at these universities. All subjects are offered in English while Afrikaans is used as an alternative (DuPlessis, 2006). The reality is that claims to offer any of the other South African official languages at university level appears to be mere rhetoric or a way of gaining political ground (Unterhalter, 2003 and Cele, 2004).

Despite the views of scholars such as Alexander (2000) and Van der Merwe (2014) that the use of home languages could help South Africans to cope better in schools, this does not automatically translate to a successful transition to using indigenous languages nationally, or at HEIs in South Africa. By the same token, not everyone could be taught in all eleven languages at the HEIs so one common language has to be used, and logically that should be English, since it is not only a nationally but also an internationally recognised language.

**The implications and effects of higher education policy on transformation in post-apartheid South Africa**

In 2002, a major policy decision was taken via the National Plan on Education as a means to approach transformation of the higher education system when the then Minister of Higher Education, Kader Asmal, embarked on a series of mergers and closures of higher education institutions, reducing them from 36 to 26, a figure that includes three newly established universities since 2013 (Kubler & Sayers, 2010). In hindsight, this seems to have been a mistake in that the decision to decrease the number of HEIs as informed by the policy on transformation of HEI in South Africa did not adequately address the problem of access, participation and equity in its full sense but rather spoke to a political motive to redress racial imbalances while neglecting other factors. Certainly, if the policy had been better conceived, a feasibility search could have been done, as was the case in countries such as Ghana and Tanzania.

The central focus of the South African Commission on Higher Education when introducing the policy on transformation appears to be on scrapping most of what the apartheid government introduced in higher education. In the process, the principles applied during the apartheid era were not only discouraged but were eradicated without considering those that could have benefitted society in the new dispensation. A clear example would be the dissolution of teacher training colleges which previously had imparted the necessary training for teaching at secondary education levels. In this regard, instead of introducing, implementing and monitoring policy to transform HEIs, certain derailing factors took the lead, mainly in the political arena, which militated against tackling real issues such as opening access, widening participation and applying equity. The policy on transformation of HEIs remains a good initiative, but implementation and monitoring did not yield the hoped for developments. Indeed, even after two decades of democracy, the hostility and conflict on how the HEIs operate and how are these institutions managed, is still rife. The enrolment and/or access system applied at historically white universities does not adequately accommodate students from poor or low social backgrounds. Concomitantly, the access system and participation in the historically black universities has not improved to meet that of the historically white universities (Bunting, 2004). Despite the restructuring of the HEIs brought about by
the policy on transformation, issues of race, class and access still weigh down the discourse on HEIs to date. The debate is ongoing and the task of the government is to determine how the system should be restructured to accommodate previously disadvantaged students, a task that has not as yet been realised as is evident from the failure of policies such as the Draft Green Paper from the DHET (2012). It is an undisputed fact that the social disparities and segregation at higher education institutions in South Africa had to be addressed, but not by using a blanket approach to disband existing universities and technikons and restructure them as universities and universities of technology. Disbanding and restructuring of higher education through the eradication of technikons and technical colleges as higher education institutions did not yield the expected results as huge numbers of school-leavers were left without appropriate institutions in which to enroll. Moreover, Asmal’s actions did not add value by increasing capacity nor did they help to bring about a balanced equity in terms of race and affirmative action standards in the country. With this in mind, if the National Plan on Education has as its intention to cater for future enrolments and broaden access for previously disadvantaged groups (blacks, coloureds and Indians), having more rather than fewer institutions could have worked to advance the needs of the previously disadvantaged students. Instead, the government through its Ministry of Education chose to cut the number of institutions in the hope that its monitoring capacity would be improved, while enforcing new legislation or policy on higher education to eradicate segregation and high levels of stratification at the HEIs in South Africa. It was a noble aim but it was flawed.

**Conclusion**

This paper has provided an overview of the conditions resulting from the policy on transformation in the context of higher education. The intention was to draw attention to the most significant aspects which could be used in the development of HEIs. Thus, issues relating to access, equity and widening participation carry a lot of weight and are closely linked to transformation in HEIs in South Africa (Bunting, 2004 and Boulton & Lucas 2008). Past regimes, such as the apartheid system in South Africa, used discriminative principles which did not advance the social living standards for all in the country. This perpetuated racial divisions and marginalisation amongst people in society. And since higher education forms part of the uplifting of social standards as well as the development of the nation, higher education institutions can be used for the advancement or regression of a society.

Looking at the present and to the future, university access has to be managed through enrolment planning as suggested in the White Paper on transformation (White Paper, 3 1997). Normalisation of student and staff performance at the universities could help improve access and induce wider participation since the standard of performance of students and academics is measured by the quality of teaching and learning. Improving access could be achieved through offering equal and standardised educational programmes [curriculum] in all universities within a particular country by implementing
global educational standards. People from different social backgrounds should benefit from an inclusive higher education environment, irrespective of their race and living standards since they form part of a developing society. The use of language and the medium of instruction at university plays a significant role and must be based on the dominant language understood by the larger part of society.

The paper further suggests that a need to introduce one dominant language such as English as the medium of instruction at higher education institutions could be helpful in eradicating the dominance of a language like Afrikaans which is replete with negative memories. Further, the use of English as a medium of instruction in higher education could have reduced unwanted costs by avoiding the oversubscription of study materials in both languages (English and Afrikaans) and teaching staff who must do double duty by teaching in English and also in Afrikaans. The use of various teaching languages (of choice) and English could best serve at the basic education level until grade twelve. This could help prepare each pupil for entry to higher education thus stimulating improved access, participation and greater levels of equity. In this way transformation in higher education has a better chance of being realised in South Africa.

References


Ethnic Nationalism and Conflicts in Africa: Lessons from Nigeria

Paul Oluwatosin Bello¹

Abstract: This article explores the linkages between ethnic nationalism and conflicts in Nigeria. Traditionally, ethnic nationalism typifies a sense of identity, national pride and solidarity, to mention a few. But its configuration today is rooted in deep distrust, idiosyncrasies and the domination of one or more ethnic groups over others, contestation over power and resource control. Unfortunately, such reconstruction has given rise to the growth of ethnic militias or militant groups pitting themselves against the State or opposing groups, and consequently resulting in the eruption of violent conflicts. Attempts were made to resolve this quagmire through the doctrine of necessity for peaceful co-existence by state actors but it has yielded little or no result, and in some instances exacerbated militarism. What does ethnic nationalism portend for Nigeria beyond the centenary? From a positional standpoint using qualitative method of document analysis, this article interrogates the growth and development of ethnic nationalism in Africa and its current trends, focusing on Nigeria. It suggests measures to adopt in order to guarantee peace in a vacillating region.

Introduction

More than other continents of world, Africa has been enmeshed in violent conflicts - much of which could be explicated as by-products of the undulating effects of ethnic-nationalism (Bello & Olutola 2016:70; Nwadike & Ekeanyanwu 2012:3; Bujra 2002:1). Despite the ubiquity of ethnic nationalism crises on a global scale, its gruesome impacts on human lives, and the socioeconomic development of several African countries in recent times, is worrisome.

Colonialism cum imperialism brought about the partitioning, and illogical fusion of territories that were previously occupied by divergent ethnic nationalities, under a single flag (Ake 2000; Gurr 1994). It established several systems with structural imbalances in several African States. These imbalances further engendered wide disparities in the level of development among the various ethnic-nationalities in these countries. For instance, in Nigeria, the establishment of Colonial administrative offices in Lagos and Calabar resulted in antipathies from other deprived region and ethnic groups (Aluko 2009:485; Nnoli 1980). In Rwanda, the Belgian colonialist policies favoured the Tutsi minority than the Hutus majority, particularly in relation to political power. A parallel scenario also played out in Kenya, Uganda, Mozambique, and Angola, to mention a few (Bergmann & Crutchfield 2009:148).

Africa’s ethnic nationalism transcends the era of colonialism, and remains active in contemporary African societies. However, its current configuration is not necessarily in the form of opposition to colonial rule. It is could best be explained in context of reaction to ethnic parochialism, discrimination, idiosyncrasies and the domination of one, two or more ethnic nationalities over others, among others. This imbroglio has frequently led to the emergence and growth of ethnic militias or militant groups, and

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in some instances degenerated into violent conflicts, in the form inter-ethnic clashes and civil wars. Examples abound in several African countries. For instance, since her independence, Uganda has witnessed nine regime changes with the exception of the first government (1962-1971) that was formed through peaceful democratic means.

Most of the upheavals in Uganda were fuelled by ethnic antipathies, ethnic domination and subjugation, leading to incessant military interference in Ugandan politics. Such cleavages led to a political situation which Brett (1995) described as a condition where “bullets rather than ballot” dominated the political scene, resulting in the removal of two regimes by coup d’état, (e.g. Obote I – 1971 and Obote II – 1985). The first occurred through foreign invasion (i.e. the 1979 Tanzania-Uganda National Liberation Front invasion), and the other through armed rebellion (e.g. the National Resistance Army (NRA) and Museveni rebellion of 1981 – 1985, which culminated in the overthrow of Tito Okello) (Frederick, 2009: Xii; Brett 1995).

Unlike the practice in pre-colonial Uganda where ethnic nationalism was employed as a strategic instrument for a united front, particularly against colonialism, its contemporary form is an aggressive tool utilised by certain political assemblages, including the government to establish and maintain hegemony over other political opponents. The aftermath has often been conflict, with one group trying to impose its policies on others, while the other political groups resist and fight back to access State’s authority and resources (Frederick, 2009: Xiii). In point of fact, Africa’s ethnic nationalism was used by past African leaders and regimes to make scapegoat out of their political opponents. It was devised as a scheme to divert public attention from salient political issues. For instance, President Idi Amin of Uganda employed this tactics to expel wealthy Indians and Pakistanis from Uganda (Frederick, 2009). Former Zambian President – Chiluba, also used it to ban his predecessor Kauda from contesting for election on the claim that his parent were of Malawian origin (Frederick, 2009). However, there is a sharp departure from such practices in recent times.

Contemporarily, ethnic-nationalism in most African States is of militarised configuration. According to Zeleza (2007) “militant ethnicity is predominant in several African countries that are currently undergoing the process of democratisation, as the tensions and twists arising from the competitive politics of democracy often find articulation in the entrenched identities, idioms and institutions of ethnic solidarity”. In Nigeria, the democratisation process has led to the resurgence of ethnic identities and proliferation of regional and local struggles over the claims of citizenship, expressed in the language of the ‘indigenes’ and ‘settlers’. These struggles have increasingly snowballed into the formation of ethnic militias that have wrought havoc on Nigeria’s civil society. It has unleashed periodic convulsions of inter-communal violence, resulting in the destruction of properties, loss of lives, poverty and socio-economic retrogression (Agbu 2004; Vickers 2000; Osaghae 1996).

Ethnic-Nationalism in Nigeria: An overview
The magnitude of ethno-political, and somewhat religious crises that engulf the Federal Republic of Nigeria in recent times, cannot be explored in isolation from the historical forces, processes and factors that concretise them (Bello & Olutola, 2016). The legacy of colonialism and imperial incursion of Nigeria between 1914 and 1915 soldered divergent territories populated by various ethnic nationalities within a unitary system (Aluko & Ajani 2009; Aluko 1998). Such legacy laid the foundation for what Ebegbulem referred to as the “ethno-genesis” which culminated into “ethno-tensions” that has affected virtually all spheres of the country till date (Ebegbulem, 2012:76).

The amalgamation of the Southern, Northern and Lagos protectorate into a single entity in 1914 was effected to serve the interest of the British government (Ebegbulem, 2012). Such political transaction took place without any dialogue, as to get the consent of other ethnic nationalities. It could best be described as a deliberate attempt by the colonial powers to thwart the development and sustenance of nationalism in the federation, by sponsoring ethnic-nationalism as a means of capturing power. For example, prior to and during colonialism, the Hausa/Fulani predominantly occupied the Northern part of the country, while the Yorubas and Igbos were preponderant in the Western and Eastern part of the country respectively. These regional divisions produced ethnic tensions, suspicions and rivalry among the three major ethnic groups (Ebegbulem, 2012). Such tension further resulted in the transformation of the nation’s outlook, from ethnic identity into regional identity, to capture political power. This action signalled the beginning of ethnic struggle for power and resource control in Nigeria.

Furthermore, this transformation culminated in the emergence and formation of regional political parties. The Northern region formed the Northern Element Progressive Union (NEPU) and the Northern People’s Congress (NPC) - the NPC was led by Ahmadu Bello. The Igbos in the Eastern region formed the National Council for Nigerian Citizens (NCNC), led by Dr Nnamdi Azikiwe. In the same vein, the Yorubas in the Western region formed the Action Group (AG) - a political party aimed to represent the political interest in the Western region, led by Chief Obafemi Awolowo - (Coleman, 1960). This ethno-regional politics became the bane of Nigerian politics during independence era.

However, in post-independent Nigeria, there has been consistence struggle by these major ethnic groups to capture political power and control the nations numerous resources (Ebegbulem, 2012). Some of such agitations accounted for the remote and proximate factors that led to the Nigerian civil war from 1967 – 1970 (Edegbelem, 2012:79, 84). In the First Republic, the tripartite nature of national parties spur ethnic rivalry and political struggles that primarily reflected ethno-regional interest, rather than the overall interest of the nation.

These ethno-regional parties resonated in the Second Republic, though with different party nomenclature, but with same ideologies and strong ethnic ties as the former. The Northern region NPC metamorphosed into National Party of Nigeria (NPN), though possessing a national outlook. Majority of its founders and members are northerners, and it represents the interest of the Hausa/Fulani ethnic groups. The same was simulated in the Western and Eastern regions. The Unity Party of Nigeria (UPN)
of the Western regions for instance still had Chief Obafemi Awolowo as its leader and shares the same ideologies as the defunct AG of the First Republic (Edoh 2001:87). Similarly, the bulk of Dr Nnamdi Azikiwe’s loyalist joined him in the formation of Nigeria People’s Party (NPP) – a South-eastern political party representing the interest of the Igbos. All these parties reawakened the spirit of ethnic politics that prevailed in the First Republic.

In the Third Republic, the military regime of General Ibrahim Babangida tended to seemingly crush the tripod of ethnic politics in the country with the introduction of two party system into the Nigeria’s political space. The two parties are the National Republican Convention (NRC) and the Social Democratic Party (SDP). It is pertinent to state that it will be erroneous to argue that its formations had ethnic underpinnings, since both parties had a northerner as either the presidential candidate or the vice-presidential candidate. It therefore marks the first time Nigeria’s political terrain would reflect more of a national than ethno-regional outlook, since she gained independence from the British government. Unfortunately, such historic achievement was undermined by the annulment of the 1993 national election result that produced Chief M.K.O. Abiola of the SDP as the winner of the June 12, 1993 election. It was argued that the annulment of the election was to ensure the northern political hegemony is not lost forever (Çanci & Odukoya 2016:94).

The annulment subsequently resuscitated the old ethnic suspicion and rivalry among the three ethnic groups, with the Yorubas of the South-West feeling cheated and robbed. According to Çanci and Odukoya (2016:94), with the annulment, it is conceivable to discover that stimulation of ethnic awareness easily turns into a conflict in order to get more from the scarce societal resources. And this situation provokes political tensions and cleavages among the ethnic groups. However, Nigeria is not the only country in the world where such things are experienced (Çanci & Odukoya, 2016). The annulment triggered regional protests and riots in the South-West leading to the elimination of northerners in some parts of the South-Western States. Critics of General Babangida’s military regime argued that it was a deliberate attempt by the Northern oligarchy to subvert democracy by preventing the slipping away of power from the North to the West (Çanci & Odukoya, 2016; Ebegbulem, 2012).

The danger this crisis foretell is that Nigerians, who seemed to have overcome the legacy of ethnic cleavages and regional hurdle in the 1993 election to vote Chief MKO Abiola, have been compelled again to put ethnic identity first, rather than national interest. The denial of the tacit winner of the 1993 presidential election reverberated the operations to the Oodua Peoples Congress (OPC) - a curious radical Yoruba group that employs violence as a means to redress the apparent injustice against the Yoruba. Such development also sprang-up a counter-militant group in the northern part of Nigeria – the Arewa Peoples Congress (APC) (Osinubi & Osinubi, 2006:106).

These groups resuscitated and led to a proliferation of ethnic militia groups and other socio-cultural and ethnic based groups across the federation. In the Eastern part, there was the ‘Ohaneze Ndigbo, Egbesu Boys, Bakassi Boys, among others (Oluwaniyi, 2012). In the Middle Belt or the Niger-Delta, groups
such as the Middle Belt Forum (MBF), Movement for the Emancipation of Niger-Delta (MEND), Movement for the Survival of Ogoni People (MOSOP), Niger-Delta People Volunteer Force (NDPVF), The Tombolo Boys, Coalition of Militant Actions (COMA), Ijaw Youth Council (IYC), amongst others, were formed. In a similar fashion, the Arewa Consultative Forum (ACF) was formed in the Northern region, while Egbe Omo-Oduduwa (EOO) and Yoruba Council of Elders (YCE) emerged in the South West (Aluko & Ajani, 2009:485; Oluwaniyi, 2012).

The Fourth Republic ushered in a multi-party system. However, the prominent ones were still divided along ethnic lines. For instance, the Alliance for Democracy (AD) and Action Congress (AC) still reflected the ideologies of the defunct AG and UPN - and were of a Yoruba ethnic configuration. The All Progressive Grand Alliance (APGA) which is predominantly of Igbo extraction hold sway in the Eastern part of the country; while the All Nigeria Peoples Party (ANPP) was of Hausa/Fulani extraction and of northern dominance. It is only the Peoples Democratic Party (PDP) that could be argued to have a national outlook, in that it cuts across all the three regions and ethnic groups. After the annulment of the June 12 1993 Presidential election in Nigeria, the election that produced General Olusegun Obasanjo (rtd) as the president under the platform of PDP, with Atiku Abubakar as the Vice-president could be argued to have broken the jinx of ethnicity in the political terrain of the country again. Though debatable, the victory of PDP in the 1999 presidential election was a deliberate act of the northern oligarchy to pacify the Yorubas of the Southwest over the annulment of the June 12 election that produced their kinsman as the winner.

Contemporarily, the incidence of ethnic-party politics is still prevalent in the political landscape of Nigeria, as demonstrated in the activities of AC now Action Congress of Nigeria (ACN), APGA and ANPP. The introduction of Congress for Progressive Change (CPC) led by General Mohammad Buhari (rtd) reverberates and reinforces the ethnic ideology of the Hausa/Fulani NPC party. But the merger of CPC, ANPP and ACN into Action for Progressive Change (APC) further blurred the ethnic picture of Nigerian politics. However, ethnic suspicion, disagreements and power-sharing formula are threatening the survival of this party in recent times, even after capturing power on 29th May 2015.

Moreover, despite the introduction of geo-political zoning into the national political life, ethnicity is still a major factor that is threatening the sustainability of Nigeria's evolving democracy (Çanci & Odukoya, 2016). For instance, the geo-political zoning arrangement pushes forward the agitations of the South-South people. The South-South region, which is largely made up of minority ethnic groups such as, the Ijaws, Itsekiris, Uhrobo, Agbor, among others, seems to have been sidelined in the political discourse of the country right from independence. Nonetheless, the introduction of geo-politics has brought them to the fore.

The Niger-Delta people who occupied the South-South geopolitical zone of the country have been deprived for years (in comparison to other major ethnic groups) (Çanci & Odukoya, 2016). Colonialism had only favoured the three dominant ethnic groups as earlier enunciated, with the exclusion of the
Niger-Delta people who are in the minority (Oluwaniyi, 2012). It is these injustices, consolidated by heavy cloak of silence on a number of environmental degradations issues that form the bane of the Niger-Delta struggles. Prominent among the environmental problems is oil spillage, which has affected virtually all their means of livelihood, including water, soil, even their health (Oluwaniyi, 2012). More often than not, their demands have often been suppressed by military regimes, which have also in turn triggered a number of agitations and fuelled incessant violence in the region (Oluwaniyi, 2012).

It is imperative to assert that their (Niger-Delta people) grievances were borne out of frustration and deprivation accruing from several years of neglect and rape. The challenges faced by the Niger-Delta people are encapsulated in the work of Oluwaniyi titled “The Post Amnesty Programme in the Niger-Delta: Prospects and Challenges”, (Oluwaniyi 2011:147). According to Oluwaniyi, the Niger-Delta struggles took place in the context of equity and self-determination, ethnic autonomy, lack of political participation and democratic accountability, underdevelopment and widespread poverty (Oluwaniyi 2011:147). Consequent upon these strives were feelings of distrust and dearth of patriotism, which has resulted in the emergence of ethnic-militias in the region and triggered violence conflicts. Feelings of deprivation have made them take their destiny in their hands, thereby causing a dent on the nationalistic image of the country.

In a bid to address the impact of ethnic nationalism on the Nigerian political stage, several actors - national, regional, continental and international have suggested several approaches to resolving this issue. However, in most cases, much of those suggestions have resulted in a scenario where conflicting parties are constantly agreeing to disagree. Worthy of mention is the not-too-far “National Conference” organised by the Federal Government of Nigeria (FGN) to address gaps in the constitution and a range of other national pressing issues, such as: resource control, security, political power sharing, economic, to mention a few. Though the conference could be viewed as a step in the right direction (though debatable), but the credibility of most of the nominees was questionable. There was no transparency in their selection process. In point of fact, it was not subjected to referendum. Moreover, the allowance allocated to each nominee projects the conference as a national bazaar for each representative to share out of the national cake.

**The European Experience**

Ethnic nationalism is not only limited to Africa, it is also synonymous to Europe and the United States. Drawing examples from Central and South-Eastern Europe, using Estonia and Croatia as case-study, Ethnic nationalism in these two countries is technically different from the ones practiced in Nigeria and by extension Africa.

The collapse of Soviet Union re-awakened the consciousness for secession in the minds of the Estonians; however, the country was occupied by both the Estonians and Russian ethnic nationalities. The Estonians complaint of subjection to severe political and economic injustices by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republic (USSR) and the Russians in Estonia, who when compared to the ethnic Estonians
were better off economically. This led to the formation of the Popular Front of Estonia (PFE) as a major political alternative that led the Estonian independence movement and subsequently the Republic of Estonia (Molugno, 2011:7). However, despite Estonian nationalism that deprived minorities from their political and cultural rights, Russians in Estonia preferred negotiations and other democratic measures over coercive means of conflict resolution. Till date in Estonia, ethnic nationalism is a form of collective identity and not necessarily of ethnic identity, even as the Russians in Estonia have also viewed themselves as Estonians and pursue the same ideology as the main Estonians in nation-building and in the development of the Republic of Estonia.

In Croatia, similar to the Estonians in USSR, Croats in Yugoslavia felt marginalised and endangered by Serb domination in terms of their culture and language as well as economy which was above the already strong Croatian ethnic consciousness and led to aspiration of an independent State of Croatia. This subsequently led to the formation of the Croatian Democratic Union (CDU) in 1990, and set the pace for their independence in 1991. Though there were attacks by the Serb forces backed by Yugoslav army but it was unsuccessful (Amnesty International 1999).

For the two case-studies, they both had a high intensity of nationalism, i.e. pursuing inward-looking ethnic nationalism and neglecting demands and interests of other ethnicities. But the democratic outcome of this process vary considerably, with Estonia successfully democratising and becoming a member of the European Union (EU) and Croatia experiencing stagnation in the transition process to democratisation, with high intensity of ethnic nationalism (Munoglu, 2011:12).

Ethnic nationalism as practiced in these two countries is more of civic nationalism which claims that nations are social constructs of the modern era as a result of industrialisation and modernisation of societies (Gellner, 1983) and that intellectuals invent and shape national identity in order to mobilise the mass in nationalistic movement (Guibernau, 1999:90). Civic nationalism conceives nations in terms of citizenship by offering equal rights to all citizens regardless of ethnicity (Kupchan, 1995:3; Munoglu, 2011:3).

Any Implication for Post-Colonial Nigerian State?
Despite the merits of ethnic nationalism, especially as a potent weapon for liberation as demonstrated in various African States during independence era; its contemporary form indicate a lot of danger for the fragile peace and security of Nigeria. As earlier enunciated, scholars of ethnicity spotted colonialism as the derivation and propeller of ethnic conflict in several countries, including Nigeria. However, from the post-independence period till date, ethnic nationalism has been an issue that has eaten deep into the fabrics of our nationhood and threatens its continuity.

The nature of ethnic nationalism as practiced in Nigeria today epitomises that of ethnic loyalty to one's ethnic group rather than to the nation. This is borne out of suspicion and rivalry, especially given the past experiences of the various ethnic groups with respect to civil war and other cogent issues such as
ethnic exclusion, marginalisation, political and resource control, to mention a few. The need to protect each nationality’s interest and resources, led to the emergence of ethnic militias across the three regions and the Niger-Delta as earlier stated. Though the activities of these militant groups are groundswell reactions to deprivation, neglect, resource control, among others, on one hand, it also portend a great danger to fragile peace in the country, on the other hand. It is indeed a major threat to peace and security of Nigeria.

It is pertinent to state at this juncture that Nigeria is sitting on a ‘keg of gun powder’ given the wave of incessant crises in the country, which are mostly of ethno-religious composition. Ethnic identity, and loyalty, which is the main description of ethnic nationalism in the first republic hold sway, and is still deeply rooted in Nigeria. The various ethnic configurations in the country are suspicious and bias towards one another. For instance, a typical Igbo man does not wholesomely perceive or accept the Hausa/Fulani man as a fellow countryman, rather as ‘old time’ sworn enemy, which is somehow not disconnected from the ‘Nigeria Civil-War Saga’. This is therefore a big blow on of the collective responsibility effort for the defence of the sovereignty of the country.

Moreover, the political terrain is austere in Nigeria today due to incessant crises arising from the inordinate ambitions of politicians to stay in power indefinitely, through character assassination, outright elimination of opponents and other dastard means. This model of ethnic nationalism is often employed as a strategic tool by politicians and the aristocratic class to pursue parochial interests in a bid to capture political power; mostly among their ethnic groups. Hence, ethnicity is used by this oligarchic group to mobilize, manipulate and / or hypnotise people, mostly of same ethnic group as them, for victory at the poll. This is reflected in the statement of Egwu in (Egwu, 2007) that ethnicity is “an abstraction of the ethnic group because it cannot stand independently on its own, as such, it’s always driven by the political class interest or the quest for power”. Hence, ethnic nationalism today is viewed as an impediment to socio-economic and political development in a multiethnic State like Nigeria.

When voting during election is based on ethnic sentiments and not on merit, even when the contesting candidate is unqualified for the post he/she is vying for; it speaks volume on the nature of output such candidate will produce in terms of performance, when compared to his/her counterpart who is qualified and/or a professional. Buttressing this point, Kaplan (1996) argues that “Africa has witnessed an increasing trend of conflict because its economies have performed so poorly both absolutely and relative to other regions of the World”. Hence, the varying forms of crises witnessed in Nigeria today are linked to the contingent effect of uncompromising economic circumstances and development disappointments. Ethnic nationalism based on sentiments as it’s been practiced in Nigerian context today will hamper developments, which will in-turn have exponential effects on the nation’s economy and socio-political transformation.

Loyalty to ones’ ethnic group rather the State will have adverse effect on social harmony and the unity of the nation be blurred. When social cohesion is eroded and the unity of a country is distorted, national
frontiers become porous for various forms of illegalities. Allegiance to protect the territorial integrity of the country will be compromised by the armed forces and other security operatives, given rooms to unhindered flow of cross-border crimes, such as: smuggling, drug trafficking, human trafficking, organ trafficking, small and light arms trafficking, to mention a few (Haken, 2011). Since most of these cross-border crimes are perpetrated by highly sophisticated international criminal gangs / networks, they could lay siege on a section of the country’s territory and carryout nefarious acts on the vulnerable civilian populace, while the nation is feeble. A classic example is the incessant attacks, maiming, kidnappings, killings and other despicable acts meted out by the dreaded Boko Haram terrorist sect on harmless civilian populations in the North-eastern part of Nigeria.

Furthermore, given the waves of corruption, favouritism/nepotism, misappropriation of funds and money-laundering, dominant in Nigeria's political terrain, loyalty to the nation will dwindle drastically. Political and national apathy will on one hand breed ethnic suspicion; hatred; idiosyncrasy, and criticism which will turn have adverse effect in the nation building process. On the other, it has the capacity to create and build tension, especially from the deprived or marginalised group; and if not well managed could lead to State failure which may resuscitate secessionism, and spark-off another round of civil war in the country.

**Conclusion**

This article has been able to bring to the fore the nature and conflict implication of ethnic nationalism in Nigeria and draws out lessons for Africa. The problem of ethnicity is in itself not Africa's problem. It can be harnessed for the stability and socio-economic development of the country. However, politicising it or using it as a political machinery to drive parochial interest will make it a vehicle for violence. Hence, for Africa to soar above the heights of ethnic cleavages in contemporary era and in future times, constant provision of social or public services is inevitable. Public services must be evenly provided to enhance or facilitate economic growth and development in the troubled regions. These variables will serve as palliative against ethnic strife and agitations against neglect and poverty.

Entrenching the tenets of democracy, such as rule of law, respect for fundamental human rights, independence / impartial judiciary, and independent court system, freedom of press, of association and religion will also have far-reaching positive impacts on the polity of the African State. Such system should be neutral such that citizens will be free and allow to exercise their franchise without fear or favour. Without being manipulated and bribed with money, "recharge cards" or through "rice distribution" by political party agents. In addition, there should be vibrant and effective institution and ethnic tolerance. All these will help set in motion the process of nation building.

Nation building is an essential ingredient for peaceful coexistence. However, for there to be nation-building, there must be the cooperation and subordination of all agitating ethnic nationalities and of conflicting interest and loyalty to the State provided that the latter offer to citizens the necessary climate conducive to build a strong sense of national identity. For instance, Tanzania adopted this strategy of
nation building that helped the State to curb ethnic violence. Julius Nyerere of Tanzania pursued a dogged policy in building a nation whose citizens would only be recognized or identified as Tanzanians and proscribed ethnicity from official or national records. Till date, Tanzania still doesn’t allow political parties founded on religion, race, colour or gender.

In sum, for peace to be restored in the vacillating regions of Africa, there should be a paradigm shift from ethnic loyalty to national loyalty. Africans should learn to tolerate one another and live peaceably among themselves without any suspicion and hatred. Major socio-economic nuances among regions and ethnic groups, such as inequalities, discrimination, and idiosyncrasy, corruption, amongst others should be addressed. The dividends of democracy should be felt by all, and not necessarily the exclusive reserve of the aristocratic class. Poverty, unemployment, social amenities, to mention a few, should be tackled.

References


Dynamics of Social Exclusion in Urban Bangladesh: A Sociological Study of Bihari Community

Mowsume Bhattacharjee

Abstract: The aim of the present study is to explore the patterns, dimensions and incidences of social exclusion among the Bihari community in the Geneva Camp, Dhaka. Previous research works on Bihari community have explored why they are deprived of. However, the present study addressed two basic research questions: why and how Bihari people are excluded? What is the extent and incidence of exclusion among them? The methodology of this study involved purposive and systematic sampling for area and respondent selection respectively, and, mixed methods (survey and case study) for data collection. The study used major classical and contemporary theories of exclusion to explain its underlying dynamics. Based on 150 survey interviews and 13 case studies, the study found that more than 95 percent of the respondents hide their identity and dwelling place when they stay outside the Camp. About 70 percent respondents said that they do not enjoy any political right in their personal or social life. By using the CBN method for measuring poverty, the study found that about 30 percent people are poor. However, about 70 percent people think that they are poor and excluded in terms of ethnic identity, civic alienation, stigma, and poor social capital. The chi-square test found that most of the factors of social exclusion are strongly associated with ethnic identity at the significance level of $\alpha=.01$. Finally, the study found that the Bihari people are facing discrimination in almost every sphere of society wherever they involve in, and wherever they live in the country.

Keywords: social exclusion, Bihari, Geneva Camp, stateless, ethnic identity, poverty

Introduction

Doing an empirical research regarding social exclusion is always a challenging endeavor because of the multiplicity and furtive nature of society. By definition, social exclusion means the disadvantaged population who lack full-fledged participation in society as a community. The present study was designed to explore the underlying causes and consequences of social exclusion among the Bihari community who are living in the Geneva Camp, Dhaka, Bangladesh. After having a thorough review on the previous research works on Bihari community, it has been found that the pattern and trend of social exclusion has not been studied properly from the sociological point of view. Previous research works on Bihari community have explored the research questions such as why they are deprived of. However, the present study addressed two basic research questions: why and how Bihari people are excluded? What is the extent and incidence of exclusion among them?

The Bihari people are known as the Stranded Pakistanis, who are Urdu-speaking Muslim people living in Bangladesh after the partition of India in 1947 (Yasmin 2004, Sattar 2007, Khan and Samadder 2007, Farzana 2008, and Hussain 2009). The records show that Biharis were stateless until 2008. After that, they got the citizen rights through a judgment by the Dhaka High Court, though the refugees—who were adults at the time of Bangladesh Liberation War—did not get citizenship (BBC, 19 May 2008; Hussain, 2009).

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2009). From a report by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Pakistan in March 2105 showed that more than 170,000 Biharis had been repatriated back to Pakistan, however the official data of Bangladesh government showed that there are still 300,000 people living in Bangladesh (Country Reports on Human Rights Practices, 2003 (2004); The Express Tribune, 30 March 2015).

Based on 150 survey interviews the study found that Bihari people are more excluded than the mainstream Bengali community in many respects. They have limited access to health services, educational facilities, labor-market and social services. Bihari people are mainly facing five types of exclusions such as social, economic, political, cultural, and spatial. From survey data, I have found that poverty is a prime feature of exclusion in Bihari Camp. By using the CBN method for measuring poverty, the study found that about 30 percent people are poor, while nearly 70 percent respondents claim that they have sufficient income to run their family, though they are deprived of all basic rights. However, about 70 percent people think that they are poor and excluded because of their ethnic identity, civic alienation, stigma and poor social capital. The study again showed that about 65 percent respondents are living in jobless home. Due to this poverty condition, Bihari people are unable to meet all the necessities of their lives. Most of them fail to bear the educational and health expenses of their family. As a result, many Bihari children are dropping out from school as well as living under malnutrition.

From 13 case studies, I have also found that the Bihari people are facing discrimination in every part of their life. They are excluded from broad social arena, political rights, labor market, and the mainstream culture and festivals. Moreover, poverty, lack of resources, lack of goods and opportunities, powerlessness are the manifestation of social exclusion in this Camp. In addition, hiding identity and dwelling place are two most significant indicators of exclusion, by which I found that they are excluded from their own social being or from their biological entity.

Other findings of this study indicated that more than 95 percent of the respondents claimed that they hide their identity and dwelling place when they stay outside of the Camp for work, for shopping, for education, and so on. In addition, the chi-square test found that most of the factors of social exclusion are strongly associated with ethnic identity at the significance level of \( \alpha=0.01 \). Most of the respondents claimed that they don't have access to proper housing, sanitation, health facilities, and education. Moreover, about 70 percent respondents said that they do not enjoy any political right in their personal or social life. For example, they have voting rights, but no one is allowed to hold a passport. Finally, the study found that the Bihari people are facing discrimination in all sphere of society wherever they involve in, and they are spatially alienated from main stream society wherever they live in the country.

**Examining the Relevant Literature**

The paper reviewed some important global literatures which provide insights and guidelines for the present study. Literature on social exclusion in sociology can be traced back through the writing of Emile Durkheim (1893), who tried to formulate his theory on social exclusion engaging the ideas of social order and solidarity. He claimed that modern industrial society comes through a major transformation
from agrarian society, which created social order in society in one hand, and social dislocations on the other hand (Room, 1995 cited in O’Brien and Penna, 2007:3). For Durkheim, this dislocations and disorders are the root cause of social exclusion in society (Rawal, 2008:161-162). Moreover, we find many important theorists in classical sociology such as Weber’s theory of social enclosure, Georg Simmel’s Dyad and triad perspectives, and Robert Park’s Marginal Man theory.

In the 1970s, a famous work on social exclusion carried out by French sociologist R. Lenoir who coined the term social exclusion and claims that the minority group people are always excluded in society (Lenoir, 1974: 11-16). He shows that the people who are excluded are labeled as: delinquent youth, youth addicts, runaways, physically disabled persons, mental patients, elderly invalids, suicides, alcoholics, vagrants, former delinquents, the mentally deficient, the marginal or anti-social, irregular prostitutes and so on (DIMÉ, 2005:7).

Hillary Silver, a reputed scholar on social exclusion from France, provides three influential discourses, which derived from the real experiences of the disadvantaged people from French society (Hillary, 1994:539). She shows multiple meanings of exclusion using her threefold typologies (or discourses) of exclusion such as: solidarity, specialization, and monopoly. According to Silver, these three paradigms are distinguished from political ideologies and national discourses and based on different notions of social integration and political philosophy regarding the multiple forms of social disadvantages (Rawal, 2008:167-170).

Based on French Republican political ideology, the solidarity paradigm demonstrates that exclusion is the powerful agency for the breakdown of a social bond between individual and society. This social bond is culturally and morally constructed rather than economically manufactured. This approach is based on Durkheimian social theory of anomie, which indicates the normlessness situation that threatens social order and eventually creates social exclusion. This approach also incorporates the multicultural notions of solidarity. She argued when solidarity decays, exclusion arises (Mathieson, Jane, et.al. 2008:17). The second paradigm of Silver, the specialization paradigm, illustrates that exclusion is the outcome of market failure or economic discrimination (Silver, 1994:560).

Drawing attention on Weber and Marx, the monopoly paradigm, the third one, of Silver depicts that exclusion germinates when a segment of population are intentionally driven out from the access to mainstream resources. This approach also claims that hierarchical power relations are the determinant of exclusion. According to Silver (1994: 543), “Exclusion arises from the interplay of class, status and political power and serves the political interests of the included…exclusion is combated through citizenship, and the extension of equal membership and full participation in the community to outsiders.”

Pierre Clavel (1998), another renowned scholar on social exclusion has drawn four approaches to explain exclusion through an empirical study in France. He showed that in society there are four types of exclusion: (1) an approach by population groups—in which people in the society have segmented
into major social classes where somebody are beneficiaries and others are disadvantaged; (2) the economic approach—in which social exclusion is defined by some indicators such as income, socio-economic inequalities, levels of poverty; (3) denial of rights approach—refusal of or lack of access to resources; and (4) extreme situations approach—the situation where people are considered as outsiders, alien, and unwelcomed (1998:p. 186).

Ruth Levitas, another towering figure in studying social exclusion, has also identified three discourses of social exclusion. The first one is redistributionist discourse, which claims that lack of full rights to citizenship undermines people's well-being conditions that further create poverty and exclusion. The second discourse is moral underclass, which has argued that the excluded persons are responsible for their own fate. It focuses on the dependent behavior of the poor who are destroying their capability though welfare dependency (Levitas, 2005:21). The social integrationist discourse, the third one, examines exclusion in terms of labor market attachment. It emphasizes on inequalities between paid workers, particularly gender inequalities (Levitas, 2005:26; Jane Mathieson et.al. 2008:18). Moreover, David Gordon et al. (2000) in their study show poverty and social exclusion as the major problem in recent British society. This survey shows how poverty and social exclusion are interconnected: poverty leads to exclusion and exclusion further creates poverty conditions.

In Bangladesh, I have found some significant works on social exclusion on the Bihari Community. Among them, Ahsan and Hussain (1990), Refugee and Migratory Movements Research Unit (RMMRU) (2003), Yasmin (2004), Sattar (2007), Khan and Samadder (2007), Farzana (2008), and Hussain (2009) are mention worthy. I have used these literatures for my study to find out the research gaps and to formulate the research questions. Based on their study findings I have found that the exclusion has yet not been studied through the lens of sociology, particularly on Bihari community. Thus, I have tried to fill up some research gaps in this field by conducting this study.

Ahsan and Hussain (1990) discussed different patterns of exclusion among the Bihari Community drawing samples from a total number of 300 households (150 Bihari and 150 Bengali) who are residing in the Khalishpur Camp under the district of Khulna. They have shown how the Bihari and Bengali community experience the different types of exclusion, where the Bihari community are more vulnerable because they have least political rights. Khan and Samadder (2007) in another study showed that after the liberation war of Bangladesh the Bihari people has attracted a lot of concentration. This paper examined the fear of sexual harassment, oppression, violence, crime, violation of humanity and abuse of rights among the Bihari people.

Moreover, Yasmin (2004) in her study "Beyond the Archive of Silence: Narratives of Violence of the 1971 Liberation War of Bangladesh" shows that Bihari community people are deprived of basic rights and excluded from political rights. In most cases, Bihari people are treated like an outsider, the study shows.
Refugee and Migratory Movements Research Unit (RMMRU) has published a periodical named “The Camp-based Bihari Community: Perception of the New Generation” 2003. The main aim of this series is to find out the background of the Bihari problem and the present situation of this community. This periodical also explains the different aspects of Bihari women who are living in 70 Camps of Bangladesh. This periodical also shows that the people of Bihari community are leading a vulnerable life inside and outside the Camp. They are stateless refugees because they have no state of their own, though recently they got the citizenship status in 2008.

For this study I have also used some insights from Rahman’s (2011) study “Struggling Against Exclusion: Adibasi in Chittagong Hill Tracts, Bangladesh”. This study shows the multiple dynamics of social exclusion among the ethnic minority groups in the CHT. The main thesis of this book is to find the answer regarding the question of why this ethnic minority group people are excluded and marginalized. To find out the answer of these questions the writer explored how people are being denied from their basic needs such as food, health, sanitation, education, security etc. Along with this, dispossessed from their own land is a very crucial factor of social exclusion for the CHT people, which is examined by the writer thorough political economic perspective.

Methodology and Evidences:
The study used a mixed method approach to collect data and examine the research question. Accordingly, this study interviewed 150 people from Geneva Camp located in Mohammadpur, Dhaka, the capital city. I have selected Geneva Camp because it is the biggest Bihari Camp in Bangladesh. Here currently 4084 households are living, which have 18,945 people. Firstly among the major Bihari Camps (Dhaka, Khulna, Syedpur, Nilfamari) Dhaka metropolitan city had been selected through purposive sampling technique. Then, from three Camps in Dhaka metropolitan city—Tejgaon Bihari Camp, Kalshi Bihari Camp in Mirpur and Geneva Camp in Mohammadpur—the study purposively picked up Geneva Camp as because of its historical significance.

Through systematic sampling procedures I have interviewed 150 respondents, of them male are 78 and female are 72 (as sex ratio is 1.08). In order to balance gender criteria, proportionate quota sampling has been used. Some non-sampling errors are evident in this study. For example, when I found any refusal, I have followed the replacement method as it was a systematic sampling. This study excludes partial interviews and proxies. I have conducted survey from 15th September to 20th November, 2014. A close-ended questionnaire with some options of being open-ended was directly administered to the respondents. The respondents were asked to indicate which of the items they consider important without which they would feel socially excluded, deprived, and poor. The average interview time was one hour. For case studies, I have talked about one and half hours to each respondents (total 13 case studies) using a check list. I have processed my data by using SPSS (Statistical Package or Social Sciences, version 16).
The measurement techniques those I have used for measuring exclusion and poverty are (a) exclusion index (measuring by chi-square test) consisting of most essential items which constitutes exclusion and (b) the CBN method. The study had respondents from both sections of population: male and female. Among the respondents men were 52 percent and the women are 48 percent. Here male respondents are little more (4 %) because they are more informative regarding the overall situation of the Camp. The people whom I interviewed have age range from 15 to 68 years. The highest percent of the respondents belong to age group 40 to 44 years. Among the respondents 84.7 percent are married and 15.3 percent are unmarried. Household size of the respondents ranges from four to nine. Here, I have found twenty categories of occupation among the respondents. The highest number of the respondents is housewife i.e. 14 percent. The next highest category is cook (8.7%) and the third highest number of people is unemployed (about 7.3%).

**Research Question and Hypothesis Formulation**

To get a comprehensive insight on exclusion this study had some research questions: how ethnic identity leads to exclusion, whether exclusion contributes to poverty conditions and vice versa, whether exclusion creates spatial alienation and tendency to hide identity, and how exclusion is related to the socio-demographic, political and economic correlates. Based on these research questions I have tested the following hypothesis: (1) whether there is any association between exclusion and socio-demographic, political, and economic correlates, (2) whether there is any association between ethnic identity and exclusion, (3) whether there is any relationship between ethnic identity and occupational structure, (4) whether there is any relationship between exclusion and poor social capital, and (5) whether there is any correlation between ethnicity and access to basic needs/rights.

**Theoretical and Conceptual Framework**

Existing theories on a particular field of knowledge always guide an empirical study through its major postulates, concepts, variables, and tested theses. The present study is not an exception. Theories of social exclusion in sociology can be traced back to the writing of Emile Durkheim, a renowned classical moral sociologist. Because of his focus on functionalist perspectives, Durkheim tried to formulate his theory on social exclusion engaging the ideas of social order and solidarity. He claimed that modern industrial society comes through a major transformation from agrarian society (Durkheim, 1893). Arguably, he said that this transformation phase creates solidarity and order in society in one hand, and creates social enclosure or dislocations on the other hand (Room, 1995 cited in O’Brien and Penna, 2007:3). For Durkheim, this dislocations and disorders are the root cause of social exclusion in society (Rawal, 2008:161-162).
Moreover, we find a good number of reputed theoretical works in sociology on exclusion besides Durkheim, explaining why and how exclusion originates and sustains in the broader arena of society. Accordingly we find many important theorists in classical sociology such as Weber’s theory of social enclosure, Georg Simmel’s Dyad and triad perspectives, and Robert Park’s Marginal Man theory. Later, we find more comprehensive and rigorous theories on social exclusion by the writings of R. Lenoir (1974), Hillary Silver (1994), Pierre Clavel (1998), Sen (2000), Aasland and Flotten (2000), Jo Beall (2002), Dave Muddiman (2003) and Ruth Levitas (2005). In the following I have discussed these theories in order to get more inclusive ideas about social exclusion.

**Findings**

The major findings of this study have been presented through dividing four sections: political, economic, social, cultural and spatial. Below are the major findings that I had gathered from field interviews. I have discussed the findings one by one started from political exclusion to cultural and spatial exclusion. Next, based on these findings, I have explored why and how exclusion exists among the Bihari people in discussion and analysis section. Finally, I have put major calculations and hypothesis test in appendices.
Political Exclusion

Political exclusion in Geneva Camp is more apparent compared to any other Bihari camp in inner cities. The major factors that cause political exclusion are: (i) minimal facilities provided by the state, (ii) partial voting rights, (iii) no access to passport, bank account, bank loan, and insurance facilities, (iv) no participation in the National Election, and (v) received minimal facilities provided by the GOs, NGOs and INGOs. They also do not have access to file a case and have no power to make protest against grievances.
The findings of this study showed that most Bihari people (69.3%) do not hold any political power to negotiate with state or government or political parties. About 54 percent of the respondents claimed that they do not receive any facilities from the state. The study found that they did not have voting rights since 1971; however, in 2008, after a long struggle, the state has given them voting rights and issued national identity cards. From my fieldwork I have found that 84.7 percent of the people have voting rights and 10.7 percent still do not have. Even right now 91.3 percent Bihari people have no right to own a passport. They claimed that the state never issues passport to Bihari people. However, some 8 percent people hold a passport because they got that by hiding their Bihari identity.

The study showed that 82.7 percent of the respondents have no access to bank account because of their Bihari identity; however, rest of the people got access to bank account because they used addresses outside the camp. Moreover, about 69% percent Bihari people do not have access to any form of bank loan. It is also evident that 88 percent respondents have no access to insurance facilities. Moreover, the study showed that though they got voting rights recently, 90 percent people cannot participate in the national election because they do not have a voter ID. The study found that 51 percent of the people do not have access to file a case. The study showed that 86 percent Bihari people are unable to make protest against any injustice to them. They claimed that they are powerless and have no ability to show their grievances.

**Economic Exclusion**

Economic exclusion is acute among the Bihari people. The income data and poverty line (see appendix 2) showed that 30 percent people are poor in the Camp, who are unable to spend Tk. 9000 a month (a family with 4 members). The highest number of people (about 45%) belongs to Tk. 10000-14999 income groups. Moreover, 65 percent respondents claimed that they are living in a jobless home and 63.3 respondents reported that their jobs are confined to some low pay works. About 50.7 percent people responded that they have at least two adult members who are jobless for long time. They claimed that they have more access to NGO job than Govt. jobs. Thus, 71.3 percent people reported that they have access to NGO jobs. Moreover, the study showed that low education is the main reason for economic exclusion.

The study also showed that 43 percent Bihari people face serious discrimination in working place. About 65 percent respondents reported that they are not satisfied with their recent jobs. They are dissatisfied (58 percent) because they receive low pay from the same job compared to Bengali people and 49.3 percent respondents are dissatisfied because they work longer hours than their Bengali counterparts. Moreover, 15.3 percent respondents are dissatisfied due to constant threat in working place. Furthermore, 22.7 percent respondents are frustrated due to physical torture in the working place. About 49 percent people reported that they have savings, though it is very minimal in amount. Another 15.3 percent respondents said that they have no savings because it is a daydream for them to save money for the rainy day.
Social Exclusion

The study examined the relationship between gender and income of the household, where male have the higher income compared to the female. And it is also true for expenditure. The study also showed that the people who have higher income have the higher education level. Limited access to education for their children is a very strong indicator of social exclusion in Geneva camp. Very few children (13 percent) can get access to the government schools, another 26% children have access to NGO school. In most cases, 98% claimed that, the children hide their identity to their peers. Among the respondents, 49.3 percent people reported that their children are facing discrimination in school. For example, 23.3% respondents said that the teachers paid less attention to their children. Another 13.3% respondents said that Bihari children are facing disparity in allotting stipend. Due to this discrimination, 60 percent people said that their children usually drop-out from the school.

Moreover, 92 percent people reported that they do not have access to any private clinic because of their poverty, though they got access to government hospitals. 30.7% respondents claimed that some government and non-government health services are available in Geneva Camp, though those are so negligible. About 51 percent people said that NGOs provided immunization program to them whereas 30 percent claimed that they provide reproductive health services to them. Moreover, 19 percent respondents claimed that they received various types of health awareness programs from the NGOs. About 31 percent respondents reported that they faced discrimination in hospital or clinic when they had visit to hospital.

More than 96 percent people claimed that they are very angry with their sanitation. About 69 percent people claimed that the sewerage system of Geneva camp is very bad, because almost all through the year the sewerage system got blocked with garbage. Moreover, they do not have enough toilets and thus, 72 percent people express that they are very dissatisfied with the toilet system in the Camp. More than 43 percent of the respondents said that they share a toilet with ten to eleven families and 23 percent shared a toilet with more than 12 families. About 15 percent respondents claimed that 13 people are living in a small room house. Thus, it is so vivid that people in this camp are excluded from education, health, and other basic rights and services.

Spatial and Cultural Exclusion

More than half of the population of the Bihari Camp is not satisfied with their living place; rather in most cases they feel alienated. More than 60 percent people claimed that they are living in a stigmatized place with huge frustration, anxiety and alienation, with that they are no longer satisfied. About 49 percent respondents claimed that they can rent a house outside the Camp whereas 35 percent reported that they cannot rent because of their identity and the Bengali people do not trust them. About 84.7% claimed that they have no housing and land facilities outside the camp. About 21 percent respondents said that they do not get proper services from the City Corporation. Every one claimed that they have no access to gas to cook or for other purposes; however, they all have access to electricity. Moreover,
65 percent respondents said that they have no access to safe water in their Camp; they collect water from the street, outside the camp.

A total of 95 respondents (63.3%) claimed that they can participate in the cultural festivals of the Bengali community; however, 36.7 percent people claimed that they cannot, because they feel alienated from them. Around 69 percent respondents claimed that the Bengali people are not interested to make friends with them. Most of the respondents claimed that they are not allowed in most cases to make friendship with Bengali people and to marry them. About 18.7 percent respondents reported that Bihari people are conservative to marry Bengali people, on the other hand, 50.7% respondents said that Bengali people are conservative to marry Bihari people. The study demonstrates the trends of marriage between Bihari and Bengali people. Only 46 respondents (30.7%) claimed that Bihari marry Bengali people whereas 50.7% claimed that both Bihari and Bengali marry each other. However, 18.7 percent respondents claimed that both Bihari and Bengali are conservative to marry each other. The study depicts the tendency toward hiding identity among the Bihari People. More than 95 percent respondents claimed that they hide their identity outside the Camp. However, only less than 5 percent people said that they can disclose their identity outside the Camp, but not at all times. Many of the Biharis are keeping themselves segregated from participating in cultural festivals of the nation.

Discussion and Analysis
Sociological knowledge regarding social exclusion is abundant in global arena, though in Bangladesh we find few empirical studies. The present study is one of the recent empirical works on Bihari community. From ethnographic observations, I have found that the Camp area is a non-livable place for people in modern day world. The environment of Bihari Camp is very dirty, deplorable, obnoxious, awful, unhygienic, unclean, unhealthy, and unwholesome. People are living here in inhuman conditions without having minimal access to basic needs and rights.

The Camp dwellers are facing serious housing problem. More than 8 people live in a small room and they have to share this single room for sleeping. Majority of them cannot rent a house outside the Camp due to lack of money and due to their ethnic identity. In many cases they cannot rent house because Bengali people distrust them. Bengali people suspect them because they think that Bihari people are connected with Pakistan and are harmful for Bangladesh. The Camp dwellers are also facing serious shortage of sanitation facilities. At least 15-18 families have to share a single toilet, which reveals that the numbers of toilets are totally inadequate. The numbers of bathrooms are also insufficient and pitiful. Women and young girls face problem in using these toilets at night as the toilets are very far from the living rooms and always remain crowded. In some cases they also face insecurity in using toilets at night because entry into the Camp area is not restricted; rather it is an open place for all. Findings also reveal that the Bihari people are mainly excluded from the Bengali community because of their Urdu language. That means language is the main barrier of this community to assimilate with the mainstream society. However, many of them are learning Bengali well in order to integrate with the Bengali community or for social inclusion.
From survey data it was revealed that Bihari people are more excluded than the mainstream Bengali community in many respects. They have limited access to health services, educational facilities, labor-market and social services. Bihari people are mainly facing four types of exclusions such as: social, economic, political and spatial exclusion. From survey data, I have also found that poverty is a prime feature of Bihari Camp. About 30 percent Bihari people are living in an abject poverty. Due to this poverty, Bihari people are unable to meet all the necessities of their lives. Most of them fail to bear the educational and health expenses of their family. As a result many Bihari children are dropping out from school as well as living under malnutrition.

The rate of female literacy is very low in the Camp. Many young girls have to leave their school due to eve-teasing and improper care. Bihari people often face discrimination in their working place because they receive low pay than their counterparts, work longer hours and get fired from job without prior notice. It has been found that women are more discriminated in their working place than Bihari men. They are also sexually harassed in their working place, as the case studies showed.

From 13 case studies I have found that Bihari people are facing discrimination in every part of their life. They have achieved the citizenship status, though most of them feel as stateless because they have limited access to the state facilities unlike the Bengali people. They reported that they cannot exercise political power because they have no political parties and no national representative. Rather their political life is controlled by the Bengali political leaders and local mastans.

The study also found that local mastans regularly demand subscription from the Bihari people. If Biharis disagree to fulfill their demand then they cause a lot of harms to them. Moreover, the Geneva Camp is a safe place for illegal business. For example, drug business is a common scenario of this Camp. Local Bengalis and Biharis both are involved with this business. Many young Biharis are getting addicted with drug, which is destroying the youth and children in their own community. Most of the Camp dwellers made protests against this illegal business but failed to stop for a single day. Crime and violence are also increasing rapidly in Geneva Camp. Many criminals consider this Camp as a black-hole for concealing or hiding their arms. Bihari people have restricted right to get passport because the state did not issue passport to them because of their identity. They can only get passport if they use a fake address.

Bihari people want to educate their children but their children cannot continue their study due to financial inability and some hatred toward them. Most of the Camp dwellers are rickshaw pullers, day laborers and construction workers whose incomes are inadequate for maintaining their family. Illiteracy is also high among Biharis. It has been found that the older people are more illiterate than the youths. The new generation is trying to obtain the light of education but they are facing massive discrimination in their schools. For example, Bihari people are admitting their students to the low grade schools through hiding identity and dwelling place. They cannot use their Camp address for getting admission in good and
high-quality educational institutions. In educational institutions they are often teased and insulted by their Bengali classmates, even by the teachers.

In many cases, the teachers do not give much attention to Bihari children because they cannot speak Bengali properly. The Bihari people cannot use their Urdu language in public sphere. Bengali people are reluctant to make friendship with Biharis only because of their identity. Thus, identity crisis is the prime problem of Bihari people. The older generation of Biharis is willing to repatriate to Pakistan but the newer or present generation considers Bangladesh as their homeland and are unwilling to repatriate. In spite of all problems the youths want to live in this country. Thus, there is a debate between the older and newer generation.

In a nutshell, it can be argued that the stranded Pakistanis or the Biharis are living in an inhuman condition. They are deprived of all basic necessities of modern life. The government of Bangladesh does not offer any special facilities (e.g. health, education, nutrition, housing, etc.) to them. Both married and unmarried women, young girls, pregnant women, adult and disabled people face greater health problems than the Bengalis. Only few NGOs offer them some health facilities but these are inadequate in true sense. Bihari people are always in the fear of being arrested. The police often arrest them, though in most cases they don’t have criminal reports. In many cases, Bengali local mastans and local political leaders commit crime but the blame is put on the Bihari Community.

Conclusions
In sociology, social exclusion refers to the study of non-participation of a group of people in a society. In this study, I have analyzed how and why the Bihari people are excluded from society. I found that this section of people is excluded from broad social arena, from political rights, from labor market, and from the mainstream culture and festivals. I have examined that Bihari people are excluded from five types of exclusion such as social, political, economic, spatial and cultural. Moreover, poverty, lack of resources, lack of goods and opportunities, powerlessness are the manifestation of social exclusion in this Camp. In addition, hiding identity and dwelling place is most robust indicator of exclusion, by which I can say they are excluded from their own social being or from their biological entity. For example, the study shows that more than 95 percent of the people hide their identity and dwelling place outside the Camp.

Moreover, about 30 percent of the people are poor among the respondents, while nearly 70 percent respondents claimed that they have sufficient income to run their family but they are deprived of all basic rights. However, about 70 percent people think that they are excluded because of ethnic identity, civic alienation, stigma, poor social capital, and the like. Most of the respondents claimed that they don’t have access to proper housing, sanitation, health facilities, and education. The shortage of these basic needs made them excluded. Besides, about 70 percent respondents said that they do not possess or enjoy political power for negotiation as a full citizen in this country. For example, they have voting rights, but they are not allowed to get a passport. The study also showed that about 65 percent respondents
are living in jobless homes. Thus, they reported that they are discriminated in all sphere of society wherever they lived and they are spatially alienated from main stream people.

References


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Appendix 1:

Table 1: Measuring Association among the Factors of Exclusion
(Summary Table of Chi-square Values of Selected Variables)
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dependent Variable (s)</th>
<th>Independent Variable(s)</th>
<th>Chi-square value ($\chi^2$)</th>
<th>Degree of freedom</th>
<th>Level of significance</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Hiding dwelling place</td>
<td>Gender</td>
<td>253.421</td>
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<td>$\alpha=.05$</td>
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<td>Age</td>
<td>327.545</td>
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<td>$\alpha=.05$</td>
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<td>5</td>
<td>$\alpha=.01$</td>
</tr>
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<td>Occupation</td>
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<td>$\alpha=.05$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hiding dwelling place</td>
<td>Education</td>
<td>677.343</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>$\alpha=.01$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hiding dwelling place</td>
<td>Income</td>
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<td>21</td>
<td>$\alpha=.05$</td>
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<td>726.447</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>$\alpha=.01$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poor social capital</td>
<td>Gender</td>
<td>677.343</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>$\alpha=.05$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poor social capital</td>
<td>Age</td>
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<td>27</td>
<td>$\alpha=.01$</td>
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<td>Occupation</td>
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<td>$\alpha=.01$</td>
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<tr>
<td>Poor social capital</td>
<td>Education</td>
<td>722.764</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>$\alpha=.05$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poor social capital</td>
<td>Income</td>
<td>474.432</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>$\alpha=.05$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poor social capital</td>
<td>Ethnic identity</td>
<td>372.356</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>$\alpha=.01$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Restricted citizenship rights</td>
<td>Gender</td>
<td>453.439</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>$\alpha=.01$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Restricted citizenship rights</td>
<td>Age</td>
<td>645.543</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>$\alpha=.05$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Restricted citizenship rights</td>
<td>Marital status</td>
<td>534.544</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>$\alpha=.05$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Restricted citizenship rights</td>
<td>Occupation</td>
<td>849.568</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>$\alpha=.05$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Restricted citizenship rights</td>
<td>Education</td>
<td>253.425</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>$\alpha=.05$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Restricted citizenship rights</td>
<td>Income</td>
<td>927.545</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>$\alpha=.01$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Restricted citizenship rights</td>
<td>Ethnic identity</td>
<td>658.565</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>$\alpha=.01$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Absence from national politics</td>
<td>Gender</td>
<td>529.443</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>$\alpha=.05$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Absence from national politics</td>
<td>Age</td>
<td>972.355</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>$\alpha=.01$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Absence from national politics</td>
<td>Marital status</td>
<td>677.345</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>$\alpha=.05$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Absence from national politics</td>
<td>Occupation</td>
<td>455.365</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>$\alpha=.05$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Absence from national politics</td>
<td>Education</td>
<td>345.124</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>$\alpha=.01$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Absence from national politics</td>
<td>Income</td>
<td>629.136</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>$\alpha=.05$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Absence from national politics</td>
<td>Ethnic identity</td>
<td>677.567</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>$\alpha=.01$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Feeble voice against grievances</td>
<td>Gender</td>
<td>322.764</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>$\alpha=.01$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Feeble voice against grievances</td>
<td>Age</td>
<td>734.434</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>$\alpha=.05$</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
From the above measurement it has been found that 7 hypotheses are tested between independent and dependent variables at the significance level of $\alpha=.01$, and $\alpha=.05$. Most of the factors of exclusion (dependent variables) are strongly associated with the ethnic identity (independent variable) at the significance level of $\alpha=.01$ Moreover, some factors such as gender, income, education are also strongly associated with all the dependent variables such as poor social capital, restricted access to citizenship rights, absence from national politics, feeble voice against social grievances, poor well-being conditions and civic non-participation at the significance level of $\alpha=.01$, and $\alpha=.05$.

1 Formula for calculating chi-test

\[ \chi^2 = \frac{(O - E)^2}{E} \]

Where,

- $O$ = is the Observed Frequency in each category
- $E$ = is the Expected Frequency in the corresponding category
- df = is the "degree of freedom" (n-1)

a. Observations must be independent of each other (so, for example, no matched pairs)
b. Cell count must be 5 or above for each cell in a 2 x 2 contingency table
c. Chi-square should not be calculated if the expected value in any category is less than 5
d. Chi-square requires that you use numerical values, not percentages or ratios
However, two independent variables (such as occupation and marital status) are poorly associated with the all dependent variables, which is significant at the level of $\alpha = .05$.

Appendix 2:

Measuring Poverty:

For this study, it has been found that poverty is an unavoidable consequence of exclusion. Following Bangladesh Bureau of Statistics (BBS) poverty measurement, this study measured poverty by the CBN method for a Family of four (husband, wife and two young children) in Geneva Camp, Mohammadpur, Dhaka. The poverty measurement (see table 2 below) shows that a family with four members need to earn Tk. 9000 in order to be non-poor. The family which has income less than Tk. 9000 is considered as poor in the Geneva Camp.

Table 2: Poverty measurement by the CBN method for a Family of four (husband, wife and two young children) in Geneva Camp, Mohammadpur, Dhaka

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Items</th>
<th>Quantity</th>
<th>Cost of Basic Needs (in taka)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>I. Food bundle:</td>
<td>3 meals a day</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(30 days)</td>
<td>5500.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II. Non-food bundles:</td>
<td></td>
<td>3500.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. Power (free of cost)</td>
<td>Every 30 days</td>
<td>---</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Fuel</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>600.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. House rent¹</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>700.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Festivals</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>400.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Clothing</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>600.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Transport</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>500.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Medicare</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>700.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total:</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>9,000.00</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

¹ They pay a token money of Tk. 700 to the Government for housing in the Camp
This measurement is based on income on what people can spend money for their basic needs. This measure found that about 30 percent of the people among the respondents of this Camp are poor (which also can be found if you have a look to the income data).

Moreover, among the poor (30%) about 51 percent claimed that they have the low income and about 49 percent posited that their ethnic identity is the main cause of being poor, because they are not welcomed in broader job market.
The Significance of Social Capital in State Provided Housing: 
The Case of Hlalani, South Africa

Sipho Jonathan Nkambule¹ and Takunda John Chirau²

Abstract: Under the apartheid regime, housing was used as one of the tools for segregation. Urban black people resided in townships characterized by high densities (with others staying in hostels) and inadequate services. The urgent task of the new democratic South African government was to adopt a policy framework for all citizens, hence the slogan “Housing the Nation”. The objective of the paper is to map out the forms of social interaction and community activities which exist in Hlalani in terms of the notion of sustainable human settlements in housing. This paper focuses more on the question of social capital by examining both intra-household and inter-household relations and the kinds of social networks which exist within Hlalani. The paper argues that social capital formation is contributing to community belonging and social cohesiveness remains an elusive dream for Hlalani residents. The paper concluded that social networks which do exist in Hlalani do not enable community participation and do not provide the basis for the reduction of poverty.

Keywords: housing, social capital, community, households, sustainable

Introduction

The apartheid system of racial domination, bequeathed a racially-based spatial legacy in urban South Africa which regularly undercut the emergence of social capital. When a city is so systematically divided through acts of authoritarian social engineering like the South African city, the end result is often social alienation and segregation. After the 1994 democratic elections, the African National Congress (ANC) government adopted the Reconstruction Development Programme (RDP) to address, amongst other apartheid legacies, the housing needs and aspirations of the poor, politically marginalized and economically exploited (Kallis and Nthite 2007: 3). The houses built (by the government) under this programme became to be known as RDP houses. The RDP saw an important role for housing and it implied that housing is central to economic growth and development. In the post-apartheid South Africa social capital and social cohesion have emerged as an area of key interest to various government departments, including the Department of Human Settlement, aiming to combine community building and a whole of government approach to policy. The most contemporary housing policy is the Breaking the New Ground (BNG) which aims among other things to create and maintain a safe, strong, socially cohesive communities which embrace community life and social connections, and to provide economic opportunities, access to clean water, sanitation, safe place free from crime, etc.

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The main argument made in this paper is that state’s involvement in public housing programmes, does not seem to contribute significantly to the social reproduction of urban black communities. The significance of social capital to these communities, in the face of limited housing provision by the state and grand claims about human settlement sustainability, becomes critical. In South Africa social capital in public housing is the least researched and indeed is often overlooked completely. The main aim of the paper is to examine the kinds of social capitals which exist in Hlalani (a township in Grahamstown, Eastern Cape Province), and whether these social networks contribute positively to their daily survival livelihood strategies. The paper discusses the following main topics theory of social capital in housing, research design, background and socio-economic conditions in Hlalani, intra-households-relations, inter-relations, community participation in development and community activities, positive and negative networks.

**Theory of Social Capital on Housing**

There are a number of problems in the formulation and usage of this concept. Social capital is a hotly contested concept. The arguments made by different scholars are that there is no one clear definition of social capital and it is ambiguous. According to Tzanakis (2013) the concept has been widely used in different fields as a formula for societal problems and non-economic solutions. The broadening of its meaning and the weakening of its application has resulted in questioning of its true content. However, social capital is undoubtedly of sociological interest which describes communal vitality. The paper draws from both Bourdieu and Putman viewpoints on social capital, and study uses these two theories to analyse data. The way Bourdieu and Putman theories on social capital deal with the problems of the society differ. Bourdieu speaks of sociology of conflict or struggles, forms of deprivation, domination and power. Contrary, Putman discusses about sociology of social integration. In his theory concepts of trust and social capital are guided by question about machineries that foster “integration of the values of society, solidarity and togetherness; and that create consensus and sustain the stable development of society” (Siisiainen 2000: 22). For Van Schaik (2002), social capital is measured by the individuals’ attitude towards trust and norms and values of reciprocity. In short, how individuals invest in each other through time, resources and support. Putnam (1993: 3) defines social capital in terms of:

- Community cohesion associated with: the existence of co-operative and accessible community networks/organizations; high levels of participation in these; a strong sense of local identities; and high levels of trust, mutual help and support amongst community members.

However, this definition has been heavily criticized due to its strong connection to social cohesion. According Bourdieu, social capital is “made or potential resources which are linked to possession of a durable network of institutionalized relationships of mutual acquaintance and recognition – or in other words, to membership in a group” (Bourdieu, 1986: 248). He describes social capital as a form of capital owned by members of a group. In this regard, social capital is a collective valuable resource providing its members with credits, and it is sustained and solidified for its usefulness when members remain in
the social network. Bourdieu describes social capital as the totality of all resources available to someone by being part of a social network. He believes that there are three elements of capital which are all related to class. These capitals are social, economic and cultural. In Bourdieu’s view social capital is associated with the volume of accrued social capital and size of network controlled by an individual (Bourdieu 1986: 249). He further argues that the main reason individuals join certain networks is the envisaged profit. This kind of profit is not necessarily economic, however, he believes that actors profit more from economic capital than other capitals. The agents’ potential for accumulating social control and profit of are unevenly distributed. Bourdieu’s views have been heavily criticized for favouring economic capital as the main source of profit than the other capitals (Alexander, 1996; Jenkins, 1992).

In Putman’s perspective social capital is seen as a “blessing” that decreases anti-social behaviour, stimulates democracy and has financial benefits. According to Putman social capital has more benefits. There are said to be three significant outcomes of social capital. Firstly, it enables citizens to resolve common problems more easily through increased cooperation. Secondly, it facilitates the processes that allow communities to develop through increased levels of solidarity and trust. Thirdly, it works as a mechanism to distribute information that facilitates the achievements of collective and individuals goals (Putnam 2000: 290). Putnam view that trust has all-positive results is baseless and it demonstrates to be naïve in practice. Such assumptions fails to recognize that trust can also be created by conflicts, and mistrusts. Bourdieu theory on social capital is not interested whether the results of social capital are positive or negative. Portes (1998), notes that social capital can have negative and positive results. Positive social capital as linked to enforced, assured solidarity and obligatory trust, and on the hand negative social capital is associated with unsociable networks that have detrimental impact to the society as a whole. This could have negative implications for the surrounding society (Werner 2007: 4). Portes is against Putman’s idea that social capital always produces positive outcomes. He believes that there are a number of negative aspects associated with social capital. One of the key negative aspects is the exclusion of individuals who are not part of social network (Tzanakis 2013).

Three basic forms of social capital are normally identified in the literature, namely: bonding, bridging, and linkages. Bonding social capital focuses on strengthening already-existing social relationships such as religious associations, regional-based groups, gender-based groups and ethnic or racial organizations and associations. Bonding social capital therefore reinforces solidarity and norms of reciprocity among people who have an existing high level of trust between and among themselves. However, this kind of social capital can undermine integrative objectives linked with broader society because it is exclusive. Bridging social capital allows social interaction and relationships between diverse groups of people, and often between groups and people across the usual social divides. Therefore, “if bonding social capital provides a type of superglue between highly trusted individuals and groups, then, bridging social capital reduces friction and increases movement between unrelated and often, unknown groups of people” (Tatlietal. 2011: 14). Both types of social capital are important to the success of societies in a number of ways. However, each type has its own weakness. Finally, linking social capital involves relationships between:
Different social strata in a hierarchy where power, social status and wealth are accessed by different groups. Positive examples of linking social capital include shared habits of participation in civic affairs, and open and accountable relationships between citizens and their representatives (Moobela et al. 2007: 6).

In this regard, the emergence and existence of strident civic organizations are seen as crucial in building linking capital specifically networks between ordinary citizens and those in authority, hence allowing ordinary people to influence and be engaged in decisions made by state structures which directly their community (Lake and Huckfeldt 1998: 567).

Studies in sociology of housing has long accepted that a house is more than just a shelter it is associated with things like the neighbourhoods, economic opportunities, community facilities and all these things have significant repercussions on social capital as they can influence the way people interact and bond with each other and the sense of community among individuals (Foley 1980; Pynoos 1973). Housing is the central constituent of the built urban environment (Chui 2004) and plays a pivotal role in all dimensions of sustainable human settlements. These dimensions are social, economic and environmental (Tibaijuka 2008: 1). Crucially, the social dimension of sustainability often encompassed under the notion of social capital. Despite the fact that housing provision need resources in form of financial capital for their development, it become quite clear that economic resource alone do not lead to human settlements sustainability. This has led to the acknowledgement that combinations of resources are crucial to improve human settlement wellbeing, including human capital, cultural capital, economic capital and social capital.

**Research Design**

This section focuses on the research design which provided the basis for the paper. A mix of quantitative and qualitative methodology was adopted in the study known as mixed methods approach. A qualitative style of methodology involves the surveying targeted group, participation of the researchers and direct observation, in which is trying to comprehend a specific phenomena. Quantitative style includes survey research which produces information that is intrinsically statistical in nature (Neuman, 2003: 364). Qualitatively, the research entailed informal in-depth interviews and focus group discussions. This qualitative research work aimed at capturing the forms of social and community interaction which exist. The in-depth interviews were conducted face-to-face and guided by an interview schedule. They each took no longer than one hour to complete. Forty-two interviews were conducted, mainly with the same people who were respondents to the questionnaire. We held two focus group discussions. One group consisted of ten participants and the other had fifteen participants. The participants were selected from the questionnaire respondents and interviewees. The discussions, like the interviews, were recorded on audiotape for accuracy (Puchta and Potter 2004: 97) but the researchers also took notes with regard to the interaction taking place between the participants. Each focus group discussion lasted about 45 minutes. In terms of quantitative research, a survey was undertaken based on a fixed questionnaire (Bryman 2004; Dick 2006) and a selected sample of Hlalani residents.
The survey was particularly important with respect to provide an overview of socio-economic conditions in Hlalani, including the status and character of the houses occupied by residents.

The municipality has built approximately 560 RDP houses for Hlalani residents. Fifty households, consisting of 287 people, were surveyed (with the number of people per household ranging between two and nine persons). The survey participants have been staying in the study area generally for more than eight years and the sample selected was based on purposeful sampling. The aim was to identify households which occupy (RDP) subsidized low-income housing and not self-constructed shacks. Also, the researchers were not able to obtain a complete list of all residents in Hlalani who occupied state-subsidized housing and hence a simple random sample of a clearly identified universe was not possible.

Results and Discussion

Background and Socio-Economic Conditions in Hlalani

The study was conducted in Hlalani (meaning “Stay There”), which is one of the townships in Grahamstown East. Hlalani was one of the first sections of Grahamstown East to receive RDP houses in the 1990s. Grahamstown is located in the second largest province in South Africa (the Eastern Cape Province) and is the heart of the local Makana Municipality (which exists within the larger Cacadu District Municipality). It is situated 120 km from Port Elizabeth to the southwest and 180 km from East London to the southeast. The province has a population of 6.4 million people, with fourteen per cent of the population of South Africa living in the Eastern Cape (Census in Brief 2003: 6). Many residents in Hlalani have moved from informal settlements into RDP housing in recent years. Though this has led to some sort of fixed property ownership on their part, poverty remains very pervasive in the township because of unemployment, low wages and limited alternative livelihood strategies. Of the fifty households who participated in the study, all but one household had a member who worked in the formal economy on a fulltime basis. But, given the low monthly wages, households are struggling to sustain themselves on the available income with significant debt existing for many households. In the survey, Hlalani residents with full-time formal employment consisted primarily of females, and they included the following low-skilled employees: shop assistants, construction labourers, domestic maids, security guards and one administrative assistant. Domestic work, which is notorious as a low-paid sector of employment, is the predominant full-time employment. The salaries range from R1,300 to R3,000 per month, with the breakdown of salaries (from highest to lowest) as follows: the administrative assistant (R3,000), maids and security guards (between R1,800 and R2,000), and construction labourers and shop assistants (between R1,300 to R1,500). The female-headed households with children rely quite heavily on the child support grant as a source of income.

Residents in Hlalani are not only victims of unemployment and marginalization, as they are agents in their own right thorough ingenuity and creativity. They do this for instance through
informal economic activities as a source of income and survival. The economic activities include selling
firewood, providing transport to carry goods from town and around the township using a donkey cart,
selling homemade beer (called umshovalale) and selling meat such as tripe; there are also money
lenders, hairdressers and robbers who rob people for survival. Income generated from these activities
is for basic and immediate household expenses. Those who sell or provide services often provide their
customers with credit and sometimes this is not paid or is not paid in good time; this of course
negatively affects their business and cash flow. Although they engage in a number of informal
economic activities for survival, these activities do not positively contribute to their daily lives. In short,
they are not sustainable because they are still trapped in the circles of poverty.

The level of poverty in Hlalani is reflected in the education of residents. The fieldwork reveals that there
is a very high dropout rate from school in Hlalani and that there is a negative view of the role of education
in facilitating any improvement in socio-economic status. In this respect, one female participant noted
that:

"Many people are educated and some of them are graduates from colleges like Midlands but they
are unemployed. So it is a waste of time to be educated in our days (March 10, 2012)."

Most participants in the survey argued that dropping out of school arises because of household inability
to pay for school uniforms and other education-related expenses. Learners wearing old uniforms to
school are subjected to ridicule. The research findings revealed that 16% of the participants have a
primary level education, 22% have a lower secondary level education, 26% a higher secondary level
education, 12% some kind of tertiary education, while 24% of the participants are illiterate.

Though the length of stay in Hlalani for survey participants has been reasonably long, the
poverty context has led to a situation where relationships between households do not seem to be based
on high levels of trust. This is consistent with the argument by Richards and Roberts (1998: 8)
that "poverty and economic crisis lead to an unstable situation, where individuals do not have much to
lose by breaking trust". Poverty and housing are inseparably linked (Blane 2006) and, in the case of
Hlalani residents, their conditions of poverty are constantly manifested in their day-to-day lived
experience in relation to housing, water, sanitation and other services. Greater dependence on social
capital among poor people becomes imperative in times of reduced state commitment of resources to
improving the lives of the poor, but the question of the existence of social capital in communities like
Hlalani is complicated and questionable as explored in the following sections.

Intra-Household Relations

Households are a key focal point of contemporary human societies and a fundamental basis for social
structuring of society and the social positioning of individuals in society. They are a critical place where
social values if not produced are at least inculcated and, for this thesis, an important place and space
for the generation, maintenance and possible undermining of social capital (Edwards et al. 2003: 3). This section, in looking at intra-household relations has one sub-section, namely, family bonds.

**Family bonds**

The research clearly shows that residents in Hlalani value their families as a site where identity and bonding relationships are forged. Dodson and Wilson (2009: 52) suggests that family relationships “do not offer many of the positive factors found in friendships” but the study indicates that families continue to play a significant role in Hlalani, and that local residents turn first to family before turning to friends for various forms of assistance. Even more specifically, relationships of mutuality exist within immediate families more so than extended families. One unemployed male resident aged 30 noted in this regard:

> I do not ask anything from my relatives, I only ask from my mother if I need anything. My mother looks after me (Interview, April 16, 2012).

Despite relational problems existing in some households more than others, family social relations tend to be characterized by trust, reciprocity and strong social ties. Parenting was found to be a key mechanism in the development of values such as trust and cooperation (and of social capital more abstractly). These types of familial relations exist in conditions of marked physical overcrowding within houses in Hlalani. On average, at least amongst the residents who formed part of my study, there are about seven individuals in any one house (with house sizes being about 40 square metres). According to (Graydon 2001), the definition of crowding depends on local cultures such that it is not unusual for large families under certain socio-cultural conditions to share what other cultures might consider cramped physical spaces. At some point, however, questions about space do begin to have a negative effect on the mental, emotional and sometimes physical health of household members. Overcrowding though in itself may not lead to an undermining of social connectedness and social cohesion (Stone and Hulse 2007: vii) amongst family members located within a particular household sharing a common physical space.

It may in fact be the case, with regard to Hlalani households, that the existence of large families in limited spaces brings these families together as socially functional units based on specific forms of interconnectedness. For instance, the cramped space within the RDP houses provides a number of vital opportunities to intermingle and interconnect together, if only to chat and watch television. RDP houses as physical structures, though perhaps built with insufficient cement, nevertheless cement the occupants together in a manner which more spacious houses would not. One of the unmarried female participants therefore stated bluntly:

> It is not good for the house to be small but its advantage is that it makes us very close (Interview, March 15, 2012).

Overcrowding in Hlalani hence may not be understood by occupants in the same manner as posited by outsiders. However, it may be that Hlalani residents have adjusted to a bad situation and are seeking to rationalize their everyday existence as a form of compliance to a social condition which is beyond their control.
In this respect, it is certainly the case that problems do exist within Hlalani families sharing a RDP house. There are signs of disturbances, disrespect, arguments and divisions at times, but these cannot always be reduced to space constraints in any clear linear fashion. In some cases such problems can be attributed to questions about space. For instance, in certain households, family members on occasion come back home late at night, make excessive noise and disturb other family members who are sleeping. Such issues raise levels of stress and have the potential to boil over into more serious long-term problems including physical violence (Chan et al. 2006: 2). Hence, there is a correlation between the size of houses, overcrowding and conflict, though this is not a universal one. The study shows that sometimes conflicts within families consolidate relations or act as a binding agent between family members rather than being associated with stress and divisions. In this regard, drawing from Bourdieu and Putman theories of social capital one would argue that conflict is the basis of trust and solidarity in some families in Hlalani.

Inter-Household Relations

By way of summary of the key findings, it seems that in Hlalani there is only limited evidence of patterns of cooperative social interactions; in other words, mutual reciprocity and social cohesion are not pervasive and this leads to, if not a divided community, then a community devoid of social unity. This section is divided into two sub-section namely, neighbourliness and friends.

**Neighbourliness**

When asked if they look after or assist each other in the immediate neighborhood, 40% of respondents answered ‘yes’ and 60% answered ‘no’. Those who answered ‘yes’ believed that they have a sense of reciprocity with their neighbours, whereby they assist each other in times of need. Some of those who answered in the negative highlighted that even though some households in their area are relatively well-off financially, they do not help others in times of crisis. They spoke about the plight of particularly youth of school-going age whose education could be uplifted with support from the broader community. The implication is that this type of support is not taking place in Hlalani, as households tend to be inward-looking rather than community-spirited. This is despite the fact that residents would clearly prefer some kind of inter-household symbiotic relationship which enhances the livelihoods of all Hlalani households and brings about strong community ties.

But households generally had only limited interaction with their immediate neighbours and most felt that it would be awkward to ask for financial or other forms of assistance from neighbours for everyday needs let alone for extraordinary ones. This also stems from general mistrust between neighbours including positing insincere motives behind any out-reaching arm from another household. As one male resident aged 36 bluntly claimed:

> Some pretend to be helping you but they don’t mean it. They will go around saying, ‘I helped him’ and this is not good (Interview, March 25, 2012).

This overall hesitancy in forming inter-household bonds or even ad hoc relations of assistance is evident in the case of disputes within the community. Many disputes take place between households in Hlalani,
including over alcohol, girlfriends or boyfriends, money and gossip. When asked if they sought mediation when disputes do arise, 34% of respondents answered ‘yes’ and 66% answered ‘no’. Those who answered ‘yes’ had sought mediation from other nearby households or from locally-recognized and mutually-accepted structures. Most of those who answered ‘no’ indicated that, while disputes do occur, they no longer seek mediation because they do not trust any locally-based mediators; in the past, they claim, mediators took sides without first fully identifying the nature of the dispute. Others believe that there is no need to ask for mediation, as they handle the matters directly (without necessarily resolving them) or they prefer to let the dispute dissipate uneasily if at all. In Bourdieu’s terms Hlalani settlement is a site of conflict and domination to accrue resources which in many cases results in the division of inter-household relations.

The discussion so far would seem to imply that Ubuntu does not in any way exist between households within Hlalani and therefore fails to animate relationships between them. Ubuntu means “a spirit of fellowship and humanity” (Burnett 2006: 124). In short, it refers to the sense of community and morality linked with traditional African societies. The study directly confirms the absence of Ubuntu, at least in terms of the social meanings which residents give to inter-household relations. There is a claim, among the older residents, that any loss of Ubuntu has a generational dimension. The younger generation is said to have contributed to the undermining of inter-household unity. The absence of Ubuntu in Hlalani amongst those who reminiscent about it means the absence of humanity, dignity, unity, reciprocity and trust.

The notion of trust indeed runs as a central theme in many of my interactions with Hlalani households. When asked explicitly about trust between households, only 22% of respondents said that they trusted their neighbouring households. Such low levels of trust are expressed in the erosion of any sense of identity and identification vis-à-vis Hlalani as a site of community belonging. Some residents speak openly about suffering back-stabbing by their (seemingly) once trustworthy neighbours, such that they have looked for and found ‘neighbours’ (or people they can trust) outside of Hlalani. Many relationships between nearby neighbours (understood spatially) in Hlalani have been broken, never to be repaired. Insofar as there was bridging social capital between households in the past, it appears that this has been drained out of the community; with some households almost completely alienated from any interaction beyond their own household.

Friends

More than half of the respondents (56%) indicate that they have friends in the neighbourhood, though it seems that the depth of friendship is often shallow or that friendship is intermittent or turns sour very easily. Friendships are particularly vital for young adults who are mainly unemployed. Friendships in these cases offer some meaning to everyday existence and also allow young adults to structure their days. The friendships established between young male adults are often replacements for the absence of meaningful relationships within their respective households; these young adults are prone to fighting
verbally with their parents and hence friendships within Hlalani may relieve or alleviate tensions built-up elsewhere.

Male friends tend to meet at street corners and in shops to discuss sports, girls and sometimes politics. The most common type of reciprocity entails the exchange or sharing of cigarettes, alcohol and illicit drugs, and the relationships as a general tendency are based on these instrumentalist-type transactions. Sometimes they steal to buy alcohol and drugs; however, they do not see themselves as criminals. Male friends also go to taverns to drink alcohol and there they sometimes meet the friends of their friends. Expressive support is not in evidence in these male friendships. Although there is instrumental support, it is found in petty things like the exchange of cigarettes and alcohol. The networks of young female adults are very rich in expressive social support, as they find it relatively easy to go to their friends and share their personal problems. They realize though that these problems are likely to be shared with others in the female-based network and hence will not remain confidential. Female friends, compared to male friends, appear to make greater use of information technology (including “WhatsApp” and “Facebook” via cellular phones) to stay connected, remain close and disseminate news. In this sense technology contributes to the formation of social capital through female networks in the settlement. In this regard, it is important to note that “the formation of social capital Information and Communication Technologies are found to enable individuals to thicken existing ties and generate new ones” (Zinnbauer 2007:23). The significance of this quotation is the reference to generating new ties. In Hlalani, the cellular phone-based technology enables young female adults to establish new contacts and networks and possibly friends outside Hlalani. In this sense, “WhatsApp” and “Facebook” are contributing to the erosion of any residual bonds of spatial proximity in Hlalani settlement. In Putman’s (2000) thought this is “privatization of leisure”. High levels of trust do not seem to exist within either male or female friendships. Sometimes the friendships appear to be mere pretense and more equivalent to acquaintances.

**Community Participation in Development and Community Activities**

Community involvement and participation in common activities is a key element in identifying the existence of social capital in practice and it facilitates community development (Reid 2000: 3). Participation in informal community activities and in civic associations is a form of social networking which enhances the prospects for sustainable communities (Narayan and Woolcock 2003: 238). The study of Hlalani found that only low levels of participation exist, such as cultural activities and sports. Indeed, when asked explicitly about belonging to community-based organizations, 80% answered in the negative.

During the planning phase of the RDP housing development in Hlalani, residents were not consulted by the state in any shape or form; no community input or local expression of views were incorporated into the planning phase. Hence, when asked if they were encouraged to participate in the planning phase of the housing development programmes, all respondents claimed that no such encouragement was forthcoming from the state. In fact, all residents claim that they have been totally excluded from any engagement in community development initiatives and that this absence of engagement has
effectively destroyed any prospects of a sense of community belonging, identity and pride. Hlalani residents feel isolated and excluded from the state. By being consulted, residents emphasized in particular the sense of pride and degree of ownership over community projects which might emerge. In one focus group, they asserted that:

If Councilors had consulted us at the planning stage of the housing development project in order for us to voice our views, for example to contribute to the design of the houses, we were going to like our houses and our settlement. So we are not proud of the houses and the settlement itself (May 20, 2012).

Linking capital, with specific reference to the relationship between state and citizenry, is all but lacking in Hlalani. Because the municipality is at the coal-face, the wrath of Hlalani residents is in large part directed to the local municipality which, after all, is the constitutionally-assigned local development agent. Residents repeatedly spoke, and quite aggressively at times, about the sheer un-accountability of municipal officials when it comes to ongoing service delivery problems in Hlalani and they claim that such officials are there simply to line their own pockets. In this regard, Bourdieu would argue that the municipal officials’ main reason to join the municipality was the calculated profit, thereby depriving the poor their rights to access to basic services.

Attendance at community events may contribute to a sense of belonging as this provides residents with opportunities to come together, interact and participate (Holdsworth and Hartman 2009: 89). Instead of any municipality-sponsored events, Hlalani occupants (74%) rather attend cultural and traditional events independent of the state. The dominant ethnic group in Hlalani is Xhosa-speakers and Xhosa culture is respected locally and upheld on a regular basis. Any differences and divisions between households are set aside and laid to rest on a temporary basis in the pursuit of observing cultural practices and events; such events are held by a particular household on for instance the death of a family member. They do this, as the dominant reasoning goes, because attending a cultural event while holding grudges against neighbours or against the household holding the event will mean that Xhosa ancestors will not bless the ceremony. In a Durkheimian sense, then, these ritualistic events have the unintended consequence of bringing about some degree of harmony and cohesiveness to an otherwise disjointed and dysfunctional local community.

These traditional ceremonies though do not only enhance social interaction, as they also play a role in relieving poverty. One male respondent aged 50 therefore claimed, in self-interested fashion:

You know traditional ceremonies are beneficial to some of us because if there is a ceremony we attend and we will get food. This relieves the stress as I do not have food at home (Interview, May 24, 2012).

Hlalani residents invest energy and time in preparation for traditional ceremonies because of some inkling or perhaps expectation of a return on the investment. Some residents help the household holding the ceremony by, for example, cutting wood or slaughtering a goat or cow, expecting that they will receive food and alcohol in return at the ceremony when held. The kind of reciprocity generated here is what could be called ‘tit for tat’ reciprocity. Although cultural ceremonies seem to facilitate social interaction, again there is a sense in which this interaction entails some degree and kind of pretense and therefore rings hollow in terms of building longer-term relationships. Those who do not attend such
ceremonies (26%) gave the following reasons: being unaware of the event or being too busy, or because the events are not relevant to their interests or their age group.

Involvement in leisure activities is also important in creating community networks and bonds vital for social cohesion. Different sports teams exist in Hlalani, including for rugby, cricket and soccer. A number of respondents cited that there are many talented sports people in Hlalani and a significant willingness on the part of residents to engage in sports, but that there are no playgrounds, sports kits and sponsors. This has a negative impact on the generation of social capital in Hlalani because “sport provides opportunities for the development of both bridging and bonding social capital” (Tonts 2005: 139). Thus, the absence of playgrounds, soccer kits and sponsors detrimentally affects the quality of residents’ everyday life and inhibits community integration and belonging.

Positive and Negative Social Networks
This section focuses on three institutions which prevail in Hlalani: churches, stokvelsand gangsterism. The section identifies their implications for social networking and cohesion in the local community. During good times and troubled times, individuals turn to a range of different institutions for support and comfort (Robicheaux 1998: 4). We refer to churches and savings clubs (known as stokvels) as positive networks and gangsterism (in the form of the gangs called the ‘twenty eights’ and the ‘twenty sixes’) as negative networks from the perspective of primarily bridging social capital. All these institutions exemplify bonding capital, but it is important to note that even ‘positive’ networks are exclusionary. Nevertheless, churches and stokvels are far more likely than gangs to generate social capital of a kind which will facilitate community cohesion.

Church

The interviews reveal that churches provide both expressive and instrumental support. Expressive support entails assisting church members emotionally during stressful times. For example one female aged 55 participant noted:

      Church is where we offload our burdens especially on Thursdays during women’s prayers. As women we’ve got problems, so this makes us to unite and to be one and carry other’s burdens through prayer. When you come out of church you will feel better (Interview, May 22, 2012).

From this statement, it becomes clear that the shared problems faced in life in this case, by womenbring residents together, acting so to speak as ‘social glue’. Instrumental support entails supporting church members materially and financially. Besides these contributions, church members attend the funeral wearing the church uniform which symbolizes unity in Jesus Christ. Reciprocity and trust help church members to cooperate and work together to achieve shared objectives. Indeed, church members believe and in most cases, quite rightlythat mutual assistance is embedded in their daily practices and this has a direct influence on social cohesion. However, this reciprocity is exclusionary in that social support is only available to members of that particular church or denomination.

On the whole, the study reveals that members of church communities have more extensive and stable social networks and greater access to social support than do their non-church going co-residents. But
even within churches, there is variation in levels of support provided. More specifically, active church members receive more social support and less active members receive less support. This is consistent with the study by Ellison and George (1994: 58) which concluded that “active participants in religious congregations may receive greater social support, on average, than their less active or unchurched counterparts”. Such practices act as a form of social control in preventing non-church members from abusing the resources found in the church; and, for less active church members, it acts as a way of disciplining members to ensure that they adhere to church principles. In Portes (1998), line of thinking the churches in Hlalani enforces positive social capital through providing resources to its members to reinforce active church participation, solidarity and trust while non-members are excluded.

**Stokvels**

Many women in the study who are single mothers and sometimes widows are members of *stokvels*; this helps these women to generate sources of income to raise their children. A *stokvel* “a type of credit union, or communal buying group, in which a group of people enter into an agreement to contribute a fixed amount of money to a common pool weekly, fortnightly or monthly, to be drawn in rotation according to the rules of the particular stokvel” (Townsen and Mosala 2008: 1). *Stokvels* in Hlalani help members in many ways in addition to financial assistance. They satisfy participants need for sharing, belonging, social interaction and emotional support. Although Bourdieu has been criticized of privileging economic capitals over other capitals but in the case of Hlalanistokvel members joined the group mainly for economic capitals. The research highlights though that there are very few *stokvel* associations in Hlalani. Many other *stokvels* existed in the past, but divisions arose within them and the members went their separate ways. The reasons cited for their disbanding involve claims about some co-members, namely, that they are unreliable, untrustworthy, marked by jealousy and practice witchcraft. *Stokvel* members highlighted the importance of trust in their associations, and they indicated that there are mechanisms in place to build and maintain trust and ensure that the social networks flourish. They thus recognize that trust “is a key ingredient in transactions, a lubricant permitting voluntary participation” (Dasgupta 2001: 312), though ensuring that members comply (such as confirming bank deposits) seems to go contrary to a living and active trust.

**Gangsters**

The research found that there groups of gangsters in Hlalani which are involved in criminal activities such as rape and robbery which negatively affect the community. Due to the fact that community policing in the area is almost absent, the settlement has become a breeding ground for gangsters. Reputation is very important to all gangsters in Hlalani. The gangsters gain and maximize their reputation by being as violent and anti-social as possible, at least in relation to the forms of crime within which they engage.

The gangsters are called the ‘twenty eights’ and the ‘twenty sixes’. The twenty eights rob people without normally harming them physically; however, sometimes they do molest or rape victims. The twenty sixes rob and intentionally harm people; they believe in shedding blood and sometimes victims are killed. The twenty eights are called ‘sunrise’ because they operate during broad day light, while the
twenty sixes are labeled ‘sunset’ because they operate at night. The effects of the gangs on the community as a whole are fear and terror, both day and night. The local concentration of young males who are unemployed and lack tight familial social controls facilitates gang membership; once a member, gang discipline kicks in. But between the two gangs there is conflict at times, despite or perhaps because of their different modus operandi. One male respondent aged 30 who is a member of the ‘twenty sixes’ claims:

The twenty eights and the twenty sixes hate each other because of their differences on how they do their business [of robbing people](Interview, May 22, 2012).

Even within one particular gang there is antagonism. The same gang member said:

We don’t trust each other. It is the survival of the fittest; you must always watch your back (Interview, May 22, 2012).

The only reciprocity that occurs in the gangs is that of alcohol, dagga and other drug substances. Although they operate as a group, they do not emotionally support each other if for example a member loses a family member. In these groups there is no expressive social support. Violence is not only directed to the community but even to members within the group, often through initiation ceremonies. In the case of membership in the ‘twenty six’ gang, as indicated by a member of this gang, each member will need to kill someone at some time to ‘strengthen your number’ (Focus Group, May 22, 2012), that is, to gain full membership. In Bourdieu terms the gangsterism field in Hlalani is a site of conflict, violence and domination. In this kind of association violence and power is produced and reproduced by the gangsters as they are enjoying the game that they are playing. Clearly, then, these gangs while engaged in intense bonding social capital internally are negative networks in the sense of minimizing the prospects for a broader, community-wide bonding process. This kind of “evil networks” (as we would like to term them) may be labeled by sociologists as a sign of “fragmented society”, “anomalities”, “social traps”.

**Conclusion**

Overall, the current social networks which do exist in Hlalani do not facilitate community participation and do not provide the basis for the alleviation of poverty. Low levels of trust and solidarity in particular do not allow for the emergence and development of efforts to bring about change by engaging with local state structures in any meaningful manner. Intriguingly the absence of linking capital, or the disenchantment of Hlalani residents with the local municipality, does not appear to animate the consolidation of bridging capital between households of a kind in opposition to the municipality. If anything, this absence has led to a withdrawal of Hlalani households from broader interaction with each other and thus has served to insulate households from each other. In other words, it may be that bonding capital within households is intensifying. This argument, we would suggest, is the key contribution made by this thesis to existing sociological knowledge. Bonding, bridging and linking capitals must be seen as mutually animating each other, and in a contingent and fluid manner. Although they may be discrete and separable analytically and descriptively, they point to sets of social relationships on the ground which intertwine and give shape to each other. Their particular forms and the interrelations between them are historically- and socially-produced and therefore subject to change.
The discussion of social capital leads to the inevitable conclusion that sustainability is a misnomer with respect to Hlalani.

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Bumster Subculture and Rastafari Identity in The Gambia: The Search for Survival and Social Mobility among Marginalised Male Youth

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Abstract: The Rastafari Movement grew out of the obscurity from the Jamaican island homeland in the early 1930s, and with time metamorphosed into a leading and iconic socio religious and cultural movement with diverse global following using reggae music and other Rastafarian hallmarks as powerful means of transporting the vital messages of Rastafarianism. The movement has nevertheless, localized, and reinterpreted in different ways depending on where it has been appropriated. There is evidence of the profession of the Rasta tradition among young people in numerous places in The Gambia expressed through the sway along reggae music, dreadlocks, and many other paraphernalia. This article examines the evolution and diffusion of the Rastafari code of behavior and ideology, and argues that the beach boys in The Gambia locally known as bumsters have adopted the Rastafari identity as source of livelihood and a ticket to a more prosperous life and upward social mobility that involves tourist-related sexual-economic exchanges of power and control.

Keywords: Bumsters, internalization, Rasta, Rastafari, Reggae, tourist, youth

Introduction
The youth in the West African country of The Gambia constitute the largest proportion of the population (36.7 per cent aged 13-30 years) and constitute the cohort experiencing excruciating living conditions brought about by poverty, deteriorating economic opportunities, widespread unemployment, fragile economy, limited skills, and globalism. Faced with the fact of bleak economic opportunities and constricting chances of securing a feature, many of the males among them as observed, embrace and experiment with cultural products and lifestyles inconsistent with Islamic tenets by meshing into a ghettoized urban male youth subculture of pseudo-Rastafarian and consequently appropriate the visual signifiers of Rastafarianism—listen to reggae music, braid or roll up their hair into dreadlocks, and smoke marijuana— as they simultaneously identify with the global Muslim community. But while they experiment with and assert dual identities, they are still confronted with the barriers of being able to secure a living. The seemingly feasible option for this set of young people is to take advantage of the opportunities in tourism for livelihood as beach boys or bumsters as they a called in The Gambia, and interact with White female tourists for material gains and invariably free themselves from the hegemony of the elders in their pursuit of survival and some future of stability.

Background of Rastafari Roots and Ideology

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The Rastafari movement has its historical roots within the liberation struggles of the African diaspora. It developed in the slums of West Kingston, Jamaica’s in response to slavery and colonialism of the country’s past society, and by extension the exploitative and oppressive conditions of the Western World. King (2002) places this narrative within the context of three distinct historical timelines: (I) Marcus Garvey and Ethiopianism (1870-1930); (2) the coronation of Haile Selassie as emperor of Ethiopia and the formation of early Rastafarian churches (1930-1949); and (3) the emergence of the Youth Black Faith as a militant faction within the Rastafarian movement (1949-1958). A common strand implicit in the first and third narratives out of which the Rastafarian movement emerged were the manifest conditions of economic deprivation, political disfranchisement, and cultural alienation that prevailed among Afro-Jamaicans; reaching its nadir in the 1920s and 1930s. Though the hardships of the 1920s and 1930s might have been indeed part of the precipitant situations, Edmonds (2003, 32) submits that “the crowning of Ras Tafari (his original name) as Haile Selassie, emperor of Ethiopia, was the main catalytic event that called the Rastafarian movement into existence”. To understand why the coronation of took on such significance, we have to recognize that Haile Selassie audaciously resisted and confronted the ferocious forces of colonialism at a period in history when Africans were considered chattels of the invading European colonial powers. His utter disgust with the ravaging scourge of poverty borne out of inequality and exploitation, as well as his unequivocal condemnation of institutionalized racism triggered an avalanche of reactions that became one of the driving forces behind the decolonization and subsequent ‘liberation’ of Africans, Diaspora Africans, and other oppressed people of the world from the manacles of colonial oppression and servitude. Hence, those who founded the movement regarded the coronation of Haile Selassie, the last Emperor of Ethiopia, Elect of God, known as Jah as the fulfillment of a prophecy of deliverance and the downfall of Babylon (a reference to Western political and economic domination and cultural imperialism) and the deliverance of the black race. The Rastas adopted the term Babylon from the Christian scripture, a direct reference to its embodiment of the cultural ethos of the forces that worked against “the people of God”, the Hebrew (Edmond 2003).

From its conception, Rastafari Movement considers all Africans in the diaspora as exiles in Babylon “destined to be delivered out of captivity by a return to Zion, that is, Africa, the land of our ancestors or Ethiopia, the seat of Jah, Ras Tafari himself….” (Chevannnes 1994,1). Thus, the Rastafari movement provided hope to the disenfranchised, strengthening displaced Africans with the promise that Jah Rastafari is watching over them and that they will someday be restored to the promised land of Africa which they lost by being taken to the Caribbean by slave traders. This suggests why repatriation has been the cornerstone of Rastafari belief, although this has changed for many modern-day Rastafarians. Even at that, Edmonds admits that “Rastafari represents an attempt of the African soul to free itself from the alienating fetters of colonial domination and exploitation and to recreate itself in the image of Africa” (2003, 42).
Internationalization and Diffusion to Africa

The Rastafari movement has transited from obscurity to a cultural phenomenon with widespread local and international following. Hansing describes it “as one of the leading Afro-Caribbean religions as well as most popular cultural trends in the world” (2006, 62). The process of internalization culminating to the diffusion to Africa originated in the 1970s when reggae started the global spread it enjoys today (Elias; 2010; Savishinsky 1994b). Savishinsky (1994b, 21) identifies a combination of factors that aided the spread and popularity of Rastafarian philosophy and culture in West Africa. They include: (1) the widespread appeal and penetration of reggae music and the religious and sociopolitical messages embodied therein, (2) the ritual/secular use of cannabis and its associated trade, (3) the appropriation of Rasta-inspired fashions and (4) the missionary work carried out by Jamaican and Anglo-Jamaican Rastas. However, Hansing isolates reggae music and other popular cultural media as the primary catalysts in the movement’s international spread. She goes on to point out that “it is the only contemporary socio religious movement whose world-wide diffusion is directly tied to a medium of popular culture; reggae music” (2006, 61). In Africa, Rastafarianism in all its manifestations has been popularised by the musical form of reggae with strong youth identification particularly and its role of giving voice to the voiceless. It is not surprising that it has become a popular vehicle for meaningful social evaluation, social engagement, and change. As Spencer (1998, 27) observes, “Africans have welcomed reggae and wedded it to their national concerns. Of all continents, Africa has explored reggae the most as a means to chant down colonial oppression”.

But then, the literature of the phenomenon on the continent has limited geographical range. Savishinsky traces one of the initial penetrations of the Rastafari cultural motif in Africa to the early 1970s when Jamaican Rastas began settling on land emperor Haile Selassie reserved for blacks in the New World seeking repatriation to Africa. Surprisingly, the Marxist government accommodated them with forbearance despite their veneration of Haile Selassie. Perhaps, it was the presence of Jamaican Rastas in Ethiopia that appears to have stimulated some interest in Rastafari among a small contingent of urban-based youth, as evidenced perhaps by the numerous reggae bands that surfaced in the capital Addis Ababa during the early to mid-1980s.

On the manifestations of Rastafarianism in West Africa, Sashivinsky (1994a) claims it derives directly from Jamaican predecessors. “West African manifestations of Rastafari as I was quick to discover (during fieldwork), largely derived from and mirror their Jamaican counterparts forebears in both form and function” (p.125). According to Bergman (cited in Savishinsky) the reggae and the Rasta mystique billowing across Africa had climaxed in West Africa in the mid 1980s and became a dominant factor within the sub regional cultural landscape.

Chawane (2012), admits that there is no recorded history of the rise of Rastafarianism in South Africa. However, he found in the work of Oosthuizen elements of individual Rastas in Soweto during the late 1970s. Like in other parts of the world Johnson-Hill (1996) attributes the large-scale transfer of Rastafarianism from Jamaica to South Africa, to reggae music, which preached Garveyism and Ethiopianism, the bedrock of the Rastafarian movement. Jimmy Cliff was the first reggae artist from
Jamaica to visit South Africa in 1976 at the height of apartheid and performed in Soweto, Cape Town and Durban (Chawane, 2012). Despite the controversies that dogged his presence—over what was perceived as a breach of the international cultural boycotts in protest against the apartheid system, Chawane believes that Cliff’s performance did much to popularize reggae among black South Africans with reggae music which sings against oppression in such tracks as House of Exile.

Subsequent visits by both reggae flag bearers, Peter Tosh, and Bob Marley (who did the most to promote Rastafarianism globally) to Southern Africa in the early 1980s eighties added vigour to the spread of Rastafarianism in South Africa. While Bob Marley performed at the independence celebration of Zimbabwe in 1980, Peter Tosh performed in Swaziland during Christmas of 1983. These two visits contributed greatly towards drawing the attention of youth in Southern Africa to the movement culminating in the rise of local reggae stars among whom was the late Lucky Dube (sometimes considered the “father” of reggae music in South Africa) who not only had the greatest impact but also happened to be one of the most successful, innovative, and internationally renowned African reggae artists to emerge on the continent in recent.

Moyer (2005) provides us with a compelling case of the rise of the Rastafari/reggae phenomenon among poor youths in Dar es Salaam and elsewhere in Tanzania linked in part to Bob Marley, and the mass production of sounds and images associated with Rastafari culture—a trend that has become increasingly common over the last several years. According to Barnett, it is estimated that the Rastafari movement exists today in some shapes forms, and structure throughout most African nations. Besides, reggae music and some of the outward aesthetics of Rastafari are swiftly on the rise within the African continent in general particularly among young men living at the margins of global capitalism.

At this point, there is need to understand the close association between the Rastafari movement and reggae music; a movement founded on resistance. As a matter of fact, music goes beyond an expressive effort. Music is culture, and “music is an incredibly powerful (emotional) force” (Garofalo 2011, 727). It is “a determinant of diverse communities and can serve as a bridge between different people and communities by offering an accessible form of communication across cultural boundaries” (Mattern 1998, 7). Eyerman and Jamison (1998) offered one of the initial significant and stimulating explanatory efforts in the reciprocal relationship between social movements and music. Accordingly, they argue that “Movement ideas, images, and feelings were disseminated in and through popular music, and at the same time, the movements of the times influenced developments, in both form and content, in popular music” (1998, 108). What is important to note is that reggae music delivers social and political commentary. It is important that any social revolution must first begin with an awakening of individual social consciousness. While the imperial capitalist authorities established many social structures, organizations, and institutions to groom the masses for consensual social control, the content of reggae music attacks these very structures. Thus music and song of any culture, from any era, can serve as a window into their history and perceived realities. Since political sentiments have often been expressed musically, “people with political commitments have certainly turned to music as
a means of expressing their ideals, often with the expectation that listeners might be persuaded by the lyrics. And movements have often embraced songs that crystallize their core beliefs” (Roy 2010, 1).

As an instrument of oppressed and marginalized people, reggae music is critical of Babylon, capitalism, and the status quo, and is empowering at various levels. Today, the Rastafari Movement has become a ubiquitous popular culture deeply entrenched, and observable in the visual arts, performing arts, literature, ritual smoking of ganja (marijuana), the symbolism surrounding Emperor Haile Selassie I, and reggae. In many ways it was reggae music that brought the Rastas into the limelight. Reggae resonates with Rastafari, a spiritual resistance nucleus and Back-to-Africa identity which has been a triggering factor for the music, and has become an element of this culture on which the Rastafarian Movement has made its boldest mark. To Murrell (1998, 1) ‘The long, natty dreads on the heads of Rastafarians, who fearlessly chant down Babylon with the help of reggae music, make Rastafari a highly visible movement and a globally powerful cultural force’. Echoing this, rock critics Davis and Peter Simon, (cited in King 2005, 90) believe that reggae propelled “the Rasta cosmology into the middle of the planet’s cultural arenas, and suddenly people want to know what all the chanting and praying and obsessive smoking of herb [marijuana] are all about”. Savishinsky places the interaction between Rastafari and reggae into one of its best perspectives when he argued that “for whereas many who have written about Rastafari claim it to have acted as a major source, inspiration, and catalyst in the creation of reggae”, and concluded that “nearly all acknowledge the fact that reggae has functioned, and in many instances continues to function, as the principal medium through which people the world over have acquired their knowledge and awareness of Rastafari (the lyrics of Jamaican reggae songs having been dominated since the early 1970s by Rastafarian themes, imagery, and symbolism)” (Savishinsky 1994a, 260). Today, the terms ‘reggae’ and ‘Rasta’ have become so closely linked in minds of many that they are frequently accorded the status of synonyms. But this popular perception of the movement is by no means an accurate one. Nevertheless, the framing processes used in reggae as a platform for political and social commentary has undoubtedly serve a critical role in sustaining the Rastafarian movement.

Rasta in The Gambia: Appropriation and Reinterpretation

The Gambia is the smallest country in the West African sub-region with a predominantly youthful population that is urbanizing rapidly. The adherence to the Rasta philosophy and culture remain a strong current among a conspicuous number of urban youth some of whom are migrants from within the West African sub-region. This resonates with the findings of Savishinky that Rastafari has in the course of its history drawn its largest and most committed international following from mainly from both disenchanted, poor, and marginalized youth, as well as from among people whose auctochnous culture has been suppressed or supplanted supplanted by western modes, imposed during centuries of colonial and neo-colonial expansion. (Hansing 2005). In other ways, while reggae music not only holds a prominent place in the hearts and minds of this segment of the population it continues to serve as a major force in the urban pop music scene and to some extent appears to represent the ongoing assimilation by urban-based youth of the culture of the Diaspora.
Almost everything in any society has a potential for profit and the Rastafarian movement and reggae are no exception. The popularity of reggae in The Gambia has resulted in the development a ghettoized urban male youth subculture of pseudo-Rastafarian groups who appropriate the cultural trappings of Rastafarianism—listen to reggae music, braid or roll up their hair into dreadlocks, smoke marijuana, and imitate the dialect, without embracing its religious and ideological doctrines. The reasons, significance and potential implications for this have a lot to do with economic opportunism. The Gambia economy depends largely on agriculture, tourism and services but social mobility and successful livelihoods among youths are challenged by a number of barriers including unemployment, underemployment, poverty, drop-out from school, employability due to limited skills, and in some cases lack of all relevant connections to strategically positioned kin or patrons. In their attempt to beat looming poverty, many youths in The Gambia aspire to migrate to ‘Babylon’, a name for the West; perceived to be a dream destination and land flowing with numerous economic opportunities. The ‘Babylon syndrome’ in which young men yearn for, dream about, discuss, devote long evenings wishfully planning, and aspire towards travelling to the West in order to escape the misery encapsulated in Gambian existence, is a widespread ambition among this subculture.

Broadly speaking, being a *semester* (local word for Gambian youth who lives in the West visits the country on vacation) is a status symbol and as such this forms the core of their fantasies and aspirations since such an opportunity is perceived as the only sure and steady source of regular remittances back home, acquisition of local assets, investments, and self-fulfillment. Many options are explored in attempt to achieve this ambition including formal visa application at respective Western embassies of their choice, or, risking their lives in illegal trafficking scams, going through the ‘back way’- attempting risky long sea trips all of which are fraught with high failure rate. The ‘back way’ option is usually a back-up exit strategy in the quest for better life overseas. In the neighbouring Senegal, Mbaye (2012) links this phenomenon with the following driving forces: i) willingness on the part of the potential illegal migrant to accept a substantial risk of death, ii) biased and erroneous expectations of potential migrants, highlighting the fact that people may base a risky decision on incorrect information, iii) the existence of a positive relationship between migrant networks and illegal migration motivations; which is attributable to the fact that that friends and relatives (FARs) who have already migrated help reduce the costs associated with illegal migration. In this case as he further argued, FARs can sometimes provide less than accurate information about their living conditions abroad, thus increasing the desire of potential migrants to undertake the move, iv) the fact that host countries’ stricter immigration policies might not be effective and may backfire. For him, while they may deter potential legal migrants from migrating, they may not halt illegal migration. Such reasons may well explain the desperation for illegal migration from the Gambia in search of improved standard and quality of life in the West, after all the majority of the youth in both countries share similar socio cultural and economic experience due to geopolitical and historical links.
Invariably from impoverished families, unskilled, have little or no education, and are sometimes illiterate, poor and vulnerable; the seemingly feasible option for this set of young people is to take advantage of the opportunities in tourism for livelihood as beach boys or bumsters as they are called locally. What actually appears to be the attraction to the tourism industry as a soft-landing spot for survival is the seeming earnings made from it despite their lack of skills, training, and education. According to Nyanza et al (2005) such earnings for some were much better than most salaries and wages and were used to provide support for their friends and extended family.

Tourism is a very vibrant and productive sector second to agriculture in its place in the economy of The Gambia. It is an important foreign exchange earner and major source of both formal and informal employment. Indeed, while the sector’s generated employment is projected to increase from an estimated 16,000 jobs in 2004 to around 35,000 jobs in 2020, its contribution to the country’s Gross Domestic Product is targeted to increase from an estimated 13 percent in 2004 to around 18 percent by 2020 (See The Gambia Tourism Development Master Plan Final Report 2006). The tourism industry is geographically stretches along a 10 kilometre strip along the Atlantic coast, constituting the Tourism Development Area (TDA). It has attracted heavy investments in tourism development by foreign investors resulting in many foreign-owned tourist resorts and facilities. The country is primarily, a winter-sun packaged holiday destination that utilizes both formal and informal operational intermediaries. Among the core formal intermediaries are restrictive official tourist guides, tour operators, local shops and restaurants and other formalized and tourist services. Informal tourist sector intermediaries include the unlicensed guest houses, all those individuals and micro enterprises which engage with tourists and the tourism industry, but are not members of the Gambian Hotel Association or the Tourism and Travel Association, and bumsters who by the fluidity of their activities act as informal guides and culture brokers provide opportunities for the tourists to meet the local community outside the official tourist space. Perhaps, it is within the context of the structure of both intermediaries as well as the infrastructure surrounding this package tourism that creates the permeable boundary that creates the need for the bumster (McCombes, 2012).

Fashioning themselves as Rastafarians; they wear dreads, listen almost exclusively to reggae, and smoke marijuana. As a predominantly Muslim country it makes sense to perceive them as embracing and experimenting with products and lifestyles that are un-Islamic. However, it could be argued that for some Gambian youth the choice of ‘Rasta’ identity is borne out of the desire either for a lifestyle or subculture which to them provides an alternative to the traditional world of their parents and elders which not only marginalizes them but has become irrelevant to their needs. Along this line of thinking, Beyat and Herrera (2010) see the Muslim youth in both the global North and South as navigating between asserting their youthfulness and often times their Muslimness within a threshold mediated by a host of social, economic and political settings within which they operate. In this respect, “the Muslim youth, located in the process of globalization … share many significant points of convergence with their global generational counterparts, especially when it comes to concerns about livelihood (Beyat and Herrerer 2010: 362). It thus becomes a fact that “many individuals observe the cultural aspect of religion
without necessarily adhering to the entire doctrinal ethos, moralities and spirituality (Nyanza and Bah 2010:112). For most of these Rastas, there is more money to be made offering services to tourists than any other form of options. After all it is only a matter of time before they meet the European or American benefactor who will make their dreams come through.

As such, the Rasta identity gives them access to tourist space and time to explore and court friendship with female tourists, preferably middle-aged and elderly single and unaccompanied white female tourists or ‘toubab’ (as Westerners are locally called) believing that they are all rich. This identity is also used to signal the wearer’s availability as escorts for female foreign tourists. Consciously or otherwise these tourists reinforce this image of affluence in the way they display and flash money around; with some women doing so deliberately for the purpose of seducing the men into a relationship with them. For some of these females, tourism provides requisite latitude for unhindered behavioural and sexual expression that is constrained by the home environment (Van Wijk 2007). Perhaps, it not impossible that as Pruitt and LaFont (1995) suggest that “while some of them want to redefine confining gender roles or engage in “forbidden” interracial relationships; others simply desire a new “cultural experience” (425-8). In these tourist zones, these bumsters advertise their carefully constructed Rastafarian identity by shaking their dreadlocks dry on beaches and further employ a range of seductive technique to establish ambiguous relationships as a prelude to initiating conducive clime for the provision of romantic and sexual services. From the point of view of McCombes (2012) this attitude is “not through personal desire but in order implicitly or explicitly to obtain money or goods of some sort and the possibility of upward social mobility” (2012: 300), and in other cases in exchange for possibility of foreign travel, a Western work permit, permanent residence or citizenship overseas (Nyanzi et al., 2005). Given these antecedents, the biggest accusation levelled against bumsters by other segments of the society is that ‘they sleep their way out of The Gambia with old White women’. Pattison (2012 1995: 304) places them into one or more of the following compartments: “(1) Mr. Friendly; (2) Mr. Businessman /Entrepreneur; (3) Mr. Casanova; (4) Mr. Criminal/Scammer; (5) Mr. Disguised/Sophisticated bumster, and (6) Mr. Sympathy Seeker”. Nevertheless, in the eyes of the female tourist, these bumsters seemingly possess many favorable qualities waiting to be explored. From the perspective of Pruitt and Lafonte (1995: 431). “The penchant foreign women have for men with dreadlocks is fueled by the mystique associated with the dreadlock singers of the international reggae music culture who project an image of the Rastaman as a confident, naturally powerful, and especially virile man”. In fact, a study by Sociologist Joane Nagel in the Caribbean found that given the stereotypes of black men as a highly sexual and masculine local, dark-skinned black men with dread locks receive a greater degree of attention from foreign women than those without. The Rastaman is thus constructed as the exotic Other, more passionate, more natural, and most important more sexually tempting. So, why these female tourists arrive with their finances alongside their preconceived ideas of sexual desire and exoticism stemming from their ideas about race, sexuality, class, difference; the Caribbean men capitalize on Rastafarian motifs in order ally themselves with the conceptions of the visitors. Such reason may well explain why some bumsters adopt the Rasta identity in The Gambia.
Policy makers, youth advocates, and the media are critical of this trending youth subculture and describe it as not only a dangerous pastime but a dissipation of potentials and resources. Even the leadership of the country has severally assailed this attitude and blames the youth for choosing the way of illusion and day dreaming of migrating to the West at all costs rather than taking advantage of the emerging educational opportunities as well as important policy frameworks including the Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP), The Gambia Priority Employment Programme (GAMJOBS) and Programme for Accelerated Growth and Employment (PAGE). By way of elaboration, the PRSP was implemented in two phases (2003-2005, and 2007-2011) as a medium term planning framework for reducing poverty in the country. The latter was developed around five cardinal pillars in attempt to improve on the gaps and lapses identified in the former as follows: i) Creating an enabling policy environment for rapid economic growth and poverty reduction ii) Enhancing the capacity and output of productive sector iii) Improve coverage of basic social services and social protection needs of the poor and vulnerable iv) Enhance governance systems and build the capacity of local communities and Civil Society Organizations (CSOs) to play an active role in Economic Growth and Poverty Reduction v) Cross-cutting Issues (IMF Country Report, 2011). To further address the growing unemployment and poverty situation, the Government of The Gambia, with assistance from ILO and UNDP, launched the GAMJOBS. The overall objective of the programme was to demonstrate the centrality of employment creation for poverty reduction with particular focus on the youth and women. Its priority action plan consists of four key areas: i) Mainstreaming employment in macroeconomic sector and social policies. ii) Strengthen labour market policies and institutional reforms. iii) Establish a Gambia Enterprise and Skill Development and Training Fund (GETFUND) for employment and job creation). iv) Promotion of labour intensive technologies in public works/programme to create employment and sustainable livelihoods (The National Employment Policy and Strategies 2010-2014). PAGE was developed to be will be implemented during the period 2012 to 2015 as a successor to The Gambia’s Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper II. Its main thrust is mainly to improve among other things employment levels, per capita income, social services, gender equity and The Gambia’s economic competitiveness. To do this the national priorities revolved around sustainably exploiting agriculture, tourism, infrastructure and other natural resources, and producing conducive environment for a private sector led economic development as well as and partnering with civil society organizations to provide relevant social services and protection for all (PAGE 2012-1015). A common strand that runs across these policy framework packages is the provision for training and vocational skill acquisition for sustainable livelihood among the youth.

Harassment of tourist by bumsters in The Gambia is well documented (Gregg and Trillo, 2003; Master Plan Study, 2005; Carlisle, 2010). During the beginning of the 2002-2003 tourist season, the Gambian government established a tourist Police Force which, in collaboration with the national tourism authority, launched an ‘anti-bumster’ campaign during to control and regulate the menace of the group. Further effort on the part of the government was to round up obvious-looking bumsters, shaved off their dreadlocks, and routinely mounted surveillance within the Tourism Development Area (TDA). Bumsters were outraged by the action. While some permanently fled the business others operated covertly, and
those willing were offered an opportunity to train for various vocational. The anti-bumster operation was viewed with mixed feelings by some groups including human rights activists, tourists, investors and proprietors in the tourism industry, independent economic analysts and journalists. According to Nyanzi et al. (2005) proprietors in the tourist industry were vocal in welcoming the initiative as a solution to the threat that bumsters posed to profits earned from tourists and toubabs or White foreigners. Despite the general negative perception of bumsters, Carlisle (2010) finds that they arguably justify their actions as wanting a share in the tourist expenditure as they may find it difficult to secure alternative means of sustenance.

Thus as the economic fangs bite harder, hanging around middle-aged, and elderly white female tourists as a prelude to marry their way out of poverty to a perceived comfortable life in the West offers an alternative space to refashion meanings to success among these male youths. This mindset is further reinforced by the success stories of other youths whom they consider to have gained some measurable sense of accomplishment in this enterprise; hence their desire to build their pathways to success however unconventional.

It must be recognized that analyzing the encounter and relationship between the bumster and the female tourist is not a straight forward task because they hold contradictory images concerning the nature of the relationship. It is a material encounter for the ‘Rasta’; given the desire for Western materialism and a Western lifestyle, as noted previously, and an emotional encounter of love and companionship for the female tourist because she want to become more exotic, carefree and sexy (Pattison 1995). Besides, “travel allows some Western women to sexualize their bodies in ways that would be difficult to achieve while maintaining their honour back home (Taylor 2000, 46). While this may be indeed be an exaggerated description, power and control remain essential component of this encounter, especially when it involves a relationship that take place in developing countries. If that is the case, the core question becomes who exploits who in this relation, and to an extent, whether it is a mutually beneficial arrangement. In The Gambia scenario it is argued that the ‘Rastas’ are exploited by female tourists (the same way men exploit female prostitutes) since the economic power and idiosyncrasies of the female tourists dictates the gamut of the relationship with them. (McCombe 2012). In The Gambia, as in other destinations, these female tourists rediscover their sense of womanliness and sexuality by being sexually desired by their partner. Women who are either on the shelf or who feel shunned by men in the West over issues of height, weight, and not being attractive find that in The Gambia all this is reversed. If that is the case, the idea of control on the part of middle-aged, and elderly white female tourists from Europe and North America holds true in so far as these white female tourists can use their greater economic power and or racialized identities to exert control over the relationship. Such control means that these women can secure compliance in the relationship and also forestall the risk of being jilted, abandoned or humiliated by the bumster. But in other ways, power could be relational. For instance, “the wearing of dreadlocks also signifies sexual prowess, marijuana, naturalness, erotic-exoticness, and liberation from all forms of oppression” (Kibicho 2009, 117). Driven
by this notion, Pattison rejects the claim of uneven power locus and argues that the Gambian male equally has reciprocal power, and writes:

“The male Gambians use their bodies as a form of power to attain the aspiration of a Western lifestyle and to take control of their livelihood. Appearance is important in terms of the construction of identity of the Gambians. The’ boys’ deliberately grow long dreadlocks to fit the image of the Rasta, in the belief that women find them exotic, ‘rugged’, and masculine. They wear tight shirts to show off their muscular bodies” (2012: 224).

Bumsters feel empowered when they win the affection of the rich Western women who are in most cases considerably older than themselves. From their perspective, power comes not necessarily through sex but what the seduction of the Western women represents. Power and control also emerges in the way the boys treat the women: seduce them for their sex and money and then abandon them when opportunity knocks. Paradoxically, Kibicho finds the bumsters’ male-assertiveness a momentary posturing since they quickly condescend to the feminine subject position in their encounter with the Western female tourists. Perhaps, from a cultural standpoint “it is sickeningly un-macho for a man in traditional in traditional African patriarchal culture to giggle and flirt, and to walk down the streets holding hands with a woman” (Mwangi 1995, p.2 cited in Kibicho p, 117). Further to this aberration as Backwesegha (1982) argues is that “all the things a beach boy must do to get a Western woman to go out with him demeans his masculinity in local cultural terms,” (Backwesegha, p. 17 cited in Kibicho p, 117). With this in mind, he see the whole idea of going out with a elderly Western female tourist for material, pecuniary reasons a loss of self-control and negation of local social norms. But even at that, Pattison believes that in The Gambia, the bumsters employ sex as a form of power and resistance to the exclusionary nature of the tourism industry perceived to suppress and exclude them. The material, sexual encounter gives the Gambian power over his peers; through the conquering of the rich Western foreigner; through acquisition of wealth and through image. There are high expectations and peer pressure for a young local male to get into a relationship with a white foreign female. Many Gambian males use White, Western women as symbols of wealth, respect and power. For the Gambians the older the richer the female is, the greater the respect for the male amongst his peers. There is a certain respect or social standing given to those local people in a relationship the richer, older women is likely to take the bumster overseas. Kibicho found in Kenya a similar defense mechanism the bumsters employ different guises to mask their subservient feminine roles; often stressing and asserting their masculinity to their audience; extraordinarily emphasizing on their sexual prowess, stressing their ability to control their Western women lovers, and consuming alcohol in unwise quantity to free them from social rules and responsibility for their actions.

From the perspective of Kibicho, it could be said that that the bumster female tourist relationship serves dual purpose in that it provides the former with an opportunity to escape from economic hardship while at the same time creating a situation in which they can at least pretend to control the Western female tourist who is in a structurally more powerful position.
Conclusion

Although the Rastafari influence is visibly present in the Gambia its symbolism has been adopted by the bumster subculture many of whom possess little or no insight into the deeper historical, religious and sociopolitical significance of the movement. To them, it more of a survival strategy and a means to become part of a global life to which otherwise they have no access; through encounters and relationships formed with Western female tourists in the tourism space for financial and material gains. Although this encounter is characterized by a complex web of negotiations of power and control on both parties, the Western female tourists exercise a greater degree of dominance since they use their greater economic resources to exercise power and control over the relationship into which they enter with the bumsters. It is very clear that the bumsters’ desire for economic gains in such encounters is in direct opposition to authentic Rastafari ideology. For many of the women seduced by romance encounters, the actual experience can unmask the projected fantasies/myths as some of the men abandon their women they moment they arrive the West. In this sense, the bumsters are only pseudo-Rastas that commodify Rasta motifs; they utilize Rasta imagery to capitalize off of the exotic expectations of tourists.

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Female Headed Household’s Rural Livelihood Trajectories in Post-apartheid former Bantustans of South Africa: Emerging Evidence from the Eastern Cape

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Abstract: Since the inception of apartheid South Africa, the rural livelihoods of female headed households have been multiple in order to maintain household economic well-being. The paper examines the contemporary livelihood trajectories of female headed households in Cala communal areas of post-apartheid South Africa. In order to get to the core, the paper examines how female heads earn a survival amidst underdeveloped rural economy. Three life histories in form of ‘vignettes’ are explored, this imply the qualitative nature of the study. The major findings of the paper are firstly; female headed households are largely agrarian-land based, natural capital continues to give life to female heads amidst deagrarianisation. Secondly, remittances still play a crucial role in households where there is rural-urban nexus (this does not apply to all the female heads). Thirdly, female heads rely largely on state transfers described as predictable and constant. Furthermore, the study unfolds that female heads in Cala are not homogeneous but rather varied. The social differentiation of female heads in Cala is largely configured by productive assets among the thriving households, surviving households and struggling households. It is this social differentiation that divide the ‘have and have not’s’ of the rural areas. The paper concludes that, despite the ‘little’ derived from livelihood activities, female heads continue to manoeuvre their way out and at times rise above their circumstances.

Keywords: livelihoods, rural livelihoods, state transfer, social differentiation, agrarian, deagrarianisation

Introduction

Rural livelihoods particularly of female headed households are important to be understood as they face different kinds of vulnerabilities. South Africa inherited a highly skewed economic system which disapproved rural economies. Livelihoods in former Bantustans of post-apartheid South Africa remain precarious and female headed households are at the brink of collapse. The paper draws from livelihood enquiry to examine how female headed households are earning their living amidst prevailing socio-economic and political conditions. The paper anticipates that the livelihoods of female heads are wide-ranging as the households exist in different circumstances. The rural underdevelopment suggests that social differentiation of female heads is largely shaped, continue to be shaped and reinforced by poverty (despite the roll-out of the state transfers in form of grants).

The paper is structured as follows. In the first instance, the historical continuities of segregation and apartheid are explored. This detailed and yet nuanced discussion uncovers the social, political economy of South Africa during apartheid. Secondly, Redistributive and Neo-Liberal Programmes and impoverished rural livelihoods are explored. The section unfolds the economic policies that the democratic government since 1994 implemented to address the historical imbalances between the minority and the majority of South Africa. It also focuses on the livelihoods which rural citizenry employ.
to earn a living. Following this, is the significance of the study and the methods and techniques used to gather evidence of this study. Following that, is a presentation of the empirical data collected, the discussion should be read in terms of the thriving, surviving and struggling households. Last section speaks to the social differentiation of the female heads.

**Historical continuities of segregation and apartheid**

Segregation and later apartheid South Africa is well-remarked for its racial discriminatory tendencies in all spheres of life (this includes the social, economic and political). Apartheid South Africa is regularly understood as involving petty apartheid and grand apartheid (Christopher 1994), with the former relating to segregation and discrimination in the social sphere. Grand apartheid involved separation and domination within the political and economic spheres, including the denial of political rights of citizenship for blacks in the (white) nation-state and the consolidation of (ethnic) homelands or Bantustans (the earlier ‘reserves’) where blacks were expected to pursue their political aspirations (Davenport 1991).

During segregation and apartheid, the South African economy grew at the expense of the socio-economic and political rights of the black majority, rural citizens in the former bantustans more specifically.

With the formation of the union, the Natives Land Act of 1913 was promulgated and effectively divided the union geographically into white areas (including the cities) and Native reserves, with the latter occupying a small percentage of the total land mass of the union and often in areas with low agricultural potential. The 1970s and the 1980s in South Africa were characterised by a deepening economic and political crisis. On the economic front, the seeming advantages of the apartheid economy resulted in deepening contradictions and tensions within the national economy, such that ‘financial indicators showed that both a fiscal and monetary crisis was imminent’ (Gumede 2007:425; Chili 2000). From 1974 to 1987, the annual average Gross Domestic Product rate was only 1.8 percent while, before this, the average rate over an extended period was 4.9 percent (Levy 1999:4). The declining international gold price hit the economy particularly hard given South Africa’s historical dependence upon minerals for exports and foreign currency generation, and thus had knock-on effects for the apartheid state’s fiscus (which already entailed deficit budgeting). As well, using black workers as primarily an unskilled labour force resulted in growing skills shortages in the manufacturing industry, particularly at a time when manufacturers sought to capitalise their operations through technological innovation. And despite significant economic growth until the end of the 1950s, urban unemployment amongst the black township population became endemic and indeed structural (Nattrass 1995). International sanctions against the apartheid regime, although regularly subverted, also impacted negatively on the economy in terms of capital withdrawal. The implications of all this for urban blacks, in terms of deepening levels of poverty, became very clear in the 1980s (McGrath and Whitefords 1994). By the late 1980s, the South African state and nation was captured in a deep structural crisis and, in this light, the National Party-led apartheid government pursued a negotiated settlement which was eventually finalised with the first democratic elections in 1994.
Redistributive and Neo-Liberal Programmes and impoverished rural livelihoods

Since the dawn of freedom in 1994, the South African government led by the African National Congress sought to redress the racial inequalities instigated initially by segregation and later apartheid in 1958. The redressal has been through the introduction of economic policies and programmes primarily focusing on redistribution (including land distribution). However, it is disturbing that continuities of segregation and apartheid are still evident particularly in the former reserves/bantustans since 1994. The historical preconditions are still manifesting in post-apartheid South Africa as the rural inhabitants are treated as second class citizens on their own land. The actual story of South Africa’s socio-economic restructuring since then is riddled with tension. The ANC government was faced with a dilemma in 1994: on the one hand, to address the massive inequalities of the past through redistribution and, on the other, to maximise economic growth as the basis for development. The dilemma related to the possibility of doing both simultaneously, and the tension existed because it seemed that pursuing both in practice was contradictory. This tension, in the 1990s, is highlighted by Lesufi (2002:286) who distinguishes between ‘growth through redistribution’ (based on a Keynesian-style development programme) as reflected in the original post-apartheid government economic policy called the Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP), and ‘redistribution through growth’ as a more market-driven neo-liberal approach embodied in the Growth, Employment and Redistribution (GEAR) programme adopted in 1996. Subsequent to GEAR, emerged the Accelerated and Shared Growth Initiative for South Africa (AsgiSA) in 2005 and, more recently, the National Development Plan (NDP). To talk of radical economic transformation in South Africa remains a utopia. Helliker and Vale (2011) are correct in saying that it is highly problematic to talk of a full-blown and unadulterated neo-liberal state in South Africa. It is clear that these policies and programmes have uncontroversial failings and perhaps the failings are more clearly shown in the ‘subjective’ situation, namely, in and through the ongoing rural and urban-based struggles, harrowing poverty, unemployment people’s movements, movements calling for President Zuma to step-down and fractured tripartite relations between ANC, Congress for South African Trade Unions (COSATU) and South African Communist Party (SACP). This raise questions about the living conditions of the rural citizens in the former bantustans (including the Eastern Cape) as they rely partly on urban-rural based linkages. The living conditions of female headed households are miserable; this is compounded by the persisting patriarchy in the former reserves. In that regard, the four state strategies have failed to question the gender in a meaningful way.

Rural livelihoods in South Africa today are characterised by the continuities of apartheid, more than two decades after the dawn of democracy. Colonialism, segregation and recently apartheid have contributed to the decline of the subsistence farming in the former reserves. The racialized land dispossession has created a labour deficit in the former reserves in order for industrial capitalism to flourish particularly in towns and cities of South Africa. Poverty is rampant among the black majority particularly in the communal areas; over 25 million South Africans were poor in 2000, with a proportion of the poor being rural people (Leibbrandt et al 2010). Whereas poverty rates are extremely lower among the Indian and coloured South Africans. The inequality rate has broadened even further after the dawn of democracy, this ‘intra-African inequality and poverty trends increasingly dominate
aggregate inequality and poverty in South Africa’ (Leibbrandt et al 2010:4). By the year 2000, 72% of
the poor were living in the rural areas (Nobel and Wright 2012) of Eastern Cape, Limpopo and KwaZulu
Natal. Perhaps, the political crisis in South Africa since the reign of President Zuma has seen more
migration from rural areas to urban areas proliferating the informal settlement locally known as
‘umkhukhu’. A real chance of broad-based rural development in these areas has been undermined
consistently by neo-liberal restructuring. Rural livelihoods hence continue to be characterised by
significant levels of poverty with ‘the overwhelming number of rural women being ‘poor or very poor’
(Walker 1998:4). Though (former) Bantustan households continue to engage in some form of agriculture
as well as consumption of (and trade in) natural resources, cash transfers (such as social grants and
remittances) are extremely important for household well-being and food security (Adams et al. 2000,
Shackleton et al. 2001).

Studies continue to highlight the relevance of land and agriculture for rural livelihoods. This may entail
income through engaging in market sales of agricultural products or natural resource products, or the
direct use value of land-based livelihood activities (through own consumption) including small livestock,
garden and field produce, wild foods and other natural products. Moreover, these direct use values
arising from land-based livelihoods act as a safety net for rural households in times of stress (Ashley
and LaFranchi 1997, Shackleton et al 2000). This safety net cushions shocks that are as a result of for
example loss of employment or death of a household breadwinner. There is voluminous evidence in
the former Bantustans, and particularly in the case of remote and deep rural households, that
dependence upon natural resources is increasing. Shackleton et al. (2005) claim that natural resources
contribute an average of 22% of total household income and consumption in the rural areas of
Bushbuckridge (part of the former homelands of Gazankulu and Lebowa, and now in Mpumalanga
Province). And the significance of natural resources is typically greater in particular for poorer rural
households (Thondhlana et al. 2012). A study by Vetter (2013) comments on the numerous benefits
(both cash and non-cash), that rural households get from livestock, mainly in contributing to livelihood
diversification and resolutely resilience. Often, though, poor rural households tend to rely to a greater
extent on their smaller numbers of livestock compared to wealthier households with larger herds, in part
because they do not have regular forms of employment (Sallu et al. 2010).

Overall, the majority of all livestock owners derive little, if any, regular cash from livestock sales (Vetter
2013) and the direct-use values of products such as milk and meat exceed that of cash sales
(Shackleton et al. 2005). Mutenje et al. (2010) rightfully claim that the role of livestock as a form of
savings and insurance and hence as a safety net should not be overlooked, though livestock is not
simply treated as an asset to be disposed of in times of crisis (Mapiye et al. 2009). A range of other
livelihood benefits are derived from livestock such as access to organic manure, oxen for ploughing
(including for others) and bride wealth payment (lobola). Compared to the presence of livestock in the
former Bantustans, there is clear evidence of declining commitment to crop production though its
ongoing relevance should not be dismissed. Rural households engage in social networking and social
reciprocity on a regular though not necessarily formal basis. As such, networks (including kinship,
friends and neighbours) are particularly important as forms of mutual exchange and assistance in rural
areas, or as possibly informal means of social protection (Bracking and Sachikonye 2006). Neves and du Toit (2013:107) note that ‘these practices underpin both inter- and intra-household transfers, and animate urban-rural linkages and household livelihood activities'. These circuits of mutual assistance are prevalent throughout the communal areas because of the significant exposure of households to poverty perennially.

The Present Study

After two decades of democracy, former reserve inhabitants continue to face abject poverty amidst state capture by senior African National Congress members. The post-apartheid regime has created a ‘black bourgeoisie’ class at the expense of other black people particularly the vulnerable cohorts of children, disabled and the females. Although the state support has increased through the social welfare grants, kinship ties and employment opportunities have diminished significantly, female headed households are at the brink of collapse. Coupled with the economic crisis is the ‘never ending political crisis’, ordinary people had to use their own resources at disposable, and develop their own livelihood strategies to sustain households. Few studies have examined the conditions of female headed households in South Africa, for instance Schatzz, Madhavan and William (2011). The study primarily focused on how female headed households contended with HIV/AIDS in rural South Africa- the study dates back to 2011. This paper examines the contemporary trajectories of female headed household rural livelihoods in former Bantustan’s of Eastern Cape specifically Cala communal areas near Queenstown. It does so by looking into three differing rural livelihood trajectories in form of ‘vignettes’ (including thriving households, surviving households and struggling households). The paper is important for a number of reasons. It fills an empirical lacuna in the study of Cala communal areas specifically, thereby by generating fresh and current literature. It does so by offering a gendered examination precisely looking at female headed households in Cala communal areas as not passive victims of the socio-economic and political crisis of post-apartheid South Africa but ground-breaking agents seeking to safe-guard family economic well-being. This study uses an explorative approach in its quest to understand the various differentiated female headed households.

Materials and Methods

All the research is informed by particular ontological and epistemological commitments. Research methodologies and methods tend to derive from ontological and epistemological claims and clearly the claims are open to considerable variation and contestation. This section has no intention of getting bogged down in philosophical arguments about ontology and epistemology, but it is important to set out briefly the papers philosophical position. Indeed, the main objective of the thesis shows sensitivity to both understanding and explanation. The paper is mainly informed by a qualitative method (based often on constructivism) which is more concerned about deep understandings of the social meanings inherent in the world and that they regularly eschew any notion of causality. The paper stresses the importance of inter-subjective meanings as animating the social world, it would argue that the social world has a reality independent of such meanings and that differing everyday interpretations are in fact interpretations of this ‘outside’ structured world (Roth and Mehta 2002). Three life histories were utilized
to gain an in-depth understanding of the lived experiences and livelihoods of female heads in the Cala case study but to do so in a manner which captured the socially-structured context of their existence. Life histories provide a wealth of evidence about people and their experiences rather than mere aggregated classifications, categories and characteristics (Kothari and Hulme 2004). A purposive sampling was employed for selecting the three heads (from amongst the 5 heads), there was a subjective evaluation of the contribution that the female heads would likely make to an in-depth understanding of the phenomenon under study. According to Kothari and Hulme (2004) claim that life histories enable a complex and nuanced understanding of social realities while simultaneously revealing common themes and trends which reflect wider social characteristics and processes. They also provide an understanding of the ways in which the past informs and shapes present realities (in this case, the rural realities of female heads). Thus are able to track changes and therefore, in this study, life histories enabled me to trace changes in female heads’ livelihoods and to understand why such changes would lead to coping strategies adopted at a particular time. In terms of analysis, the qualitative data collected was analysed through identifying themes in the evidence and the various relationships between the themes. In doing so, I tried to ensure that the themes speak directly to the main of the study. Overall, it is important to outline that the names used in this study are pseudo names for ethical considerations.

Understanding Livelihood Trajectories

From the data elicited, it is evident that livelihood portfolios of Cala female-headed households differ considerably and therefore the challenges they face vary depending on the specific livelihood activities pursued. In fact, it became very clear during the in-depth interviews that the female heads in Cala communal areas cannot be viewed as homogenous or undifferentiated. They can be disaggregated in order to understand the different kinds of lives and livelihoods existing in Cala. Female heads (de jure and de facto) pursue diverse and different livelihood strategies which often vary over time in terms of intensification of a particular strategy or diversification into alternative strategies. Their livelihoods are not necessarily static and, in the context of threats, risks and shocks, they move in and out of poverty as they seek to respond to crises (Wabwire 1997). However, it is possible to categorise female-headed households in Cala broadly speaking, and are distinguished between struggling, surviving and thriving households. These categories are not based on purely more qualitative evidence. A more longitudinal study would be needed to ascertain if particular households move in and out of poverty over time or during the course of a year.

Case study vignettes

The vignettes presented below are specific and particular. The analysis below does not make any statement to generalisability of the all-female headed households in former bantustans of South Africa. Instead, the vignettes presented here are an entry point into understanding the heterogeneous nature of female headed households, their existence and livelihoods.
Thriving Households – Case of Sifiso

The thriving households are mainly less vulnerable, and have comparatively more assets and resources. Data collected in Cala communal area reveals that a small number of female heads (either *de jure* or *de facto*) were relatively better off and were better able to cope with (or even avoid) the risks, threats and shocks experienced locally in Cala. The thriving households possessed significant financial capital. Due to the availability of this, they had the capacity for instance of hiring labour to work in the homestead gardens and the arable fields (either permanently or periodically). They were also able to hire a tractor to plough the homestead garden and arable land despite the exorbitant prices charged for hiring. In turn, this contributed to high agricultural yields. Thriving households owned a significant number of livestock (more than five cattle and more than ten small livestock such as goats and sheep); had access to clean and affordable energy and proper sanitation; and possessed a well-constructed homestead. Of importance to note is the fact that these households received remittances regularly (i.e. every month) and approximately more than R4000 from children working in different towns. A member of such households normally was a recipient as well of an old age pension.

The thriving households at some point are able to accumulate assets and savings, even when there is worsening poverty in Cala communal areas more widely. In fact, these households seemed to take advantage of poverty in Cala and somehow ‘exploited’ the vulnerability of other households by buying assets (particularly livestock) at very low rates from the surviving and struggling households during difficult and desperate periods. In that way, they increased their household assets and resource base. The following is the story of sixty-eight year old Sifiso and her thriving *de jure* household composed also of grandchildren:

In 1997, I was in Bloemfontein and working as a till operator for a BP garage and my husband was working for Transnet in Bloemfontein. While in Bloemfontein we did not forget our roots [referring to the village]; we established our village house here in Mnxe and during the festive holidays especially Christmas we would come with our children for holidays after closing school. In 2003 my husband was retrenched at Transnet and I had provided for the house even if he was given his retrenchment package and was receiving a monthly income [pension]. After five months of retrenchment he was diagnosed with diabetes and he died while asleep on the 23/05/2003. Life became hard as I had to rely on one income to provide for my five children, sending them to school and so on…The pension for my husband I invested into my children’s education. Fortunately, Tshepiso[her child] was awarded a bursary at Fort Hare to study her social work…I relocated to Mnxe because I could no longer afford rent in town because we were staying in the company house…I am not poor because I receive money from my three children, two in Gauteng and one in Cape Town. On top of that I also receive child support grants for my grandchildren. Because I am getting old I now hire labour (especially for weeding) to work in my garden where I produce vegetables – carrots, spinach, onions, cabbages, maize. I sell most of the crops that I grow but because people do not pay what they owe…cash only…No nono credit; I have done that in the past years but I end up losing money for nothing. I also sew traditional garments because while in Bloemfontein I attended a course for knitting and sewing and I used to get a lot of time but now because I have grandchildren most of my time is spent in making sure that they have eaten. I have saved my money and I have bought sheep, goats and pigs [she hires someone to take care of the livestock] and at times sell the livestock to local butcheries…presently I have 12 goats, 15 sheep and 20 pigs. Life is difficult in the village but my house is managing because my children take care of me through sending the money and I also make sure that I do not rely on them because they have their own needs too (Life history, Mnxe Village, November 2015).

Sifiso’s case is a clear illustration of a thriving household. Evidence from the fieldwork reveals that most of the thriving households derive their income from multiple livelihood activities and are financially stable.
and better off because of this. If one activity for any reason goes under or becomes erratic, the household can normally rely on the other activities to see them through any hard times.

Surviving Households – Case of Thandiwe

Broadly speaking, these are households meeting their basic needs but are not capable of moving out of poverty or improving their life condition. These households tend to mainly survive, as their main source of income, on child support grants as well as casual labour and at times old age pensions (in a case where a grandmother is present). Farming is on a very small scale and only for consumption (particularly 50m x 50m), with only slight surpluses infrequently supplement household income. Generally speaking, the surviving households do not have the capacity to invest money in assets given their limited finances. They own very few livestock (for instance, one to three cattle) and some other small livestock. And they often exchange their labour in return for income. But these households engaged in livelihoods aimed at minimising risk and uncertainty by pursuing a range of limited livelihood activities spread across space and time, and generally on an ad hoc basis. At times they had to sell off assets to meet basic household consumption needs to allow them to ‘hang on’. They also sought to minimise expenditures by for example resorting to the use of traditional energy sources (particularly fuel wood) in food processing because they could not afford electricity regularly.

Thandiwe’s de jure household has most features of such households:

I live with my five children and among them no one is employed because there are no jobs here in Cala. Life is difficult in this village because we are struggling day in, day out. I used to be employed at Shoprite in Queenstown and I retired from working in 2005 due to my health...from 2011 life became difficult because I was the breadwinner since the day we divorced [referring to her former husband]...He never paid maintenance for the children...I am raising the children alone without his help and one this that angers me is him claiming that he is the one taking care of the children yet he doesn’t do anything. My life is not easy...at times I became very stressful not knowing what will I feed my children with the next day...God has been faithful to me since the time of my divorce. The only source of income that I get is the child support grant for my two children; my first born used to be employed by the EPWP but his contract was never renewed. He once had argument with the ward councillor who has an influence in the contract of EPWP and since that time he has never returned to work From time to time my children have to look for part time work to bring food onto the table and this has helped the family to cope under difficult times. Thabiso[her son] normally collects firewood and water for Nonhlanhla[a villager] for approximately R650...from time to time. There is a time where we get money and sometimes we do not have money and can go for the whole month without money until child support grants are out or unless my son gets some part time work to raise money. He has saved this money to buy sheep and up to now we now have three [sheep]. Life is not easy in this village, but I sometimes get help in the form of groceries and money from my brother working for North West Municipality to supplement what we get from our small garden. It has been very helpful for my family because we cut costs. Me and my household we are just surviving...taking each day as it comes (Life history,Lupapasi Village, November 2015).

The case of Thandiwe aptly illustrates a household that is surviving. For instance her household is unable to accumulate productive assets (such as cattle) due to limited and irregular income. Somehow, under such desperate conditions, these surviving households are able to ‘get by’ on a monthly basis in meeting their basic needs. But any shock of significance might turn them into a struggling household.

Struggling Household – Case of Karabo

Data collected from the fieldwork uncovered that Cala communal is marked by a large number of struggling female-headed households which are deep in poverty and very poor. The struggling
households do not have access to any meaningful income from employment or even state grants (be it an old age pension or a child support grant). They have no livestock and they have small gardens and fields that are never utilised or are severely underutilised. They engage in labour intensive activities for instance working part-time in gardens and mostly for ‘thriving’ households, or being involved in public works programmes when operational. These households have few or limited livelihood sources to fall back on in the context of possible shocks and stresses. This concurs with the findings of Bennett (1992) about why some female-headed households exist in pronounced conditions of poverty.

Karabo is a 58 year-old widow who migrated from the Dwesa (in Transkei) in 1986 together with her late husband and their four children to settle in Sifonondile village. Mayee (2003:21) maintains that ‘when a female loses her husband she discovers herself in a world of problems – the difficulty to earn an income topping the list… [N]ot accustomed to doing works outside her home, it becomes a huge task’. Karabo has this to say.

*Life is very difficult in the village especially when my health is deteriorating… My husband died and no one provides for the family. I can’t do anything anymore, and I have to rely on my children and grandchildren. My children have been looking for work in different provinces and what they get is part time and is not sustainable. Kasebo [her son] was working in a farm in Elliot [a town located east of Cala] and after harvesting he has no job for the whole year. Other families have children who get the child support grant but for me I do not get anything…but for me NO NONO. We struggle year in year out, we are living under a difficult situation…I hope one of the days my children will get work and support their mother and siblings. My crops always fail due to lack of rainfall, in cases where the water is coming from the tap we are not allowed to use the water for garden purposes. My children end up walking long distances to fetch water in order to water the crops for our benefit since we get our food from the garden…It’s a problem again because the tractor is expensive and I end up ploughing a small place. My grandchildren have moved to live in with my sister in Elliot because I have not enough food to give them and I have now lost household labour since I do not have cattle for draught power…The ANC is doing nothing to help poor people…we are poor very poor…they only come here when it’s time to vote and give us empty promises. They preach employment but none has come along to our children…we are struggling… we are a poor family. My father was poor. I am poor. If things don’t change, my children will probably be poor* (Life history, Sifonondile Village, November 2014).

Karabo’s case is a story of desperation and of no light at the end of the tunnel. Broadly speaking, the struggling households fail to accumulate any assets and to diversify livelihoods, and they have a tendency of selling their physical assets for immediate household needs such that their asset base becomes depleted. Karabo’s problems are compounded by her health status and the reduction of family labour because she had to send her grandchildren to her sister in Elliot. Though Ferguson (1999) claims that it may be possible to celebrate the coping abilities of poor rural people and acknowledge their innovative means of compensating for the ‘impossibility of their everyday lives (Hecht and Simon 1994, cited in Ferguson 1999:165), it is also important to recognise that many people are not managing to cope at all and their lives on a downward spiral. Another female head in Cala thus spoke about her circumstances in the following words:

*My life is very difficult and I borrow money for medication and food from my neighbours …My future is uncertain because I do not have enough food and my health is deteriorating. I do not even know how I will survive for the next day, weeks, or months* (In-depth interview Lupapasi Village, November 2014).
Undeniably, the overwhelming majority of female-headed households in Cala are living under very extreme conditions of poverty – they are certainly not ‘thriving’. In fact, combined, the surviving and struggle households’ amount to over 80% of the female-headed households surveyed. Table 4.4 seeks to show the ways in which the three categories of households can be differentiated along specific variables, many of which I have discussed above. As highlighted, there is always the possibility that a particular female-headed household moves between categories over time, depending on shocks arising or opportunities becoming available. But, overall, there are few prospects that most Cala female-headed households would ever become thriving households unless there are fundamental shifts in the political economy of contemporary South Africa.

The evidence collected for this study is inconclusive pertaining to whether de facto female heads are better off than de jure female heads or vice versa. Perhaps the most suitable conclusion is that female heads that derive their livelihoods from a number of sources of income (including from employment income, government grants, remittances and many more) are better off regardless of either being located in a de facto or de jure household. To conclude that de facto female heads would necessarily be better off because the husband is working elsewhere as a migrant labourer would be misleading given that the evidence collected confirmed that many male migrants do not remit back home to their families.

**Rural female headed household’s livelihoods complexity and dynamism**

The discussion herein is based on the above three vignettes. The discussion focuses primarily on the different livelihoods employed by the female heads in Cala communal area.

**Agrarian Livelihoods**

Rural livelihoods in the former Bantustans of Eastern Cape particularly Cala communal areas are locales of agrarian activities. Although deagrarianisation animates most of the former reserves, a number of communal areas inhabitants are still practicing agriculture. Deagrarianisation is not a common characteristic of post-apartheid South Africa but during apartheid the communal areas were deprived of land which belonged to them. The selection of vignettes represents the rural locale as a place where agriculture activities still persist despite the loss of active workers through urban migration. Agriculture is practiced on two levels that is the arable lands and homestead gardening. The thriving households are completely managing to sustain through the ploughing of the arable land because of their ability to source labour. Surplus is sold to gain extra income whereas in the case of the struggling and surviving households, surplus is seldom sold to gain extra income. The cases of struggling and surviving households present a mode ‘of survivalist improvisation’ Davis (2006), whereby all means necessary anything that brings income is practiced including commodification of labour. The findings of this study are in line with Shackleton, Shackleton & Cousins (2009) who argue that land-based strategies also form part of a rural safety net. In communal areas it through this commodification of labour to gain a living that has managed to sustain subsistence agriculture. Despite the ‘dying’ of agriculture activities particularly in the struggling households, agriculture activities continue to save as
Livestock rearing has proved to be very important in Cala communal areas. Thriving households own a large head of livestock. The livestock serve a number of purposes namely providing draught power, supplying meat and milk. It is although seldom that livestock like cows are slaughtered for the purpose of getting meat unless it is a ritual or a funeral. However, the availability of milk presents in itself the ability of households to substitute meat with the readily available milk (locally known as ubisi). During summer communal areas prefer to have umphokoqo (milk mixed with crumbled mealie meal). This is a very common meal among the poor rural female heads and the general rural populace because of its affordability and readily availability. Livestock availability among the female heads represents a sign of wealth. The poor households have used the available livestock to accumulate income to send their children to school. Such an opportunity has made the thriving households to accumulate more cattle (as is the case of Sifiso). In that light, the surviving and struggling households of Thandiwe and Karabo are kept in perennial poverty as they seek to provide for their families, they at times afford basic commodities but they are not able to move out of poverty. In general, the asset holdings of the surviving and struggling households are very low and prevent female’s heads to engage in processes that bring ‘humanely life’. The rural poverty

**Remittances**

The linkages of urban and rural areas are not only through rural-urban migration but resource flow. It is prudent to say that remittances play a significant role in rural livelihoods particularly in Cala communal areas. The case of Sifiso is an example of how remittances help female heads are able to subsist. The remittances are in form of cash and in-kind gifts namely the groceries. In that light, remittances provide a safety net particularly to female heads whose relatives and children remit back home. In Cala communal areas there is evidence pointing to the fact that remittances are declining as a result of the dying economic opportunities. Despite such dearth of employment opportunities, the case of Sifiso is testimonial to remittance existence in Cala communal areas. The availability of remittances adds to a number of other myriad sources of income.

**Social Welfare**

Female heads in Cala rural areas are recipients of South Africa’s system of means-tested state cash transfers. This is in form of child support grant, old pension grant, foster care grant and disability grant. In all the vignettes presented above, social welfare grants are a common source of income particularly in the surviving and struggling households. The grants are the most predictable and stable form of income to poor female heads. The value of the grants is in their predictability and consistence. Has it not been these grants, the female heads in both surviving and struggling households would not be subsisting at the level they are. The case of Karabo is a difficult one as she is not a receipt of old pension grant (because of her age) and child support grant. Aside from Karabo’s case, Thandiwe’s case present’s grants as mechanism to lift the surviving households out of poverty for at least half a month;
this is because the money is not adequate enough to cater for family basic needs for the whole month. However, if used wisely the grants have the capacity of improving nutritional status, reducing morbidity and stunting (Devereux 2001), and elevating educational enrolment and outcomes (Case et al. 2005; Budlender and Woolard 2006). In case of Thandiwe and Sifiso the social grants increase the ‘buying power of female heads’. It is evidenced among female headed household that grants are often shared with non-beneficiaries thereby reducing the effect of the grant.

Female headed household’s differentiation

This final section presents female headed household differentiation. Female heads in Cala communal areas and the entire communal areas of post-apartheid South Africa’s life circumstances cannot be treated as homogenous. This is primarily because circumstances shaping their lives are varying considerably hence their livelihoods too. Poverty and vulnerability animates rural lives but the levels of poverty and vulnerability is differentiated. Treating the female heads in Cala communal areas as homogenous is unfair. Female headed households in Cala communal areas have access to different assets namely; land-based endowments, remittances, livestock, physical capital, grants and commodified labour. The access and ownership to these assets determine the configurations of vulnerability and differentiation therefore evolving. As presented above in the cases of Sifiso, Thandiwe and Karabo, the access to different assets differ, this configure and differentiate between what have been termed as ‘thriving, surviving and struggling’. Significant to note is that the conditions prevailing in the communal areas serve as enhancers and perpetuators of decent livelihoods or inhumane livelihood (such as that of Karabo).

Furthermore, the vignettes discussed above are writ-large in the sense that they differentiate between the thriving household, surviving households and the struggling households which are marginalised from the rural economy. As such, this shows how rural economies produce differentiated households and maintain the differentiation. Access and ownership of productive assets therefore determine the ‘village social hierarchy’. The continued marginalisations of female heads in post-apartheid continue treat women (particularly female heads) as ‘second class citizens’ despite the attainment of democracy two decades ago. The state and status of the female heads particularly those surviving and struggling households is somewhat linked to historical trajectories of the rural economies dating back inception of apartheid in 1958. Furthermore, what is exasperating is the fact that over two years of democracy, female heads in Cala communal areas still bear the brunt of apartheid; rural development has remained stagnant while the elite black bourgeoisie continue to enrich themselves at the expense of rural citizenry (in particular female heads).

Despite the access to state monthly transfer which are referred to as predictable and constant, other livelihood income sources are critical in ensuring that if one source of income depletes, households are able to pick on other sources. This is not the case with struggling households whose sources of income are limited, or garner very little income. Another important source of livelihood as evidenced by Sifiso and Thandiwe is the ownership of livestock. The ownership of livestock in Cala communal areas is
linked to rural elite who have multiple means of income and therefore survival. The direct and in-direct use value of livestock cannot be underestimated. This largely differentiates rural households in Cala communal areas. Access and ownership of livestock is directly linked to utilisation of the arable and homestead land as represented by the cases of thriving and surviving households.

Table 1: Summarising social differentiation households

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Household trajectory</th>
<th>Household roofing type</th>
<th>Flooring type</th>
<th>Land areas cultivated</th>
<th>Livestock ownership</th>
<th>Labour utilization</th>
<th>Comment</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Thriving</td>
<td>asbestos</td>
<td>Cement/tiles</td>
<td>+ 1 hectare</td>
<td>1. +5 cattle 2. 10 goats &amp; sheep 3. Plenty chickens</td>
<td>1. hire labour and have permanent helper (gardener or house maid)</td>
<td>1. have very strong social networks 2. does not depend on anyone for income, but rather remittances come as supplementary to available income 3. diversify livelihoods and income is stable 4. income per month is more than R5000 5. old pension grant and child support grant</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Surviving</td>
<td>Asbestos/zinc sheets</td>
<td>Cement</td>
<td>-1 hectare</td>
<td>1. + 2 cattle 2. 5 goats &amp; sheep 3. limited livestock</td>
<td>1. at times hire and hire out labour.</td>
<td>1. limited social capital 2. depends on child support grants and old pension in case of an old person living in</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Struggling</td>
<td>Thatch/zinc</td>
<td>Cow dung/mud</td>
<td>50m X 50m Some do not cultivate</td>
<td>1. no livestock at all</td>
<td>1. hire out labour</td>
<td>1. no social networking 2. does not receive any grants 3. household size is big 4. inadequate or limited income</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source*: Life Histories, November 2014.
Conclusion

This paper examined the contemporary trajectories of female headed household rural livelihoods in former Bantustan’s of Eastern Cape specifically Cala communal areas. That was accomplished by looking into three varied rural livelihood trajectories in form of ‘vignettes’ namely; thriving households, surviving households and struggling households. The communal areas of Cala remain deep pockets of poverty and underdevelopment. The legacy of apartheid regime still manifest in the communal areas, this is evidenced by the deagrarianisation—a common characteristic of apartheid after the passing of the Land Native Act. Livelihoods among the three varying households include agrarian based activities, social welfare, informality, remittances and other income livelihoods. Of importance is that the livelihoods are not highly compartmentalised but are interconnected. Natural capital in form of collecting firewood for selling is transformed to financial capital (money) to purchase basic commodities. Although, female heads engage into myriad income sources, seldom much is garnered implying that poverty remains perennial; of course this is not the case of all households. The access and ownership of different productive assets determines the social differentiation of the households in this case, the thriving, surviving and struggling households. Female heads in the communal areas continue to face patriarchal inequalities. This further perpetuates their circumstance’s including access to productive land. Female-headed households, bear the burden and brunt of the failures of post-apartheid economic and political restructuring. While some of the empirical findings of this thesis are not novel, my study contributes new empirical data on female-headed household livelihoods in contemporary rural South Africa and specifically in former bantustans. These findings have important implications for policymakers, in particular those involved in policy for rural economies development. It is peremptory that there is need for greater support for the agricultural sector if South Africa is to achieve the goals set out in the country’s National Development Plan.

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Knowledge, Beliefs and Sources of Information of HIV among Students of a Tertiary Institution in Nigeria

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Abstract: This study investigated the knowledge, beliefs and sources of information of HIV among students of a tertiary institution in Nigeria. The study was conducted among students of University of Ilorin residing in Oke-Odo community, a student community located near the school. The objective of the study is to know if the students are adequately informed of HIV. A total of 292 students selected through a two-stage sampling method were involved in the study. Information was gathered through questionnaire administration which contained closed and open ended questions. (84.2%) of the participants know that, a healthy looking person can have HIV, (88.7%) know that HIV virus weakens the immune system of an infected person and (82.2%) know that HIV can be transmitted through unprotected vagina sex. Also, (81.2%) identified fever as the symptom of HIV while (77.7%) identified avoiding unprotected sex as preventive measure towards contacting HIV. The highest source of information of HIV among the participants is health talk accounting for (68.2%) which was followed closely by the school (66.4%). Although (63.7%) of the participants strongly disagree that HIV is a myth and does not exist, (36.6%) of the participants also strongly believe that HIV can be cured with prayers. The study showed a statistical significant relationship between knowledge of HIV and age of participants p= 0.001 while n statistical significant relationship was found between knowledge of HIV and sex p= 0.055, marital status p=0.051, religion p= 0.359 and tribe p=0.170. The study concluded that although the participants had a good knowledge of HIV, various misconceptions are held by participants on the belief held about the disease. Dissemination of adequate knowledge on HIV among students in the institution is strongly recommended.

Keywords: HIV, good knowledge, misconception, unprotected vagina sex, health talk.

Introduction

Nigeria, with a population of over 120 million people, is estimated to have one of the highest numbers of persons living with HIV in sub-Saharan Africa (Ssengonzi, Schlegel, Anyamele & Olson, 2004). Ever since the index case was recorded in the country in 1986, the infection has spread to become a generalized epidemic affecting all population groups and sparing no geographical area in the country (NACA, 2012). The initial stage of the disease is usually asymptomatic WHO (2015) but as the infection progresses, the immune system is gradually attacked, giving room for common infections like tuberculosis and other opportunistic infections as well tumors which rarely affect people with a functional or working immune system (WHO, 2015). However, late symptoms of infection are known as AIDS which is usually characterized by loss of body weight (Center for Disease Control, 2015).

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HIV can be transmitted from person to person through sexual and non-sexual activities like unprotected sex, unscreened blood transfusion, sharing of sharp objects such as hypodermic needle; mother-child infection during pregnancy (Markowitz, 2007). The disease remains incurable Durojaiye (2009) but infected persons are placed on Antiretroviral Therapy (ART) to make them live longer, healthier and avoid transmission to other people (Aids info, 2017). Globally, the spread of HIV has continued to rise especially among young people (Oppong Ashante & Oti-Boadi, 2013). Reports have it that, as of 2015, a total of 2.1 million people is living with HIV in which 80% of this is young people (WHO, 2016). The Sub-Saharan Africa has been said to account for two-third of this total infection WHO (2015) in which the highest group found to be infected with the virus is within the ages 15 to 24 (UNICEF, 2000).

This high-risk group accounts for 60 percent of all new infections in many countries, World Bank (2002) in which transactional sex has been identified as one of the critical pathways for the transfer of the virus (Cote, Sobela, Dzokoto, Nzambi, Asamoah, Adu, Labbe, et al, 2004). It is not however surprising that; sexual intercourse has become the most predominant mode of transmission of HIV in sub-Saharan Africa, accounting for approximately 90% of all infections (De-Kock, Ekpin, Gnaore, 1994). Research has shown that Nigeria has the second largest number of 3.4 million people living with HIV in the world with about 260,000 new infections occurring annually and 2,500 infections daily among young people aged 15-24 yrs (FMH, 2012). According to Chng, Eke-Huber, Eaddy and Collins (2005), HIV epidemic is spreading at an alarming rate in Nigeria with sero-prevalence rates increasing from 0.9 percent in 1990 to 1.8 percent in 1992, 3.8 percent in 1994, 4.5 percent in 1996 and 5.4 percent in 1999.

A study of Kwara State, North-Central Nigeria on HIV epidemiology and impact analysis revealed that youths between the ages of 15-19 constitute the highest age group living with HIV/AIDS (NACA, 2013). Further evidence has also been shown by NACA (2009) that, urban and young population has higher sero-prevalence and it is likely that the disease will disproportionately affect young people including those in the educational sector (NACA, 2009). According to Adefuye et al., (2009) school environment provides fertile grounds for high sexual risk behavior which may lead to HIV. This was also confirmed by Abiodun, Sotuns, Ani & Jaiyesimi (2014), it is against this background that this study is being conducted. The study is expected reveal how informed the students are about HIV as a pointer to reducing the prevalence of the HIV among young adults in the school community.

**Theoretical construct**

The study was explained with the Diffusion of Innovation Theory proposed by Rogers in 1983. The theory describes the process of how an idea is disseminated among people in a community. According to the theory, there are four key elements that must be put into consideration in the process of disseminating innovation ideas, these include: the innovation itself, its communication, the social system and time. The theory proposed that people’s exposure to a new idea or innovation, which takes place within a social network, will be determined by the rate at which various people adopt a new behavior. The theory holds that, people are most likely to be receptive and adopt new behavior if such ideas are evaluated and perceived favorable especially when such information is communicated to them through reliable sources (Kegeles, 1996).
Resting on this assumption, the diffusion theory can be applied to HIV risk reduction in the sense that, normative and risk behavioral changes can be initiated among students when the source of such information is highly trusted. When such information is disseminated and adopted by trusted channels, it can influence students to do the same and eventually diffuse the new behavior norm widely within peer networks. It is expected that, when beneficial prevention beliefs are instilled and widely held within one’s immediate social network such as student community, individuals’ behavior is more likely to be consistent with the perceived social norms.

Critics of the theory have however emphasized that diffusion of information is not easy to quantify because people and human networks are complex to understand. They are of the opinion that diffusion of information is extremely difficult, if not impossible; to measure what exactly causes adoption of an innovation (Damanpour, 1996).

Methods

The study was conducted among University of Ilorin students living at Oke-Odo, Ilorin, Kwara State, North-Central Nigeria. Oke-Odo is a student community located in Tanke near the University of Ilorin where students who prefer to live outside the campus mostly reside. The community is a mixture student’ and private residences. It consist of several students hostels where numerous students reside because of its proximity to the school campus. A two-stage sampling method was employed in selecting students for the survey. First, hostels where students live were first purposively identified in the community and secondly, participants were randomly selected from these hostels.

A total of 292 consenting participants were included in the study. Information was gathered through administration of self-administered questionnaires which contained closed and open ended questions. Data was presented in tables which contained frequencies and simple percentages. Information was retrieved in anonymity in order to gain the confidence of the participants.

Results

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Socio-demographic variables</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Age group (years)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&lt; 20</td>
<td>147</td>
<td>50.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20 – 24</td>
<td>107</td>
<td>36.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25 – 29</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>10.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>≥ 30</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>2.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sex</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Male</td>
<td>165</td>
<td>56.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>127</td>
<td>43.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marital status</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Single</td>
<td>263</td>
<td>90.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Married</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>9.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religion</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Christianity</td>
<td>176</td>
<td>60.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Islam</td>
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<td>39.0</td>
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<tr>
<td>Traditional</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0.7</td>
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<tr>
<td>Tribe</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Yoruba</td>
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<td>Ibo</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>14.7</td>
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</table>
Researchers’ Survey, 2017

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percent</th>
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</thead>
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<tr>
<td>An healthy looking person can have HIV</td>
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<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>15.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HIV has no cure</td>
<td>180</td>
<td>61.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>112</td>
<td>38.4</td>
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<tr>
<td>Knowledge of full meaning of HIV</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Correct</td>
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<td>46.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>There are two types of HIV, HIV 1 and HIV 2</td>
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<td>70.2</td>
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<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>87</td>
<td>29.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HIV weakens the immune system of the infected person</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
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<td>11.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HIV is the virus that leads to AIDS</td>
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<tr>
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<td>13.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>It is possible to have HIV for years without having AIDS</td>
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<td>80.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>19.9</td>
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</table>

Researchers’ Survey, 2017

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<th>Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mode of transmission of HIV</td>
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<td>82.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unprotected vaginal sex</td>
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<td>52.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anal sex</td>
<td>213</td>
<td>72.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Multiple sex partners</td>
<td>218</td>
<td>74.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sharing of infected needles</td>
<td>235</td>
<td>80.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>From mother to child</td>
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<td>28.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Through kissing</td>
<td>221</td>
<td>75.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Blood transfusion</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>6.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hugging an infected person</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>7.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Handshake</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>11.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sharing towels</td>
<td>163</td>
<td>55.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sharing tooth brush</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>11.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sharing bathing soap</td>
<td>105</td>
<td>36.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oral sex</td>
<td>182</td>
<td>62.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fever</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>16.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sore throat</td>
<td>97</td>
<td>33.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Swollen glands</td>
<td>120</td>
<td>41.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Headache</td>
<td>229</td>
<td>78.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Upset stomach</td>
<td>150</td>
<td>51.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coughing</td>
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<td>22.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D rowsiness</td>
<td>82</td>
<td>28.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low blood</td>
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<td>52.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HIV preventive measures</td>
<td>224</td>
<td>76.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Use of condoms</td>
<td>196</td>
<td>67.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sterilize needles and sharp objects before use</td>
<td>190</td>
<td>65.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abstinence from sex</td>
<td>160</td>
<td>54.8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Researchers’ Survey, 2017

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<td>97</td>
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<tr>
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<td>229</td>
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<td>51.4</td>
</tr>
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<td>Coughing</td>
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<td>22.3</td>
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<td>D rowsiness</td>
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<td>Use of condoms</td>
<td>196</td>
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</tr>
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<td>65.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abstinence from sex</td>
<td>160</td>
<td>54.8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 4: Beliefs about HIV

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Beliefs</th>
<th>Strongly agree n (%)</th>
<th>Agree n (%)</th>
<th>Undecided n (%)</th>
<th>Disagree n (%)</th>
<th>Strongly disagree n (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>HIV is just a myth and does not exist</td>
<td>5 (1.7)</td>
<td>7 (2.4)</td>
<td>10 (3.4)</td>
<td>84 (28.8)</td>
<td>186 (63.7)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HIV is a black man disease</td>
<td>0 (0.0)</td>
<td>10 (3.4)</td>
<td>8 (2.7)</td>
<td>80 (27.4)</td>
<td>194 (66.4)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HIV is a poor man’s disease</td>
<td>1 (0.3)</td>
<td>4 (1.4)</td>
<td>10 (3.4)</td>
<td>78 (26.7)</td>
<td>199 (68.2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HIV is a punishment from God for man’s sin</td>
<td>10 (3.4)</td>
<td>25 (8.6)</td>
<td>31 (10.6)</td>
<td>73 (25.0)</td>
<td>153 (52.4)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HIV can be used to afflict a person</td>
<td>19 (6.5)</td>
<td>50 (17.1)</td>
<td>53 (18.2)</td>
<td>79 (27.1)</td>
<td>91 (31.2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I can never be infected with the disease even if I have contact with the virus</td>
<td>12 (4.1)</td>
<td>42 (14.4)</td>
<td>30 (10.3)</td>
<td>110 (37.7)</td>
<td>98 (33.6)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HIV can be cured with herbs</td>
<td>38 (13.0)</td>
<td>37 (12.7)</td>
<td>105 (36.0)</td>
<td>74 (25.3)</td>
<td>38 (13.0)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HIV can be cured with prayers and Fasting</td>
<td>107 (36.6)</td>
<td>80 (27.4)</td>
<td>40 (13.7)</td>
<td>31 (10.6)</td>
<td>34 (11.6)</td>
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</table>

Table 5: Sources of Information of HIV

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sources of Information</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Newspaper and Magazines</td>
<td>155</td>
<td>53.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Internet</td>
<td>151</td>
<td>51.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parents</td>
<td>143</td>
<td>49.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Family members</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>34.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>School</td>
<td>185</td>
<td>63.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Friend</td>
<td>121</td>
<td>41.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hospital</td>
<td>174</td>
<td>59.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Health talk</td>
<td>199</td>
<td>68.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Television</td>
<td>194</td>
<td>66.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Radio</td>
<td>174</td>
<td>59.6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 1 shows that, half of the participants in the study are below 20 years of age, the sampled population is almost evenly distributed with male participants accounting for (56.5%) while female participants account for (43.5%). Only (9.9%) of the participants are married while (90.1%) are not married. Among the participants, (60.3%) are Christians while (39.0%) are Muslims with (0.7%) practicing Traditional religion. In all, about two third (72.6%) of the participants are from the Yoruba tribe while other tribe like Ibo (14.7%), Hausa (7.2%) and others account for (5.5%) in that order.

Table 2 contained basic knowledge of HIV. Result showed that, (84.2%) know that a healthy looking person can have HIV, (61.6%) of the participants know that HIV has no cure, while (53.1) had the full knowledge of what HIV means. Furthermore, (70.2%) know that there are two types of HIV, i.e. HIV 1 and HIV 2. Also, (88.7%) of the participants are of the knowledge that HIV weakens the immune system of an infected person. (86.3%) knows that HIV is the virus that leads to AIDS while (80.1%) know that it is possible to have HIV for many years without having AIDS.
Table 6: Relationship between socio-demographic variables and knowledge about HIV

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variables</th>
<th>Knowledge of HIV</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th>$\chi^2$</th>
<th>p value</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Good n = 206(%)</td>
<td>Poor n = 86 (%)</td>
<td>Total N=292 (%)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Age group (years)</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&lt; 20</td>
<td>88 (59.9)</td>
<td>59 (40.1)</td>
<td>147 (100.0)</td>
<td>20.940</td>
<td>&lt;0.001*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20 – 24</td>
<td>82 (76.6)</td>
<td>25 (23.4)</td>
<td>107 (100.0)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25 – 29</td>
<td>29 (96.7)</td>
<td>1 (3.3)</td>
<td>30 (100.0)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>≥ 30</td>
<td>7 (87.5)</td>
<td>1 (12.5)</td>
<td>8 (100.0)</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Sex</strong></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Male</td>
<td>109 (66.1)</td>
<td>56 (33.9)</td>
<td>165 (100.0)</td>
<td>3.677</td>
<td>0.055</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>97 (76.4)</td>
<td>30 (23.6)</td>
<td>127 (100.0)</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Marital status</strong></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Single</td>
<td>181 (68.8)</td>
<td>82 (31.2)</td>
<td>263 (100.0)</td>
<td>3.800</td>
<td>0.051</td>
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<tr>
<td>Married</td>
<td>25 (86.2)</td>
<td>4 (13.8)</td>
<td>29 (100.0)</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Religion</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Christianity</td>
<td>124 (70.5)</td>
<td>52 (29.5)</td>
<td>176 (100.0)</td>
<td>2.049*</td>
<td>0.359</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Islam</td>
<td>82 (71.9)</td>
<td>32 (28.1)</td>
<td>114 (100.0)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Traditional</td>
<td>0 (0.0)</td>
<td>2 (100.0)</td>
<td>2 (100.0)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Tribe</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yoruba</td>
<td>149 (70.3)</td>
<td>63 (29.7)</td>
<td>212 (100.0)</td>
<td>5.019</td>
<td>0.170</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ibo</td>
<td>33 (76.7)</td>
<td>10 (23.3)</td>
<td>43 (100.0)</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Hausa</td>
<td>11 (52.4)</td>
<td>10 (47.6)</td>
<td>21 (100.0)</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>13 (81.3)</td>
<td>3 (18.8)</td>
<td>16 (100.0)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

$\chi^2$: Chi square; *: p value <0.05; Y: Yates corrected chi square

Table 3 shows the Knowledge of mode of transmission, symptoms and preventive measures of HIV. On the knowledge of mode of transmission of HIV, (82.2%) of the participants identified, unprotected vagina sex, this was followed by transmission from mother to child (80.5%), while (75.7%) of the participants identified blood transfusion, sharing of infected sharp object was identified by (74.2%) of
the participants and (72.9%) identified multiple sex partner. However, (11.0%) of the participants identified that HIV can be transmitted through sharing bathing soap and towel respectively while, (7.9%) said that HIV can be transmitted through handshake and (6.2%) said it can be transmitted to another person through hugging of an infected person.

On symptoms of HIV, the highest symptom identified by participants is fever (81.2%). (78.4%) identified the symptom of weight loss, this was followed by head ache (62.3%), low blood (52.7%), coughing (51.4%) and body rash (42.1%). However, stomach upset was the least identified symptom of HIV by the participants accounting for (16.4%). On how HIV can be prevented, avoiding of casual sex accounted for the highest identified preventive measure accounting for (77.7%), this was followed closely by the use of condoms during sexual intercourse (76.7%) and sterilizing needles and sharp objects before use (67.1%). However, abstinence from sex accounted for (65.1%) while faithfulness to one sex partner accounted for the least representing (54.8%).

Table 4 contained beliefs held by participants on HIV. (63.7%) of the participants strongly disagreed with the belief that HIV is a myth and does not exist while just about (1.7%) believes that HIV/AIDS is a myth and does not exist. Concerning the belief that HIV is a black man disease, (66.4%) strongly disagreed with the belief while only (3.4%) agree with the belief. As regards if HIV is a poor man’s disease, (68.2%) strongly disagree with this while only (1.4%) believe that this is true. On if HIV is a punishment from God for the sin of man, even though (52.4%) strongly shares this believe, (10.6%) of the participants were not sure while (8.6%) agree with this belief.

On if HIV can be used to afflict someone, (6.5%) strongly agree with this, (17.1%) of the participants do agree with this belief while (27.1%) disagree with the belief. Furthermore on if participants can be infected with HIV even if they can never have contact with the virus, (4.1%) strongly agreed, (14.4%) agreed while (10.3%) were undecided. On if HIV can be cured with herbs, (13.0%) strongly agreed with the belief, (12.7%) agreed, while (36.0%) were undecided. And on the belief that HIV can be cured with prayers and fasting, a whooping (36.6%) strongly agreed with this, (27.4%) agreed with it while (13.7%) were undecided. However, only (10.6%) disagreed while (11.6%) strongly disagreed.

Concerning the source of information of HIV, tables 4 showed that, (68.2%) of the participants were informed of it through health talk. This was followed closely by television (66.4%), and then followed by Hospital and radio accounting for (59.6%) respectively. The least source of information includes friend (41.4%) and family members accounting for (34.2%).

Table 6: showed a statistical significant relationship between knowledge of HIV and age of participants p= 0.001 while n statistical significant relationship was found between knowledge of HIV and sex p= 0.055, marital status p=0.051, religion p= 0.359 and tribe p=0.170.

**Discussion**

The study assessed the knowledge, beliefs and sources of information of HIV among students of University of Ilorin residing in Oke-Odo, a student community located near the university. The study
showed that participants have a good knowledge of HIV (See figure 1). The result is also consistent with the findings of the study conducted by Odu and Akanle (2008) from selected universities in South-West Nigeria and Abiodun, Sotunsan, Ani & Jaiyesimi among undergraduates in Babcock University which confirmed a high knowledge of HIV among students. It also rest on previous study conducted by Jose et al (2011) among student of Tertiary institutions in Guinea which suggests that majority of the participants involved in the study have good knowledge of HIV. However, this result is different from result of previous study conducted by Ashante & Oti-Boadi (2013) in Ghana among undergraduates which showed an inconsistent knowledge of HIV as participants were less knowledgeable about causative agents of HIV.

Results also showed some misconception about beliefs held on HIV among participants. For instance, more than a quarter of the participants’ believe that HIV can be cured through prayers and fasting. This finding is consistent with the findings of the previous study conducted by Ebeniro, (2010), which asserts the significance of cultural beliefs on the knowledge of HIV among students in tertiary institutions in Rivers State, South –South Nigeria. The study also corroborates the result of earlier study conducted by Odi, Akanle and Folusho (2008), among undergraduates of four universities on South-West Nigeria which also confirms the significance of beliefs on knowledge of HIV. This further testifies the strong influence of cultural beliefs on health of people in the Nigerian Society (Ojua, Ishor & Ndom, 2013).

The highest source of information of HIV among the participants is health talk. This result stand on the result of previous study conducted by Harding, Anadu & Champeau (1999) in a study conducted among students from tertiary institutions in South-West Nigeria where the media accounted for the highest source of information. This result is also similar to results of previous study conducted by Abiodun, Sotunsan, Aniand Jaiyesimi(2014) among undergraduates in Babcock University which confirmed that the highest source of information on HIV among students was the media. This result further confirms the strong relationship between the media and health information that has been established by (Obisesan, Adeyemo & Fakokunde, 1998, Adinma, 2005 & Oye-Adeniran, Adewole, Umoh, Oladokun, Gbadegesin & Ekanem et al, 2006).

A statistical significant relationship was found between knowledge of HIV and age of participants. This is consistent with the findings of the study conducted by Ezeonyido (2016) among undergraduates in Nigeria which suggested a significant relationship between knowledge of HIV and age of participants. The result also confirms earlier study conducted by Ogini, Ofodile, Odusanmi & Taiwo (2015), in which a significant relationship was found between knowledge of HIV and age of participants.

**Conclusion and recommendation**

This study investigated the knowledge, beliefs and sources of information of HIV among students of a tertiary institution in Nigeria. The study was conducted among students of University of Ilorin residing in Oke-Odo community, a student community located near the school. The objective of the study is to know if the students are adequately informed of HIV. A total of 292 students selected through a two-
stage sampling method were involved in the study. Information was gathered through questionnaire administration which contained closed and open ended questions.

Result showed that participants have good knowledge of HIV even though there were various misconceptions held among the participants on beliefs related to HIV. The highest source of information of HIV among participants in the study is Health talk which was closely followed by television. A significant relationship was found between knowledge of HIV and age of participants while no significant relationship was found between knowledge of HIV and sex, marital status, religion and tribe of participants. The study recommended wider dissemination of adequate information on HIV among students of institution of higher learning in Nigeria to ensure adequate knowledge of the disease among students of institution of higher learning in Nigeria.

References


Are the ‘Born-Frees’ Always Politically Apathetic? Social Media Use for Campus Politics by Black Undergraduates of North-West University, Mafikeng, South Africa

Babatunde Raphael Ojebuyi¹ and Abiodun Salawu²

Abstract: The South African post-apartheid Black youth—popularly known as the ‘Born Frees’—have been stereotyped politically apathetic. But there are yet empirical studies to prove that these youth are really perpetually averse to political participation, even in their universities, especially with emergence of social media that provide digital space for social and political engagements. With the specific attention on Black students of the Mafikeng campus of North-West University, South Africa as the study population, this study, therefore, employed a sequential quant-QUAL exploratory design to explore how Black undergraduates use social media to engage in political activities in the university setting. Anchored on the Uses and Gratifications Theory, the study employed questionnaire to collect data from 232 respondents selected through stratification and convenience sampling. Majority (77.1%) of the students affirmed they actively participated in campus politics using the social media (78.0%) and text messages via mobile phones (60.7%). Ironically, only 36.2% of the students said they used direct interpersonal communication as the communication modes for political engagement. The trend established in this study challenges scholars’ assumption that the Post-apartheid Black youth of South Africa are politically apathetic. Students’ interest and participation in campus politics suggest that, with effective use of the digital space that is relatively free, accessible, interactive, and independent of undue control by the state apparatus, the Black youth can also contribute positively to the South African democratic project.

Keywords: Campus politics, Social media, South African youth, The ‘Borne Frees’, Political participation, Post-apartheid era

Introduction

After 46 years of apartheid regime, which really started in 1948, South Africa had her first democratic, non-racial election in 1994 (Mattes 2012; Bosch 2013). Since then, the nation’s democracy has attracted global attention. Perhaps, one major factor that necessitated this attention was the initial apprehension as to whether a nation that had been subjected to a suppressive regime for so long would be able to sustain her democracy. Of course, the nation has had to deal with some fundamental challenges relating to nation-building and promotion of a solid democratic institution through an effective civil society involvement (Cottle & Rai, 2008). Central to overcoming these enormous post-apartheid challenges are the youth, who without doubt, have remained an important constituent of South African social stability and political freedom. For example during the 1970s and the 1980s apartheid struggles,

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South African Black youth were recognised for the significant roles they played in the anti-apartheid protests. Political activists usually relied on schools and universities to recruit youth for political struggles (Bosch 2013).

However, after the apartheid, the youth became socially passive and politically apathetic. Deegan, cited by Bosch (2013) confirms this fact by submitting that “in the post-apartheid era, the status of black youth political participation is very different, with a general perception that the black youth are generally politically apathetic and driven more by consumerism than a desire for activism or citizenship” (p. 120). Empirical facts have also indicated that contrary to the expectations that the emergence of democracy in 1994 would witness a politically active South African society, especially with a new generation of the so-called ‘Born Frees’; “the post-apartheid generation are less committed to democracy than their parents or grandparents” (Mattes 2012: 133). Similarly, Mkandawire (2008: 3) has observed that:

There is particular concern that large sections of the youth particularly those who live in rural areas have become marginalized and are not effectively participating in the transformation process. The youth are seen in a fundamental sense as disempowered and excluded.

If the youth, especially those at the grassroots, are really marginalised, disempowered and secluded as described above, this segment of the South African society may become politically apathetic. Therefore, in order to secure the future of the country in terms of political stability and democratic sustainability, the youth from all sections of the country, must have proper political education and integration that would encourage them to be politically active. To do this effectively also calls for constant monitoring of the youth especially in settings such as schools and universities, to determine their level of political awareness, interest, and participation, and the means through which they carry out these sundry political activities. Adequate knowledge of these variables, through empirical evidence, would enable government to come up with appropriate measures and policies that would enhance the level of political participation by the youth, both at the university and national levels. One of the ways to understand the political behaviour of youth is to study them within the university context. Besides, whatever the students learn or practice while they are in the university may, to a great extent, shape how they adapt to the larger society.

Of course, many studies on the relationship between news media—both traditional and digital media—and democracy in South Africa have been conducted. For instance, Jacobs (2002) examined the transformation of South African media since the nation transitioned from apartheid to democracy in 1994; Cottle and Rai (2008) examined the role of South African television in enabling and sustaining the nation’s democracy; Opamie-Ngoa (2010) analysed the relationship between functional democracy and mass media with specific focus on South Africa and Nigeria; Smith (2011) examined the media consumption practices and lifestyles of black South African youth in urban city (Durban) and peri-urban town (Alice); van Rensburg (2012) conducted a study to investigate how South Africa, Kenya and Zambia used the Internet to service their democracies; Ndlovu, (2014) studied television viewership of South African young adults and implications of this viewership on democracy, while Pillay and
Maharaj (2014) examined how the South African civil society organisations used the social media (Web 2.0) and other digital technologies for social advocacy in the democratic context.

However, despite this large number of studies on South African mass media and democracy, adequate scholarly attention is yet to be given to the relationship between the use of social media by South African black youth and their political behaviour in terms of participation in campus politics, and implications of this relationship for their potential engagement in South African politics. Besides, there is the need for more empirical validation of the foregoing claims that South African Black youth is politically apathetic (Mkandawire 2008; Mattes 2012), with specific, and isolated focus on the rural sections of South Africa, especially in the present age when the emergence of social media is believed to be changing social and political orientations of the youth. This study, therefore, aimed to fill this gap by investigating the extent to which South African black youth participated in campus politics, and how the communication media, specifically social media, influenced their level of political participation at the university level. Three research questions that guided the execution of this study are (1) What is the nature of the students’ participation in campus politics? (2) How do the students use different communication modes to participate in campus politics? (3) How does access to social media influence students’ participation in campus politics?

The study was conducted among students of the North-West University, Mafikeng Campus, with specific focus on the Black students. The reason for this is that the population share some characteristics of South African Black youth, whom (Mkandawire 2008) and Deegan, as cited by Bosch (2013) describe as being marginalised and politically apathetic respectively, especially in the post-apartheid era. Besides, the students are believed to be active social media users, and constitute a significant force in the future South African democratic project. Since the focus of this study was on black youth from a rural section of the country, Mafikeng Campus of the North-West University, which represents a historically black university in South Africa, was selected as the geographic focus for this study. Findings of this study would show how students use new media as platform for political participation. This would subsequently provide insights into the potentials of new media in triggering urge for political participation. More importantly, these potentials of new media could be explored and extended to the political education and mobilisation projects of South Africa whose Black youths have been labelled as being politically apathetic.

Youth, Social Media and Political Participation

The United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation [UNESCO] describes youth as “a period of transition from the dependence of childhood to adulthood’s independence” (UNESCO 2014: 1). For statistical purposes, UNESCO further clarifies that youth are “those persons between the ages of 15 and 24 years, without prejudice to other definitions by Member States”, and based on the definition given in the African Youth Charter, youth means “every person between the ages of 15 and 35 years”. However, it clarifies that youth as a concept “is a more fluid category than a fixed age-group”
This means that youth can have different definitions or statistical categorisations as the context changes, but they would always retain the universal characteristics of being in the period of transition from childhood to adulthood.

From one cultural context to another, and as time changes and new technologies emerge, media audience (youth) may exhibit different patterns of media consumption. For example Smith (2011: 12) submits that her previous studies found that:

Black (South African) youths are generally active consumers: they engage with texts at multiple levels, appreciating both the aesthetic value on offer as well as the narrative value of iconic black popular culture, but they do tend to not entirely embrace or adopt the educative messages and lessons implicit in the texts.

Since Smith's studies were primarily premised on traditional media, specifically television, we cannot conclude that the youth would ‘not entirely embrace or adopt the educative messages and lessons implicit in the texts’ when it comes to social media. This is because social media are more interactive, and are likely to appeal to the audience (youth) to adopt variety of contents including education messages. Studies have shown that young people all over the world are now rapidly shifting from the traditional media to the web-enabled technologies (digital media) for diverse purposes including entertainment, education, relationship, health awareness, social mobilisation, and political sensitisation (see De Ridder, 2013; Greenhow 2011; Kalyango and Adu-Kumi, 2013, Wasserman, 2011; vanRensburg 2012; , Hyde-Clarke 2013; Bottorff, Struijk, Bassel, Graham, Stevens and Richardson 2014; Maamari& El Zein, 2014; Ridder 2015).

Because of their age, youth are regarded as the most active component of the demographics of any country. They constitute “an important constituency who need to be economically empowered and afforded an opportunity to contribute to the socio-economic development of the country” (Chipenda, 2017: 51). The description of youth by Chipenda indicates that they have a massive stake in the future and continuity of their country in many aspects including military service, economic growth, sports, agriculture and politics. This is the reason why the youth should be well mobilised to actively participate in the political affairs of their nation. Political participation is more than mere voting during elections. It involves diverse activities ranging from attending political rallies, political meetings, participating in political debates, contesting for elective offices, and disseminating information about candidates or political ideologies. When people express support for a political party, or when they criticise certain policies by a political body, they are participating in politics. In order to be politically active, the citizens should be empowered through exposure to the mass media and other means of information dissemination. This would enable them to exchange information about political parties, certain political ideologies, public policies and agenda; and they would be able take independent political decisions. Trappel and Maniglio (2009: 169) submit that "modern democracy and the mass media are intrinsically related. In modern democracies the mass media are the link between those who govern and those who are governed". The implication of the foregoing assertion is that when the citizens have access to the
mass media, they would have adequate knowledge of how government activities, policies and decisions affect them.

The emergence of the social media which mostly operate on Web 2.0 platform (Vesnic-Alujevic 2012), have significantly reduced the information gap that traditionally existed between the masses, especially the majority at the grassroots as the case in Nigeria (Moemeka 2009), and the political elite. The Internet has provided open access for people to consume and create content. Through mobile phones, also termed as a hybrid medium (Wei 2008: 36), people, especially youth, now engage in a range of online and offline activities. They can use the cell phones for mass communication, relationship building, entertainment, and social and political mobilisations (Aoki &Downes 2003; Wei, 2008; Balakrishnan&Raj 2012; Velghe 2012). We can draw examples from Arab countries and Asia (Al-Kandari and Hasan 2012; Chatora 2012; Bosch 2013), where youth have actively and effectively employed the digital media (e.g. Twitter, Facebook, blogs,) to incite, mobilize, execute, and sustain political struggles and participation.

Theoretical Framework

Uses and Gratifications Theory

The Uses and Gratifications (U&G) Approach is used as the theoretical anchor for this study. It is used to investigate why media consumers choose a particular mediated communication medium whenever a new technology emerges (Elliott and Orosenberg, cited by Guo, Tan and Cheung 2010). The approach explains why and how individuals select certain news media and for what purposes or gratifications (Severin and Tankard 2001; Watson, 2003; McQuail 2007; Baran and Davis 2012). It is a theory that explores what audience do with the news media. The central concept of U&G approach is that “the uses that audiences make of the media and the gratifications produced by those uses can be traced back to a constellation of individual psychological and social needs” (Littlejohn and Foss 2009: 65). Herta Herzog is often credited as the proponent of the Uses and Gratifications Approach. Her interest in how and why people listened to the radio, and more specifically her urge to understand why so many housewives were attracted to radio soap operas, propelled her to study fans of a popular quiz show (1940) and soap opera audience (1944). She discovered that fans of the quiz and soap opera were attracted to the radio because they derived three basic gratifications from the programmes—(1) emotional release; (2) opportunities for wishful thinking; and (3) sources of advice or educative information (Baran and Davis 2012). Other founding fathers of Uses and Gratifications theory are Elihu Katz, Jay Blumler, and Michael Gurevitch, who have identified 7-point platform of U&G approach and used this platform present an explanation for “how (1) the social and psychological origins of (2) needs generate (3) expectations of (4) the mass media or other sources, which lead to (5) differential patterns of exposure to the media, resulting in (6) need gratification and (7) other consequences” (Littlejohn and Foss 2009: 65).

In summary, the U&G approach explains that people use the communication media to gratify different
purposes or needs such as information, escape, diversion, relaxation, relationship building, and mobilisation. But the needs that the media consumers want to satisfy would always be different according to individuals or groups; and consequently, individual media audience would use the media for gratifications according to their diverse, peculiar needs. Mass media scholars have employed the U&G approach to investigate how people use certain communication media and the gratifications they derive in using such media (see Lometti, Reeves and Bybee 1977; Diddi and LaRose 2006; Papacharissi and Mendelson 2007; Sundar and Limperos 2013).

Methodology

Survey was the primary method employed for the study. Data for this study were collected among the students of North-West University, Mafikeng Campus, South Africa from February 18 to March 10, 2015. The study employed a sequential quant-QUAL exploratory approach, where smaller proportion of qualitative data were first collected to design further tools for collecting quantitative data: Before we developed the questionnaire, we had initially conducted a pilot study (structured interviews) among 12 students selected through convenience sampling from the population. We made sure that the students selected for the pilot study were excluded during the main data collection exercise. Most of the important variables that we used to construct the questionnaire items emerged from the qualitative data initially collected. The survey questionnaire was administered to students who were between 15 and 30 years. To control for this, we politely asked the students to confirm their age brackets. Any student outside the brackets of 15 to 30 years were excluded. Out of 250 copies of questionnaire administered, 232 (92.8%) were returned. The sample was selected through stratification and convenience sampling. Stratification was first used to map the University by faculties in order to ensure a fair spread of the sample. Respondents were then selected from the faculties through convenience sampling. One hundred and eighteen (50.9%) of the respondents were male, while 114 (49.1%) were female. Majority (85.8%) of the respondents was aged 19 to 25. Only individuals, who were Black students of the University, and were citizens of South Africa, were selected for the study because the study focused only on Black South African undergraduates. Authors recruited and trained two research assistants, who were indigenes of South Africa to participate in administration of the questionnaire. The fact that the research assistants were natives of South Africa and students of the University facilitated the collection of the data. They were able to talk to the students using their native language(s) in most cases during data collection processes.

Results

Results in this study are presented in line with the three research questions constructed to guide the study. The research questions and the results are presented as follows:

**Research Question 1:** What is the nature of the students’ participation in campus politics?
In order to answer this research question, we investigated the students’ level of engagement in the Students Union politics, and the nature of their participation especially during election periods. Results are presented in Figs1 & 2, and Table 1.

The students exhibited different levels of participation in the Students Union politics. Most of them were active; some were not very active while some were poor in their political engagements. For instance as shown in Fig 1, majority of the students (n=107; 46.1%) rated their level of involvement in political activities on campus as active, 73 (31.0%) were moderately active, only 23 (10.0%) were passive while 29 (13.0%) rated their level of political activities on campus as poor. Political actions such as attending meetings and rallies, participation in electioneering activities, and contesting for political posts were the variables that we used to determine the scale. In the self-rating of their participation in the identified political activities, students that recorded aggregates scores between 0% and 39% were tagged poor; students in the range of 40%-49% were tagged passive; 50%-59% categorised as moderately active; and 60% and above tagged very active.

Table 1: Students’ nature of participation during Students Union elections

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Nature of Participation</th>
<th>Response</th>
<th>n(%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Contested for an office during the last Students Union elections</td>
<td>Contested</td>
<td>22(9.5)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Did not contest</td>
<td>210(90.5)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Voted for Contestants during the last Students Union elections</td>
<td>Voted</td>
<td>209(90.1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Did not Vote</td>
<td>23(9.9)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td></td>
<td>232(100%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Authors’ analysis of research data (2017)
As shown in table1, majority of the students (n=210; 90.5 %) did not contest for any post during the Students Union elections while only 22 (9.5) contested for different elective posts. On the other hand, only 23 (9.9%) of the students did not vote at all whereas an overwhelming majority (n=209; 90.1%) voted for different aspirants during the elections.

**Research Question 2: How do the students use different communication modes to participate in campus politics?**

The main objective here was to investigate the specific communication means that the students employed to engage in political activities on campus. The results are presented in fig 2.

Results, as presented in fig 2, show that 78.0% of the students said they used social media to take part in political activities on the University campus while 22.0% did not use social media to engage in campus politics. The proportion of students that used text messages for disseminating information about political activities on campus is 60.7%. Only 36.2% of the students engaged in political activities through direct interpersonal communication. In all, social media are the most frequently used communication mode for political activities by the students, while interpersonal communication is the least used mode.

![Fig 2: Communication modes used by students to participate in campus politics](image-url)

*Source: Authors’ analysis of research data (2017)*
Research Question 3: How does access to social media influence students’ participation in campus politics?

We investigated two variables here; one, the extent to which the students had access to news media, and two, the influence that news media, most especially the social media, had on students’ political decisions and participation in campus politics. Fig 3 and table 2 present the findings.

![Fig. 3: Students' Level of Access to News Media](chart.png)

**Fig. 3: Students' Level of Access to News Media**
*Source: Authors' analysis of research data (2017)*

Fig 3 shows that the digital media (which are internet-based operating on the Web 2.0 platforms e.g. Facebook, Twitter, YouTube, LinkedIn, and WhatsApp) is the media type most accessible to the students (n=211; 90.9%) on the University campus. This is followed by radio (n=13; 5.6%) and television (n=6; 2.6%) while the print media (newspaper/magazine) is the least accessible news media (n=2; 0.9%) on the University campus.

As presented in table 2, 84.0% of the students said their political decisions were influenced by information they received from social media, 62.1% of the students confirmed their political decisions were influenced by information received through text message on cell phones, while only 17.2% said that information they got through direct interpersonal interactions with other students influenced their political decisions. More importantly, 86.6% of the students confirmed that without access to social
media (Twitter, Facebook, etc), they would have been much less actively engaged in campus politics while only 13.4% held a contrary position.

Table 2: Influence that Communication Media and access to social media have on Students’ Political Decisions and Participation in Campus politics

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Communication Media</th>
<th>Response</th>
<th>n(%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Information received from Social media influenced students’ political decisions.</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>195(84.0)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>No</td>
<td>37(15.9)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Information received from friends through text messages (via cell phones)</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>144(62.1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>influenced students’ political decisions.</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>88(37.9)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Information received from friends through direct interpersonal discussions</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>40(17.2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>influenced students’ political decisions.</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>192(82.8)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Access to Social Media</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Without access to social media, students’ level of political participation</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>201(86.6)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>on the University campus would have been much passive.</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>31(13.4)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td></td>
<td>232(100)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Authors’ analysis of research data (2017)

Table 3: The news media that drive students’ active participation and extent to which access to Social Media influence students’ interest and participation in politics

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Media Type</th>
<th>n(%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Traditional Media (Radio, Television, Newspaper, etc.)</td>
<td>58(25.0)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social Media (Facebook, Twitter, etc.)</td>
<td>174(75.0)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Extent of Students’ Participation in Campus Politics as a Result of Access to Social Media</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Great Extent</td>
<td>164(70.7)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low Extent</td>
<td>49(21.1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No Extent</td>
<td>19(8.2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>232(100)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Authors’ analysis of research data (2017)

The students used both traditional media (Radio, Television, Newspaper, etc.) and Digital media (Facebook, Twitter, Blogs, etc.) to participate in the Students’ Union politics, but the two sets of news media did not have the same level impact. As the results show in table 3, only 25.0% of the students affirmed that traditional news media propelled their active participation in campus politics whereas a significant proportion (75.0%) of the students confirmed that digital news media drove their active engagement in Students Union politics. Majority (70.7%) of the students said that, to a great extent, access to social media motivated them to participate in campus politics; 21.1% of the students said access to social media motivated them to a low extent while only 8.2% said access to social media did not drive them to participate in campus politics.

Discussion

Literature suggest that South African Black youth feel politically marginalised, and are more socially passive and politically apathetic than their parents or grandparents contrary to the general expectation that the post-apartheid democratic era, with the generation of the ‘Born Frees’, would produce a society of citizens with high political consciousness (Mkandawire, 2012; Mattes, 2012; Bosch, 2013). One would
have expected the students of North-west University to exhibit a similar pattern of political apathy and social passiveness by being less active in campus politics. However, findings in this study present a contrary trend: The students are politically lively and they actively engage in campus politics. Either directly by contesting for political offices or indirectly by participating in voting during elections, the students reported high level of political consciousness. The communication means they employ to engage in political activities are the social media, text messages on mobile phones, and direct interpersonal communication. Different forms of information that the students receive from different communication media have influence on their political decisions and level of participation in politics. However, the social media was found to be the most accessible media among the students on the University campus, and had the highest influence in driving the students to participate in campus politics. Guided by the research questions, we identified three major themes in the analysis of data, and we used these themes to further expand the discussion of the findings. These themes are (1) Students’ Level and Nature of Participation in Campus Politics, (2) Modes of Participating in Campus Politics by Students, and (3) Influence of Communication Media on Students’ Political Decisions and Participation in Campus politics.

**Students’ Level and Nature of Participation in Campus Politics**

The students of North-West University are not politically passive. The proportion of the students that were actively involved in the Students Union politics is 46.1%, while the proportion of those that were moderately involved in campus politics is 31.0%. If we consider the two sub-sets as the group that participated in campus politics, the proportion is 77.1% of the sample. Besides, majority of the students (n=209; 90.9%) reported that they took part in the actual voting during Students Union elections, but just a handful (n=22; 9.5%) of the students contested for elective posts during elections. This pattern is understandable because even at the macro level of politics, fewer people contest for posts compared to the majority that constitutes the electorate.

This foregoing trend is an encouraging phenomenon because when students are already exposed to the dynamics of micro politics at the university level, they are likely to easily adapt to the mechanism of macro politics at the regional or national level when they leave the university. Citing Deegan, Bosch (2013) explains that the post-apartheid black youth of South Africa are generally politically apathetic with diminished desire for activism or citizenship. However, findings of this study here may suggest a changing trend. Students of North-West University, like other South African students who represent the majority of Nation’s youth, appeared becoming progressively politically active and conscious, at the campus politics level. This trend may be attributable to the intensified efforts of South African government to increase media education campaigns, and access to news media (Saleh, 2012), especially the digital media, which studies have proved to be more effective than the conventional news media in creating "active audience” (Sundar and Limperos 2013: 504), initiating, mobilizing and sustaining political struggles, interest, and participation among youth (see Al-Kandari and Hasan 2012; Chatora 2012; Ahmad and Sheikh 2013). And given the fact that since the apartheid era, South African youth, especially university students, have remained targets of activists and political leaders for social
struggles and political freedom (Bosch 2013), the forgoing findings, therefore, suggest that the students, who are politically conscious, constitute potential human resources for the democratic project of South Africa.

**Communication Modes Used by Students to Participate in Campus Politics**

We investigated the communication modes through which the students participated in campus politics. Three modes of communication were identified. These are social media, text messages on cell phones, and direct interpersonal communication. The communication mode mostly used by the students to engage in political activities is social media as 78.0% of the students said they used the media. Next to social media is the use of text message through cell phones (60.7%), while only 36.2% of the students engage in politics through direct interpersonal communication. This trend may not be unexpected given the age bracket of the students (19 to 25 years). Our finding here is consistent with results of other studies which show that youth are active users of mobile phones and avid consumers of digital media content especially for communication with friends, and other forms of social connections (Williamson, Qayyum Hider and Liu 2012; Cauwenberge, d’Haenens and Beentjes 2013). These benefits are examples of gratifications that encouraged the students to prefer using new media for political participation ahead of other communication modes. This finding notwithstanding, all other modes of communication, especially direct interpersonal communication, are also useful and relevant. As prescribed by the Uses and Gratification theory, every communication mode is relevant; it all depends on the communication objectives, the needs and the gratifications the individuals expect to derive from using certain communication media in a given communication context (Severin and Tankard, 2001; Watson, 2003; McQuail, 2007; Baran and Davis, 2012). However, when a new technology emerges, people are likely to adopt it in the place of an old one with the expectation that new technology would give them more gratifications (Elliott and Orozernberg, cited by Guo, Tan and Cheung 2010). This might explain the reason why majority of the students, in their political engagements on campus, used the social media and text messages via their mobile phones—the two media that are driven by new technologies. Besides, the new media have some features such as relative accessibility and interactivity that provide some gratifications for the users.

**Influence of Communication Media on Students’ Political Decisions and Participation in Campus politics**

In order to determine the influence of news media on students’ political decisions and participation in campus politics, we first examined the level of access they had to news media especially on campus. Findings show that the social media (n=211; 90.9%) are the most accessible to the students while radio (n=13; 5.6%), television (n=6; 2.6%), and print media (n=2; 0.9%) are less accessible. Students agreed that information they received from different information sources positively influenced their interest and participation in campus politics. They confirmed that the social media (n=174; 75.0%), rather than the traditional media (n=58; 25.0%), had most positive impact on their interest and engagement in campus politics. To a great extent (70.7%), access to social media motivated the students to participate in campus politics. Findings from a previous study have confirmed that the most important variable that
determines participants’ uses of, and preferences for, specific news platforms was the perceived accessibility (Cauwenberge, d’Haenens and Beentjes 2013). Pervasiveness of the internet-enabled mobile phones, through which these social media can be accessed, must have endeared the digital media to the students who represent the digital generation. One thing discernible from the foregoing findings is that, social media, which are the most accessible on campus, have played a leading role in motivating the students to participate in campus politics. The finding is consistent with the outcome of a study by Al-Kandari and Hasanen (2012) conducted among university students from Egypt and Kuwait, which affirms that “the use of Facebook, Twitter and blogs as Internet applications, together with Internet use for information, positively predict political engagement” (p. 245). Notwithstanding, our findings here contradict results of a study by Valenzuela, Arriagada and Scherman (2012: 301), which show that in Chile, youth, “as in other parts of the world, typically exhibit low rates of political participation. Between 1988 and 2009, turnout in the 18–29 age group decreased from 35% to less than 9%”. Although, our current study does not establish that students’ high level of participation in campus politics would translate to the same level of active participation in politics outside the university campus, it provides the basis to predict the potentials of new media in stimulating South African Black youth’s interest in the country’s politics and general democratic project.

Conclusion

Our objective was to investigate how post-apartheid South African Black youth, who were stereotyped as being socially passive and politically apathetic, used social media to engage in political activities. To do this we collected data among Black students of the Mafikeng campus of North-West University. Our belief was that the black population of the University would share some semblance of the South African Black youth, who belong to the generation of the ‘Born Frees of the post-apartheid era. Findings of this study have established that the students of North-West University, who were the population for this study, and who represent the South African black youths in the less-urban sections of the country, were not apathetic to politics as described in literature. Majority of them actively participated in campus politics in different forms. Most of their political activities on the university campus were driven largely by the social media, which interestingly, as established in study, were the most accessible media to the students. Text messages through mobile phones also played important roles in how the students engaged in politics on campus, but the traditional media (radio, television and newspaper/magazine) were hardly accessible and sparsely used by the students.

The foregoing findings suggest that South African Black youth may not be as politically apathetic as perceived and described by scholars. The students have the potential to demonstrate the same level of enthusiasm in national politics as they did in campus politics, if there is an effective social mobilisation scheme. Also, there is no doubts that youth are migrating to the new digital space that is relatively free, accessible, interactive, and independent of undue control by the political class or state apparatus. It is, therefore, recommended that government should make sure that the youth have more access to the news media, especially the social media, within and outside the university settings. The South African government should commit more resources to making the digital media more effective, efficient and
accessible nationwide especially to the youth. Access to social media could be a trigger for the Black youth to develop stronger interest and become more active in the democratic project of South Africa.

**Limitations**

We did not have the opportunity to observe the students to see how they participated in campus politics; the time we collected the data did not coincide with the period of Students Union elections. Rather we relied on self-rated assessment through the questionnaire. Besides, our study did not investigate the correlation between students’ level of participation in campus politics and their predisposition to national politics. These factors may constitute some limitations to the study. However, findings of the study have the promise to suggest how, and through which communication modes, the students are likely to participate in South African politics and democratic project at large. It is, therefore, suggested that nation-wide studies are carried out to establish students’ attitude to national politics and factors that may motivate them to be more politically active outside the university campus.

**References**


