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Towards a Theory of the Intellectuals and their Political Ideology in the Post-Soviet Global Society

Nazrul Islam*

I

In spite of a multitude of theories and an unlimited number of books, essays and research papers, there is no coherent theory of intellectuals. It is particularly true of the post-Soviet global society where much of the previous discussions on the intellectuals lose their merit. Marx's theory of the 19th century or the Gramscian and the Mannheimian theories of the 1920s or even the works of later Marxists and neo-Marxists tend towards redundancy in the new realities of our time. True that each theory was, perhaps, capable of explaining part of the reality and may yet be useful in explaining some situations when taken in parts. But if a coherent picture is sought, these theories at best confuse the reader and at worst are totally out of tune. It is, therefore, proposed in this study that we need a fresh set of ideas, some of which are already in the offing, to understand who and what the intellectuals are and what role they play in the post-Soviet global society of supranational organizations, transnational corporations and information technology.

Much of the previous studies of the intellectuals refer to particular cases of national, regional or some micro-level units of analysis. Few refer to the historical growth of the intellectuals and attempt cross-national studies, let alone attempt an examination of the global situation. The theories that grow out of these, or used to explain these, are mostly ad hoc in nature and lose their applicability beyond the particular study for which they were proposed. Only a few studies like those of Gouldner, Gramsci or Mannheim can make any claims to applicability in a multitude of situations. All such theories, however, owe their existence to Marx and Engels and tend to argue in favour or against a class location of the intellectuals.

It would not come as a surprise today, at beginning of the 21st century, that it is not possible to establish the identity of the intellectuals in terms of a class in the Marxian, neo-Marxian or some such sense. It may not also be a revelation that the intellectuals of today are not the same intellectuals as those of Marx's "thinkers", Gramsci's "organic intellectuals", or even Mannheim's "free-floating" ones (see also Lowenthal 1998 on Walter Benjamin). In the global economic setting or in the "postmodern" society, none of these categories make sense. Similarly it must be realized that capitalism of today is not the same capitalism of Marx, Gramsci or Mannheim. Nor is it the same capital that is dominated by the nation state. Thus the economy, which defined the class location or the ideologies and political opinions of the intellectuals, is no longer the same. So,

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what needs to be understood at the outset, in any analysis of the intellectuals and their ideologies, is the nature of capitalism today.

Back in the 1970s and 80s, what was seen by the dependency theorists and by Wallerstein as the world economy or the “world system” was merely the beginning of a process that has found its culmination in the form of the global system of today, where the economy is no longer dominated by national capital or national capitalists. The dependency theorists in the 70s and the 80s warned us about multinational or the transnational corporations as becoming more powerful and dominant than national capital. As a matter of fact even then many such corporations were larger in terms of capital than the GDPs of most countries of the Third world. Today such capital has taken a step further and is now supranational, not bound by the territoriality of a nation state; it is global capital that dominates the world economic scene now.

In Marx’s formulation capital was not expected, at least theoretically, to be limited within any state boundaries. Marx and Engels in the *Manifesto of the Communist Party* made the global nature of capitalism abundantly clear, indeed, they suggested that to achieve socialism, capitalism must be overthrown globally and hence the call for “the workers of the world” to unite. But the economic and political reality of the times not only made capital nation-state based, it thrived and prospered under the protection of the state all through the 19th century and much of the 20th century. Thus, capitalism became an economy that was clearly international “amidst a world political system that was compartmentalized into separate nation-states” (Robinson and Harris 2000)

The global nature of capital was also theorized by some followers of Marx, including Lenin, who, during the early 20th century, warned about the eventual growth of capitalism into imperialism. These Marxists, including Lenin, predicted the role of multinational capital in such a transformation. However, it was dependency theory and the world system theory that elaborated the extent of this transformation of capital into multinational capital, and in particular its subversive impact on the economy and society in the Third World.

However, these analyses, although trying to portray the historical reality of the growth of capitalism, were all limited to the explanation of capital in relation to the state or national capital. Theories of “capitalism as imperialism” saw the expansion of national capital as ruling the world. Even in the analysis of the dependency and world system theories it was the capital of the US or the core countries that dominated the world in the form of *multinational* capital. The word “national” remained at the core of these analyses.

Interestingly, however, even the proponent of the world system theory is today aware of the phenomenal changes that are taking place in the world economy and places it beyond the realities portrayed in the world system theory. Wallerstein in a recent essay (visit website below) argues that the capitalist world economic system, which has been in existence from the sixteenth century, is approaching its end, and is entering an era of transition to some new historical system. He feels that the capitalist world-economy is beset with structural strains, which it is no longer in a position to handle. Wallerstein identifies three sources of the structural strains which are a) near complete "deruralization" of the world that has driven up the price of labour, b) the ecological exhaustion, which is increasing the cost of inputs, and c) the democratization of the world, which has increased the demands for public goods. He feels that a combination of these three is creating a massive long-term structural squeeze on profits from production and is making the system unprofitable for the capitalists. He is, however, not certain which way the economy is actually moving and what kind of economic system lies in the future.

But there are others who have a clearer picture of the future of the world economy and argue that it is moving inexorably towards globalization. It was, perhaps, Barnett and Muller who, in their *Global Reach* (1974), presented the first real exposition of the nature of global capital. Today, an endless array of literature is available to support the view that over the past few decades capitalism has gone through a fundamental transformation. It has become global capitalism.

According to Burbach and Robinson, (quoted by Robinson and Harris 2000) this globalization involves an "epochal shift" in the development of the world capitalist system. In the nation-state phase the world was linked by commodity and financial flows in an integrated "international" market. In the global phase today the worldwide social linkage is an internal one (internal to the world as a whole, as the earlier "world system" theory so forcefully argued) and the process of production has become supranational (Robinson and Harris 2000). So that global capital is not just the mere collection of "national economies" or a quantitative extension of the same. It is a qualitatively different phase in the growth of capitalism, in which capital itself has become "supranational".

Finance capital is the most mobile and most deterritorialized factor and today \$25 trillion in currency move in the global financial market daily as compared to a mere \$10 billion in international trade per day (Robinson and Harris 2000). Along with money capital, the production process has also become deterritorialized. "Many previously nationally-based industries, such as autos, electronics, textiles, and computers, and even, in fact, services, are now thoroughly transnationalized" (Robinson and Harris 2000). Globalization is also evidenced in the phenomenal increase of FDI and mergers among ever-larger corporations often across

continents. This global decentralization and dispersal of production, has become possible partly because of the growth of science and technology.

II

This is not the place to go into any detailed study of the process or the forces of this transformation of capitalism from national to the supranational or global one. An excellent study of this trend towards globalization of capital is offered by Robinson and Harris (2000). What is important to note here is that under such a condition class formation can no longer be bounded by the forces of national economies either. Therefore, along with the transformation of the global economy, a realignment of classes is also taking place, which no longer responds to the forces of national economies alone but become part of a supranational class formation.

Robinson and Harris (2000) in their study focuses on what they like to call a “transnational” ruling class. They seek to establish that a transnational capitalist class has emerged, and that this transnational class is in the process of becoming a global ruling class. The newly emerged class is in the process of creating a new globalist historic block, a new hegemonic block, consisting of various economic and political forces that have become the dominant sector of the ruling class throughout the world, both in the developed countries of the North and those of the South as well. This bloc, well on its way to becoming the global ruling class, is composed of the “transnational corporations and financial institutions, the elite that manage the supranational economic planning agencies, major forces in the dominant political parties, media conglomerates, and technocratic elites and state managers in both North and South” (Robinson and Harris 2000). The block also includes the cadre, bureaucratic managers and technicians who administer the supranational agencies, such as the IMF, the World Bank, and the WTO, the states of the North and the South, and other transnational forums.

Leslie Sklair (quoted by Robinson and Harris 2000) similarly identifies this new class as being formed by the executives of transnational corporations, “globalizing bureaucrats, politicians, and professionals”, and “consumerist elites” in the media and the commercial sector. Sklair also argues that this capitalist class is no longer tied to territoriality or driven by national competition.

The global ruling class is also active in forming a global state apparatus. This is evident both in the economic and political spheres. The World Bank, IMF, WTO, UN, European Union, G7, OECD etc. are some such examples to that end. The global class “has directly instrumentalized this TNS (Transnational State, or global state) apparatus, exercising a form of transnational state

power through the multi-layered configuration of the TNS". Like its supranational component entities (the WTO or EU etc.) this global state is also supranational.

Robinson and Harris (2000) also try to argue that corresponding to the growth of this global bourgeoisie, the transnational (global) proletariat is also taking shape. However, unlike the bourgeoisie, which is both a class in itself and for itself, the proletariat has not yet attained the class consciousness, that is, it is not yet a class for itself. "The proletariat worldwide is as well in the process of transnational class formation. A transnational working class is increasingly a reality, a class-in-itself. But it is not yet for-itself." They feel that it is mainly because of the continued existence of the national-state and uneven development that class-consciousness is lacking.

In any case, this global society is increasingly crystallizing into stratified classes or class-fragments. Robinson and Harris (2000) argue that below the transnational elite or the ruling class is "a small and shrinking layer of middle classes who exercise very little real power but who – pacified with mass consumption – form a fragile buffer between the transnational elite and the world's poor majority". Thus, the global society is increasingly being characterized by a three-tiered social structure. "The first tier is made up of some 30-40 percent of the population in core countries and less in peripheral countries, those who hold "tenured" employment in the global economy. The second tier, some 30 percent in the core and 20-30 percent in the periphery, form a growing army of "casualized" workers. The third tier, some 30 percent of the population in the core capitalist countries, and some 50 percent or more in peripheral countries, *who are redundant to the system*.

According to Robinson and Harris (2000) these "casualized" workers face chronic insecurity in the conditions of their employment and the absence of any collective insurance against risk previously assured by the welfare state. The third tier who is "structurally excluded from productive activity" similarly remains completely unprotected, as the welfare and developmentalist states are "dismantled". They comprise the "superfluous" population of global capitalism (see also Hoogvelt, 1997) the caring of whom under the system is left unto themselves. In the absence of the welfare state the responsibility for care and protection of this superfluous population is being diverted to these helpless beings under the guise of "community empowerment" and the such. Hoogvelt notes that an attempt is being made by a section of the ruling bloc to organize "the poor and the marginalized to care for and contain and control themselves" (1997:149) The phenomenal growth in the NGO activities world wide, and the poorer countries in particular, attests to that effort.

However, and in spite of such claims, neither the nation state nor national capital has disappeared yet, although they may be heading in that direction. It is particularly true of the third world countries where globalization or its links are the weakest. So that, there is an uneasy coexistence of the nation state and the forces of globalization. Robinson and Harris (2000) are aware that national capital continues to define and dominate classes within the boundaries of the nation-states in these countries. The classes defined by the global economy may be superimposed on this national class structure but they do not dominate the national scenes as yet. This is particularly true of the Third world countries “where transnational class formation is weakest and where "national" bourgeoisies may still control states and organize influential political projects” (Robinson and Harris 2000) But even in these countries “transnational class formation is well underway”. We are thus, faced with a situation in which we find two sets of economies defining two sets of class relations, one national the other supranational.

III

The intellectuals too, therefore, need to be redefined in terms of this new reality. *In terms of this new reality, we can expect two sets of intellectuals one dominated by the global forces the other by the local conditions. One, directly linked with the globalizing forces, trying to promote and consolidate the global system while the other seeking to assert their independence from global hegemony.*

Thus in the midst of this new class configuration the intellectuals occupy very interesting positions. First they form a part of the ruling elite or the global ruling class both as managers and technocrats as well as the politicians and the members of the think tanks. It is with their active cooperation and participation that the global ruling class is being formed and a global state apparatus is in the process of becoming a reality. R and H note that “studies on building a global economy and transnational management structures flowed out of think tanks, university centers, and policy planning institutes in core countries” Indeed, they like to argue that the supranational state apparatus has become “one important forum” for the socialization of the new ruling class as are the “ world class universities, transnationally-oriented think tanks, the leading bourgeois foundations, such as Harvard's School of International Business, the Ford and the Carnegie Foundations, policy planning groups such as the Council on Foreign Relations, and so on”.

Robinson and Harris (2000) also argue that it is the World Economic Forum (WEF) more than any other organization that is the “quintessential example of a truly global network” that binds the transnational ruling class (global ruling class) together. They add that the component forums of the WEF include the top executives of the top 1000 transnational corporations known as the “Foundation Members”, the leaders of the top 100 media groups known as the “World Media

Leaders”, key policymakers from national governments around the world and from international organizations known as the “World Economic Leaders”, as well as the “*select academics and experts from political, economic, scientific, social and technological fields*” (italics added) known as the “Forum Fellows”. They, thus, form the “organic intellectuals” for the new global ruling class.

Like other “organic intellectuals” the intellectuals of this global class for Robinson and Harris (2000) are also involved in creating the hegemony for this class. The media, particularly in its worldwide coverage creates that hegemony and makes possible the transmission of its ideology. Robinson and Harris (2000) note that the “transnational corporate media and its tight control over the worldwide flow of information and of images are issues of cultural domination”. In doing so the global corporate media “plays an essential role in producing the ideological and cultural bases for a hegemonic bloc” (the “globalist” bloc) that they earlier identified as the ruling class. The membership in the hegemonic bloc “*also includes the politicians and charismatic figures, along with select organic intellectuals, who provide ideological legitimacy and technical solutions*” (italics added).

At the local state level one would find the whole range of intellectuals previously known to be associated with the academic institutions, the state bureaucracies, cultural and social organizations, the poets, writers, journalists and other professionals. In Gramsci’s terms they would probably today qualify as the “traditional” intellectuals as opposed to the “organic” intellectuals of the TNS identified above. In any case their role, status and activities, as will be shown below, vary considerably from those of the global intellectuals.

However, another set of intellectuals may be identified whose location may be at the national level but are associated with the supranational organizations and transnational corporations at home. Along with these is also a whole range of expatriate intellectuals who may be truly supranational as they move globally while they get transferred from one location to another. These two groups of intellectuals occupy the middle grounds as they merge on both ends with the global and local situations and take out the sharpness from of the edges. As will be shown below their political ideologies and roles may of great importance in understanding the intellectuals of today.

IV

To appreciate these claims we need to look at the intellectuals in their current variations. Even in Gramsci’s work we note the need to make greater distinctions among the intellectuals in terms of the roles they play vis-à-vis the system of production. Like other Marxists, Gramsci (visit website below for text from Prison

Notebooks) considered the workers and the capitalists as the fundamental classes but that did not stop him from analyzing the position of the intellectuals in the world of production. He realized that it was not as direct as that of the fundamental classes but was influenced by the “whole fabric of society and by the complex of superstructures”. Thus, Gramsci was in a position to look at the nature of the various strata of intellectuals. He proposed to measure these in relation to the extent of control exercised by each stratum. Accordingly, he thought it possible to measure the a) organic quality of various intellectual strata; b) their degree of connection with the fundamental social group; c) to establish a gradation of their function; and d) also of the superstructures they are associated with. These he proposed to do in relation to their control of the social and political life, in terms of the hegemony and state domination.

Although Gramsci continued to consider the intellectuals as mere deputies of the ruling class he not only elaborated on the internal differences that distinguish various categories of intellectuals but also sought to arrange these and the institutions they are affiliated with into hierarchies both in relation to their control over society and administration and also in terms of the qualitative differences among them. Thus, he was the first to really emphasize the differences among the various categories of intellectuals and their institutions of affiliations. These we shall presently argue are of immense importance in analyzing the intellectuals and their political opinions today.

Traditionally the intellectuals have been seen as belonging to the humanities. They are the philosophers, the literary critics, the artists, writers, columnists etc. Various categorizations have often been made among the intellectuals such as the traditional, the organic, the liberal, secular, left or the conservatives. In these the whole profession is treated as a single entity and little distinction was been made among the fields of specialization. Although often the differences between the humanities and the sciences and the technical vocations have been recognized, these have not been followed to their logical conclusions. Nor was it practical until now. The global forum allows us to make the differences among the fields of specialization into very suggestive categories of differences among intellectuals especially in terms of their participation in politics or their ideologies and political opinions.

As early as the first decades of the 20th century Julien Benda felt the need to differentiate the intellectuals who seek practical ends from those who build ideologies. He identified as intellectuals “all those whose activity essentially is *not* the pursuit of practical aims, all those who seek their joy in the practice of an art or a science or a metaphysical speculation, in short in the possession of non-material advantages”(Benda quoted by Kimball 1992). Benda called them the *clerc*, which in the current usage would include “academics and journalists, pundits, moralists, and pontificators of all varieties”. Some like Kimball (1992) uses the term *intelligentsia* to identify

the same group. Bookchin (1991) also uses the term intelligentsia to identify the same group but excludes the academics from consideration as “true intellectuals”. We shall look at the significance of this exclusion of the academics later. Edward Said (2001) makes a distinction between the “writer” and the intellectual, in which he sees the “writer” as a person who produces literature—that is, a novelist, poet, dramatist and has a greater prestige in society while for him the intellectual belongs to the slightly debased and parasitic class of “critics”, although at the beginning of the twenty-first century, he adds, the writer has taken on the intellectual's adversarial attributes of speaking the truth and supplying a dissenting voice.

In a similar manner Denis Smith (2001) distinguishes between those intellectuals who are “useful”, mainly to the “people in power” and the ‘genuine’ intellectuals who “want to actually influence the way people see and think about the world and in some cases they want to help set society's agenda”. The “useful” intellectuals are “the cogs in a machine” they are the “experts”. Others like Kellner (visit website below) tried to differentiate the “functional” from the critical/oppositional intellectuals. The critical/ oppositional intellectuals are the real intellectuals while the “functional” intellectuals are the “specialists in legitimation and technical knowledge.” They are “mere technicians who devise more efficient means to obtain certain ends, or who apply their skills to increase technical knowledge in various specialized domains”

This emphasis on the technical skills of a group of intellectuals was also voiced by Gouldner in the 1970s while trying to establish the intellectuals as forming a “new class”. In this formulation Gouldner (1979) saw the intellectuals and the intelligentsia as the two elites within the new class. By employing the analogous term “intelligentsia”, Gouldner tried to identify a section of the ruling elite whose intellectual interests were primarily “technical.” as opposed to the intellectuals whose interests are primarily critical, emancipatory, hermeneutic and hence often political (Don W. Dotson (visit website below). While the intellectuals are noted for their “love of books”, the “intelligentsia often wish nothing more than to be allowed to enjoy their opiate obsessions with technical puzzles”.

Gouldner argues that the sociology and the social psychology of the occupational life of the intellectuals and the intelligentsia (mostly prefixed by ‘technical’) “differ considerably”. Using Kuhn's notion of normal science and its focus on a single paradigm he argues that the technical intelligentsia “concentrate on operations within the paradigm(s) of their discipline, exploring its inner symbolic space, extending its principles to new fields, fine-tuning it”. In contrast, the field of activity of the intellectuals more commonly lack “consensually validated paradigms” and may actually have “several competing paradigms”, because of which the intellectuals “often transgress the boundaries of the conventional division of labor in intellectual life.” (Gouldner 1979). They belong to the traditional humanities (Dotson).

M. Ignatief (visit website below) in his essay with the intriguing question “where have all the intellectuals gone?” also builds up the definition of the intellectuals on the distinction between the “humanist” and the scientists. Indeed, he argues that by definition the intellectual is “a generalist rather (than a) specialist, a moralist rather than a technician”. Robert Nozick (1998), a Harvard professor of philosophy, is more specific about the distinction between the two sets of intellectuals. He distinguishes between the intellectuals who work with “words” and those who work with “numbers”. He likes to identify the intellectuals as those who “deal with ideas as expressed in words, shaping the word flow others receive”. He likes to call them the “wordsmiths”. These wordsmiths include poets, novelists, literary critics, newspaper and magazine journalists and many professors, “they shape our ideas and images of society”. He argues that from treatises to slogans they give us sentences to express ourselves. On the other hand, Nozick (1998) categorically excludes from his consideration as the intellectuals “those who primarily produce and transmit quantitatively or mathematically formulated information” whom he likes to call the “numbersmiths” and “those working in visual media, painters, sculptors, cameramen” etc.

This distinction made by Nozick (1998) is of vital importance to understand the intellectuals and their political ideologies today. It is seen very easily that the intellectuals who form the core of the new global elite belong to the category of numbersmiths and the visual media rather than the wordsmiths and the print media, although the printmedia is also increasingly becoming global. Yet, CNN is received in over 200 nations and territories while the *New York Times* is not. These numbersmiths are the “experts from political, economic, scientific, social and technological fields.” They work as scientist, engineers, as well as managers in financial institutions and supranational or global organizations and corporations.

Thus, not all intellectuals are considered as “true” intellectuals. Only those who are trained in the humanities or work as novelists, poets, journalists and critics etc. are the true intellectuals. Those trained in the sciences and technologies or work in such professions are not considered as “true intellectuals”. They are mere experts and technicians.

The second set of distinctions made in recent times is between those intellectuals who work within an institution and those who are free-lance. Bookchin (1991) distinguishes the intellectuals of the academia from the “true intellectuals”, whom he calls the “intelligentsia”. The intellectuals are the ones who are in the market as commodities and are absorbed by the academia as much

as by the government and the corporations. "Their public arena is the classroom and they work according to a syllabus." Because of this absorption into the universities and into corporations and the state machinery "they end up getting trapped in the institutions so that they can't get out of them anymore." They are, thus, the institutionalized thinkers and institutionalized people who train others, rather than impart wisdom.

Within the institutions a further distinction is also made between those in teaching and those in research. Brian Martin (1998) makes a clear-cut distinction between the intellectuals in teaching and those in research. In the academia research is more "highly valued" than teaching. Academics can increase their prestige considerably by "conspicuous research, but hardly at all by conspicuous teaching". Research is also of greater interest outside the academia, where the researchers have "more to offer to powerful groups" than do teachers. The researcher can sell his knowledge, which is seen as "expert knowledge" to the outsiders like the state and the corporations. Knowledge and advice are sought by corporations and state bureaucracies as a result those in research are more likely to become consultants for the government or industry and have personal links with the state and corporate elites.

For comparable reasons, in the earlier times, the teacher also enjoyed a higher prestige, as higher education was the preserve of the social elite. But as education became universal and higher education became more accessible to the general public, the status of teaching also declined. Ignatief notes that "never has society been better educated; never has intellectuals enjoyed less prestige". Also because research is routinely associated with social benefits and 'breakthroughs' involving medicine, space and the like, being a researcher seems more likely to bolster the prestige of individual academics. Michael Ignatief similarly says that "thanks to the brilliant popularizers of physics, genetics, and chemistry, the scientist (researcher) enjoys greater intellectual prestige than any humanist intellectual".

However, a further distinction among the various categories of intellectuals is also in order. As noted above, ever larger number of jobs both in the managerial and research sectors and consulting jobs are opening up within the global organizations and national and multinational corporations and the state. These are mostly highly paid jobs and attract a large number of intellectuals from the various fields of the sciences and technology as well as from among the social sciences, particularly economics. Many corporate research organizations have an edge over the university research organizations in terms of funds and benefits. So that ever-larger numbers are being attracted to these organizations. Similarly the major corporations including the global or multinational corporations and supranational organizations like the UN also attract a large number of intellectuals, Robinson and Harris (2000) argue that as many as 30- 40 percent people in the developed and a little less in the third world have tenured jobs in such organization.

Although this figure seems to be rather high the fact remains that an ever-larger number of intellectuals are being recruited by the multinational corporations and supranational organizations.

Of even greater consequence is the fact that these jobs attract intellectuals from all over the world and are often truly global in terms of the personnel, although the representation from the first world may be disproportionately higher. Also, these organizations disperse their personnel to distant countries and regions. Thus, it is a very likely scenario that a Bangladeshi computer analyst graduating from a US university is working for a Japanese firm in Brazil. Thus, among the global organizations we may get two categories of intellectuals, one working within their own countries for better pay and benefits compared to local jobs and the other category working for the global organizations for even better pay and benefits and working in countries and regions far from their place of origin or education and training.

It is, thus, obvious that the intellectuals of today cannot be seen as a homogeneous group and that the distinction among the various categories not only separate them into distinct groups, the nature of their jobs, terms of employment and their domain and even their place of work are all so different and dispersed that it would be too naïve to assume that they are alike in any manner. There are, therefore, several categories of intellectuals who need to be treated as separate groups of intellectuals. First, we have the distinction among their fields of specializations in terms of the humanities as opposed to the sciences and technology, then the distinction among the institutional as opposed to the freelance. Within the institutional intellectuals are those in teaching and those in research, and then there are those working at the local level or the state and national corporations and those working for the global and multinational corporations and supranational organizations working within the country and again those working outside the country. In terms of broader categories we have the intellectuals from the humanities, the wordsmiths, working mostly at the local levels in state bureaucracies and as university professors or freelance writers, journalists etc. The other is the scientists, technicians, the numbersmiths, working in various research institutions in the universities, local corporations, and multinational and supranational organizations, often becoming supranational themselves.

Therefore, a distinction among the domains of their work is essential to fully appreciate the role of the intellectuals. Martin argues that the political views of academics show much more variation between disciplines than any difference between academic attitudes and those of the general public (Martin 1998). This becomes vital for the fact that some professionals are not even regarded as true intellectuals. Thus, for Gouldner the specialists or the technical experts are the

“intelligentsia” and not “intellectuals”. Nozick (1998) summarily dismisses the numbersmiths and visual media-persons from his consideration as intellectuals.

V

Such distinctions are necessary because it is generally assumed that some intellectuals, the generalists, humanist or literary critics, the “wordsmiths”, play more of a public role either in favour or in opposition to this or that political issue and seek to transform public opinions. They are the “public intellectuals”. The scientists, the specialist, the technician or the numbersmiths, are mostly indifferent to the social and political issues, indeed, often apolitical. Thus it is their domain of work as much as, if not more than, their earlier class location in the family or their schooling (Brym 1980; 2001) that are seen as determinants of the role the intellectuals play in public life and is the key to their political opinions and ideologies.

Historically the intellectuals have played an oppositional role in Europe and America and are, thus, expected to continue to play a similar political role. They were the critics in the Dreyfus affair; they were the critics that Benda laments about in his 1927 essay, *The Treason of the Intellectuals*. They were the radicals and later the Left in most societies. According to Sartre “the duty of the intellectual is to denounce injustice wherever it occurs.” The domain of the intellectual is “to write and speak within the public sphere, denouncing oppression and fighting for human freedom and emancipation.” (Kellner, see website below).

Indeed, for many, the real intellectual is the one who plays a political role. Bookchin (1991), though he used the term intelligentsia, to identify the ‘true intellectuals’ argues that intelligentsia is a concept of Russian origin where it referred to the “people who thought and still lived in a public arena, and who tried to create a public sphere.” For him Denis Diderot is an example of the intelligentsia “who wrote - virtually in poverty for much of his life - who read and was creative, who walked the streets of Paris intoxicated by the life of the people, who played chess and was involved in the discussions in the cafes, acting as a ferment, challenging authority everywhere along his way and going to prison for a period of time.” Thus for Bookchin (1991) the intelligentsia are the people who not only engaged in thinking and writing but also “engaged in confrontations with the system instead of shying away from them.” The intelligentsia, (in Russia) went with others to Siberia (on exile) and created enormous social ferment, they worked outside the institutions and would rather create institutions for the masses that needed to understand the real issues of the time.

But in recent times it has been felt by many that not all intellectuals are engaged in building ideas and ideologies or participating in politics in equal measures. *There are many among the intellectuals who do not so much as concern themselves with politics or even the public realm.* Since the advent of universal education the number of people who would be considered as intellectuals or those who work in the intellectual professions have increased phenomenally, definitely over the past century. As a result there are literally hundreds of thousands, even millions, within any country, or society, who may be identified as intellectuals. It would be only futile to expect that all those hundreds of thousands of intellectuals be involved in public life or even to have strong political opinions. Brian Martin feels that most intellectuals have conventional views and lives. There is little inherent radicalism in being an intellectual. (Martin 1998) . Thus, only a handful of the intellectuals may be involved in shaping the public sphere and the others simply as passive as the rest of the public, while some may even be apathetic to the public need or be truly *apolitical*. This explains why some find the intellectuals as not meeting the ideal typical expectations. The number of such uninvolved ones may actually be overwhelmingly large and frustrate any attempt to define the "true intellectual".

Starr (1995) sees this apathy as the result of two major factors, first is the rise of the academia, and the research institutions and the absorption into the government bureaucracies, second the rise of the market; the culture of the academy and the culture of commerce. Russell Jacoby lamented the fact that most intellectuals have become professors. The academia kills the intellectuals. Pierre Bourdieu argues that since the intellectuals are employed by the bourgeois, who hold the real economic and political power, they remain loyal to the order. What this means in practice is that institutional intellectuals may profess any number of "radical" ideas but are curiously passive vis-à-vis the system itself (Marjorie Perloff 1997). Marjorie Perloff finds the intellectuals as a vanishing species so far as "public voice" is concerned. Olivier Mongin, editor of the *L'Esprit* recently argued that "the notion of the intellectual is today a useless one" (quoted by David Tresilian 2000).

Therefore, an attempt is often made to identify the public intellectuals and to distinguish them from those who do not perform such roles. It is in this search that some have come up with a distinction between the intellectuals and the intelligentsia or the technical experts and the humanist intellectuals or those from the institution as opposed to those who work as freelance intellectuals and those who work as researchers as opposed to those who are mere teachers. We have also made a further distinction between the intellectuals who work for the global

organizations and who work at the local levels and between those who work within their own country and society and those who work outside.

VI

We are now in a better position to understand the political roles and ideologies of the intellectuals. As noted above the assumption that the intellectuals represent a position in the social structure and that their political opinions and ideologies are a mere reflection of that position is no longer tenable. Analysts from Marx on ward have tried to identify this ideology and in most cases the intellectuals have been seen as occupying a position away from those of the basic classes, the proletariat and the capitalists, and they were seen as mere deputies of the capitalists and serving their interests, although some have seen them as classless or even belonging to the ruling class, if not forming the ruling class in itself.

All these have been argued in relation to a capitalist economy, often a socialist and not-so-capitalist third world economies, but they have always been seen in a nation-state context. It has been shown above that neither the nation state nor the capitalist economy, we were so familiar with, exist today in a manner that a Marxist would find comfortable to relate to. Although the economy is yet to become totally global, whatever that may amount to, there is today in existence at least two sets of realities that confront the intellectuals as much as it confronts the rest of the world. One is the economy based in the nation state with its political and social settings affecting the day to day life of the most while the other, the global one, which is supranational and far removed from the local level, almost an abstract entity for many. However, between these two extremes are many corporations and organizations, including state governments that deal in various intermediary capacities between the two settings so that there is no clear demarcation and that one set of reality gradually merges with the other.

For the intellectuals, therefore, their work settings are also varied beginning with one at the local to the other at the global level with various intermediary locations. At the local level the intellectual is engaged in the academia as teacher and researcher, in the state administration, various research positions in the corporations and as journalists, critics, free-lance writers etc. At the global level the intellectual workplace includes the research corporations, managerial and administrative work in the transnational corporations and supranational organizations and, as Robinson and Harris (2000) note, in various think tanks of the global organizations. In the intermediary positions are the administrators, technical experts, consultants with various

organizations and corporations, and the whole army of expatriate intellectuals working from the local to the global levels.

The political opinion, ideology or the political role of this diverse group of people cannot be similar in any manner. Nor is it possible to estimate the political ideologies or their political involvement on the basis of the variables used for estimation in the now fast fading nation-state based capitalist society alone. In the global system the social location and the arena of possible political involvement have all changed. It is no longer the state boundaries, often not even national identities that demarcate his location vis-à-vis the economic system of which he is a part. What can be the possible mode of political involvement or political ideology or even political opinion of a Bangladeshi economist born to a rural peasant family in Bangladesh receiving higher education in the USA and working for a Japanese corporation in Brazil for a six-figure salary? What defines his social location or what would define his arena of political involvement? On the other hand, while it may be possible to identify the social / class location of a freelance writer contributing to a local newspaper in a small town in the USA, what would define his political position on the degradation of the natural environment in a far off third world country by a multinational corporation which has its head office in his own county?

So that, *a simplistic model based on the social location of the intellectual at birth, or any time after, as fixed cannot be the basis of estimating political ideology or opinion.* Various authors earlier pointed out that the intellectual's social location in the family, his chances of social mobility (Mannheim), and his actual career, in terms of his affiliation with various institutions etc.(Brym) affect his political ideology and opinion. Recently it was argued by Islam and Islam (1988), that the prospect of his involvement with the multinational organization and the very fact of the incorporation of the intellectual or his country into the world system redefines his social location further. It has now been shown that *the global system similarly redefines intellectuals' social location afresh in that the intellectuals, or a large part of the community, cannot be viewed in terms of any national unit only as they become global both in terms of their involvement in the multinational and supranational organizations and because many of them are dispersed all over the globe and not tied to any national unit.* It would be futile to expect any clear-cut political opinion from this community vis-à-vis his country or the global system, unless he is directly involved either in his national politics, which too is influenced by numerous global factors, or in the promotion of the global system itself as a member of the think tanks and the supranational organizations promoting the globalization.

We have noted further that there is a qualitative difference among the intellectuals in terms of their fields of training or occupation. *The scientific and technical fields are not conducive to the*

production of the public intellectuals, nor are the various research and academic institutions, including the universities, which employ the largest number of intellectuals. Most of these intellectuals are likely to be apolitical or passive in terms of their involvement and are simple recipients and not creators of ideas or ideals and political opinions.

It must also be noted that *most intellectuals are today simply “wage earners”* working for this or that institution and are tied to their institutions for their future development and cannot be expected to voice opinions contrary to those held by the institutions. Although they do not dependent on patronage of the rich or the powerful as had been the case throughout the past, he is not the owner of immense property either and independent enough to voice a strong opinion on any issue as would have been possible for a 19th century intellectual. Although, theoretically, the professor may be independent to voice an opinion in or outside the classroom few, if any, institution would tolerate opinions contrary to its stated or unstated positions on an issue. Peter Levine, however, likes to blame the intellectuals themselves for not becoming public voices. He argues that theoretically the tenured faculty are among the society's freest and most secure employees, so it is their own fault that they do not become public intellectuals.

In any case, *in this age of universal education the number of the public intellectuals as a ratio of the total number who are trained as intellectuals is very small*, so that the sheer number of the uninvolved ones drown the voices of those who try to speak out and this is often translated as the 'death' of the intellectual as a community or their failure to perform in their age old expected role of opposing the system. As noted above, *it would not be practical to expect even a small fraction of the hundreds of thousands who may be counted as intellectuals to perform as public voices. Most intellectuals lead a life much like the rest of the public. Nor is there anything inherent in their career that would automatically make them radicals or the followers of this or that ideology*, except may be to the extent that, as a study (Nakhaie and Brym 1999) of over fifteen thousand Canadian professors suggests, social science education may make them more left leaning than an education in the natural sciences and that a tenured job may prompt them to be more politically inclined. However, very little of these translates into public voices and is mostly confined to “campus radicalism” promoting personal or community benefits.

VII

Much of what could be translated as the public role of the intellectuals was in the past confined to radicalism and later identified with the Left. The recent demise of the Left has, thus, created a void in the public sphere. For much of the past century the most important public issue that the intellectuals concerned themselves with was the debate between capitalism and socialism. The

vary interest in the study of intellectuals and their political opinion originated from this debate. Starr (1995) notes that, “for much of this (20th) century, the principal debate among intellectuals took place between liberals and the left. The overriding question was socialism versus capitalism, revolution or radicalism versus reform”. Similarly, Ignatief (see website below) argues that for most of the twentieth century intellectuals enlisted on behalf of the “great narrative” battle between communism and capitalism. The battle gave point to their polemics and meaning to their lives, with the loss of the “grand narrative” of communism the intellectuals of today are lost.

Thus, the end of the Soviet era has meant for the intellectuals, more than anything else, the loss of an alternative. For all through the past century one could debate over the prospect of an alternative process of development, could visualize an alternative to capitalism and imperialism under its sway. Suddenly that alternative is gone. This loss has produced an immense vacuum in the psyche of the intellectuals in general, and particularly among the Left, who suddenly find themselves without a cause. Very suddenly the Left is gone so are the Left intellectuals.

The loss of the Left and the Left intellectuals has direct and very important consequences for the intellectual community in general. First, *the end of the Left has also meant the rise of the Right all over the world. The intellectuals seem to have taken a step to the right as the number of conservative intellectuals increase across the world.* Starr (1995) has very aptly demonstrated the building up of this general trend in the USA in the recent decades. He notes that “where liberal intellectuals once found themselves engaged in a debate with the left, they now find themselves in a running debate with the right” He shows that during the past several decades, the number and vitality of conservative intellectuals have enormously increased, and many of them, contrary to the conventional picture, flourish outside the academy in the foundations, think tanks and research organizations and the media. Thus he feels that the decline of intellectuals on the left and the rise of intellectuals on the right have dramatically changed the politics of ideas in the USA. So has it in most countries all over the world. In the past “Conservatism did not figure as an intellectual force in the same way; liberal intellectuals did not worry about their relation to conservatives”. To day they are competing with the liberals for the center stage. The vacuum created by the exit of the Left has, thus, opened the prospect for the rise of the Right all over the world.

Second, *this loss of the Left has unfortunately also meant loss of the universal intellectual.* Starr (1995) notes that today there is a general lament about the loss of the intellectual. At the center of this lament is the fact that the intellectual in this conception is a wide-ranging moral and social critic, uncorrupted by the culture of the academy or the culture of commerce (Starr 1995), the type Jacoby would identify as the “universal” intellectual. These were mostly the intellectuals from

the Left. Thus, the end of the Left intellectual generally implies the end of the “universal intellectual” as well, the ones who would be concerned with the universal human values and decencies.

Third, *the disappearance of the intellectual as a universal voice has heralded in the rise of the intellectual who is concerned with the immediate and deal with these on an ad hoc basis.* Thus, Foucault (quoted in R.C. Thomas 1988) talked about the coming in of the “specific intellectual” as opposed to the intellectuals who championed universal values. The universal intellectual was represented by personalities such as Sartre and Voltaire, who were jurists and notables while the “specific intellectuals” are the savants or experts. Similarly Bauman (quoted in Kellner) distinguishes between those intellectuals who wish to legislate universal values, as opposed to those intellectuals who work as interpreters mostly at the state level. Ignatiev, more to our point, similarly draws the distinction between the “globalist” and the “particularist intellectuals”.

Radicalism among the intellectuals in the past almost always pushed them to the Left, to oppose capitalism and the establishment. These were the very hallmark of intellectualism. *With the Left gone and without the socialist reservoir to flow into, the radical intellectuals have very little to oppose today except to vent their energies at fragmented issues arising out of the globalization process, such as is launched against the meeting of the WTO or for the promotion of environmental concerns like “Green Peace” or in favour of issues like the women’s movement. That’s as far Left that anyone can go these days, which also defines the end point of universal intellectualism.*

Thus, *with the end of the Left intellectual and the consequential decline of the universal intellectuals we come to an impasse in which the radical bent among the intellectuals faces a dead end.* Mostly because in these days of mass communication the issues or events on which one would deliberate have become either supranational or, in quite the opposite situation, are rarely meaningful beyond the local settings. The supranational issues and events are addressed at the supranational levels or as multilateral issues dealt with by state governments or supranational organizations. There is hardly, if ever, any scope of these being influenced by individual intellectuals, the vast majority of whom are confined to the local settings as in the universities or other such local institutions.

The comparatively few who can be identified as the “global intellectuals” associated with the supranational organizations, the foundations and the think tanks are hardly concerned with issues of universal values. On the contrary, their main concern today is the promotion of free trade and

consumerism, as one sociologist (Ritzer) calls it, the McDonaldization of the world or in the words of Ignatiev achieving "sameness" throughout the world.

But, *Globalism is in itself a conservative force, seeking to keep the world under the firm control of the West and big business, keeping intact the pre-World War II advantages of the West over the rest.* The big businesses and particularly the US government have built research institutions in the form of foundations and think tanks to find ways and means to achieve these. Some of the best brains from the developed world are involved in these think tanks and foundations, which remain the abode of conservatism. Paul Starr (1995) in a recent study suggests that at least since the 1970s conservative intellectuals have influenced the business community to invest in the foundations and the think tanks as a result since the 1970s, conservatives have built an intellectual counterestablishment outside the academic world that includes foundations, think tanks, communications networks, and publications. These think tanks, foundations and the communication and publication networks along with the supranational organizations such as the World Bank and the IMF are the champions of globalism today, promoting a world suited to the tastes of the conservatives.

Intellectuals associated with these organizations are far better off financially compared to intellectuals outside and are likely to promote the interest of the organizations. As would also be the intellectuals working for organizations run by funds from these global or supranational organizations. It was noted earlier how intellectuals, bureaucrats and politicians, including from the third world, are linked to these global organizations. It is no wonder, therefore, that the Right is becoming stronger by the day.

While at the same time, the intellectuals' location in the multinational corporations and supranational organizations hardly merit any political opinion or role vis-à-vis their own nation-states as noted earlier. This would be particularly true of the expatriate intellectuals all over the world. But even for the ones working with the multinational corporations and living in their own countries there is very little possibility of political participation as little, if at all, would be tolerated by the multinational employers.

Also to be noted is the fact that most of the intellectuals working for the multinational corporations and supranational organizations are from the sciences and technical vocations, the ones who are not even considered as intellectuals. Thus, they are more likely to be apolitical, definitely are less politically inclined than the ones working with the national and local institutions. Therefore, *the further away the intellectuals are from their nation-state based institutions, in multinational and supranational enterprises, the less politically inclined they are likely to be. While those who are*

directly a part of the global system (like working in the foundations and the think tanks or are direct beneficiaries), are more likely to be conservatives in their political ideologies.

VIII

Conversely, those who are farthest from the global system or the supranational and the multinational corporations or with little or no possibility of being a part of these or ever moving out of their local situations are more likely to be highly political, focusing on numerous petty issues which criss-cross their everyday lives.

Although some may find the global stage as a befitting place for opposition in general there is a clear decline in the radical ideology at the supranational level. There is no Soviet Union or a socialist state to support them or an ideological utopia to which the present radical mind can identify with and draw inspiration from and to unite with others through these. The intellectual's opposition to any issue today is hardly defined clearly as is the extent of his emotional or physical involvement with these. In the same way the venues for practical demonstration are dispersed all over the globe.

Thus the issues, which relate to the process of globalization are supranational in character and are similarly critiqued or opposed by supranational voices, including those of the intellectuals. For example, a meeting of the WTO becomes the focus of opposition of radical intellectuals from all over the world congregating at the meeting place. Though their numbers are pathetically small they are truly supranational for as soon as the meeting is over these intellectuals depart for their own countries to get ready for another showdown at another part of the world on another such issue. For the rest of the intellectuals, as for the rest of the world, these demonstrations are almost surrealistic in nature, too abstract and too far removed from their own lives, to mean little more than another newspaper headline.

However, the issues and events at the supranational or global levels also have their local counterparts. So that terrorism, environmental degradations or feminist movements become more important at the local levels where the intellectuals can raise their voices more directly. But the problem with this is that each of these issues at the local levels, often some at the global level, are so entangled with other issues like religion, ethnicity or regional antagonisms and political ideologies and opinions, that they do not attract a common voice from the intellectual community as each intellectual has his or her own particular issue which he or she can or cannot attend to because of some other issues that affect his/her position on this particular one. Thus, *the intellectual's position on any issue is compromised by her/his position on other issues as s/he is*

separated from the others by race, religion, ethnicity, culture, language, political affiliations etc. So that the intellectual response to any issue becomes very personal and selective, they respond to a particular set of issues and not another and remain ever divided as a community with each to his own.

Similarly, the issues themselves have lost their universality and are abstract at the global level or they are very real and focused at the local levels where the intellectuals respond to them in isolation of other intellectuals of other parts of the world. Rarely is there any issue to which the intellectuals as a world community can react in a unified manner or they can do so in close physical proximity. The issues do not affect them equally nor in the same way and with the same intensity as the intellectuals face these issues primarily in their local settings and respond to these as they unfold at a given time and place and are severely limited by their own affiliations as religious, ethnic, regional or some such communities. Often the only issues that are left for them to raise their voices against are merely at the campus level.

Therefore, Ignatief (visit website below) argues that the only “grand narrative” available to the intellectuals to respond to today is the conflict between “globalism” and “particularism” “between forces of technology, capital and science, which are sweeping us towards global sameness, and the traditions of language, culture, religion, and identity, which maintain our differences intact”. In this battle some are globalists but most, especially the “former left wing” intellectuals are particularists, leading an opposition to a world dominated by McDonalds and Microsoft. But by focusing more and more on our identities we are opening up our old wounds and unleashing age old rivalries among religious factions, cultural and linguistic groupings as among national, tribal or ethnic communities or petty political affiliations. Thus, although the global change “is scouring the face of the planet” the particular is “as tenacious and resourceful” and is fighting back with equal strength while in the process we are “retribalizing” and the more globalism makes our consumption patterns converge, the more intently “we defend the particularities of national difference which remain.” (Ignatief).

More importantly, as we defend our trivial distinctiveness we loose sight of our greater concerns as human beings and our responsibilities to other human beings. Globalization is forcing us to defend our identities at various levels, where the national, religious and ethnic, political and other differences become more meaningful and we get separated from each other and from our concerns as human beings so that our universal concerns get replaced by our concern for the petty differences and personal wants. Thus, according to Ignatief, while trying to protect our trivial differences “many are sacrificing the intellectual’s historical function of defending universal human

decencies against the violence and closure associated with the tribal, the national, and the ethnic”.

Thus as the intellectuals’ concerns shift to these petty issues, like the ethnic, gender, religious, national or regional differences and even to the personal issues of promotion or funding, they get isolated from each other and are forced to cling more closely to their institutions of affiliations or the political parties or groups which appear to echo their opinions on these issues to the extent that their political ideologies get identified in favour of these groups or political parties. The political affiliations of the intellectuals, thus, also get tribalized in the sense that the intellectuals, as individuals and as a community, “belong” to this or that group or party and consider the “others” as enemies! These groups or political parties have little ideological leanings as these have lost their meaning in the global era, and are themselves more likely to be issue oriented.

Intellectuals in such a scenario have little or no personal opinions of their own they simply take sides on the issues of the day. So that the intellectuals end up as merely voicing their opinions in favour of this or that group or a political party. They become Republicans or Democrats rather than conservatives or liberals. Therefore, *today the intellectual neither stands alone against the world (as the universal intellectual would) nor alone in his independence from the world.*

More importantly the process of globalization is pushing us all towards the same end. Leading one group of intellectuals to become conservative defenders of the global system and apathetic to politics, the other group towards emphasizing our inherent, often inconsequential, differences, raising these to a heightened level of awareness and, hence, to conflicts of various magnitudes. And while we defend our negligible differences doggedly, we nonchalantly relinquish our universal values, moralities, principles and ideologies. Therefore, while the local level may sponsor heightened level of political activities, these do not relate to universal human concerns or even to clear-cut political ideologies of the Left, Right or the Centre. If anything, the involvement in the national, religious, ethnic etc. issues by its very nature is also a conservative defense and hence belonging to the Right too. *So that globalization is promoting the Right at both ends!* Therefore, if one seeks to identify the intellectuals in terms of their ideologies, if these have any meanings today, one may find mostly apolitical ones and those of the Right. The rest would be, more by default, the liberals among whom would also be the former Left.

IX

Thus, the nature of their work and the institution of their affiliations are such that their involvement in social and political causes can vary from substantial to zero involvement. The intellectual working outside his country for a multinational research corporation would have hardly anything to

contribute to the political or even the social life of the host country, nor would he be even concerned with the such. While on the other hand the local level intellectuals, such as a freelance columnist, would be in the thick of things and a political opinion would be a normal expectation from him. We may thus seek to arrange these affiliations on a continuum based on the kind of political involvement of each of these intellectual positions at one end of which would be placed the local level jobs and the opposite end the global level jobs, and at the center of which will be the zone which merges into one another.

In terms of political affiliation or expected political opinions the center point of the continuum represents the apolitical or zero political involvements moving to both ends of higher involvement and stronger political opinions. The global end of the scale will represent lesser of political involvement, mostly apolitical or closer to that, except at the extreme end where the organizers and the promoters of the global system and the members of the think tanks, the class of people Robinson and Harris (2000) would like to identify as the global block. On the other side of the scale shall be a gradations from zero involvement to very strong commitments at the local level. The global scenario would thus move from being apolitical to barely political most of the way up the scale occupied by the scientists working in multinational research organizations to expatriate administrators of the transnational corporations, to somewhat political in terms of promoting globalization and perhaps the global state of Robinson and Harris (2000). On the local end there is the scientist involved in various research organizations and universities and a large number of academicians who are apolitical to increasingly political state administrators and more and more political groups of columnist, ideologues and free-lance critics. Thus one may be highly political at the local level but have little to contribute at the global level.

In the past the continuum on which the political ideology of the intellectuals was measured ran from the radical to liberal to conservative or from the left to center to the right. Today such branding would hardly have much value. *The only meaningful branding of the intellectuals today is whether one is at all political or not.* So that the continuum may run from the apolitical, even anti-political to highly political. However, they also need to be separated in terms of the local or the global settings. The intellectuals at the local settings may range from the nonpolitical to somewhat political to highly political depending primarily upon the institutions that harbor them and their potentiality to prosper in these. Outside of the institutions the petty differences of nationality, religion, ethnicity, cultural and linguistic variations etc. may fuel very strong political opinions based on the happenings at the local level. Global level incidents concerning the same issues may also trigger heightened political opinions, which may often be rather very temporary and lose its edge as soon as the incident passes into history. These would rarely get organized

into universal concerns or turn into major movements. They are more likely to remain confined to personal opinions or as the “affected group” based ideological issues (see Figure 1 below).

Political Ideology, Institutional Affiliation and the Level of Participation of the Intellectuals in the Post-Soviet Global Society




Figure 1

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CONSTRUCTING A GLOBAL GHETTO **RACISM, THE WEST & THE "THIRD WORLD"**

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Howard Zinn narrates his observation, on his way to England, on the Queen Mary. Here, on a passenger liner, there existed the clearest evidence of an artificially created "Third World", inside the "First":

"My air crew sailed to England on the Queen Mary. The elegant passenger liner had been converted into a troop ship. There were 16000 men aboard, and 4000 of them were black. The whites had quarters on the deck and just below the deck. The blacks were housed separately, deep in the holds of the ship, around the engine room, in the darkest dirtiest sections. Meals were taken in four shifts (except for the officers, who ate in prewar Queen Mary style, in a chandeliered ballroom- the war was not being fought to disturb class privilege), and the blacks had to wait until three shifts of whites had finished eating." (Zinn 1990:88)

In the late middle ages, different regions of the world were almost equally developed (Alexander 1996:17). Then, in the course of a few hundred years, Western economic and political domination in the world led to pockets of development and underdevelopment, wealth and poverty, coexisting in close proximity to each other. A clear pattern emerged on a global and local level. The emerging dominant philosophy was capitalism, the driving force behind which was competition, based on ideas similar to *Social Darwinism*. As a result, an ideology of superiority emerged within the ruling elite, an idea that led through subtle mechanisms to the patterned underdevelopment of certain groups of people, on a local and global scale, within the interconnected World System.

Ideas of racial superiority, made moral by a hierarchical religion, "whitewashed" to reflect the preference of the rulers, became institutionalized in Western culture once Germanic races gained power by overthrowing the Roman Empire and adopting Christianity. By the 1900s, the colonial powers of Europe, together with the U.S., controlled half of what they described as "newly discovered" areas of the world, and over a third of its population (Delavignette 1964:1 etc.).

This idea of superiority led to the "race-specific" Atlantic Slave Trade in which over 40 million people were killed. A similar idea led to the genocide of the American Indians and other indigenous groups in all these "newly discovered" white-settler areas; over 50 million "savages" were killed by the "civilized" West (Zinn 1990:1). American "national security" sanitized by ideas about "our (superior) way of life," led to the civilian bombings of Vietnam and Cambodia by orders of Harvard educated elite, killing millions again. South Africa similarly used "national sovereignty," as an excuse to protect its apartheid regime.

"During the Vietnam War, US forces massacred whole villages; murdered prisoners of war; set up "free fire zones" in which all living things were subjected to annihilation; systematically bombed all edifices, including hospitals, schools, churches and destroyed croplands and work animals...The CIA director of that day, Richard Helms, admitted that 20,500 persons were assassinated by the CIA sponsored Phoenix Program...In Vietnam, the US dropped 8 million tons of bombs (leaving 21 million bomb craters), and nearly 400,000 tons of Napalm...The 18 million gallons of Agent Orange and other such chemical defoliants dumped from US planes poisoned hundreds of thousands of acres and worked their way into Vietnam's food-chain, dramatically increasing the number of miscarriages, still births and birth deformities. The chemical warfare gave Vietnam one of the world's highest rates of liver cancer, a disease virtually unknown in the country in prewar days. The continuous bombing and use of napalm and defoliants rendered two-fifths of Vietnam's land unsuitable for forestry or agriculture." (Parenti 1989: 44)

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The fate of the Australian Aborigines¹, persecuted, killed and forced on reservations was another racially motivated “national” act. “Turning the other cheek”, pulling out peacekeepers, and not stopping the genocide (total inaction) when 800,000 *Tutsis* were killed by the *Hutu* militia in Rwanda, at the rate of 10,000 per day, in 1994, provides further evidence of non-Western lives being unimportant to the elite and their “democratic” system.

Colonization and the artificial drawing of borders displaced and killed millions of poverty stricken people in India. The drawing of arbitrary borders, similar to neighborhood displacement within the developed world, cut the lifelines of many groups and communities. European wars among themselves, the First and the Second World Wars similarly destroyed tens of millions and plundered the earth.

“... Wars continued (after World War 2), which the superpowers either initiated or fed with military aid or observed without any attempt to halt them. Two million people died in Korea; 2 to 5 million in Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos; one million in Indonesia; perhaps 2 million in the Nigerian Civil War; one million in the Iran-Iraq war; and many more in Latin America, Africa and the Middle East. It is estimated that in the forty years after 1945; there were 150 wars, with 20 million casualties.” (Zinn 1990: 99)

This is the nature of racism in the modern world. Under the cloak of nationalism it has killed and caused suffering to more people in the course of a few hundred years than any other single factor in the entire history of humankind.

The nation-state was central to Western economic and political domination (Alexander 1996). Nationalism on a global scale can be compared to racism within states: Both are driven by an ideology that assumes superiority of one group over another. This linkage is evident in the relationship between the West and the “Third World” and race relations between white and black communities in the United States.

Let me clarify my use of the word “West” and “Third World” in this writing. When I say “West”, I mean the white-male elite (of European origin), who command decisions in the world and not the masses of the white world. Contrary to that, when “Third World” is mentioned, the masses are referred to and not the elite that rule over these countries. The elite in most of these countries are a part of the “second-tier” West, a legacy of colonialism, intermediaries that translate the Western cause in perpetuating “Third World” poverty. They are as far removed from their people, as the culture of the ghetto is from suburban America. Internal colonization operates within communities just like neo-colonialism operates on a global scale.

The concept of *Internal Colonialism* signifies the network of “*coercive legal, political and economic constraints imposed on racial ethnic minorities and indigenous peoples in settler societies...* Key to internal colonialism is a set of features that facilitate the exploitation of minorities as workers- segmented labor markets, separate wage scales and state and employer-imposed discriminatory practices” (Stasiulis et al, Editors 1995:12).

The “West” (also called the North or the “core”²), traditionally signified European Christian nations. The term nowadays has expanded to include the United States, the industrial states of Western Europe and Japan. Until 1990, the Soviet Union and its Eastern European colonies were excluded from the “First World” and became an intermediate division. The term “Third World” (also called the South or the “periphery”) was invented to signify underprivileged countries, mainly Asian and African, as against the first two (Fieldhouse, 1999).

¹ At the time of European colonization in the 18th century, Aborigines numbered about 1 million. According to the 1986 Census, they numbered 230,000. Their unemployment rate is over six times (600% greater) than the national average, and the average wage of the Aborigines is half that of the national average wage in Australia [Encyclopedia Britannica]. From less than 1% before colonization, Caucasian [white] population in Australia has reached 92% [of the 19 million who live there], while the Aborigines have become almost “extinct”

² According to Wallerstein’s *World Systems Theory*, the West or the “core” forces unequal political and economic opportunity on the poor nations of Asia, Africa and Latin America, the “periphery” (Schaefer & Lamm 1998:257)

Wallerstein, whose name is associated with the World Systems Theory (1974), suggested that since the 16th century, with the rise of capitalism, the world market was purposefully transformed into a group of core countries (those who were former colonizers and who control capital and material wealth in the world) and a set of peripheral countries (the rest of the world). Until Japan entered the group of core nations recently, white male elite controlled the world almost exclusively in the postcolonial era, as they did in colonial times.

The peripheral countries in order to become part of the global economic system, which was deliberately designed to serve the core nations, had to become dependant on them and their provision of developmental resources. The core exploits the periphery for cheap resources, which are exchanged for either expensive military goods or overpriced capital. Political instability and poverty is concentrated in the periphery to keep this global order intact. This ensures that the periphery remains in its subordinate position. In short, this was the reason for the birth of a few affluent nations, controlled by white male elite, surrounded by a poverty-stricken "Third World", a world where almost everyone is non-white.

The *World Systems Theory* can be extended to include segregation and suburbanization within the United States as well. In the U.S. from 1920 through the 1960s, suburbanization continued unabated (Weeks 2000:419). America is now predominantly suburban and the suburbs are predominantly white. Suburbs are the "core" where edge cities have led to the replacement of the central city's dominant position. The central city has become the periphery where minorities, especially African Americans are concentrated. This has led to the development of the ghetto and the birth of what is described as the "underclass."

In the past few decades with the rise of the so-called Asian Tigers and the oil rich countries of the Middle East, a new group, the "semi-peripheral" countries have entered the World System. These countries are linked to the core but have loose (mostly labor) connections with the majority "peripheral" world. Similar to what Marx would call the *petty bourgeoisie*, they serve the core in keeping the periphery poor, having aspirations of entering the "core" status by such service. A similar phenomenon was seen in the development of the ghetto in the United States and the changing priorities of the black elite. Massey and Denton (1993) state:

"The rise of the ghetto, more than anything else, brought about the eclipse of the old elite of integrationist blacks who dominated African American affairs in the northern cities before 1910...the (profit) interest of these "New Negroes" economic and political leaders were tied to the ghetto and its concerns." (Massey & Denton 1993:40).

It is implicitly acknowledged and "politely" enforced by the West that white Christian nations are superior to all others and are "God-appointed" leaders. The foreign policy of the world's only "super power" is a translation of this same ideology. The German sociologist Max Weber stated:

"Behind all ethnic diversities, there is somehow naturally the notion of a 'chosen people'...the idea of a chosen people derives its popularity from the fact that it can be claimed to an equal degree by any and every member of the mutually despising groups." (Vanhorne, Editor, 1997:116)

"Third World" & the "Underclass":

The ideology that led to the invention of the term "Third World" similarly led to the invention of the term "underclass" in America; a nation otherwise advertised as "classless" (Hadjor 1993:129). The underclass described by the conservative section of society signifies a group completely removed from mainstream America. Here "alien" and "odd" norms prevail, similar to "Third World" culture, which to many Americans threatens what is described as "our way of life".

According to them, the members of the underclass have a "foreign" or "alien" family structure (as described by The Moynihan Report) with a backward "code of the streets", far removed from the "normal" American "way of life". Their language is as "foreign" as Arabic or other "Third World" languages. It is seen as a section of society where chronic poverty, homelessness, crime, drugs, and disease have reached epidemic proportions, similar to and sometimes worse than the "Third World"³. The people living in such a section of society are not termed "aliens" like people from the "Third World" but are completely alienated from the outside world (like the "Third World" and its problems from the affluent West) and the outside world is completely alienated from them.

If anyone from this part of society were to go to the "outside" world, to one of the big shopping malls in the affluent white suburbs, "polite" racism and what can be called "conspicuous supervision" will keep him or her out of public areas. Access is restricted and clearly marked by "borders" of tolerance, similar to borders that separate nations. A few decades back, borders were physically marked by "red-lines" on bank maps. Today, those paper maps have been replaced by "mental mapping". Bank statistics, in poor neighborhoods, reveals that redlining is still widely practiced.

"Racial profiling" ensures that these borders are respected and crossing them can lead to swift "justice" like countless "Rodney King" cases, all through the nation. Similarly, for the "Third World", strict visa and immigration laws, to keep the "barbarians" from reaching "the gate", deportations, and detaining people on 'secret-evidence' and "swift justice" against "rogue nations", ensures much the same. National security is used as an excuse to curb the de-jure civil rights of minorities and to militarily solve economic problems that threaten the hegemony of the core. The capitalist elite, the owners of tobacco and alcohol industries, collectively kill over 470,000 Americans and millions more around the world every year, yet the system doesn't declare "war" on them. Even in wars that are declared by the capitalist system as "just wars", most of the people killed, over 80 to 90 percent have been civilians.

"Corporate Crime-or its media-friendly term, "White Collar Crime"- causes more deaths and costs you more money each year than all the street criminals (and "terrorism") combined...According to Russell Mokhiber, publisher of the Corporate Crime Reporter, in 1994 burglaries and robberies cost us over \$4 billion in losses, while corporate fraud cost us nearly \$200 billion...Unsafe work conditions on the job and occupational diseases caused more than 56,000 deaths." (Moore 1996:121)

The appearance and incidence of the geographic region inhabited by the 'underclass' has become an ecological pattern, being found in all major cities in the United States, in contrast to the affluent white suburbs. This is alarmingly similar to the incidence and appearance of poverty in the "Third World" compared to the affluent white *Settler Societies* like Australia, Canada, etc. These areas, now in ruins, once used to be prosperous business districts and now are urban wastelands like the "Third World" after colonization, due to strategic population and job displacement.

The underclass is a section of society where informal laws bar its assimilation with the mainstream economy on equal terms. The most one can expect is to get a low-paying service job with a similar entry and exit level, and that also only when the economy is good. If the person is lucky, he or she will keep the job at the same level and not face unemployment, debt, homelessness and starvation. In the case of the "Third World", the most that can be expected is the refinancing of debt owed to the West. With multiple digit inflation and unemployment, even keeping at the same level becomes a challenge that is never met.

The area being talked about above is very close to home in urban America. It is the American ghetto. A classic "Third-World" nation within the wealthiest country in the world.

³. The New England Journal of Medicine (January 18, 1990, Vol 322, No 3, p.176) reported that "Death rates for those between the ages of 5 and 65 were worse in Harlem than in Bangladesh." (Quoted by Chinyelu 1999: 1)

The Roots of Racism in Western Thought:

*"The Holy Bible in the White man's hands and his interpretations of it, have been the greatest ideological weapon for enslaving millions of non-white human beings."
(Malcolm X, Quoted by Alex Haley 1973:241-242)*

Christianity, to the European colonials, together with Biblical passages promoting the mass destruction of "foreign", "heathen" and "strange" elements, gave moral justification to the systematic genocide of millions of non-white people throughout the colonial era. Many lands were claimed, before even setting foot on the shore, "*In the name of the Father, Son and the Holy Ghost*" (Carlyle 1918). The propagation of Christianity became the cloak under which pillage and plunder was justified and exonerated. Later, especially by England, it was used to pacify the colonized masses ("*give the coat and the cloak*"-and then some), by wholesale, metropolitan export of Christian missionaries. The missionaries, themselves under the influence of this superiority complex, employed the tactics of showing the natives their "superior" Christian religion, based on a "superior" man-god, Jesus. Martin Bernal, writing about the history of racism states:

"Racism of the modern type only began in the 15th century, when Portuguese ships began to outflank Islamic power by sailing around the coast of West Africa. They started kidnapping anyone they could find and taking them back to Portugal to sell as slaves. Their justification for this was that they were prisoners of a just war, and any war fought by Christians against non-Christians qualified as a just war. Quite soon however a new justification grew up...Africans were claimed to be slavish by nature...The new racists tried to enlist religious backing for their ideological requirements..."(Vanhorne, Editor. 1997:83)

Since the 1630s in America, a small elite has been manufacturing and reinforcing ideas of "God-given", innate, white racial superiority. This 'power-elite' ensured the socialization of these ideas via the clergy, the intellectuals, the politicians, the academics and the missionaries, all competing for the 'souls' of humanity. Racism became a 'religious institution' in America, used for economic and political gain (Griffin 1999:125).

The systematic institutionalization of racism through Christianity by the white elite shows up in the distortion of facts for the purpose of indoctrination and the subsequent labels that survive to the present day. *Labeling Theory* suggests that certain groups in society acquire the power to assign labels to groups. Those labels are then adopted and they become "self-fulfilling prophecies" of behavior (Schaefer 1998:199). As a result, derogatory labels "invented" by the West and the white-elite survive to this day and are used by members belonging to the oppressed group, almost unconsciously. In America, the Indians who were slaughtered by the millions, got labeled as "savages" while the settlers became the "Founding Fathers" and claimants to being (as a recent U.S. president described it) "the most civilized nation on earth", with their shining "city on the hill".

Ex-slave, Fredrick Douglas, on a Fourth of July speech to a white audience in 1852, stated about the "democracy" of the elite:

"The rich inheritance of justice, liberty, prosperity and independence, bequeathed by your fathers, is shared by you, not by me. The sunlight that brought light and healing to you has brought stripes and death to me. *This Fourth of July is yours, not mine. You may rejoice, I must mourn.*" (Zinn 1990:232).

Religion and politics both act as a tool of the elite. The Constitution itself becomes meaningless to them when it interferes with their economic objectives. Cloaked under the rhetoric about "national security", it is painlessly cast aside. Fear mongering among the masses and the "illusions of fear" spread by their media; act as a catalyst in such efforts to "hijack" the Constitution itself.

"Once the government, ignoring democratic procedures, gets the nation into war, it creates an atmosphere in which criticism of the war may be punished by imprisonment- as

happened in the Civil War and in both world wars. Thus democracy gets a double defeat in matters of war and peace." (Zinn 1990:124)

Max Weber in his writings on power and opposition implies that it would be very difficult (and expensive) for a group to embark on a continuous struggle to control others. If however, the position of that group can be institutionalized, opposition becomes muted. Religion served as a vehicle to institutionalize racism. Political scientist, Clarence Stone calls this type of power to institutionalize a group's advantages, *ecological power* (Abrahamson 1996:27).

"And thus are appointed, in every city, elite ones of its malicious people, and they plot therein...." (Koran 6:123)

Vilfredo Pareto outlined "elite theory" (centuries after the Koran), within a similar framework; sociologist C. Wright Mills did his pioneering work, *The Power Elite* (1956). Mills states:

"The power elite is composed of men whose positions enable them to transcend the ordinary environments of ordinary men and women: they are in positions to make decisions having major consequences." (Mills 1956:3-4)

The elite targets their "persuasion" resources specifically towards existing influential institutions, for greater impact. Where religion is influential, the elite use it to legitimize their benefits, sometimes politically institutionalizing a distorted version of it. The culture of the elite and the structures created by such a culture are projected upon society in a contradictory manner in order to "legitimize" the norms that help maintain the status-quo (Castells 1987:184). Poverty, prostitution and delinquency are structurally perpetuated and implicitly encouraged to display to the masses the consequences of an "alternative" culture. Implicit control of the media and superior access to the masses, by such control of information technology, ensures socialization of this "created" culture. Alienation is unavoidable in such a system.

The dominant culture, generated by the elite, for its institutionalization depends on information and stimulation overload. The city thus provides the elite with an ideal environment. Diversity and competition control of resources and a limited redistribution of income, forces the vast majority in a city to live in a culture of "marginality" (Castells 1983:178). The city elite, taking advantage of this blasé' attitude, generated by urban density and diversity, lock individuals into a race for survival, leaving them with limited opportunity for radical "transformative" thought or collusion.

"Economic power does not automatically translate into cultural hegemony, but it makes such hegemony much more likely. Those who own the media must make conscious efforts in selecting the right managers and editors and setting down proper guidelines and permissible boundaries- so that they exercise maximum control with a minimum of direct and naked intervention." (Parenti 1986:33)

As a clear example of this, consider the strategic displacement of jobs and people and the resulting concentration of poverty in the inner cities, which gives birth to a "street code". The elite thus nourish a "street code", a code that forces people on a social level to adopt it, if they are to survive. Elijah Anderson in his book, *Code of the Street* (1999), states:

"It is nothing less than the cultural manifestation of persistent urban poverty. It is a mean adaptation to blocked opportunities and profound lack, a grotesque form of coping by young people constantly undermined by a social system that historically has limited their social options and until recently rejected their claims to full citizenship." (Anderson 1999:146-147)

In such a "cultural" system, justice is bought and sold in a market where both the buyers and sellers of such justice are the resourceful "pseudo elite". Space and its use are distributed unevenly and an "ideology of superiority" is physically enforced and explicitly displayed in the structures that fill such space. A culture of this nature and a system based upon it is necessary if the elite are to maintain their privileged position. As a result they "mobilize popular sectors around their development policies" (Castells 1982:

188). Molding social movement culture is imperative to them for such successful mobilization. The New Deal in America was a similar rescue of the capitalist system. Thus, the elite encourage social movements that adopt the “dominant” culture as they help in their cause.

Those who refuse this subjugation through this “structural” alienation are offered “chemical alienation” through alcohol and drugs⁴, which chemically produce bouts of “anomie”, i.e. normlessness and alienation⁵. As a result of this “created” culture, a “real world” much removed from the actual real world is projected. A world that traps people in a cycle, the so-called “culture of poverty”, from which escape becomes almost impossible:

“Their example is as a mirage in a desert. The thirsty one supposes it to be water till he comes unto it and finds nothing...or as shadows upon a sea obscure: there covers them a wave, above which is a wave, above which are clouds; layer upon layer of darkness. When they hold out their hands, they almost cannot see them.” (Koran 24:39-40)

This is the reality of existence for a majority of humankind. What we consider “real” and “natural” are artificially engineered and socially constructed illusions, perpetuated by institutions designed by the elite to serve their economic and political goals. All freedom for the individual is lost.

Alexander (1996) notes:

“The most important decisions in the world are made by relatively few people -the top echelons of a dozen ruling parties, a few hundred massive corporations and finance companies. They in turn are served-and influenced-by senior civil servants, policy analysts, editors and a few thousand lobbyists, pressure groups and think tanks...less than 0.03% of the people in the West. Each country has a different power structure...but their elites have more in common with each other than with their fellow citizens.” (Alexander 1996:209)

The dehumanizing of Africans began with European voyagers traveling to Africa in the 16th century. They observed, what according to them seemed like ‘pathologies’ of Africans. Richard Hakluyt, an early English historian wrote:

“ They (the Africans) are black, beastly, mysterious, heathenish, libidinous, evil lazy and smelly people who are strangely different to our superior white race.” (Quoted by Griffin 1999:14)

How the same images are perpetuated even today, is witnessed in so called “government studies”. President Nixon’s appointed chair of the “Model Cities Program,” commented on the “lower class” city dwellers, who were predominantly black:

“The lower class individual lives from moment to moment...impulse governs his behavior. He is therefore radically improvident. Whatever he cannot use immediately, he considers valueless. His bodily needs (especially for sex) and his taste for action take precedence over everything else...He works only as he must to stay alive...”(Quoted by Griffin 1999:74)

It is as if Hakluyt had been resurrected. If we replace the word, “lower-class” with “African”, the two descriptions are almost identical. A clarification needs to be made at this point about the “family structure” of African Americans. It is true that single parent, female-headed households are a big problem in African American communities, but the

⁴. Surprisingly, the Bible contains the same advice for subjugating people:

“Give strong drink to him who is ready to perish and wine to those that are heavy of heart. Let him drink and forget his poverty and remember his misery no more.” (Proverbs 31:6-7)

The use of alcohol to subjugate Africans and for acquiring slaves by the colonials, and for the subjugation of American Indians by the settlers is well documented. Alcohol chemically targets the specific area of the brain involved in social control, producing normlessness and alienation, alarmingly similar to what the French sociologist, Durkheim conceptualized as “anomie.”

growth rate of “new” cases is lower for African Americans than for white communities (Smith 1998).

Female-Headed Households

	Black	White
1950	17.2%	5.3%
2000	53.5%	19.1%
Increase 1950-2000	X 3.11	X 3.60

Births to Unmarried Women

	Black	White
1950	16.8%	1.7 %
2000	68.6%	22.5 %
Increase 1950-2000	X 4.08	X 13.23

U.S. Census Bureau Data (2000) above shows that, 53.5 percent of black families are female-headed households compared to 19.1 percent of White families. However, the rate of increase of female headed households from 1950 to 2000 is greater for whites than blacks. Similarly, the number of births to unmarried women among blacks is greater than that among whites but the rate of increase from 1950 to 2000 is greater for whites than blacks.

The breakup of the black family can be attributed to the legacy of slavery and the continuing oppression of black males. Black males ages 15-25 have three times the mortality rate of black women of the same age group. Thus the marriage pool available to black women is drastically reduced. Contributing to this reduced pool are the large numbers of black males in the U.S. prison system, around a third of all young black males have been involved in this system. To this, add the lack of economic opportunity available to black males in the 15-25 age group, and the resulting inability to support a family, and we have the exact causes of the high percentage of female-headed households in the black community. The causal pathways are clear, the U.S. Census Data (2000) shows that 64.8 percent of blacks have never married compared to 29.8 percent of whites. However, the breakup of the white family and the rise of white female-headed households (at a rate faster than the increase in black female-headed households) may be attributed, within a changing economic structure, to attitudes towards sex and marriage, the “popular” culture of the Hollywood elite. This is shown by the U.S. Census Bureau (2000) divorce numbers, only 32.6 percent of blacks have been divorced compared to 66.1 percent of whites. Thus the “morality” issue is forcibly imposed on African Americans instead of the white “moral majority”.

“The red stain of bastardy, which two centuries of systematic legal defilement of Negro women had stamped upon his race, meant not only the loss of ancient African chastity, but also the hereditary weight of a mass of corruption from white adulterers, threatening almost the obliteration of the Negro home.” (W.E.B. Dubois 1903: 50)

“What cultural supremacy could be claimed by the Europeans of yore? From the fifteenth to the nineteenth centuries, Europe was "ahead" in such things as the number of hangings, murders and other violent crimes; instances of venereal diseases, small pox, typhoid, tuberculosis, plagues and other bodily afflictions; social inequality and poverty (both urban and rural); mistreatment of women and children and frequency of famine, slavery, prostitution, piracy, religious massacres and inquisitional torture. Those who

believe the West has been the most advanced civilization should keep such "achievements" in mind." (Parenti 1995:8)

Ronald Reagan, one of the most popular presidents in recent history, is well known for his ideological battle with the African American minority. Blaming the poorest, most powerless sections of society for its greatest evils, he drastically cut government funding in public services in the inner cities, leading to a sharp jump in homelessness, inner city riots and brutal police crackdowns. In the "Obi wan" style, Reagan, based on his white Christian 'superiority' ideology went so far as calling the Soviet Union, an "evil" empire, and used the medieval term "Barbarians" to describe demonized Arabs and Muslims (Heinman 1998:145).

"During the Reagan administration of the 1980s, the country's rich became richer and the poor, poorer. Reagan's attorney general, Edwin Meese, said cheerfully he was not aware of people being hungry. Around the time he was saying this a Physicians Task Force reported that 15 million American families had incomes of under \$10,000 a year, receiving no food stamps and were chronically unable to get adequate food. A report by the Harvard School of Public Health in 1984 said that its researchers found that over 30,000 people had to beg for food to avoid starvation." (Zinn 1990:149)

In 1854 Josiah Nott published a book, in which he claimed, based on his pseudo-science, that Caucasians (White) races have the largest brains and the most powerful intellect (Griffin 1999:51). Following in the same tradition, Charles Murray and Richard Herrnstein authored, *The Bell Curve: Intelligence and Class Struggle in American Life* (1994). In the book they "prove" that African Americans are innately (biologically) "less-intelligent" than White Americans and as such are destined to a life of crime and poverty, the "underclass". They should therefore be controlled by a police state while "the rest of America goes about its business" (Herrnstein & Murray 1994).

Apart from the fact that Herrnstein and Murray do not have much knowledge of biology, their ideologically manipulated data, comparing IQ to socioeconomic status, has been widely criticized. The cultural bias in the IQ test itself is conveniently ignored (Fraser, Editor 1994), as are the over-time increasing "group" IQ scores internationally and even locally among immigrant groups. It is beyond the scope of this paper to go into details with the implicit racism of Murray and Herrnstein, however it is worth mentioning that if such be the acts of "intelligent" beings, like the whole sale genocide of communities, the 'less intelligent' animal kingdom shows a lot more prudence in its existence. Controlling for factors like "human interference", the animal kingdom might even outlive "intelligent" humanity.

By literally squeezing the life out of the earth, and leading it towards a premature death, capitalism has shown a tendency of not being able to sacrifice the present for the future. The conservative right (the torchbearers of capitalism, the likes of Murray & Herrnstein) however, blames the underclass for a similar trait (i.e. not sacrificing the present for the future). This makes us wonder who the real source of such a "culture of poverty" is. A source similar to the one that nourishes the "*code of the street*" and perpetuates the "*culture of terror*". The imperial elite, those that want to teach the "barbarians" responsibility and decency have acted in the most irresponsible and immoral way imaginable, even after using the Atomic Bomb, and seeing its effects (being the only ones to use it in human history):

"Truman threatened the Soviets with the atom bomb when they were slow in withdrawing their troops from Iran immediately after World War II. In 1950, he publicly warned that nuclear weapons were under consideration in the Korean War. In 1953 during the same war, Eisenhower made secret nuclear threats against China and North Korea. In 1954 Secretary of State Dulles actually offered tactical nuclear weapons to the French during their final losing battle in Vietnam, but Paris declined the offer. Johnson considered nuclear weapons in Vietnam in 1968. Nixon contemplated using Nuclear Bombs against North Vietnam on a number of occasions from 1969 to 1972. In 1973, he also thought of using them when it was feared that the Soviets might intervene in the Middle East. On two other occasions, anticipating aggression by Moscow against the Chinese during a border dispute and possible Soviet intervention in the 1971 India-Pakistan war, Nixon toyed with

the nuclear option... Not yet mentioned were the two occasions when President Kennedy contemplated using Nuclear Weapons: during the Berlin Crisis of 1961 and the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962." (Parenti 1989: 174-175)

Analysis of the poor in the United States reveals the dynamic nature of the group. People keep entering and exiting from the ranks of the poor. The one thing that remains consistent is that the majority of the "persistently poor" in the U.S. are the African Americans. Sociologist Herbert Gans theorized that poverty is deliberately perpetuated in society among certain segments because the poverty of those segments benefits the elite (Gans 1995:91-102). Here on a local and global scale is empirical evidence for Gans' theory:

The American Ghetto:

In the late 1940s and 1950s due to economic prosperity, men and women started marrying early and home construction in the suburbs reached an all time high. Middle class white Americans deserted the inner cities in great numbers, as a result by 1970 suburban residents were a majority in metropolitan U.S., while before they had been one third of all metropolitan residents. American cities were being rapidly transformed, but one feature of them remained the same and that was the black ghetto. White suburbanization and black in-migration to the north led to an increase in the size of the ghetto. Neighborhood racial turnover was carried out in an almost automatic manner based on what sociologists referred to as the "threshold of white tolerance". A few black families would enter the neighborhood and white residents would start abandoning and selling their homes and moving out. Realtors played a major role in lowering this threshold and made big money in the process. This was achieved by what is called "block busting." Agents would go door-to-door warning white residents of the "invasion" by black folk. They would purchase the home for a low price, divide it up into smaller units and sell at a premium to black settlers.

Because of this, spatial isolation segregation indices in the northern cities peaked in the 1950s. In the 1970s the average segregation index for African Americans was 70. This means that 70 percent of blacks would have to move out of a neighborhood in order to achieve an even white-black population configuration. In most big cities the number was close to 90 percent. The highest segregation index ever recorded for immigrant groups in the US was 56 for Milwaukee Italians in 1910. By 1970, the lowest index of segregation for African Americans was 56 in San Francisco (Massey & Denton 1996).

The U.S. Federal Government was directly involved in the segregation process. To increase employment in the construction industry and increase home ownership, the Home Owners Loan Corporation (HOLC) was started. The HOLC initiated the process of redlining. Those who resided in the redlined areas almost never got loans and could never move out. How the World Bank and the IMF divides countries of the world into zones and ratings is alarmingly similar to HOLC practices.

By giving a twenty five to thirty five year loan with a 90 percent guaranteed collateral payment, the FHA (Federal Housing Administration) and VA (Veteran's Administration), during the 1950s and 1960s, encouraged selective out-migration of middle class whites to the suburbs, leading to a decline in the economic base of the city and the expansion of the ghetto. In giving out loans, the FHA determined minimum eligibility requirements for lot size, which effectively eliminated inner city homes, thus forcing those who had got the loan to move out.

Black migration to U.S. northern cities during the early 1900s related inversely with the ebb and flow of European migration. When the economy in Europe was booming, European immigrants would move back home creating a shortage of labor in the North. This would boost black migration to the North. In bad times, the inverse would happen. Blacks were also not allowed membership in white unions and as such were used as "strike breakers" by employers. As the numbers of black migrants increased in northern cities, institutionalized methods were adopted to check the expansion of black settlements. These methods, like red lining, zoning, legalized violence, private contracts

etc, made sure that African American populations got concentrated in “ghettos” that were homogeneous, and completely isolated from the main economy (Massey & Denton 1996:31-35).

“If you are black, these white reactions brand you as a carrier of contaminations. No matter what your talents or attainments, you are seen as infecting a neighborhood simply because of your race. This is the ultimate insult of segregation. It opens wounds that never really heal and leaves scars that remind you how far you stand from full citizenship.” (Heckler 2000: 53)

Global Ghetto:

“Think of what the Spaniards did in South America; the Portuguese in Angola and Mozambique; the British in China, India and Ireland; the Belgians in the Congo; the Germans in Southwest Africa; the Dutch in the East Indies; the French in North Africa and Indochina, the Japanese in Korea, Manchuria and China; the Italians in Ethiopia, Somalia and Libya; and the Americans in the Philippines, Central America, Indochina and in North America itself (against Native American Indians, Mexicans and African Americans). Actually it is difficult for most of us to think about it, since imperialism’s terrible history is not regularly taught in our schools nor treated by our media.” (Parenti 1989:38)

The similarity between the creation of the ghetto in America and the creation of the “Third World” cannot be overlooked:

1. Colonial powers established trading systems in the colonies to extract much needed resources for the West. These trading systems were controlled by the colonial powers in the case of the “Third World”. Higher-level employment was not offered to locals and so there was little transfer of skill (Fieldhouse 1999). This led to “skill mismatch”; similar to what William Julius Wilson discusses as one of the reasons for the development of the “underclass.”(Wilson 1996)
2. The primary commodities, and raw materials towards which the “Third World” economy was forcibly geared were very vulnerable to price fluctuations. This led to the development of a “cyclical” pattern of poverty, similar to the “ebb and flow” leading to black employment in the northern United States, discussed above. The West even today, allows migrant workers when there is a demand at home and expels them when the economy goes down (Alexander 1996).

“For 162 years, the Naturalization Law, while allowing various European or “white” ethnic groups to enter the United States and acquire citizenship, specifically denied citizenship to other groups on a racial basis.” (Takaki 1982)

3. The local market was forcibly opened to imports of colonial “core-country” products to boost the colonial power’s economy thereby destroying the “infant” industries of the “Third World”. This is alarmingly similar to the relocation of inner city jobs in America around the globe (to exploit cheap labor) and the creation of empowerment zones in the inner cities. These zones bring in outside firms that put the local vendors out of business. The big outside firms at best provide a handful of minimum wage jobs to the community, but drain the billions in purchasing power already possessed by it (Chinyelu 1999).

As jobs moved to the suburbs, the poorer segments of the Black working class that had relied on factory jobs found themselves in a disastrous situation. Lack of affordable transportation made it impossible to hold a job and reside in the city. Moving to the suburbs was impossible also because of housing segregation and independent zoning by the suburbs that effectively kept low income and poverty stricken people out. The changes in industrial restructuring coincide in time with the boom in the number of the urban homeless.

With the elimination of decent paying manufacturing jobs in the inner cities, most people sought employment in low paying service jobs that required no skill and paid a minimum wage. The real value of the minimum wage in 1977 was \$2.38 (after correcting for inflation) while in 1988 it was \$1.88 (Yeich 1994: 88). Considering this meager amount,

year round full time employment does not provide enough for renting a one-bed room apartment, ignoring other costs of survival like food and health care. By 1980, more than half the population in the lowest income bracket was paying over 72% of its income in rent as opposed to 34% in 1970 (Hamburg & Hopper 1984, Quoted by Daniel Kerr).

The government deregulation of business in the 1980s led to employers downsizing and eliminating even more jobs. The transport industry alone cut 200,000 jobs. As employment opportunities got fewer and fewer, many of the poor sections of the inner city, racially and geographically segregated, had no option but to become homeless. Burt and Cohen of the Urban Institute (1989) noted that the average time spent without a job by homeless people was longer than that average time spent without a place of residence. Therefore, joblessness preceded homelessness (Glasser 1994: 46). Government policies towards those affected, as well as lack of available and affordable housing, amplified the problem and made homelessness more permanent.

In the "hierarchy" of "opportunity allocation" based upon race and gender, other things being equal, capitalism produces a layered society where "inter-layer" passage is almost impossible for the group confined to the lowest layer. This is similar to the "race-based" hierarchy set by the European colonial powers in their dealings with Asians and Africans.

4. Marketing boards controlled by the colonial powers were set up in these countries and they purchased local produce at prices well below the market, added their markups and sold them to the colonial "core" power. The huge profits they earned were sent to their homes in these "core" countries and not invested in the "Third World" (Fieldhouse, 1999). This is very similar to the lack of investment in inner-city infrastructure and employment base building. In most cases, the investment goes to boost tourism and to develop the downtown area for outsiders, with no money being spent on providing much needed housing and jobs.
5. Currencies of the "Third World" were devalued by force, thus increasing land depletion (desertification) to meet the increased quantity demanded by the "artificially" lowered price. The extra income and profits were either spent on giving big salaries to the European "managers" of these colonies, or the European owned transportation networks, or the European owned marketing boards. Eventually, all this capital was drained from the "Third World" as these Europeans sent the money back home.

Environmental depletion is not only perpetuated in the "Third World" by the West, minorities face similar environments within the rich industrial countries as well. The U.S. *General Accounting Office* study of hazardous waste landfill siting, found a strong relationship between the siting of offsite hazardous-waste landfills and race and socioeconomic status of the communities in which they were located (Bullard 2000:32)

Just like the ghetto, the "Third World" economy was completely detached from the one section of its developed economy that serviced exports to the European colonial powers.

The "Third World" led to the development of the West. The following, added to what has already been discussed above, is a summary of what has been well documented by many researchers:

1. Under priced raw materials, and the vast capital flows from the "Third World" sustained Europe during the 19th century and led directly to its modern industrial development.
2. Mineral wealth and Gold extracted from the "Third World" laid the foundation of the capital markets in the West.
3. Over 20 million unpaid Africans forcibly enslaved, added to the surplus that drove the industrial engine.
4. Millions of indentured servants provided labor at wages well below subsistence.
5. Markets, like today, were specifically geared to serve optimally the markets of the "core" colonial powers. The surplus was invested in the "core" country and not in the "Third World".

6. Destroying local industry, forcing specialization in products, the prices of which could be easily manipulated to serve the Western market, strengthened markets fed by “Third World” capital. There was thus complete monopsony (one buyer who can set the price at which he buys) in the purchase from the “Third World” of its resources and complete monopoly (one seller who can set the price at which he sells) in the sale of colonial products to the “Third World”. (Fieldhouse, 1999 & Alexander, 1996)

Consider the example of Nigeria. Nigeria produces one of the highest-grade oils in the world. This oil, *bonnie light* crude oil has great demand in the aviation and space programs in the developed world. However, the country including the people that live around the oil fields are plagued with unemployment, poverty and lack of health care (Chinyelu, 1999).

The Data:

An analysis of census data in the United States (U.S. Bureau of Census) shows that the structure of the African American population (the demographic profile) in the United States resembles populations of the “Third-World” more closely than the general population of the society in which they reside, comparatively. The African American population is younger than the white population having a median age of 30 years compared to 38.1 for whites. Similarly “Third World” populations are consistently younger than the developed world because of higher fertility and mortality. Only 8% of African Americans are over 65 compared to 14% of whites. Life expectancy for black males is 67, while that of white males is 74. Similarly life expectancy in the developed world is consistently higher (in some cases by over 30 years) than in the “Third World”.

Infant mortality for white Americans is 6.0 per 1000 live births, while that for blacks is 14.3 per 1000. The median family income for white Americans is \$46737, while that for black Americans is \$29404. The median personal incomes are \$14892 for black males (15 and over), and \$24122 for white males (15 and over).

Unemployment rate for blacks (16 and above) was 11.3% while national unemployment rates were around 3% nationally in the late 1990s. Of all people 25 to 34 years of age 14.6% of blacks compared to 29% of whites had a bachelor degree. Private schools in the United States are almost entirely white. Fifty percent of all private schools had black enrollment of less than 9%, even though almost half of the private school students came from central cities, where minorities aren’t even minorities (Wright, Editor. 2001). Murder victims are disproportionately black males. Fifty black males per 100,000 population were murdered in 1995 compared to 7 white males.

Black males make less money than white males in similar occupational positions that require similar levels of skill. The median income of white males with a bachelor’s degree is \$43,335, that of a black male with a similar degree \$33,217. Fifteen percent of black males in the black labor force are managers compared to 30% of whites in the white labor force. However, 32% of blacks are laborers compared to only 18% of whites. U.S. Bureau of the Census data reveals that 30.2% of African Americans are below the poverty level compared to 9.4% of Non-Hispanic whites.

Median Income– US \$- U.S. Census Bureau (2000)

	White \$	Black \$	Relation Per \$ 1000 of White
Families	56442	34192	606
Men	42224	30886	731
Women	30777	25736	836

(\$ 606 means black families make \$606 for every \$1000 made by a white family)

Education and Earning per \$1000 made by Whites
US \$- U.S. Census Bureau (2000)

	Black Men	Black Women
	\$	\$
High School	799	944
Bachelor's Degree	784	1117
Masters	778	1030

(\$ 799 above means for example, black men with a High School diploma make \$799 for every \$1000 made by white men with a similar diploma)

Environmental racism is witnessed clearly in the southern United States. Out of the 27 landfills operating in 48 states, a third are located in five southern states. The total capacity of these represents 60% of the nation's total landfill capacity. Blacks make up 20% of the south's population, yet zip codes of minority areas represent over 63% of the total landfill capacity of the south (Bullard 2000:33).

"Chemical companies (in the West) transfer their most dangerous plants to places like India, Mexico and the continent of Africa. Toxic wastes are shipped from the West to be dumped in less vigilant areas of the Majority World." (Alexander 1996:93)

(Page break for data table below)

DATA DISAGGREGATED BY RACE- UNITED STATES

(Percent)	Populati on Under 15 years	Populat ion Over 64 years	Familie s Below Poverty Level	Under 18 Below Povert y Level	Over 64 Below Poverty Level	Unemplo yed Over 16, Males, in Labor Force
BLACK	27.4 %	7.9 %	21 %	30.2 %	21.9 %	11.9 %
WHITE	18.7 %	14.3 %	6 %	9.5 %	8 %	5.1 %

(Percent)	Family Owns Home	Got Bachelor's Degree or Over	Labor Force Males in Executive Jobs	Labor Force Males in Service Jobs
BLACK	53.1 %	17 %	8.7 %	22 %
WHITE	83.3 %	29.4 %	18.2 %	8.4 %

Source: U.S. Census Bureau, Current Population Survey (March 2002)

Data from the U.S. Census Bureau's current population survey (March 2002), mirroring the "Third World" comparatively, shows that 27.4 percent of the African American population is under 15 compared to 18.7 percent of the Non-Hispanic (i.e. European) white population. Similarly due to higher mortality, only 7.9 percent of the African American population is over 64 years of age, compared to 14.3 percent of the white population. Twenty one percent of African American families are below the poverty level compared to 6 percent of white families. Of those under 18, 30.2 per cent of African Americans are below the poverty level compared to only 9.5 percent of whites. Following a similar trend, of those over 64, 21.9 percent of African Americans are below the poverty level compared to only 8 percent of whites.

Of those over 16 in the labor force, 11.9 percent of African American males are unemployed compared to 5.1 percent of white males; black male unemployment rate is thus 2.3 times that of the white males. Fifty three percent of African American families own their home

compared to 83.3 percent of white families. As regards jobs and education, a similar disparity is seen across the board. Only 17 percent of African Americans have a bachelor's degree or higher, compared to 29.4 percent of whites. Of those in the labor force, African American males having executive jobs are only 8.7 percent while whites are 18.2 percent; white males are thus more than twice as likely to be executives. On the flip side, African Americans are almost three times as likely to have low paying service jobs compared to white males.

Since this data is national data, it gets easily diluted, by not taking into account segregation of African Americans in impoverished inner cities. Data further disaggregated by segregated communities reveals the true "Third World" condition of the African Americans in the United States. For example, according to the *New England Journal of Medicine* (v.345, n.2 12 July 2001), the probability that a black man would survive from the age of 15 years to 65 is only 37 percent in Harlem (as compared with the U.S. average of 77 percent for white men). The survival probability for black males in Harlem is lower than that for the inhabitants of many Third World countries.

"A study by the economist Amartya Sen shows that African Americans as a group have a lower life expectancy than people born in China, in the Indian state of Kerala, Sri Lanka or Costa Rica. Bangladeshi men have a better chance of making it to the age of 40 than African American men from Harlem."

(Arundhati Roy, *Instant-Mix Democracy*, 2003)

"Geographic variations in health within rich countries are substantial. White men in the 10 "healthiest" counties in the United States have a life expectancy above 76.4 years. Black men in the 10 least healthy counties have a life expectancy of 61 years in Philadelphia, 60 in Baltimore and New York, and 57.9 in the District of Columbia. The 20-year gap in life expectancy between whites in the healthiest counties and blacks in the least healthy is as big as differences between countries at very different stages of economic development. The best off are like Japan; the worst off hover around the level of Kazakhstan and Bangladesh."

(Michael Marmot, Ph.D. University College London.)⁶

Distribution of diseases also reveals the colonial status of African Americans in the U.S. African Americans and Hispanics make up around 15% of the U.S. population yet they make up 49% and 20% of all AIDS cases reported among those 13 to 19 (<http://www.icare.to>). Black women are three times more likely to die while pregnant and four times more likely to die at childbirth than white women are. The mortality stratum for all Africans (Child/adult) is either high or very high while that for all Europeans is low to very low. Only the Russian Republics and some countries in the former Eastern European Soviet block have high adult mortality among whites.

The American Indian death rate from diabetes is 380% higher than that for the white population (27.8 per 100,000 compared to 7.3 for whites). Whites are three times more likely to undergo bypass surgery than non-whites, improving their probability of survival. Similarly poor urban Black and Hispanic neighborhoods have an average of 24 physicians per 100,000 people compared to 69 per 100,000 in poor white communities.

The introduction of disease by white settlers that devastated the indigenous population is well documented in history. From the 1770s, venereal disease was introduced among the Maori in New Zealand. In the 1790s influenza and TB entered the population. This devastated the indigenous community, which had no resistance against such "foreign" diseases. Beginning in 1769 when Captain James Cook entered New Zealand, the Maori outnumbered the settlers 40 to 1. By the 1870s the demographic picture of the Maori changed. The settlers outnumbered them 6 to 1. In the 1880s only 30% of Maori girls reached their 30th birthday (Stasiulis, Editor. 1995:42).

Stasius and Japphan write about disease and the American Indians:

"More devastating to the American Indians than changes wrought by trade were the scourges of disease against which Native peoples had little or no immunity (small pox, influenza, bubonic plague, yellow fever and so on), and the intrusion of Christian missionaries. It is now estimated that 20 waves of pestilence killed as much as 90% of the original population...". (Stasiulis, Editor. 1995:102)

⁶ (Michael Marmot, *Inequalities in Health*. *New England Journal of Medicine*, v.345, n.2 12 July 2001, <http://www.mindfully.org/Health/Inequalities-In-Health-Marmot.htm>; retrieved 8/25/2004)

Indigenous people within the so-called white "settler societies" like Canada, Australia, New Zealand and the United States have suffered fates similar or worse than the creation of the "Third World". For example modern estimates place the pre-Columbus population of North America at 10 to 12 million. By the 1890s, it was reduced to about 300, 000. In Australia, Native/Aboriginal children of mixed-race were forcibly removed from their parent's home and given to adoptive white families. They thus grew up without knowledge of their roots, being termed the "stolen generation".

Consider the case of Canada: According to some estimates, the unemployment rates for the Native American population in Canada have never gone below 80%, and most of those working are working at projects funded by the government (Powless, 1985). In 1970, 24 percent of Indian males made more than \$6000 per year compared to 52 percent of Canadian white males. The earnings of the average Canadian are 29 percent higher than those of the Native Indian man. The proportion of Canadian men in professional and technical positions is nearly twice as high as those in the Indian labor force (18% compared to 8.6%). The average Canadian man earns 35 percent more than the average native man in the same occupation with the same skill level. In 1969, 80 percent of the Indian families were below the poverty line.

The death rate for Indian people is six times the national average and the infant mortality rates are more than twice the national average. The life expectancy at one year of age is 63.4 years for Indians and 72.8 for the general population. Suicide among Indians is six times the national average and violent deaths are four to five times the national average. In 1974, 54 percent of the Indian population was using social assistance compared to 6 percent of the non-Indian population. The juvenile delinquency rate for natives is three times that of the national average. In 1979 Native people represented 1.3 percent of the Canadian population yet they were 9.3 percent of the penitentiary population.

Australia is another example: Just as the patterned appearance of the ghetto in the inner cities of the United States, the appearance of affluence in close proximity to poverty is found in this white 'settler state'. The life expectancy of indigenous people in Australia is 20 years less than that of the non-indigenous population. Similarly indigenous people account for 31 percent of all Australians who live in abandoned dwellings or are "homeless" by all real measures. The unemployment rate for the indigenous population is twice that for the non-indigenous white population.

Compare the above data to an almost similar pattern of disparity (Table 1) found among the white 'settler states' and the former colonized non-white world. Global poverty is the rule and not the exception. Wages in "Third World" countries are 80 percent to 90 percent lower than in the West. Fifteen percent of the world's population (the rich countries of the West) controls over 80 percent of total world income (Chossudovsky 1997:35). Given that roughly 25 percent of the population in those countries controls over 50 percent of their wealth (in the U.S., the top 5% controls 50%), an even smaller group controls the world. Over 85 percent of the world population gets less than 20 percent of total world income. The poorest 20 percent of the world's population get around 1 percent of world income (Macionis 1996:189). The world's three richest individuals have more wealth than the combined GDP of the 48 poorest countries. According to data compiled by the Public Information Network of Seattle, in 1995, 358 billionaires were worth \$760 billion, the same as the poorest 20 percent of the world's population.

The poverty numbers however are only partially telling. They understate and mask the true picture of global poverty, as their provision is based on a relative assessment of poverty. For example, according to the World Bank, the 'upper-poverty' line is defined as a per capita income of \$1 a day. Those that earn more than \$1 a day are defined as non-poor by such a definition. Thus poverty is grossly understated. Compare this to the U.S. with a per-capita income of over \$20000 a year; one in five is defined as poor (Chossudovsky 1997:43). In many "Third World" countries that increasingly approach the cost of living similar to that in the U.S., the \$2 a day benchmark for assessing poverty is totally inadequate and unrealistic. Families making even \$5 a day might not get proper nutrition or adequate shelter.

According to the United Nations' Least Developed countries (LDC) report 2002 & 2004⁷, during 1995-1999, 81% of the populations in the LDCs lived on less than \$2 a day. When adjusted by purchasing par parity (PPP), it comes to an average consumption of \$1.03 a day (1985 PPP). Of the African LDCs, 87 percent of the population was living on less than \$2 a day, with an average consumption of 86 cents a day (\$0.86). From 1965 to 1969, 48 percent of the people in the LDCs were living on less than \$1 a day, now its almost 50 percent. Taking into account the population increase from the 1960s, that comes to more than twice the number of people living at less than \$1 a day now than did back then (138million then, 307 million now). The average per capita income of the LDCs, in the late 1990s measured in terms of current prices and exchange rates comes to \$0.72 a day (72 cents).

According to Marxian analysis of stratification, economic oppression of minorities in capitalism is necessary. Racism thus becomes a screen, which the capitalist elite uses in order to pit groups of people against each other. If people can be distinguished easily and social consciousness can be molded by use of religion etc., to convince a group of people that others are inferior to them, or are after their wealth, the emphasis of conflict shifts from its source, the capitalists, to the masses.

Oppression of the minorities serves a dual purpose, being profitable in addition to being a screen. Minorities can be hired for low wages to do the work no one else wants to do. This not only reinforces the stereotype that they are inferior and easily exploited, it provides so called 'empirical' evidence in favor of the "ideology of superiority" based upon the theoretical construct of *Social Darwinism*. The real cause, the institutional arrangement of the elite, is thus masked. It is not only the *interpretation* of religion but also the *interpretation* of 'science', pseudo-science, which becomes the 'opium of the masses'. Facts and ideas are separated, so the analysis of the meaning of facts is easily manipulated. As a result stereotypes emerge that are perpetuated by incomplete information and casual/subjective empirical observation that ignores the context of the situation. Stereotypes thus become a cost-effective 'weapon of oppression', employed by the elite for maximum profitability and resource allocation.

"The refusal to relate isolated facts and fragmentary comment with the changing institutions of society makes it impossible to understand the structural realities which these facts might reveal; the longer run trends of which they might be tokens..."

(C. Wright Mills, *The New Left*, essay 1960. Horowitz, Editor 1967:248)

Evaluating a list of eight Black stereotypes including "prefer to accept welfare" and have "less native intelligence", 75 percent of the whites agreed with one or more and over 50 percent agreed with two or more, in a recent national survey of the Anti-Defamation League. About 30 percent or more agreed with four or more. In a 1994 National Opinion Research Center (NORC) survey about the work orientation of Blacks, only 16% listed Blacks as hardworking. Whereas only 7 percent placed Whites on the "lazy" end of the spectrum, a little fewer than 50 percent placed Blacks in that category.

Racialized emotions are an effective way to ensure de-facto, that old laws of separation are respected even when they have been made illegal on the books. In a 1990 survey in the United States, two-thirds of the Whites said that they would have a negative reaction if a close relative married a Black person. Only 5 percent said that they would have a positive reaction.

Confusion, created and exploited by the media, exists among the public at large between personal troubles and social issues. Such confusion effectively deflects criticism away from the system, which is the real cause behind the problem(s) being discussed. A distinction needs to be made at this point between personal responsibility and social/institutional problems. Take the case of unemployment. If in a hypothetical city of a hundred thousand, ten people are unemployed, it might be their personal attributes that are to blame. However, if in the same city of 100,000, unemployment is 13,000, then it has to do with the structure of the economy and not personal traits. Take the example of marriage: Inside a marital relationship, personal problems

⁷ (http://www.unctad.org/en/docs/ldc2004overview_en.pdf)

might exist between the couple which may lead to divorce, but when over 500 of every 1000 marriages attempted end in divorce in a society, it has to do with the social institution of marriage and family and other institutions that affect them (C. Wright Mills, *The Sociological Imagination*, 1959).

GLOBAL ECONOMIC APARTHEID:

"The extremists are already in power. They have turned much of the world into a military garrison and an economic purgatory..."(Parenti 1989:6)

TABLE 1

REGION	LIFE EXPECTANCY (YEARS)	INFANT MORTALITY RATE Per 1000 live births	Gross National Income. Purchase Power Parity-Per Capita IN US \$	POPULATION DENSITY PER SQ MILE	POPULATION INCREASE 2001 TO 2050 (Percent)	TOTAL FERTILITY RATE (Average Number of children per female)
Western Africa (AVERAGE)	51	88	1000	101	393%	5.8
Eastern Africa (AVERAGE)	50	97	850	102	128%	5.7
Middle Africa (AVERAGE)	48	113	1500	39	203%	6.6
South Asia (AVERAGE)	61	72	2250	362	66%	3.4
United States	77	7.1	25440	77	45%	2.1
Canada	79	5.5	31910	8	18%	1.4
Australia	79	5.7	23850	6	29%	1.7

Population Reference Bureau 2001, Washington, DC

In 1955 the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) was ratified leading eventually to the development of the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 1995. The benefits of these organizations for the most part have accrued to international banks and transnational corporations. They imply a supervision of "Third World" countries. The conditionalities of the WTO have given a new 'legal' setting to the relationship between the West and the "Third World". The elite in the "Third World" countries that accept funds from the agencies mentioned above agree to "sell" their sovereignty, by accepting conditions for economic restructuring and policing to ensure compliance by the West (Chossudovsky 1997:35). Debtor nations have to give up their control of fiscal and monetary policy and Western institutions dictate their financial budgets and the working of their Central Bank. Thus every debtor country has a nominal government having even less power than subject local governments of the colonial era.

Militarized Capitalism & the Lending of Poverty:

One of the first big loans that the World Bank made was on August 7, 1947. It was given for reconstruction to the colonialist government of the Netherlands. The Dutch had just sent 145,000 troops to crush the anti-colonialist uprising in the East Indies. In 1966, the Bank in defiance of the United Nations continued to lend money to Portugal (and its colonial domination of Angola and Mozambique) and South Africa (and its apartheid). At this time in history, the Bank was not profitable and had few lenders in outside regimes fighting wars. This however was to change in the late 1960 and early 1970s.

The boom in the oil prices in 1973 and the U.S. recession forced the loaning of money to the "Third World" at close to zero (sometimes negative) interest rates. This money was used to purchase U.S. and Western imports, resulting in economic growth in the West and the creation of over 2 million jobs (Alexander 1996:114). Just like a modern day credit-card company that makes borrowing attractive by a short period of low interest lending, at the end of which the rate jumps to unreasonable levels, the U.S. suddenly increased interest rates in 1979.

The total outstanding debt of developing countries was \$62 billion in 1970; increased to \$481 billion in 1980 and in 1996 stood at over \$2 trillion (Chossudovsky 1997:46). By the middle of the 1980s, the poor countries of the world were giving more in debt servicing to the rich West than was being received in the form of all inputs (loans, foreign investments and aid).

Banks and institutions that set up shop in poor minority communities in the United States similarly drain the community of their resources. The same system is at play with its predictable pattern of winners and losers. Chinyelu presents a case study of the *Freedom National Bank* that was established in 1964 in Brooklyn to serve as a community institution for providing loans to African Americans for home purchase and small business establishment:

"Freedom National collected \$50 million in deposits from their two Brooklyn branches, yet woefully made only three mortgage loans, totaling a mere \$130,000 to Brooklynites seeking to purchase homes...In other instances, members of the bank's management board pushed through unsecured loans, either for themselves or for their friends, some of which were not repaid." (Chinyelu 1999:84-85)

The loans that were given by the World Bank and the IMF came with strict conditions. They were "policy-based". In the beginning of the 1970s, the Peterson Report in the United States recommended to "establish a framework of principles, procedures and institutions, that will ensure the effective use of assistance funds and the achievement of US national interests." (McNeill 1981:52⁸). The "weighted" vote of the United States and the West in decisions is comfortably placed in such institutions, to guarantee decisions in their favor.

"From 1970 to 1980, the flow of investment capital from the United States to the "Third World" amounted to about \$8 billion. But the return flow from the "Third World" to the United States in the form of dividends, interest, branch profits, management fees, and royalties was \$63.7 billion. Together (1989 figures), all multinational corporations and banks in the world take as much as \$200 billion every year from the "Third World" Nations." (Parenti 1989: 13; Monthly Review 1983:37; Political Affairs, July 1982:37- all quoted by Parenti)

Consumers know that credit-card companies are happy if you make the minimum payments on your credit cards thereby maximizing the profits of their company via interest and "late-fees". Now imagine if they had the liberty to "force" you to use the convenience checks that they mail you, and dictate where you do the spending- this is a close approximation to how the World Bank and IMF operate with "Third World" countries. If your debt becomes unmanageable, you have to work to pay off the debt, whether you like your current job or not, otherwise you risk misery.

The IMF and the World Bank have devised a way to be even more profitable than the credit card companies. They do not require the poor countries to pay back the principal (at the

⁸. The IMF classifies countries in terms of "resource usefulness" to the West. In terms of murder and rape, the countries of the West are the 'least developed', however that is not the criteria that the West has dictated (Alexander 1996:80). From 1982 to 1990 the total amount of money transferred from the "Third World" to the West was around six times the amount of the Marshall Plan that helped rebuild Europe after World War II. How come the "Third World" isn't six times or even equally developed? (Alexander 1996).

moment) as they realize that most of them cannot, even if they wanted to, so they just require the periodic payment of the interest on the loans. This is called 'debt-servicing' by 'rescheduling' debt payments.

However, apart from being extremely profitable, resulting in a net flow of capital from the "Third World" to the West (poor people feeding the rich), it gives the rich industrial countries of the West complete control over the national economic policies of these countries. There are tight conditionality to these loans, and deadlines to their implementation in the debtor's economy. The changes that these institutions require are not based on the implementation of an investment program or project; they are "policy" changes that affect the entire economy and especially the majority population in these countries, those that are the most deprived. The names and terms of the loans explicitly suggest the objectives. They are called "*structural adjustment loans (SAL)*," or "*Sector adjustment loans.*" The IMF calls part of its loaning facilities "*Systematic Transformation Facility (STF)*".

On paper, the loans are contingent upon macro-economic stabilization and structural reforms. By macro-stabilization, the IMF-World Bank requires a country to devalue its currency, liberalize its prices and snip and cut the country's budget, called austerity measures. This is required of countries whose combined GNP is less than the personal wealth of a few super rich individuals in the West. Fifteen percent of the world's population living in the Western industrial countries is responsible for nearly 80 percent of world expenditure (UN World Report 1998). Yet the same people, who spend the most, want to promote "austerity" in the "Third World". These slumlords enforce the following:

i) Currency devaluation: This is almost universal in the IMF-World Bank policy agenda. A devalued currency almost overnight sends the "Third World" economy in question into a price hike. Imports become more expensive while exports of the country become cheaper to the West, through the reduction of the dollar price of labor cost. The extra dollars that the government earns or saves are supposed to be used for debt servicing i.e. recycled back to the West. The effect of devaluation is that the domestic price of food and medicine and public services- common necessities- goes up almost overnight. Thus the poor are made poorer. Those who have saved all their lives lose the real value of their money in a matter of hours. However, commodities and raw materials required by the rich countries of the West become cheap to them but expensive for "Third World" home consumption and lead to a booming economy in the West with a 2.2 percent inflation rate (as in the late 1990s), compared to double digit inflation in the "Third World".

"By 1983, the money collected by foreign banks in the form of interest payments on "Third World" debts was three times higher than their profits on direct Third-World investments."
(Parenti 1989:27)

After adopting the 1991 IMF plan, the price of rice in India rose 50 percent in six months and the real-earnings of the textile industries fell by 60 percent due to inflation. This directly affected the lives of over 60 million people. Adding to the misery were the reduced wages of rice-paddy workers, around \$0.57 for a day's work. This amount, 57 cents, contrary to popular opinion is not a fortune in India. Adjusted for cost of living (purchasing power) differences, it could buy only \$2 worth of goods in America. A monthly salary of less than \$50, if they were in the US (Alexander 1996:109). Can anyone survive on \$2 a day in the United States? However, the Indian government didn't care because most of these "low-wage" workers were of the "untouchable" class. At best they needed "controlling" and "austerity" similar to the view of the West towards the "Third World".

After the flood in Bangladesh in 1991, which killed over 140,000 people, the IMF enforced its devaluation program. The retail price of rice went up by over 50 percent causing a famine and killing tens of thousands of people on paper. The real number was much higher, as the emergency food, being appropriated by indigenous officials never reached the starving masses (UN World Report, 1998).

ii) Anti-inflationary program: After causing inflation via devaluation, the IMF wants the government to enact an "anti-inflationary program".

The IMF method of attacking inflation is to cut demand and put a tight control on the money supply. However, devaluation, which was the real cause of inflation, is ignored. Contraction of demand implies that public expenditure is to be controlled. The only way government expenditure can be controlled is to lay off public employees or to cut social service programs. This has a double effect. It cuts government spending as well as private consumption spending. If people do not have jobs they spend less on consumption. Therefore, money is freed to service the debt while people live at near starvation levels⁹. Global consumption expenditure has grown at an average of 3 percent since 1970, however in the poorest of the "Third World" countries it has fallen dramatically. Both public and private consumption per capita in Africa has fallen over 20% since 1980.

Another way expenditure can be controlled is to cut investment and infrastructure building. Thus projects like public utilities and water are stopped midway. The bubonic plague in India in 1994 was directly attributed to the IMF structural reform program of 1991 which cut spending in that sector. Out of 4.4 billion people in developing countries, 60 percent lack access to sanitation and nearly forty percent have no access to clean water and a quarter have no housing (UN World Report, 1998). About 17 million die of curable infectious/parasitic diseases like Malaria and Diarrhea etc. Yet the "noble" dream of the World Bank according to their web site is "a world free of poverty."

There is yet another way that demand can be reduced and that is to reduce foreign imports. However, the IMF-World Bank agenda strictly forbids any control on trade. Not only this, imports from the West are forcibly encouraged by "quick disbursing policy-based loans"(Chossudovsky 1997:53), for importing consumer goods and food from rich countries. Not only is the debt enlarged, it earns extra profit for the West as more of the devalued currency has to be used to pay for the "same" amount of imports.

The devaluation discussed above causes a short-term boost to the "Third World" economy by increasing exports. The West's control of the governing bodies of "Third World" nations ensures that the profit from this, what is left after debt servicing, goes to overseas bank accounts, in the West (by making the free movement of foreign exchange one of the conditionalities of loan provision in many countries). The short-term boost however is over soon. Devaluation by the other "Third World" countries, all fighting for crumbs from the "master's table" soon restores the balance of trade to the former level, leaving the country poorer and the misery greatly magnified. This sets a viscous cycle of misery with riots, government overthrows, and near-war situations in many of these countries.

iii) Separation of Central Bank from politics: One of the conditions of the IMF is that the debtor nation separates the Central Bank from all political power. Thus the IMF and not the government of the country controls the money supply and money creation. Therefore the economic development or non-development is now directly in the hands of the 'foreign' power, the IMF and the World Bank, with its decision vote in the hands of the United States and its Western European allies. The influence is such that the heads of many of the Central Banks are former senior officials of the International Financial Institutions, and sometimes receive salary supplements from these creditors (Chossudovsky 1997:58).

iv) Public Expenditure Review: The IMF-World Bank monitors all public expenditure by the government through its "*Public Expenditure Review (PER)*". It has required that certain 'vulnerable' groups be targeted but overall the state reduces its expenditure on such things like health and education. During the 1980s, spending on education in African IMF countries fell by 50% according to the UN Commission on Africa. Real wages in Africa and Latin America fell by 25% in the same period (Alexander 1996:127).

According to Ann-Louise Colgan, Research Associate with Africa Action:

⁹. Most debtor countries devote around one-third to two-thirds of their export earnings to service their debts (Parenti 1995:20)

"In the 1980s and 1990s, African governments had to cede control over their economic decision-making in order to qualify for World Bank and IMF loans. The conditions attached to these loans undid much of the progress achieved in public health. The policies dictated by the World Bank and IMF exacerbated poverty, providing fertile ground for the spread of HIV/AIDS and other infectious diseases. Cutbacks in health budgets and privatization of health services eroded previous advances in health care and weakened the capacity of African governments to cope with the growing health crisis. Consequently, during the past two decades the life expectancy of Africans has dropped by 15 years." (<http://www.africaaction.org/action/sap0204.htm>, retrieved 8/27/2004)

The reduction of expenses on social services, which were small to begin with, is not a one-time demand by the IMF and the World Bank. They require a "moving target" approach. Once the target is reached, a further reduced target is set for the next period, causing a further cutback in public spending. At the same time, spending on the military industry, especially where the sellers are the Western firms is never discouraged. The major part of the expenses of many of these nations is on arms imports. In NATO countries, military spending fell by 33 percent between 1987 and 1996, however in South Asia, it increased by 13 percent and in some countries like Indonesia and Malaysia, by over 35 percent (UN Human Development Report, 1998).

These arms were imported in the major part from the West. It is therefore expedient for the West to keep situations in these countries at a 'near war' level. The 'conflicts', that are kept alive in many of these countries have already been decided upon by the United Nations [Kashmir and Palestine are the cases in point] but are deliberately ignored by Western powers that seek to benefit from the status quo. In keeping with this contradictory policy, certain other United Nations' resolutions are forcibly extracted and executed with lightning speed in the "Desert Storm" fashion.

"The weapons addiction of all our political leaders... is a colossal waste of human resources, it dangers the survival of us all...If we think holding hostage the passengers of an airliner is unspeakably evil and call it terrorism, what name shall we give for holding hostage the entire human race?" (Zinn 1990:288)

In the 1970s Somalia was almost self-sufficient in food and Vietnam had a 90% literacy rate. After they allowed the West to implement "Structural Adjustment" in their economies, we saw that Somalia was starving and enrollment in Vietnamese schools dropped by over 25% in a short period (Chossudovsky, 1997).

"In 1989, a trillion dollars- a thousand billion dollars- were spent for arms all over the world, the United States and the Soviet Union accounting for more than half of this. Meanwhile, about 14 million children die every year from malnutrition and disease, which are preventable by relatively small sums of money." (Zinn 1990:282)

v) *Investment in infrastructure*: In controlling expenditure, "ceilings" are placed on all expenditures of investments. The state cannot choose or employ its own public to build infrastructure. Though the "*Public Investment Projects (PIP)*", the IMF-World Bank become brokers of all investment projects in the "Third World" country. It is required that 'competitive bidding' among select international firms are the criteria. International firms are employed which charge large amounts of money in management and consultation fees (intellectual property rights). A huge proportion of the debt is used for such "technical assistance." Thus once again, no capital is sent and a few numbers are added to the computer totals. The money changes hands in the same block of rich Western countries that compete for contracts to build. Locals are kept out of the planning process but local laborers do most of the building at marginal wages. Thus, the external debt is enlarged, and local resources are not used for developing technical expertise but for basic "raw" labor, as against "planning science".

Another way the IMF-World Bank stunts domestic growth in the poor nation is by controlling the price of fuel and utilities. The price often inflated several hundred percent, force many manufacturers into bankruptcy by fictitiously increasing the cost of manufacture and internal transportation. Thus imports from the West appear as the only

alternative. The East India Company achieved a similar motive in colonial times when it imposed "internal-transit duties" on local manufactured goods, thus aborting a newly forming industry. The same is happening today in Sub-Saharan Africa where local farmers cannot transport their produce to urban areas for sale (Chossudovsky 1997:63).

Yet another way employed by the IMF-WB to reduce investment (in the domestic economy to keep it at a resource providing, non-manufacturing level) is the deregulation of domestic banking and the free entry of foreign banks in the market. The government is not allowed to give subsidized loans, and a strict control of money creation together with other economic requirements of the IMF-WB, drives up interest rates to unreal levels. It becomes impossible to borrow money to invest in industry as its 'opportunity cost' is too high. It would thus be more profitable to keep that money in interest-earning accounts. This encourages non-investment and an inflow of "black money (money that has escaped taxation)" and "dirty money (illegal trade)" into the "Third World" money market.

The advantage of this is temporary for the domestic economy, which gets short-term relief in debt servicing. After a short gain there is a huge loss, as the elites in these countries, after laundering this money, send it to the West, whereas before it couldn't be sent as it was out of the system. Therefore, there is a double-exit of capital from the poor country. The exit that occurred when the funds were used for debt servicing and the exit that followed shortly thereafter in the form of laundered money sent to Western banks.

The IMF-WB policy encourages money laundering on a global level, where it suits the interest of the West. Where such laundering doesn't suit them (or is channeled back to the domestic economy), worldwide bank chains like the Bank of Credit and Commerce International (BCCI) are forcibly shut down, and their funds appropriated.

"Officially, the IMF and World Bank condemn bribery. Nevertheless within days of Pakistan's filing of corruption charges and cutting payments to the accused British and American power combine, the IMF Bank at Clinton's and Blair's request, threatened to cut off Pakistan's access to international finance. Panicked by the threat of economic blockade, Pakistan prepared to collect the cash to pay off the UK-US consortium. On December 22, 1998, Pakistan's military sent 30,000 troops into the nation's power stations...acting as a guarantor of payments to the multinationals." (Palast 2002:113)

On a local scale, writing about the *Freedom National Bank* in Harlem, Chinyelu (2000) states:

"Earlier in 1990, when Freedom National was having problems, a much larger bank in Boston, The Bank of New England, was in a similar situation. However, the federal government made an effort to sustain the Bank of New England by depositing public funds in the Bank, while at the same time sharply cutting back similar deposits at the Freedom National Bank, thus hastening the collapse of this small minority owned institution. Equally disturbing was the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation willingness to cover the Bank of New England's \$3 Billion in uninsured deposits, while not willing at least initially to cover Freedom National's \$8 to \$10 million in uninsured deposits." (Chinyelu 1999:85)

vi) Removal of Import Quotas: The policies that encourage Western imports at the detriment of the developing domestic industry is further strengthened by the insistence of the IMF-World Bank that import quotas and tariffs be reduced if not eliminated. This has two effects; i) It leads to an increase in luxury goods being imported into the domestic economy, thereby resulting in a further outflow of capital to the West from poor countries and ii) a reduction of custom duties to the domestic government which could have been spent on education, health and other public services. Most of all however, this "increase" in spending is not due to a good economy but is sustained on either "short-term" export gains by devaluation (discussed above) or on "adjustment loans" i.e. further debt (also discussed above).

vii) Privatization of Enterprises: Another policy advocated with a vengeance (by threat of cutting off funding) by the IMF-World Bank is the privatization of state owned enterprises. In the best scenario for the West, the most profitable "Third World" ventures are bought in exchange for debt servicing by Western firms. In most cases these transactions are just "on-the-book". There is no transfer of capital to the poor country. The "debt" number is

reduced by a small amount on a computer “in” the West and ownership of a key industrial player in the “Third World” is transferred to Western ownership. The profits from this venture are now, instead of being invested in the domestic country, being sent to the West; in the case of Citibank, to the US. The poor country has gained nothing in the process. Since the mid 1960s history has shown that the debt number that went down slightly in that computer “in” the West has gone up more than 3200 percent, as poor countries got buried in “forced” debt.

Another privatization venture enforced by the IMF is the privatization of land by issuing land titles to farmers. The income so generated would help the debtor country pay off the interest on the loans taken from IFI’s through the IMF-WB. However, this displaces traditional farmers, many of whom find themselves without land to grow food, almost overnight.

viii) Domestic Tax reforms: These have been the agenda of the IMF-World Bank as well. They have insisted that a domestic sales tax be applied on ‘common necessities’. The burden of this tax invariably falls on the lower and middle class consumers who are already under the burden of reduced real wages and inflation [caused by IMF devaluation]. The contradictory nature of this policy is revealed when these agencies insist that “tax breaks and tax holidays” be given to foreign investors. Those investors who will cause a slight reduction in a computer number and will send most of the domestic growth abroad.

Not only has empirical evidence shown the disasters caused by the IMF-World Bank on an almost universal scale, especially in Africa and Asia, the IMF and World Bank have acknowledged their failures (without a change in policy however):

“Although there have been a number of studies on the subject over the past decade...In fact it has often been found that the programs are associated with a rise in inflation and a fall in the growth rate.” (IMF Staff Papers 37:2:1990, p196, p222- Quoted by Chossudovsky 1997:69).

Conclusion & Solutions:

“We live in a world where imperialism consigns hundreds of millions of people to lives of misery and oppression and where the shadow of nuclear death is cast upon us all, a world where the pursuit of profit is destroying the ecological conditions of life itself...The people of this country and other nations are increasingly become aware of this. The people know that nuclear weapons bring no security to anyone and that interventions on the side of privileged autocracies and reactionary governments bring no justice. They also seem to know that they pay most of the costs of the arms buildup and imperialism”(Parenti 1989: 203)

As we saw, legislation based solutions are extremely limited in the results they can get given institutionalized racism, which I have argued is the cause for the continuing exploitation of the “Third World” by the West. The clearest historical and empirical proof of this is the discriminatory treatment of non-white colonies compared to the white “settler states” like Australia, New Zealand, South Africa and Canada. In these countries, the white minority was allowed complete control over domestic resources and was free to invest the surplus in the local economy and protect their local industry from being devastated by forced-exchange.

“At its base, the white settler society construct refers to the intention of colonial administrators...an ‘overseas extension’ or replica of British society. Hence the dominant culture, values and institutions of the society mimic those of the ‘mother’ country...”(Staliusis et al, Editors 1995:97).

The British invested in infrastructure in these “settler” countries and money was loaned at rates that followed local banking rates, and thus were not unusually inflated or exploitive. Wholesale killing of the non-white indigenous populations by the white settlers also restored a favorable population-resource ratio in most of these countries. Since there was no forced production in these ‘settler-states’ and they were allowed protectionism (Fieldhouse 1999:19) and the freedom to choose their own economic

policy, the products they chose to specialize in were products similar to those in the West and thus were more profitable and less susceptible to price fluctuations (Fieldhouse 1999: 130-162). The fact is that Britain treated these "settler states" as an extension of Britain and not "alien" like its Asian and African colonies

"According to one insider, the respected Economist Davison Budhoo who worked for the World Bank and IMF for twenty two years, ' Racism makes itself felt in a wide range of organizational practices...Among these is the classification of South Africa [in 1990] as a "European Country" administered by our highly segregated, virtually "white staff only can work here" European Department. Moreover certain Departments of the Fund are virtually segregated along racial lines, and "internal" race relations are deteriorating further.' (Quoted by Alexander 1996:130 from Budhoo, Davison, "Enough is Enough". 1990:7, 49)

We similarly saw that after the "emancipation" of African Americans after the Civil War, the ideology that justified racism to the Western mind, persisted and resulted in a condition for the group that was little different than the 'informal' colonization of the 'emancipated' colonies after independence. The ideology, as we saw, exists today with a change in terminology. The dropping of the Atomic Bomb on Japan and not on "white" Germany revealed the same ideology. Bonner F. Fellers, General MacArthur's military secretary and chief of his psychological warfare operations, stated before the war with Japan ended:

"The war with Europe was both political and social, the war in the Pacific was racial." (quoted by Dower, John W 1999:286).

Recently, Harvard professor and "poverty expert" William Julius Wilson suggested in, *The Bridge over the Racial Divide (2000)*, that a broad based coalition be formed that discusses both white and black poverty matters and is non-race based (to attract the white majority). On paper it looks like a noble cause but in reality it doesn't deal with the source of the problem. It is a dangerous idea as it delays the addressing of real problems and tactfully serves as a tool of the elite in maintaining the status quo.

The very assumption that a "non race based" coalition is needed to motivate action implicitly recognizes that white America is indifferent to the plight of black America unless their own concerns are addressed, in such a coalition. The problems of the "Third World" have never been solved by such seemingly 'broad based' coalitions. The United Nations, the IMF, the World Bank all have 'noble aims' on paper and are seemingly 'broad based', yet the problems and the poverty of the "Third World" has only increased through most of their history. Small problems were addressed but the 'broad' issues remained unsolved due to an exploitive racist ideology. An ideology that supports the corporate elite while implanting a culture of crime and terror and universal misery around the world

Conditions in the "Third World" that are perpetuated by the global capitalist system result in an oppositional "terrorism culture". Selective empirical evidence of injustice perpetuated by the West, to the followers of such an "oppositional" culture reinforce their own "Robin Hood" standing. Similar conditions in the inner cities lead to an oppositional "code of the street" and perpetuate street crime. Elijah Anderson in his ethnographic study, *The Code of the Street (1999)* states:

"The emergence of an underclass isolated in urban ghettos with high rates of joblessness can be traced to the interaction of race and prejudice, discrimination and the effects of the global economy. These factors have contributed to the profound social isolation and impoverishment of broad segments of the inner-city black population...In their social isolation an oppositional culture, a subset of which is the code of the street, has been allowed to emerge, grow and develop...A larger segment of people are now not simply isolated but even more profoundly alienated from the wider society and its institutions." (Anderson 1999:316)

1. New ideology:

If a lasting, just solution to the continued subjugation and periodic genocide of a majority of humankind is to be found, we need a new ideology. An ideology that demonstrates, in theory and action, the "one community" of humankind¹⁰. Malcolm X witnessed such unity in Mecca during *Hajj*, the Muslim pilgrimage.

The psychologist, Erik Erikson stated that our cultures create, "pseudospecies", i.e. false categories of race and nation that destroy our sense of ourselves as one species thereby encouraging hostility and violence. This explains how "easy" it becomes for the West, to justify to its culture the systematic genocide of millions of "non-white" people (Quoted by Zinn 1990:40).

A common, equity based ideology is critical for generating a "broad based" collective identity that seeks *transformative* social justice. It is only under such an ideology that individual and collective "identity frames" can be brought into synchrony to reduce the potential for identity disputes (Stoecker, 1995). Without a common *justice based* ideology, "narrow issue frames" would result in a movement that at best achieves small goals and either disintegrates or is co-opted by the elite before any meaningful social change. As a result, without a change in ideology, all calls for "broad based coalitions" like Wilson's *Bridge Over the Racial Divide* (2000) are bound to fail, like the IMF, UN and World Bank have failed in achieving "transformative change" in the world.

The history of every human conflict and resulting injustice can be traced to the "selfish desire" of groups leading to factionalism (Koran 6:65), based upon an ideology of superiority. Without ideological shifts, even the oppressed workers, when they get a chance, become oppressors, within a rationalizing system, as *Michels' Iron Law of Oligarchy* makes clear.

Capitalism is designed to keep people apart through competition and individualism. The elite, taking advantage of the system and the market mechanism generated by capitalism lock individuals in a race for survival, pitting one against the other. By reducing the worth of everything, including human relationships to their "money" value, elite corporate ideology and a society projected by such an ideology, produces the worst form of "bondage" possible. Slavery to material objects, in which the purpose of life becomes their acquisition. A "slavery" in which those who are enslaved do not even realize the depth of their bondage as they finally makes objects of themselves. What has been traditionally understood as "humanity" is universally lost.

Malcolm X said, and herein lies the solution:

"The Western world's most learned diplomats have failed to solve this grave race problem. Her learned legal experts have failed. Her sociologists have failed. Her civic leaders have failed. Her fraternal leaders have failed. Since all of these have failed to solve this race problem, it is time for us to sit down and reason. I am certain that we will be forced to agree that it takes God Himself to solve this grave racial dilemma." (Haley, 1973).

2. Access to the media and communication networks:

"We take the media out of the hands of the public, give them to private tyrannies, and call it democracy." (Chomsky 1996:48)

Formal controls alone do not change minds and attitudes. People discover over time that laws can be violated and avoided. Positive public relations, especially through the media can have an immense influence on people's views. Black communities, which

¹⁰ Koranic ideology:

"O humankind! Be careful of God who created you of a single essence..."(Koran 4:1)

"O humankind! We have created you male and female and divided you into nations and tribes for identity. The best of you in God's sight is the one most (socially) aware." (Koran 49:13)

"And of God's signs is the creation of the heavens and the earth, and the differences in your colors and languages. Indeed in this are signs for those who have knowledge." (Koran 30:22)

"You (men and women) issue one from the other."(Koran 3:195)

"Let not a nation deride a nation"(Koran 49:11)

are among the poorest in this country, have lacked access to the media of mass communication. Because of segregation, the majority of white Americans find out about black Americans as well as the "Third World" through the media controlled by the elite who want to perpetuate and rationalize a culture of "superior-subordinate" relationships.

The media is a very powerful and effective tool. It has been effectively used by Israel to change the image common Americans have about Jews. By carefully portraying the Holocaust, they have monopolized world sympathy in their favor. Compare this to the much larger scale genocide of American Indians and Africans during the slave trade, which nobody hears about. So powerful is this persuasion via the media that it makes the world ignore the genocide of Palestinians by the once persecuted Jews.

3. "Odious" Loans:

Most of the loans given by the IMF-World Bank were 'odious' loans. They were given to regimes supported by the West that were in most cases non-democratic. The people in these countries were never asked if they wanted the extra debt. Hence, the default of these loans and the complete writing off of these loans is justifiable (Danaher 1994). Not only did the regimes to which these loans were given, removed from office for corruption in some cases, they sent huge amounts of the same loans back to the West in terms of personal accounts and business and managerial contracts (McNeill 1981:54).

Thus, the people of the "Third World" should collectively, following the example of Mexico, refuse to make any payments on the loans (principal and interest). On the contrary they should demand the "time adjusted compensation" from the West for the "rape" of "Third World" resources by the colonial powers and for the free use of labor, unfair compensation and capital drain from the "Third World" during the colonial era and after. Similarly African Americans should demand time-adjusted reparations for unpaid labor during slavery, labor that laid the foundations of the industrial machinery of the United States.

4. Investment Banks, Cartels and Counter Trade Embargoes:

Cartels to control the price of primary commodities should be set up, so that the West does not gain an unfair advantage by its economic "warfare" on the "Third World". The example of the 1970s where, if the "Third World" could collectively impose a defensive economic embargo against the West, should serve as a benchmark for the restoration of the balance of power in the world.

"Third World" poverty receives lesser attention in the West than a few cent rise in the domestic price of gas, as we regularly see in the U.S. Unless the ideology of racism is replaced by a completely different, more humane ideology, the "Third World" should pursue "de-linking" from the Western economy, engaging the West only where it is beneficial to the masses of the "Third World". This implies exiting all "broad based" coalitions that serve the interests of the West.

Regional investment banks in the "Third World" that cover certain blocks of countries should be established. The granting of loans to private "domestic" entrepreneurs based on the monitoring of their performance in the local economy should be envisioned. Import subsidizing industries should be developed with maximum investment and protection. Trade within the "Third World" block should be encouraged as against Western imports. When these "infant" industries grow up, trade can be liberalized on equal, non-predatory terms with the whole world.

Non-bureaucratized small business should be promoted and encouraged. At the root of human suffering in our epoch lie huge centralized corporations. Their manipulative and manipulating ideology and status in law as "persons" should be challenged as should their monopoly over the world's perception of "reality". A business environment where money is not the motivator will eventually develop given such changes, leading to need-based production and consumption for one human community on earth, where artificial national boundaries, designed by the elite to keep humanity divided, are shattered.

5. Investment in Education and Information Technology:

The "Third World" should make maximum investment in developing its media to control the media warfare by the West (controlled by a few elite-groups with vested interests). The West's export of the culture of racism, under the false pretense of "freedom"¹¹ should be intellectually challenged. Boards that deal specifically with media issues and the communications of ideas should counteract, and bring to public notice injustice done in the name of democracy and freedom.

The West developed in the major part due to information freely shared by Muslim merchants and the Islamic civilization. Science, Accounting, Mathematics and Algebra (including the number system), the philosophy of the Greeks, all came to the West through Islam (Alexander 1996:7 etc.). The colonials, by non transfer of industrial knowledge, and the West nowadays by non transfer of "equal" technology, plays a game of "technology warfare" backed by a philosophy that, "*an educated Negro (or "Third World") is a dangerous Negro (or "Third World")*" (W.E.B. Dubois 1903: 71). "Skill mismatch" is the outcome of planned alienation, backed by a racist ideology.

Knowledge is nobody's property. New information gets its foundation on older information. It is nobody's right to block one level when the earlier level was not "invented" by him or her. Thus all intellectual property rights are illegal in the most part. Loops around barriers to education can be found if properly searched. The "Third World" in this information age needs to locate these loopholes. "Persuasion resources" should be directed towards the intellectuals so that they can see the "right" and "wrong" in issues based on justice. Such members will be the lifeline of the majority world if it is to survive in an age where information and knowledge are used as weapons because of racist ideologies, based themselves on a "lack of knowledge".

Rather than being technicians of Western tyranny, the intellectuals should be persuaded to become pragmatic and join the global struggle against for justice and freedom. They should play an active role in politics and challenge the elite and its crackpot versions of reality on every forum. By not putting their knowledge to transformative use, and not challenging the widely communicated nonsense of the mass media, the intellectuals have been squandering their true wealth, acting like "*a donkey carrying books*" (Koran 63:5).

The Majority World needs to understand and know those who manufacture consistent policy for the elite in the West, policy that is then used to oppress the majority of those on earth. They also need to understand how the manufacturers of this policy have a deep belief in apartheid and are funded by corporations that want to ensure such a "superior-subordinate" setup for their maximum profitability:

"Considerable credit for the consistency of policies across the West is due to think tanks such as the Council on Foreign Relations, the Bilderberg Group and the Trilateral Commission. Members of these groups influenced critical moments in Western development, helping to create the League of Nations, British Commonwealth, United Nations, Treaty of Rome, NATO and the G7 summits. Funding for these groups was almost entirely from charitable bodies set up by corporations such as Carnegie (steel), Chase Manhattan Bank, Ford, Rockefeller (oil). In 1976 more than half of the world's 115 largest corporations and banks were represented on the Trilateral Commission. There is a remarkable historical link between these groups and (white) South Africa. Cecil Rhodes, flush with money from South Africa's gold and diamond mines, founded a secret society in 1881, which became the original Round Table Group in 1909."

(Alexander 1996:206)

6. Population-Resource Ratio:

Most countries, especially the poorest in Asia and Africa have a very unfavorable population to resource ratio. The population boom, as understood by sociologists, is not

¹¹ "And among humankind are those whose speech about the world and its life dazzles you...yet when they act, their aim is to spread destruction through the earth and destroy its ecology and livestock..." (Koran 2:204-205)

based on “free-will” choices but on a host of deterministic factors. These factors, like the lack of education or adequate diet are the direct legacy of colonization in the case of the “Third World” and slavery, and institutionalized oppression in the case of the African American underclass. If the other problems are taken care of, population levels will overtime, automatically adjust as reflected by the *Demographic Transition Theory*.

Hopefully in the long run, we can all succeed together by altering the structures within which our lives are enacted, and in the “perfect-world” humanity can grow as one. If not, then history has shown that empires like the West, built and sustained upon human suffering, eventually crumble from within.

“ Systems have passed away before you. Travel in the earth and see the nature of the consequence for the tyrants.” (Koran 27:69)

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Long-term Camp Life and Changing Identities of Sri Lankan Women Refugees in India*

Abhijit Dasgupta**

The study of identities of the marginal groups like the refugees has not received the kind of attention that it deserves. Right from the time of displacement to the phase of rehabilitation/incorporation refugees are forced to reject their old identities and accept the new ones. During the time of exile their identities remain in a flux. A refugee camp could be an ideal site for the study of changing identities, especially when the camp life becomes a long-drawn one.¹ This paper examines the trajectories of identity formation in refugee camps in the southern Indian state of Tamil Nadu where some 65,000 refugees have been living for more than a decade in about 111 refugee camps. This paper examines how the memories of displacement, martyrdom, and the state policies played a major role in shaping new identities of the refugee women. The past, the memories of war, the life of an ideal Tamil woman in Sri Lanka's North and the Northeast all contribute to the formation of new identities. Besides, the segregated camp life, restrictions on movements, lack of job opportunities, the exclusionary policies of the state too need to be explored in the study of women's identity in camps.

At the outset let me point out that instead of using the broader markers of identity like ethnicity, gender, occupation, language, caste and so on I am considering the new markers that gained prominence among the women during camp life. In a camp setting, women who carry on their day to day life with courage and dignity are referred to as 'the ideal women', women who sacrificed their near and dear ones in the war are called 'the mothers and sisters from the family of the martyrs', and women who try their luck elsewhere and migrate to the Middle East for jobs are known as 'the deserters', and those surrendered their chastity as 'fallen women'. so on. These are some of the new identities of the Tamil women living in refugee camps. With the help of case studies, I would like to show how some of these identities are constructed over time and what these constructions would mean to the women in camps.

Many sociological studies have shown that the state plays an important role in constructing identities. E. Valentine Daniel, for example, describes the role of the state in the following way:

“...faced with the threat of Tamil separatist movement, the state....does like to highlight the differences among Tamils. In this mode, it differentiates Tamils of the Jaffna Peninsula from those who live along the east coast, from those who live along the northwest coast, from those who work on the tea estates in the Island's south-central hills, and so on. On the other hand, the state, at various time to various degrees, fuels the more

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general Sinhala sentiment that holds all Tamils (including the Tamils of South India) to constitute the monolithic other against whom the Sinhala people, along with the Sinhala state, can define its identity. The blueprint of this construction is to be found in linguistic nationalism" (1997:17).²

This is how the Sri Lankan state sharpened the existing divide between the Tamils of the Jaffna Peninsula, the estate Tamils, and the Muslim Tamils. As opposed to this when almost all the Tamil militant groups emphasized the participation of women in the national liberation struggle, the new identity of women as warriors gained currency. The Liberation Tigers of the Tamil Eelam's (LTTE) call to women to take part in the war clearly led to the shift in the construction of women from 'brave mother' to that of 'women warrior' or 'woman guerilla'. The Sri Lankan Tamils in India were seen as inheritors and part and parcel of a great Tamil culture and tradition, who became 'victims' of a bloody ethnic war, and now 'living in exile'. From time to time, Tamils in India were reminded by the politicians and the intellectuals of the great ethnic bond between the Tamils in the Island and the Indian Tamils. However, the state went out to prove that this earlier construction was more 'fictive' than 'real' since the Sri Lankan displaced Tamils were involved in killings of political leaders including the former Prime Ministers of India, Tamils from the Island were branded as 'subversive elements', 'potential terrorists'.

I. Background

Nearly 64,000 Sri Lankan refugees are now residing in 111 camps in Tamil Nadu. These camps are located in 23 out of 29 districts in the state (Table 1.1 and Map 1). Some are large camps accommodating more than 1000 families. In the following six districts the number of families in camps exceeded 1000: Tiruvalur, Vellore, Tiruvannambalai, Erode, Madurai, and Shivaganga. Each of these districts accommodated 3,500 or more persons. After 1983 exodus of the Sri Lankan refugees, the then chief minister of Tamil Nadu, M.G. Ramachandran drew up a plan to send refugees to as many districts as possible so that they are not confined in a few places. Accordingly, the district collectors were informed to allot land for their rehabilitation. This kind of dispersal gave them more space and job opportunities especially to those who managed to get shelter near the district headquarters or a small town. However, one of the drawbacks of the plan was meeting relatives and friends living in far off places. Many camps were located far away from the city or in unhygienic and congested cyclone shelters.

Table 1
CAMP POPULATION OF SRILANKAN REFUGEES
IN TAMIL NADU, 2002

S.No.	District	No. of Camps	No. of Families	Total No. of Persons
1.	Kancheepuram	1	88	98
2.	Tiruvallur	2	1031	4148
3.	Vellore	8	1109	4210
4.	Tiruvannamalai	13	1095	4158
5.	Tuticurin	4	397	1534
6.	Villupuram	2	372	1482
7.	Dharmapuri	10	988	3810
8.	Salem	8	813	3181
9.	Namakkal	2	424	1540
10.	Coimbatore	9	990	3788
11.	Erode	4	1254	4835
12.	Trichy	2	804	3017
13.	Karur	2	552	2128
14.	Perambalur	1	70	287
15.	Pudukottai	3	840	2997
16.	Dindigul	7	831	3160
17.	Madurai	4	1382	5177
18.	Sivaganga	7	1035	3339
19.	Virunagar	6	902	3341
20.	Ramanathapuram	1	523	1578
21.	Tirunelveli	8	753	2778
22.	Triptnukudi	3	373	1553
23.	Kanniyakumari	4	330	4308
GRAND TOTAL		111	16955	63941

Source: Report of the Government of Tamil Nadu, 2002.

Large-scale exodus of Tamil refugees took place on three occasions. The first influx began in 1983 and continued till 1987. During this time about 1,40,000 refugees arrived in Tamil Nadu to escape ethnic violence in Sri Lanka.⁴ Out of these refugees, 43,000 were repatriated between 1987 and 1989, after the signing of a peace accord between India and Sri Lanka.⁵ The second exodus took place in 1989 when the Indian Peace Keeping Force (IPKF) withdrew from Sri Lankan war-torn areas, most of these refugees were repatriated in 1991-92, after the assassination of Rajiv Gandhi. The third and the final influx began in April 1995 and it coincided with the declaration of Eelam War III, the battle between the Sri Lankan army and the Liberation Tigers for Tamil Eelam (LTTE). The influx can be divided into three phases (Table 1.2). The story

of Sri Lankan Tamil refugees rotates around three large-scale displacements, rehabilitation, and repatriations on two occasions.

Table 1.2
Influx of Tamil Refugees

	Phase	Period	No. of Refugees
First	1983-1989		1,34,053
Second	1989-1991		1,22,078
Third	1996-2001		21,940

Source: Annual Report, Ministry of Home Affairs, Government of India, 2002, p.127.

II. Three Categories

Sri Lankan refugees in Tamil Nadu can be divided into three broad categories. First, 'the camp refugees' or those who took shelter in camps, mostly located in the rural areas. They were sent from the Mandapam transit camp to different locations. The 'non-camp refugees' are those who are living in rented house with relatives and friends without any assistance from the government. Nearly fifty thousand refugees lived outside camps, most of them are staying in big cities⁶. The third group consisted of those who supposedly posed security threats since they were involved in subversive activities in Sri Lanka. They were sent to 'special camps' where they had to live under constant surveillance. These special camps came into existence in 1991. This paper deals with the first category of refugees only.

Following Kunz (1981) Sri Lankan Tamil refugees can also be classified in terms of degree of alienation⁷. There are refugees who believe that their opposition and antagonism to events at home uprooted them. They are paying the price for the principle they cherished. These refugees retain a strong bond with their homeland and they will be the first to come forward in the case of repatriation once the cause of their exile is removed. They are the heroes among the displaced. There are refugees who leaving their homeland for a long time feel alienated from the people back home. Long periods of asylum had caused such alienation. They are less likely to have a strong desire to return if they see no change in social and political conditions that alienated them. There are also 'self-alienated' refugees who exiled themselves rather than society alienating them. They are less likely to return. The degree of alienation from the community or from one's self is particularly relevant for the study of camp refugees. We shall return to this point later.

III. Identities: old and new

Let me begin by stating that identities take forms, erode, reconfigure over time and this is all the more so in the case of refugees. Marker of identities that are not important any more may lose relevance. The village in South Asia remained a reference point of identity for centuries⁸. The village, following Daniel, may be described as a 'place'. One is linked to a place by a sense of identity with and belonging to that has roots. This may be contrasted with 'space', which is an "epistemic unit", it provides with a way of seeing the world. The space has a deeper and larger connotation, more stable than place⁹. The sense of belonging to a village gradually disappears among the people experiencing liminality, and it becomes a fluid marker of identity. When thousands of villagers are displaced from the place that they shared for many generations, they look out for other appropriate markers of identity. Sometimes, one's district becomes an important marker that remains with them throughout their journey as displaced and during their stay in refugee camps.

Another marker of identity, namely 'caste' too loses its meaning with the displacement.¹⁰ Circumstances make it difficult for displaced persons to hang on to this traditional marker of identity. In congested boats that bring them to India and camps, following of caste rules and practices becomes extremely difficult. Thus in marriages or in other forms of social interactions caste ceases to carry any weight. In some extreme cases, linguistic and community identities undergo changes too. This happens when lives in exile turn out to be a long one. The displaced people get assimilated with the local social milieu, speak in the language of the hosts and adopt culture of the local communities. Many examples of this kind of assimilation can be cited from recent South Asian history. For example, Afghans migrated to many parts of northern India several years ago, today old markers of their identity can hardly be found among the Afghans. Several Chinese and Burmese had migrated to India since the early fifties. For them too the traditional markers of identity carry little meaning. However, recent studies on diasporas have shown that there remains a space between the rejection of the old markers and the acceptance of the new. This space gives uniqueness to the community. The core elements of identities that stay on and give uniqueness to diasporas is now a popular subject for sociological research.¹¹

IV. The 'Ideal Women' in Camps

As mentioned earlier, the construction of identities of refugee women has been studied here in the context of harsh camp life, which to a large extent is a result of the exclusionary policies of the state. The new identities of women that are associated with hard life in refugee camps are labeled by the camp refugees as 'the ideal women', 'the deserters', 'the women from the home of the martyrs', and so on. Let me examine the case of the ideal women first. These are the women exemplifying an ideal and often taken as a model for imitation by the rest as they are role models for many in an extraordinary

situation. The ideal that they exemplify is simply keeping high morale in the midst of adversaries. The loss of husbands and elderly male members in the war forced these women to act as the heads of their households. Some of them do all the household chores, look after the children and also go out to earn extra money. Some of these women are married but most of the time lives alone because their husbands go to far off places in search of work and show up only at the time of distribution of doles. Here are some case histories of women, widows who are considered as 'ideal'.

Let me now cite some examples.¹² Laxmi lives with five children in a camp located in the southern Tamil Nadu. I entered Laxmi's house to find her in the kitchen what is a luxurious 4 feet by 4 feet space, an extension of the small room in which they live. Her three daughters, all looking alike, and one in the cradle were all there. Laxmi told me that her only son was out playing. Although Laxmi lives with her husband, she is literally a single mother since her husband goes out to work and comes back only after a week or a fortnight. He needs to be here at the time of disbursements of loans. He earns Rs.60.00 a day and brings it all home, with five mouths to feed. She often borrows money from the moneylender at Rs.10 interest for 15 days for a principal of Rs.100. With debts and hardships life hardly moves for Laxmi. Her neighbour says, "she looks after the children as best as she could.....the children come first when it comes to the question of feeding the hungry." Although she comes from a well off family in Sri Lanka, Laxmi has dealt with the hard life in camps in an exemplary manner.

Like Laxmi, another ideal woman is Jaya. In 1992, Jaya and her family had to leave their home at Mud road, in Mannar District, after her husband was killed in crossfire. A month later, helped by her neighbours she reached Manar. Time was difficult for her as uncertainty clouded her mind for not having a single pie at hand and having to protect three children. She shielded them through the forests: She recollects with gratitude the favour she received from her neighbours who helped her with the bus fare, food and also provided necessary protection: They even paid the boat fee for the family. She spent nearly ten years in camp and weathered crisis after crisis with determination. Rajalakshimi, the eldest daughter, was married when she was 16. She was once again diagnosed with a cyst and was recommended an operation. A camp refugee points out, "she refused to get operated fearing the expenses since she has two other children to look after." She is unable to lift heavy loads now, walk or even perform the daily chores. The illness has deprived her of daily wage job. However, her son works very hard to educate the two kids and feed her. In the eyes of the camp resident, Jaya showed courage, brought up children with her sweat and blood, an out and out an ideal mother.

Nageshwari is another ideal woman in the camp. She and her family lived in Omandhai in Vavunia district. For war and continuous bombing they decided to flee. They walked a distance of 45 kilometers for five days to reach Madu and for twenty-five days to go to Gramam. On reaching Rameshwaram, the family of six had to look after an ailing child aged 2. The officials saw the child and paid immediate attention and sent the family along with the child to Palayamkottai hospital where he died. She suffers from chronic asthma and is unable to perform her home duties Her eldest daughter has epileptic attacks, the third daughter developed

tuberculosis and the husband was wounded by thorn which grew septic, he was unable to move his fingers or grip anything with his hand. He goes to work only when he is well. The family had a debt of Rs.48, 000. After meticulous effort she managed to reduce the debt to Rs.18, 000. Despite frequent illness Nageshwari wants to go out and work to save the sinking family.

These are the women of courage, struggling hard to make both ends meet against all odds. A camp resident says, “...against all odds she stood like a rock, did all that was necessary to look after other members of the family....” Another person remarks, “she personifies high moral and ethical standard for other women in the camp.” Indeed, these are exceptional women carrying out struggle with dignity. For camp residents, they know how to strike a balance between adversaries and moral life. Laxmi lives alone, carrying all the burden on her shoulder, Jaya suffers from ill health, and Nageswari too is unwell and sinking in debts. Valorization of ideal living does not take note of the suffering in silence. The ideal womanhood finds expression in a culture of silence, poverty, and hardships. They make an ideal ground for this culture to thrive on.¹³

V. Women of the Martyr's Family

The war in Sri Lanka restructured social relations, redefined the role of women in a war-ravaged society. Many women sacrificed their husbands, sons, daughters, and relatives for the cause of 'Tamil Eelam'. These women occupy special position among the Tamils in refugee camps, they are treated with honour and dignity. These are 'the women from the family of martyrs'

In the mid-eighties, almost all the Tamil political outfits carried out campaign to recruit as many women as possible into their organizations. They were not only needed in the battle fields but also to nurse wounded soldiers, to carry out campaign for the cause. The political pamphlets valorized Tamil women and their sacrifice.¹⁵ The appearance of a Tamil women in the print media wearing military outfits and with a gun in the hand presented a new image of women. Women who sacrificed their lives as suicide bombers became martyrs, the role model for other young women. Peteel noted how terms like 'thuuwar' (revolutionaries), 'fedayeen (guerillas), 'munadaleen' (strugglers) became signifiers of a reconfigured self and community in the case of Palestinian women.¹⁴ One can see parallels here.

A few cases may be cited. Mary Jesentha lived with her husband in Akaturchi, northern Sri Lanka. The IPKF men were around these areas and they harassed the men living close to the IPKF camps.¹⁵ ***One day, the IPKF caught Mary's husband and charged him for supporting the LTTE. They beat him up and kept him in detention for a few days. Ever since he was beaten up, he developed chest pain and finally expired. At that time Mary was pregnant. Her in-laws took her and cared for her and the baby. Eventually she***

was asked to leave. Today she works in an iron factory to bring up her children. But she is from a martyr's family. The camp refugees know that her husband died for a cause.

Manjula is from Vavunia district. Due to army occupancy and heavy shelling they were forced to leave the place. Manjula's husband was taken by the army for his links with the LTTE and was beaten up severely. When he came back he fell sick and was not in a position to work. They traveled from Vavunia on foot for three days and nights without food amidst heavy shelling and aerial bombing. They rested in temples and churches, on the way. In April 1990 they reached India. They were transferred from Mandapam transit camp to Thapathi. On reaching India her husband fell ill, he died shortly after arrival. The children were educated in the neighbouring school. Manjula is sick with a series of intestinal problems. She says that the doctor instructed her not to work. Burden of poverty forces her to work hard every day. Back home she cooks and takes care of her children. She looks grimly at the future and says that "I am worried." Manjula occupies a special place among the camp women. Camp refugees know that Manjula's husband sacrificed his life, thus she is a member of the martyr's family.

All such women of martyr's family enjoy prestige, honour and dignity within the camp. A woman whose husband had been killed in action, who lost sons, daughters or relatives for Eelam is always regarded as a 'woman who has made sacrifice for a noble cause'. This is not unique only in camps, even in Sri Lanka, in the areas under the control of the LTTE, such women are treated with honour and deference. A family that sent a male or female member to the battle field is regarded as 'a freedom fighter's family' and the family that sacrificed a member in the war is 'a martyr's family'.¹⁶

The 'ideal women' and 'women from the martyr's family' are to set high moral and ethical standards against all odds. As stated, these high expectations are difficult to fulfill in refugee camps. These women are expected to handle crisis at any cost for the sake of ideal ethical and moral life since they are the cut above the rest. As one refugee puts it "...come what may, these are women with brave hearts, they are not going to tilt..." This often puts an added burden on the shoulder of these women as they work hard to meet expectations from their new roles. Most of them pay the price, physically and mentally and they suffer in silence

VI. The Deserters

Economic hardship has forced many refugee women to take up jobs in the Middle East in a clandestine manner, often by obtaining false passport and by forging one's name. Since the journey is undertaken secretly, it is difficult to get an exact figure of women who had been to the Middle East and now living in the camp and those who have not returned yet. These women who leave camp to take up jobs elsewhere are called

'kaividugiravau' or the deserters. Several steps need to be taken before a prospective refugee woman leaves India. First, she needs to establish contact with the local agent who acts as a conduit between the main agent in Colombo and his client in Tamil Nadu. These agents are refugees who are in the age group between 25 and 40. Second, financial matters have to be settled, and once the deal is struck the agent takes step to obtain 'clearance' or exit permit with the help of the local 'Q' branch official, and the Revenue Inspector. Third, once the clearance is obtained, the agent applies for an emergency passport to take his client to Colombo. He purchases the air ticket and establishes contact with the main agent for necessary action there. Once this is over, the woman begins her journey from Chennai to Colombo and from there to Riyadh in Saudi Arabia or to Kuwait or to other countries in the Middle East. At the place of arrival a contact person takes the woman to her employer or the employer himself turns up at the airport to pick up the maid himself.¹⁷

In financial terms, these jobs are lucrative since each maid earns minimum Rs.4000 a month. But for money they have to forego several things like their religious identity, since the employers take only Muslim women as housemaids. The women take fictitious names, surrender their rights to live in the camps as refugees, forego doles and any other assistance from the state. Anandakrishna, an agent residing in one of the refugee camps, provided the details in the following way:

A prospective immigrant to Saudi Arabia will have to obtain an emergency passport from the Sri Lankan High Commission at a price of Rs. 310. For an emergency passport, one has to pay an additional amount of Rs. 1000 to the broker. Most women prefer an early delivery of their passports and thus end up paying Rs.1310 in all. One of the major expenses is the amount payable to the Sri Lankan agency at Colombo that arranges the deal. His commission is Rs.4,500 initially. The air ticket from Chennai to Colombo and from Colombo to Riyadh would cost Rs.13,500, in addition one has to pay a visa fee of Rs.100 in Colombo.

In Riyadh, each maid receives a monthly salary of Rs.6000 per month, from which the agent in Colombo deducts Rs.2000 each month. The job pays off only in the long run."

Anandakrishna finds out suitable women from camps. For each deal his commission is only Rs.2000. However, as a middleman Anandakrishna becomes a party to fraud and deception since Hindu women migrating to Saudi Arabia take fictitious names in their passports. A few cases may be cited here.

In 1996, Asai and her husband traveled from Mannar by cycle to Madu and then by boat to Rameswaram transit camp. After spending a few months in a camp, she decided to work in Saudi Arabia for two years as a domestic maid. For this, she had taken a loan from a family friend who collaborated with an agency in Sri Lanka to set up the job and issue a passport. For this placement, the Saudi family that took Asai paid 400 riyals to the Sri Lankan Agency. In addition, it was agreed that 200 riyals from Asai's salary of 600 riyals would be deducted by the agency every month. She then returned to camp in 1998 on a six-month tourist visa after the termination of her two-year contract. In the same year she again went to Jeddah for three years and finally returned to Sri Lanka and then to India in September 2001 on a six-month tourist visa. Though

her visa has expired, she continues to live in the camp illegally without registration. She pointed out, "earlier in 1998, a few women who had returned along with me were in jail for four days for staying in camp exceeding visa time limit. But I have spoken to the 'Q' branch officials about my status and they guaranteed that I won't have any problems in future". She remarked, "though I have spent almost five years abroad, my husband was not wise enough to save any money.

One of the camp refugees remarked, "why doesn't she stay back like other women? How can she leave husband and children behind for such a long time?"

In 1997, Jayalakshmi went to Riyadh for a maid's job for two years, in order to earn money and educate her children. Upon her return in 1999, the collector of Vellore sent a letter to Jayalakshmi stating that she was not entitled to stay in India and she has to go back because her visa was not valid anymore. She did not take that letter seriously and one day police came to her house and arrested her and similar other women who went to Saudi for work. They were taken to police station and were asked to stay there for seven days.

Jayalakshmi with the help of a lawyer came out of the police station. The lawyer charged her in all Rs.1000 for her release. When she was working in Saudi, she was earning Rs.4000 and what all she earned for her children's education, was spent in renewing her stay in the camp, paying bribe and paying fees to the lawyer.

The journey to the Middle East has led to more hardship and complications. One immediate consequence of taking up jobs abroad is that a refugee loses his right to live in India and right to receive dole. When they return with the tourist visa, they are allowed to live in the country as long as the visa is valid, normally for a period of six months. Once the visa expires, they encounter trouble from the authorities. They end up paying large sums of money as bribe for staying in the camp. The hard earned money goes for the payment of bribe. Jayalakshmi points out, ".....once you are back you feel like a stranger.....the camp members do not come forward to help you....and the sharks are all around.."

Finally, in camps some are considered as 'fallen women', those who have surrendered their chastity. The women belonging to this category are those who had to take prostitution for living. Some of these women have their clients within the camp, some go out to cities for better prospect. These are the women who differ from a community's dominant ideologies, and they are condemned for moral weakness. Even in most liminal situation, control over sexuality by women is considered as non-negotiable.

Liminal position of refugee women in camps provides an ideal opportunity for the study of identities. New identities take shape and become important markers in everyday life. The identity formation is always in flux, changing constantly depending on the changing social situation. It is also a process of negotiation, always eliminating or accepting, and in some cases compromising. In the case of Tamil women refugees the old markers that got eliminated were caste, village, kinship, region and so on and the markers that got acceptance were ideal womanhood, martyrdom, desertion, sexual immorality and the like. In a perceptive essay on the Moors in Sri Lanka Q. Ismail noted "identities cannot be taken for granted; that they are fluid, transient, always in flux, never permanent; and that they alter (discursively) precisely because they are constructs.

If they were “real”, stable and eternal, they couldn’t change.”¹⁷ This indeed is the case with the Tamil women, the new markers of identity now play a significant role among the women in the refugee camps. These markers are byproduct of the exclusionary policies of the state, and of the war and martyrdom. However, the stories of configuration and reconfiguration of identities of refugee women would tell us very little unless we take note of the issues of silencing the women and the suffering in silence, the former is linked with the latter in a complex way.

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2. *E. Valentine Daniel (1995), Chapters in an Anthropology of Violence: Sri Lankans, Sinhala and Tamils, Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1995.*
3. *‘Q’ Branch is a special branch of the police in the Tamil Nadu state that was initially assigned the function to curb the activities of the communists. Later on they were asked to look after the refugee-related matters.*
4. *The influx of refugees coincided with the Eelam Wars. Eelam War I began after the spread of 1983 riots against the Tamils. The Eelam war II started in 1990. In April 1995, the LTTE broke off talks with the Sri Lankan government and declared the Eelam War III.*
5. *Two Reports that dealt with the repatriation issues are prepared by the U.S. Committee for Refugees (1991) Sri Lanka: Island of Refugees, Issue Paper: Washington D.C. & (1994) The Bitter Harvest, Issue paper, Washington.*
6. *According to a Rehabilitation Department official, this may be an underestimation. The figure includes only those who have registered their names with the local police stations, there may be more staying without registration.*
7. *E.F. Kunz, ‘Exile and Resettlement: Refugee Theory’, International Migration Review, vol. 15, 1981, pp.42-51.*

8. *Anthropologists referred to the significant role of village solidarity time and again. See M.N. Srinivas, The Social System of Mysore Village, in M. Mariott (ed.) (1955), Village India, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, p.32; F.G. Bailey (1959), Politics and Social Change: Orissa in 1959, Berkeley, University of California Press, p.129.*
9. *E. Valentine Daniel, op. cite. p.17.*
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12. *These women were interviewed as a part of a project work for the UNHCR, New Delhi. All the names appear here are pseudonyms.*
13. *The behaviour is characterized by docility since they do not openly speak out. Their obedience is too demonstrative so that suspicions and criticisms do not arise. In literary theory the phenomenon of silencing is well known. Cheryl A. Wall (ed.) (1989), Changing Our Own Words: Essays on Criticism, Theory and Writing by Black Women, New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, pp. 10-15.*
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The Socio-spatial Differentials of Political Behavior of the Urban Poor in Bangladesh

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Abstract: Gottdiener and Feagain proposed the socio-spatial approach as an integrated method for explaining the role of both settlement space and compositional/social characteristics in human behavior. This paper explores the relationships between socio-spatial characteristics and political behavior of the urban poor. Data were collected from three lower income neighborhoods in Dhaka City, Bangladesh, through a structured questionnaire. The study reveals that the participation of the urban poor into electoral and action politics and their interaction with elected urban bodies are largely determined by their neighborhood and housing and compositional factors. However, the paper argues that settlement space and social/compositional characteristics play significant role in political behavior of the urban poor.

Introduction:

The exploring politics of the urban poor is of paramount significance for social policy but the dearth of quantitative or in-depth analysis speaks of the difficulty in conducting research on the political behavior of the impoverished citizens (Lawless and Fox, 2001). While political participation of the urban poor is essential for fair representation within the political system, most of the existing literature indicates that those living in poverty lack the necessary material and social resources that motivate participation (Cohen and Dawson, 1993; Verba et al, 1995; Hossain, 2003). Despite providing the broad and compelling explanations of the lower level of political integration of the urban poor these literatures often do explain variations in the pattern of the political behavior of the urban poor. The paper attempts to explain socio-spatial differentials in the political behavior of the urban poor in Bangladesh. Data were collected from the urban poor living in three different neighborhoods in Dhaka City, Bangladesh, through using a structured questionnaire constructed on socio-spatial characteristics and political behavior especially their voting behavior, attending action politics, organizational behavior, and interaction with urban government. However, the paper argues that both settlement space especially neighborhood and housing and social/compositional characteristics like neighborhood, housing, age, sex, education, employment, income, as well as city exposure largely determine the political behavior of the urban poor in Bangladesh.

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Explaining Socio-Spatial Perspective (SSP):

Socio-Spatial Perspective (SSP) developed by the writings of both Weberian and Marxian sociologists, has tried to explain human behavior from an integrated point of view. It attempts to take what is best from the new ideas while avoiding the endemic reductionism characteristics of both traditional ecology and recent Marxian political economy. It does not seek explanation by emphasizing a principal cause such as transportation technology, capital circulation, or production process. Rather, it takes an integrated view of growth as the linked outcome of economic, political and cultural factors. Lefebvre (1991) is without question the seminal source of new thinking on the city from a critical and Marxian perspective. Inspired by the work of Lefebvre, Feagin (1983, 1987) and Gottdiener (1985, 1987) use the socio-spatial approach to explain city life. The approach tried to solve the continuing debate on the role of social/compositional factors and spatial factors in human behavior. The socio-spatial approach considered the view as limited, which regarded the space of habitation as a container of social activities. Space not only contains actions but also acts as a part of social relations and is intimately involved in daily lives. It affects the way people feel about what to do. In turn, people alter space and construct new environments to fit their needs better. Hence there is a dual relationship between people and space. On the one hand, human beings act according to social factors such as gender, class, race, age, and status within and in reaction to a given space. On the other hand, people also create spaces for themselves that express their needs and desires (Gottdiener, 1994). The perspective links the dual relationship between people and space with the social factors that are the bases of individual behavior. The most basic concept of this approach is that of the settlement space, which refers to the built environment in which people live. Settlement space is both constructed and organized. People build it following some meaningful plans for the containing economic, political and cultural activities. People organize their daily actions according to the meaningful aspects of constructed space. The perspective, however, captures the interaction between space and society. Some of the factors that affect behavior are traditional concepts of sociology, such as gender, class, social status, age, and race. To these it adds the elements of space itself (Gottdiener, 1994).

Data & Method:

The study was conducted in three lower income neighborhoods in Dhaka City, Bangladesh from October 2002 to July 2003. These neighborhoods are *Adabor* under City Ward-43, *Gandaria* under City Ward -81 and *Kalsi* under City Ward-2. These neighborhoods represent various forms of urban adaptations of the poor migrants in the city. *Adabor* developed as the low costing housing area where the poor rent houses mostly form the land leasers by paying a small amount of money. *Gandaria* is mostly dominated by the poor settlements developed as squatters and *Kalsi* developed as the resettlement camp for the destitute population by the urban government. Five hundred respondents were selected for interview from the three neighborhoods proportionately. They were selected randomly from different strata based on age, sex, education, employment, income, and urban residence pattern. Data were collected through a structured questionnaire constructed on the socio-spatial characteristics and political behavior especially voting behavior, participation in action politics, organizational behavior, as well as interaction with the urban bodies. Both descriptive (percentage) and inferential (co-efficient of correlations) statistics are used for data analysis. The study reveals that the urban poor are politically active and they are desperate to integrate with the larger urban political systems. But their level of involvement in urban politics is largely determined by their socio-spatial characteristics.

Findings:***Neighborhood Differentials***

The urban poor are living in three different neighborhoods i.e, *Adabor* (39%), *Gandaria* (25%) and *Kalsi* (36%). The neighborhood has a definite impact on the political behavior of the urban poor. Eighty percent of the poor in *Kalsi* are voters in the city; whereas less than fifty percent of the poor living in *Adabor* are city voters. The percentage is relatively higher (65.6%) among the poor living in *Gandaria*. Most of the poor of *Adabor* (58.5%) are the voters in their ancestral village where they cast votes in union level elections. But 37.6 % of *Gandaria* and 30.6% of *Kalsi* are the voters in their ancestral villages. Casting votes in parliamentary election and city corporation election is also higher among the poor living in *Kalsi* than those living in the other neighborhoods. More than 72% of the poor living in *Kalsi* cast their votes in the recent elections. Party support and participation in political activities is higher among the poor

living in *Gandaria*. The poor of *Gandaia* (40.0%) and *Kalsi* (47.8%) were politically more aware and registered as city voters by themselves. The poor living in *Kalsi* are comparatively more affiliated with organizations (33.9%) and bargained more with urban elected bodies. Most of the poor of *Adabor* (69.7%) are directly affected by the recent urban policies but only 15.4 % of them protested these policies. However, the neighborhood is significantly correlated with being voters in the city ($r = -.274$ at 0.01), being voter in the ancestral villages ($r = .245$ at 0.01), voting in parliamentary election ($r = -.261$ at 0.01), voting in city corporation election ($r = -.294$ at 0.01), supporting political parties ($r = -.155$ at 0.01), voter registration by self ($r = -.175$ at 0.01), bargaining with the urban elected bodies ($r = -.169$ at 0.01) and being affected by urban policies ($r = .123$ at 0.01).

Housing Differentials

The urban poor are mostly living in *jupri* (47.4%), temporarily made of bamboo and straw, and tin-shed housing (34.6%). Only 18 % of them are living in the *semi-pucca/pucca* housing having a permanent wall of cement. About 72% of the urban poor who are living in *jupri* are city voters whereas the percentages are 53.1% and 67.7 % for the poor living in tin-shed and *semi-pucca/pucca* housing respectively. The poor living in tin-shed housing is mostly (56.1 %) voters in their ancestral villages. Among the poor living in *jupri* the percentage casting votes in both parliamentary (65.4%) and city corporation (62.0%) elections is higher than the poor living in the other types of housing. Party support (71.7%) and participation in political activities (31.6 %) is also higher among the poor living in *jupri*. But the poor living in *semi-pucca/pucca* are politically more aware. About 47% of them registered as city voters by themselves and more than 73 % of them cast votes by their choice. The poor living in tin-shed and *semi-pucca/pucca* housing are more affiliated with organizations than the poor living in *jupri*. Only 15.6% of the urban poor living in tin-shed housing have ever bargained with the urban elected bodies, whereas 27.4% of the poor living in *jupri* bargained with these bodies. The poor living in *semi-pucca/pucca* housing (44.4%) is less affected by the recent urban policies. Although most of the poor (64.2%) living in tin-shed housing are affected by the recent urban policies, only about 16 % of them protested the policies. Housing type of the poor is significantly correlated with their being voter in

their ancestral villages ($r = -.131$ at 0.01), voting in parliamentary election ($r = .090$ at 0.05), voting in city corporation election ($r = .093$ at 0.05), participating political activities ($r = .105$ at 0.05), voting by own choice ($r = -.089$ at 0.05), bargaining with the urban elected bodies ($r = .094$ at 0.05) and being affected by urban policies ($r = .097$ at 0.05).

Age Differentials

The urban poor are mostly (80%) within the age of 45 years. Among them 39% are younger populations, who are not more than 30 years of age. Another 41% are middle-aged population from 31 years to 45 years of age. Only 20% of the urban poor are aged who are 46 or more years of age. Less than fifty percent of the younger poor are voters in the city whereas 83% percent of the aged poor are voters in the city. Most of the younger (44.1%) and middle-aged (47.3%) poor are voters in their ancestral villages. The percentage casting votes in both parliamentary election and city corporation election is higher among the aged poor than the poor of other age groups. Although party support is higher among the middle-aged poor, participation in political activities is slightly higher among the aged poor. Only about 29 % of younger poor were politically aware and registered as city voters by themselves, whereas 42 % of middle-aged poor and 49% of aged poor registered by themselves. About 35% of the middle-aged poor and 31.0% of the aged poor are affiliated with organizations. The aged poor have more contact with the urban elected bodies. The middle-aged poor are mostly affected by the urban policies. That's why this group of poor protested the policies more than the other groups of poor. Age is significantly correlated with being voters in the city ($r = -.283$ at 0.01), voting in parliamentary election ($r = -.300$ at 0.01), voting in city corporation election ($r = -.249$ at 0.01), voter registration by self ($r = -.162$ at 0.01), affiliation with organizations ($r = -.112$ at 0.05) and bargaining with the elected bodies ($r = -.116$ at 0.01)

Gender Differentials

The number of male respondent (72.6%) is significantly higher among the urban poor. Though the number of city voters is slightly higher among the poor men, the number of village voters is quite higher among them. The percentages for male and female village

voters are 46.8% and 33.6% respectively. Casting votes in parliamentary election and city corporation election are also higher among the poor men. Only 13.8% of poor women participate in different political activities whereas 32.5 % of poor men participate in these activities. As men were more aware about their political rights, most of them (39.1%) registered as city voters by themselves. As women are more dependent on their male guardians (fathers or husbands), they have less freedom in casting votes. More than 29% of poor women are affiliated with different organizations. Only about 16% of them have ever bargained with the urban elected bodies whereas more than 24% poor men bargained with these bodies. Only about 5 % women protested these policies whereas 17.4% men protested these policies. Gender is significantly correlated with being voters in ancestral villages ($r = .119$ at 0.05), participation in political activities ($r = .186$ at 0.01), voting by own choice ($r = .145$ at 0.01), bargaining with the elected bodies ($r = .088$ at 0.05) and protesting urban policies ($r = .168$ at 0.01).

Education Differentials

More than 60% of the urban poor have never enrolled in schools in their lifetime. And the rest of them have at least primary level of schooling. The literacy status also affects political participation of the urban poor. The number of both city voters and village voters is higher among the poor having schooling. About 59% of the poor having schooling cast their votes in parliamentary election whereas 48.5% of the poor having no schooling cast their votes in the election. The percentage of casting votes in the city corporation election is also higher among the poor having schooling. Though party support and participation in political activities is higher among the poor having no schooling; the poor having schooling are politically more aware. More than 43% of the poor having schooling registered as city voter by themselves whereas 35% of the poor having no schooling registered by themselves. The poor having schooling are more affiliated with organizations but they are less involved in bargaining with the urban elected bodies. More than 63% of the poor having no schooling are affected by the recent urban policies. As they are more affected by these policies their participation in protesting the policies is much higher. However, schooling is significantly correlated with their affiliation with organizations ($r = .113$ at 0.05), being affected by the urban policies ($r = .105$ at 0.05) and protesting the policies ($r = -.093$ at 0.05).

Employment Differentials

Most of the urban poor (63.6%) work as wage laborer while only about 23% are involved in self operated petty trade. Another 13.6% are currently unemployed, who are mostly female and involved in unpaid household work. Self-employed poor are mostly (81.6%) voters in the city, though the number of voters in the villages is comparatively lower among them. More than 70% of the self-employed poor cast their votes in both parliamentary election and city corporation election. Whereas 52.5% and 48.1% of the urban poor working as wage laborer cast their votes in parliamentary election and city corporation election respectively. Though political support is comparatively higher among the self-employed poor, participation in political activities is higher among the poor working as wage laborer. Only 31.4% of the poor working as wage laborer registered as voters by themselves whereas 51.8% of the self-employed and 47.1% of unemployed poor registered as city voters by themselves. The unemployed poor have less freedom in casting votes than the other groups of poor. The affiliation with organization is much higher among the self-employed poor. The unemployed poor have less contact with the urban elected bodies. Though the significant portions (57.4%) of unemployed poor are affected by the urban policies, only about 6% of them protested the policies. Employment status is significantly correlated with being voters in the city ($r = -.113$ at 0.05), being voters in the villages (.089 at 0.05), voting in parliamentary election (-.101 at 0.05), voting in city corporation election (-.128 at 0.01), participating in political activities (.152 at 0.01) and voter registration by self (-.1577 at 0.05).

Income Differentials

About 44 % of the urban poor are hardcore whose household income is up to BD Tk.3500 per month. Another 56% are absolute poor whose household income is above BD Tk. 3500 per month. Their level of poverty significantly determines their involvement in politics. The percentages of city voters among the hardcore and absolute poor are 58.4% and 69.5% respectively. But the number of village voters is higher among the hardcore poor by 7.7 %. The percentage of casting votes in both parliamentary election and city corporation election is higher among the absolute poor than the hardcore poor. In the last city corporation election 60.2% percent of the absolute poor cast their votes where as 48% of the

hardcore poor cast their votes in the election. Party support is quite high among the absolute poor though the participation in political activities is higher among the hardcore poor by 5.3%. As the absolute poor are politically more aware, they mostly registered as voters and cast their votes by their choice. More than 34% of the absolute poor are affiliated with different organizations whereas only about 20% of hardcore poor are affiliated with these organizations. The absolute poor also have more contacts with the elected bodies. The recent urban policies affects 62.4% percent of the hardcore poor but only 12.7% of them protested the policies. The level of poverty is significantly correlated with being voters in the city ($r = -.116$ at 0.01), voting in parliamentary election ($r = -.108$ at 0.05), voting in city corporation election ($r = -.122$ at 0.01), party support ($r = -.097$ at 0.05) and being affiliated with organizations ($r = -.155$ at 0.01).

Urban Residence Differentials

Most of the urban poor (61.2%) are long-term city residents who are living in the city for more than 10 years. Their length of residence in the city is also an important determinant of their political integration. The long-term residents are mostly (83.7%) voters in the city whereas the short-term residents are mostly (70.6%) voters in their ancestral villages. The difference of casting votes between the two types of poor is also significant. About 72% of the long-term residents cast their votes in parliamentary election and city corporation election whereas less than one-third of the short-term residents cast their votes in these elections. Party support and participation in the political activities is also higher among the long-term residents. About 50% of the long-term residents became voters in the city by their choice whereas only about 20% of the short-term residents became voters by their choice. As the long-term residents are more aware they cast their votes more independently. The organizational affiliation is also higher among the long-term residents. Only about 8% of the short-term residents have ever bargained with the elected bodies whereas 30.7% of the long-term residents bargained with these bodies. Though most of the poor are affected by the recent urban policies, only about 9% of the short-term residents have ever protested the policies. However the urban residence is significantly correlated with being voters in the city ($r = -.501$ at 0.01), being voters in the villages ($r = .111$ at 0.01), voting in parliamentary election ($r = -.195$ at 0.01), voting in city corporation election ($r = -.123$ at 0.01), voter registration by self ($r = -.297$ at 0.05), voting by own choice ($r = -.157$ at 0.01), affiliated with organizations ($r = -.189$ at 0.01), bargaining with the elected bodies ($r = -.264$ at 0.01) and protesting the urban policies ($r = -.116$ at 0.05).

Discussion:

The characteristics of the neighborhood determine the political behavior of the urban poor. The political behavior of the urban poor refers to their political activities such as voting in elections, participation in action politics, organizational memberships and interaction with the local urban government. These political activities of the urban poor depend on the spare time they get after earning their livelihood and also on their interest in politics. The neighborhood of *Kalsi* is an urban fringe where the poor have been resettled by the government. The poor living in the neighborhood actively participate in politics to get shelter and other benefits from the government. Due to various community-based organizations in the neighborhood the poor are politically more aware. *Gandaria* is located near city centre where the poor developed squatter settlements. They also actively participate in the political activities in order to get protection from the political leaders. The neighborhood of *Adabor* is different from the other two neighborhoods as it developed recently as a low cost housing area where the poor are living by paying a small amount of rent. The poor in the neighborhood are less active in politics as they are not getting any support from the government. The type of housing where the urban poor are living is also a determinant of their political behavior. The poor who are living in *jupri*, temporary housing made of bamboo and straw, are more active in city politics to protect their settlements with help from local political leaders. The poor living in *semi-pucca/pucca* housing are less active in political activities as they are less dependent on local political leaders. But the poor living in the *semi-pucca/pucca* housing are politically aware because of their better socio-economic background. They are less affected by urban policies adopted by the government, as the housing and employment of the poor is less dependent on these policies. The role of settlement in the political behavior of the urban poor justifies the Gottdiner's (1994:16) argument "the factor of space constitutes a part of social relations and is intimately involved in our daily life".

The political behavior of the urban poor is also determined by their age. The aged poor are more active in urban politics. They are mostly city voters and cast their votes in both national and city elections. As the aged poor lose their contact with their ancestral villages for long stay in the city, their connection with their ancestral villages become lesser. That's why only a small percentage of the aged poor are voters in their ancestral villages. The younger poor become voters in the city being influenced by their guardians like father or elder brother. Sometimes the local guardians like landlord

or community leaders also influence them. Affiliation with organizations is higher among the middle-aged and aged population as they are more aware about organizational affiliation and other political matters due to their better political understanding and more city experience. Due to seniority the aged poor get more attention from the elected bodies so they have more contact with these bodies. However, in spite of their age their participation in protesting the urban polices is not higher. Nelson noticed the age differences in political behavior of the urban poor in different developing societies. He (1979:114) points out, "young people participate less politically because they are preoccupied with personal matters – finding a job with prospects for advancement, choosing a mate, completing an education, locating a place to live."

Gender also determines the political behavior of the urban poor. The participation in political activities is higher among male than female because of the existing social structure. The existing patriarchal social system helps to perpetuate the economic and social inequality of women (Kabeer, 1991; White, 1992; Dannecker, 2002). In many instances, their participation in politics and in other activities is dependent on the decisions from their male guardians like father or husband. The existing religious values don't encourage equal participation in the development activities especially political activities. But it is true that the participation of female in urban politics is much higher than their rural counterparts. It becomes possible due to living in the urban environment and their empowerment through participation in urban labor market.

The level of education also determines the political behavior of the urban poor. The poor having at least primary level of schooling can realize their political rights better than those who have no any schooling in their life; as such, the percentage of casting votes in different elections is higher among the poor who have at least primary level of schooling. Due to their schooling they become politically more aware and can apply their reason better in casting votes rather than being directed by the others, from their communities or from outside their communities. The poor who have no primary level of schooling are mostly dependent on others in choosing the right person as their leader. The poor having no schooling is more affected by the government policies as they are mostly doing unskilled jobs like rickshaw pulling which, is recently being restricted by blocking off the main streets of the city. The relationship between the level of education and urban adaptation has been supported by a number of previous studies (Caldwell, 1969; Oberai and Singh, 1983; Hussain, 1996; Afsar, 2000).

Employment status of the poor determines their participation in urban politics. The unemployed poor are less integrated with politics as most of them are female and involved in household activities. They can't even take their decisions regarding political matters independently due to their dependence. The type of employment in which the poor are involved is also important for integrating in city politics. The poor working as a day labor get less time to be involved into politics because they are mostly busy looking for jobs. In order to avoid underemployment situation they try to find a second job while they are doing one. As the self-employed poor have no problem of being unemployed, they can pass their time in a relatively relaxed manner and can be more involved in politics. Shah and Smith (1984: 297) findings on urban female migrants also support the role of employment on integration. They point out, "entry into the urban labor market has important implications for adjustments. The type of economic activity that she enters into is crucial not only for her initial adjustments to the city but also for future her social mobility within the urban environment".

The level of poverty is also a determinant of political behavior of the urban poor. Absolute poor are more integrated with urban political systems than the hardcore poor. As the hardcore poor are mainly busy looking for work they cannot get enough time to be involved in politics. Beside these, due to their economic marginality they become social and politically marginalized. The local political leaders don't care much about this section of the poor, as they have no influence on the other sections of the poor. The hardcore poor keep greater distance from the powerful sections and hardly maintain contact with the elected urban bodies. On the other hand, the absolute poor are financially in a better position and they become more interested in politics. They get more attention from the political leaders and maintain greater contact with them. Due to better socio-economic conditions the absolute poor are politically more aware than the hardcore poor. Generally political radicalism is absent among the urban poor because they always think about their basic needs necessary for survival in the city and they don't plan for any revolution to change the present power structure. This implies that political consciousness of the urban poor is not necessarily engendered by their serious deprivation, which is also noted by scholars working on the urban poor in developing countries (Eckstein, 1990; Gilbert, 1992; Gugler 1997).

Finally, urban residence has a definite impact on the political behavior of the urban. Due to living in the city for a long period of time they become more exposed to the urban life. They gradually know more about the city and participate in different activities including political activities. Beside this, when they loose their bondage with their ancestral village, due to stay in the city for a long period of time, they become involved in city politics. Nelson (1979: 115) further points out, "recent arrivals are preoccupied with finding suitable long-term employment and housing, settling their families if they are married, choosing mates if they are not, and generally adjusting to urban life. Their circle of friends may be limited. They are less likely than the established urbanities (natives or earlier migrants) to belong to voluntary association." Hossain (2000: 195) observed "recent migrants are more alienated in the new urban environment than long term migrants because of homesickness and initial instability".

Conclusion:

The urban poor cannot play an important role in urban politics due to their social and economic marginality. But that doesn't mean that the urban poor are politically indifferent. Rather, the urban poor are desperate to be integrated with the larger urban political systems to overcome their marginalized position. Their level of involvement in urban politics is determined by their socio-spatial characteristics. The characteristics of the settlement space especially the neighborhood and housing where the poor are living and the pattern of internal organizations largely determine their political behavior. Beside the space settlement, social/compositional factors like age, sex, education, employment, income and urban residence also determine their political behavior. There is a variation within the level of influences of the socio-spatial variables. The neighborhood characteristics, poverty level and urban residence are relatively more important determinants of political behavior of the urban poor especially for their voting behavior, party affiliation, attending action politics, organizational behavior as well as their interaction with urban government. Therefore, the socio-spatial approach, which combines settlement space, demographic, social and economic factors, could be effective in explaining the political behavior of the urban poor.

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Appendixes:

Table-1: Socio-spatial Characteristics of the Urban Poor

<u>Socio-spatial characteristics</u>	<u>Frequency</u>	<u>Percentage</u>
Neighborhood:		
<i>Adabor</i> (City Ward-43)	195	39.0
<i>Gandaria</i> (City Ward-81)	125	25.0
<i>Kalsi</i> (City Ward-2)	180	36.0
Housing type:		
<i>Jupri</i>	237	47.4
<i>Tin-shed</i>	173	34.6
<i>Semi-pucca/pucca</i>	90	18.0
Age:		
Younger (Up to 30 Yrs)	195	39.0
Middle Aged (31-45 Yrs)	205	41.0
Aged (46 Yrs+)	100	20.0
Gender:		

Neighborhood	-0.274** (.000)	.245** (.000)	-0.261** (.000)	-0.294** (.000)	-0.155** (.000)	-.063 (.161)	-.175** (.000)	.006 (.888)	-.068 (.129)	-.169** (.000)	.123** (.006)	.026 (.557)
Housing type	.078 (.082)	-.131** (.003)	.090* (.044)	.093* (.038)	.077 (.086)	.105* (.018)	-.017 (.701)	-.089* (.048)	-.056 (.213)	.094* (.036)	.097* (.030)	.021 (.641)
Age	-.283** (.000)	.065 (.147)	-.300** (.000)	-.249** (.000)	-.017 (.701)	-.060 (.177)	-.162** (.000)	.026 (.562)	-.112* (.012)	-.116** (.009)	-.029 (.523)	-.009 (.847)
Gender	.033 (.464)	.199* (.008)	.031 (.483)	.028 (.536)	.026 (.560)	.186** (.000)	.031 (.492)	.145** (.001)	-.014 (.761)	.088* (.049)	.083 (.063)	.168** (.000)
Education	-.006 (.888)	-.032 (.473)	-.014 (.748)	-.017 (.708)	.051 (.259)	.037 (.415)	-.082 (.067)	-.006 (.888)	-.113* (.001)	.013 (.768)	.105* (.019)	-.093* (.038)
Employment	-.113* (.012)	.089* (.046)	-.101* (.024)	-.128** (.004)	-.018 (.690)	.152** (.001)	-.157** (.000)	.055 (.220)	-.071 (.114)	.074 (.101)	.056 (.209)	.076 (.089)
overty level	-.116** (.009)	.077 (.084)	-.108* (.016)	-.122** (.006)	-.097* (.031)	.058 (.194)	-.078 (.081)	-.040 (.370)	-.155** (.001)	-.016 (.725)	.059 (.190)	-.029 (.515)
Urban residence	-.501** (.000)	.111** (.000)	-.195** (.000)	-.123** (.000)	-.086 (.056)	-.081 (.060)	-.297* (.000)	-.157** (.000)	-.189** (.000)	-.264** (.000)	-.049 (.276)	-.116** (.009)

** Correlations is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed)

- Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed)

Source: Field Survey 2002-2003

Drug Abuse and Criminal Behaviour In Penang, Malaysia: A Multivariate Analysis

Usman Ahmad Karofi*

Abstract

A growing number of literature and empirical research have documented that a relationship exists between drug abuse and criminal offences. Through studying a selected sample of three hundred institutionalised drug addicts [inmates] with and without criminal history, subjects stratified by ethnicity in Government Rehabilitation Centre in Penang, Malaysia, this research affirmed that there is a relationship between drug abuse and involvement in criminal offences. The major findings of the research were: (1) heroine and cannabis (ganja) were the major drugs abused by the subjects; (2) all eight independent variables correlated with the dependent variable with the exception of broken home; (3) drug abuse is significantly related with property offences; (4) the majority of the research respondents agreed that they get involved in criminal activities in order to support their drug use habit; (5) Finally, the multivariate analysis results attest drug abuse, peer group and poverty as the major reasons why the subjects get involved in criminal activities. The theoretical implication of the study is that drug abuse alone is an inadequate explanatory variable for why drug abusers become involved in criminal activities. For a proper understanding of criminal activities committed by drug abusers, focus must go beyond their addiction to drugs to include both micro and macro factors in order to obtain a proper understanding of crime, the dependent variable of this research.

1.1 INTRODUCTION

The understanding of the relationship between drug abuse and criminal activities is currently at the heart of criminological research. There is a consistent worry in and by the mass media, communities, parents and the general public at large of the various problems brought about by youth who abuse drugs. This paper attempts to explain the relationship between abusing drugs and getting involved in criminal activities in the state of Penang, Malaysia. To accomplish the above task, the paper attempt to address the following questions: What is the relationship between drug abuse and criminal activities? To what extent are drug abusers involved in criminal activities? Why are drug abusers engaged in specific types of criminal activities? and Why are drug abusers involved in criminal activities?

In order to show that drug abuse is a serious social problem the 1998 Narcotics Report summarizes the drug problem in Malaysia as follows: (1) the Malaysian drug situation remains a serious one; (2) from 1988 to 1998, a total of 162,750 drug addicts were identified throughout the country; (3) from this total, 88,527 drug addicts were identified for the first time and the remaining 74,223 drug addicts were recidivists; (4) This invariably means that for every 100,000 inhabitants in Malaysia, there were 734 drug addicts, (5) out of which 335 were hard-core drug addicts.

In 1995, for instance, the total number of inmates in all prison institutions in Malaysia was 21,513. Out of this figure, 8,513 (39.57 percent) were inmates associated with drug related offences (Prison Statistics, 1995: 4). In addition, the 1996 Prison Statistics indicated that the total number of prisoners on remand and convicted as drug traffickers and abusers was high compared to that of the previous years. Out of 8,291 prisoners, 4,245 (50 percent) were abusers of illegal drugs, and 1,204 (46 percent) were drug traffickers, (Prison Statistics, 1996: 3).

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In the State of Penang Table 1 below shows that Butterworth and Georgetown were the two main locations among the five locations in with the highest number of drug addicts in Penang. Heroin, morphine and ganja were the most frequent drugs being abused in the two administrative areas.

**Table 1 New Reported Cases of Drug Abuse in Penang:
(January - December 1999)**

	Geographical Location	Heroin	Morphine	Ganja	Psycho-tropic	Ubat batuk codeine	Total
1.	Balik Pulau	43	-	60	-	1	104
2.	Bukit Mertajam	35	134	141	-	-	310
3.	Butterworth	144	341	220	1	1	707
4.	Georgetown	480	8	170	1	5	664
5.	Nibong Tebal	36	3	22	-	-	61
	Total	738	486	613	2	7	1,846

Source: National Drug Information System (NADI), Kuala Lumpur. February 2000.

Table 2 shows the number of drug addicts in Penang and Malaysia (1988-1998). The number of registered drug addicts in the State of Penang was high in 1988, but in 1989, 1990 and 1991, the number dropped drastically. However, there was a recorded increase in subsequent years (1992 and 1993), but the figures then dropped again in 1994 and 1995. Nonetheless, the trend indicates an increase in 1997 and 1998 with approximately 1,493 (150.0 percent). This is quite consistent with national figures between 1991 and 1995. Furthermore, there is also a tremendous increase between 1997 and 1998 as shown by the data.

**Table 2 Total Number of Drug Addicts in Penang and Malaysia
(1988-1998)**

Year	Penang	Malaysia	Penang as Percentage of Malaysia
1988	4,016	21,856	0.18

1989	2,715	17,729	0.15
1990	2,464	16,893	0.14
1991	1,934	19,085	0.10
1992	2,302	21,502	0.10
1993	3,763	25,502	0.14
1994	3,583	28,756	0.12
1995	5,443	34,104	0.15
1996	4,246	30,589	0.13
1997	4,615	36,284	0.12
1998	6,108	37,588	0.16

Sources: Agency Dadah Kebangsaan, Times Series Report (1988-1998).

There seems to be a clear indication from Table 3 below that the State of Penang recorded the highest number of drug addicts between January-March 2000 in the recidivist cases, and also records the second largest in the new reported cases. Furthermore, combining the total number of both the old and new cases of drug addicts, the State of Penang had the highest figures followed by the State of Johor.

**Table 3 New and Old Cases of Drug Abuse in Malaysia
(January - March 2000)**

	State	New	Old	Total
1.	Johor	2,550	1,934	4,484
2.	Kedah	1,068	723	1,791
3.	Kelantan	1,726	1,498	3,224
4.	Melaka	321	774	1,095
5.	N/Sembilan	907	690	1,597

6.	P/Pinang	2,303	4,427	6,730
7.	Pahang	1,259	1,113	2,372
8.	Perak	1,189	1,856	3,045
9.	Perlis	137	20	157
10.	Sabah	1,668	400	2,068
11.	Sarawak	302	47	349
12.	Selangor	1,729	2,291	4,020
13.	Terengganu	599	479	1,078
14.	Kuala Lumpur	1,546	2,710	4,256
15.	Labuan	69	15	84
	Total	17,373	18,977	36,350

Source: National Drug Information System (NADI), March 2000.
 [NADI Web Site at: <http://www.adk.gov.my/st.html>]

Table 3 above also indicates an increasing problem of addiction to drugs in the State of Penang. In old cases, for example, the statistics indicate that the State of Penang had the highest record. A careful look at the table further illustrates the differences between old and new cases, with old cases twice as much as new cases in just three months. For the overall total, Penang had 6,730 cases, Johor, 4,484 cases, Selangor, 4,020 cases and Kuala Lumpur with 4, 256 cases.

Furthermore, the current set of data covering the whole period of January to December 2000 explain an increasing trend of drug addiction over the period, with approximately two hundred percent increase from the old to the new cases as indicted in Table 3 above. The records from the table also highlight the increasing problem of drug abuse in the State of Penang. In a nutshell, the data reveals that the State of Penang had approximately higher figures than all the states in the Federation.

Recently, Othman, *et al.*, (2002) commenting on the patterns and trends of drug abuse situation in Penang argued that the drug abuse problem in Penang remained critical. According to their report on the number of drug addicts identified in the State of Penang for 2000, 2001 and January-June 2002, were a total of 516 drug addicts for a period of one month. The report further documented that a total number of 67 drug addicts were identified per day in the State of Penang. For example, out of the total number of drug addicts identified in 2001, 38.5 percent were new cases and 61.5 percent were recidivist cases.

**Table 4 New and Old Cases of Drug Abuse in Malaysia
(January - June 2002)**

No.	State	2001	2002	
			June	Average Per month
1.	Penang	2600	3033	505
2.	Kedah	892	2867	478
3.	Selangor	1243	1832	305
4.	Perak	1661	1561	260
5.	Kuala Lumpur	986	1498	250
6.	Kelantan	1425	1346	225
7.	Sabah	1180	1291	215
8.	Johor	784	974	162
9.	Terengganu	732	700	117
10.	Negeri Sembilan	673	615	102
11.	Pahang	577	456	76
12.	Perlis	64	294	49
13.	Melaka	275	266	44
14.	Labuan	57	112	19
15.	Sarawak	63	45	7

	Total	13,162	16,890	2,815
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Source: Adopted from International Monograph Series, Report of The Asian Multicity Epidemiology Workgroup 2002, No. 16, Page 27.

According to the data in Table 4 above, the State of Penang had the highest number of drug addicts both in the year 2001 and between January-June 2002. For the average per month the State of Penang also had the highest reported figures of drug addicts between January-June 2002, the Penang figures are twice the number of all other states in the federation with the exception Kedah, Selangor and Perak. In addition, for the first six months, there was a slight increase in cases detected from January to June 2002. The total number of cases, however, increased to 433 (14.2 percent) as compared to the first six-month of 2001. Thus, Penang had the highest number of drug addicts in Malaysia for the first six months of 2002 as shown in Table 4 above.

1.2 Comparison of Drug Abuse Trends of Malaysian with Some Asian Countries

One dimension to show that the problem of drug abuse is serious in Malaysia is to have comparative data with some countries in the region. According to data available from the National Centre for Drug Research University Science Malaysia (1996), in Dhaka, Bangladesh the number of persons arrested for drug related offences in the period of July 1992 to December 1993 was 2,672, while for Malaysia, a total of 5,086 cases were identified from July 1992 to December 1993 in the city of Kuala Lumpur alone.

In Nepal a total number of arrests for drug offences over a ten years period from 1988 February to 1999 show that in total, 2,663 cases were identified. Comparing Nepal's data with that of Malaysia, a year's figure exceeds that of a ten-year period. According to the National Drug Information System (NADI), in 1998 alone there were 37, 588 addicts identified, the average per month as the report shows was 3,132 addicts identified per month. For the new addicts 21,073 were identified in 1998, compared to 1997 and the number had increased by 21.51 percent.

In Singapore 5,857 local drug dependent persons were arrested in 1993. In the same year, arrest of drug addicts and offenders in Malaysia were three times higher than that of Singapore. If we are to compare Penang and Singapore on the basis of geographical size since Malaysia is comparatively bigger than Singapore, the Penang data of drug addicts identified in the same year show a figure almost two times higher. There were 15, 300 addicts, while drug offenders identified at that particular period were 10, 588.

Another comparative feature will be to look geographically again at another dimension. In Kuala Lumpur alone a total of 4,348 drug addicts were identified in 1993 to 3,740 drug addicts in Singapore in 1993.

Comparing, the Kuala Lumpur data above with that of the Jakarta between 1992 and 1993, according to the report covering the period of January to December 1993 in Jakarta there were only 238 male and 25 female drug addicts. A total of 2, 238 reported cases were reported in Kuala Lumpur. The Kuala Lumpur data is more than the Jakarta data with approximately 2,110 number of drug addicts for the period 1992 and 1993.

In terms of drug Seizure by weight, a wide range of drugs were seized in Kuala Lumpur and these included opiates (29.5 kg), cannabis (56.1 kg), hallucinogens/amphetamine type (about 13,673 pills), sedatives (1,110 pills) and other psychotropic pills (14,144), whereas in Manila, the Federal Territory of the Philippine cocaine was the major drug seized followed by cannabis (66 kg and 45.9 kg respectively).

Comparing the drug abuse patterns of some selected East Asian Cities; the National Centre for Drug Research (1999) reported that between January to June 1999, the East Asian Cities of Bangkok, Thailand; Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia and Manila, Philippines, do have a drug problem. The report provided the following insights of the seriousness of drug abuse, addiction and trafficking but Malaysia seems to top the list.

Among the three cities, for example, Kuala Lumpur reported the highest number of total admissions for the six months period (2,185 admissions), Bangkok falls on the second place (865 admissions) and Manila reported a total of 418 admissions. Heroin was the primary drug abuse among most of the drug dependents that were admitted for treatment in Bangkok (83.90 percent) and Kuala Lumpur (70.69 percent). Reports on morphine abuse were mainly from Kuala Lumpur (3.13 percent), lower than reported in 1998 (6 percent). Manila reported a negligible (0.14 percent) of morphine abuse and none was reported in Bangkok.

The abuse of Cannabis among treatment admissions has been reported in all the three cities. However, it was more widespread in Kuala Lumpur (24 percent) and Manila (21 percent). A less significant percentage of cannabis was observed in Bangkok (0.17 percent). On drug-related offences, arrest for consumption is predominant in Kuala Lumpur, (29 percent of the total arrest); while in Bangkok the predominant arrest is that of possession (50 percent). Nine-three percent of the total arrests in Manila are of sales of drugs.

1.3 Literature Review

In this section, a review is presented on studies conducted that attempted to establish the relationship between abusing drugs and getting involved in criminal activities. Regrettably, there seems to be no empirical research conducted in the State of Penang specifically devoted to establishing a link between drug use, abuse, and addiction on the one hand, and criminal offences on the other. However, extensive studies done elsewhere such as in the United States of America (Cabrera, 1999; Bureau Of Justice Statistics, 2002), in United Kingdom (Bennet, 1998 and 2000); in Australia (Makkai, 1999, Makkai and Doak 2000) showed that there is a relationship and connection between drug abuse and involvement in criminal activities.

Clinard and Meier (1995) point out that not only are manufacturing, selling and using of certain drugs illegal, but there are also crimes associated with drug abuse, such as those committed by drug addicts in order to secure money to purchase drugs. In addition, there are other areas of establishing a relationship between drug abuse and involvement in other unwanted behaviour, specifically crime/criminal activities. These areas include: 1) euphoric feelings that result from abusing certain substances; 2) property and economic- associated crimes involved by drug abusers and addicts in order to uphold their addictions to drugs; and 3) mostly violent related crimes which result from drugs distribution and the marketing, among other factors.

The review begins with Goldstein's (1985) conceptual essay which offered a tripartite classification of drug-violence connection: 1) psychopharmacological violence: due to the direct acute effects of a psychoactive drug on the user; 2) economic-compulsive violence: committed instrumentally to generate money to purchase (expensive) drugs; and 3) systemic violence: associated with the marketing of illicit drugs such as turf battles, contract disputes, among others.

Goldstein and his colleagues (Brownstein, *et al.*, 1992, Goldstein *et al.*, 1989, Goldstein, Brownstein and Ryan, 1992) applied this scheme empirically in studying homicides rates in the State of New York (1984) and in New York City (1988). They found that drugs and alcohol were important causes for a large share of homicides in both samples. In 1988, for example, they classified: a) 53 percent of 414 homicides as drug-related; b) a substantial percentage whose drug-relatedness could not be determined; c) of those homicides that could be determined to be drug or alcohol related, 14 percent were psychopharmacological (68 percent for alcohol, 16 percent for crack), 4 percent were economic-compulsive, and 74 percent were systemic (61 percent for crack, 27 percent powder cocaine). In contrast, in 1984, before the crack surge in the United States, only 42 percent of the homicides were drug or alcohol related, 59 percent were economic-compulsive, and 21 percent were systemic.

Goldstein, *et al.*, (1990) expanded the classification of drug-related homicide beyond "pharmacological" to include "economic," in which persons rob and kill to finance their own drug use, and "systemic," in which homicides resulted from the business of drug dealing. They found that roughly half of a sample of 414 homicides in New York City in 1988 was drug-related. Most were classified as *systemic*, such as territorial disputes and other aspects of the business of selling drugs rather than being caused by the *pharmacological* effects of cocaine or other drugs or "economic" reasons. Only 14 percent of the drug-related homicides were due to the pharmacological effects or drugs and/or alcohol. As with the medical examiner studies and the prisoner studies, their study had some limitations. The classification of homicides relied on the judgment of police in the field and their decisions might have been subject to bias, problems with reliability, and limited information.

In a longitudinal/developmental research, Kaplan and Damphouse (1995) studied a sample of 7th graders in the Houston School District in 1971 and re-interviewed them at an average age of 26. They reported a direct effect of adolescent drug use (narcotics and marijuana) on adult violence, controlling for adolescent violence. However, adolescent drug use was not found to account for more than 1 percent of the variance in the young adult violence. Also, the effect of adolescent drug use on adult violent behaviour was found to be greater for those who were low rather than high in antisocial personality tendencies during adolescence. The explanation offered by these investigators for this latter somewhat unexpected finding was that those groups of individuals who were least expected to become involved in violent activities (because of the low levels of antisocial personality and self-derogation) were those who were most directly affected by the use of drugs during adolescence. The explanation offered for this finding was "These well-socialized individuals, who are highly committed to the normative social order, are highly inhibited from displaying aggressiveness. The use of drugs is disinhibiting for these individuals, resulting in their being more likely to be violent later in life" (Kaplan & Damphouse, 1995: 206). It is possible that this somewhat unexpected finding occurred because the primary drugs of abuse by the study respondents (marijuana and narcotics) were not stimulants; and that if drugs like amphetamines had been the primary substances of abuse, those among the respondents who had relatively higher degrees of antisocial personality might have increased their violent behaviour to a greater degree than those who had lower degrees of antisocial personality in adolescence.

From a study of adolescent drug users who were dealers in cocaine/crack in Dade County, and who were re-interviewed in 1989, Inciardi (1990) reported on the various types of violence

associated with cocaine/crack distribution in inner city Miami. The investigator's main conclusions were: (a) that although crack distribution by hard-core adolescent offenders in Miami may not reflect as much gang-related violence as has been suggested in Los Angeles, it is nevertheless highly criminogenic; (b) the more anyone is involved in the crack business, the more crimes that person commits (currently, Miami and Dade County police officials estimate that perhaps one third of the county's homicides are drug related); (c) a somewhat more deviant group of youths is drawn into crack distribution; and (d) that participation in the crack trade facilitates crack addiction. It is not clear, however, if the same conclusion could be drawn of other drug user populations or other types of criminal activities besides violence.

The United States of America's largest National Victimization Survey (NCVS) does not ask about victims of drug use only, but uses drug use in conjunction with other data to provide insights about drugs and crime. Using NCVS (2000), a multivariate analysis of almost 450,000 observations found that marijuana decriminalisation (and proxy for lower marijuana prices) would result in higher incidence of robbery and assaults, while higher cocaine prices decrease the incidences of these crimes (Beaukimer and Reuters 2000: 8).

Mackesy-Amiti and Fendrich (1999) studied the relationship between inhalant use, delinquency and criminal behaviours among a sample of 1,300 students. They discovered that delinquent and criminal behaviour appear to be more strongly associated with the inhalant use than of other drugs. This fits clear consonance with findings from previous research on the association between inhalant use and delinquency, especially the latter. However, the research had the following limitations as acknowledged by the authors: the measurement of delinquency is not very extensive, the findings may not be generalized to other populations, and the study only relies on cross-sectional data.

Anglin and Maugh (1992) also argue that a significant proportion of crime in the United States is directly related to the use of illicit drugs. The empirical data offered in "Drugs and Crime 1989" suggest that drug use is both directly and indirectly related to committing crime at all levels, including violent, property and financial crimes. 30 to 78 percent of the arrestees had illicit drugs in their urine, suggesting that drug use played some role in their crime. The sample also showed that individuals who were dependant on heroin and cocaine had extremely high crime records, according to the official Police Crime Statistics. It was also noted that those who were involved in the regular use of hard drugs or of multiple substances are typically at high risk of recidivism after their release from incarceration.

Data from the Brown University Digest of Addiction Theory and Application (July 1997) in the United States of America reveal that women accused of crimes have much higher rates of heavy drinking and substance abuse than women in the general population. Information was gathered from self-reports and from the jail log on the type of respondents' criminal offences. The analysis reveal that women who commit crimes were likely to be older, were separated, divorced, or widowed, were unemployed, and to have lower incomes. Alcohol or drugs were equally likely to be related to the respondents' arrest and incarceration. Out of the all reported criminal activities, 50.7 percent were involved in alcohol-related events, 26.3 percent are drug-related events, and 7.0 percent violent-related events. However, it is concluded that there is a relationship between heavy drinking and violent offences. Nevertheless, the study cannot address the unresolved issue of causation.

In a study on incarceration and its relationship with alcohol and drug usage, Harry (1998) found that: (1) 80 percent of prisoners behind bars in the United States committed their crimes under

the influence of drugs or alcohol; (2) the same percentage stole property to support their drug use habits; and (3) drug usage is the major reason for the increase in the nation's prison population. Edmondson (1998) studied college crimes, and his findings show that the number of Americans in prison or jail custody has been increasing at 6.5 percent a year since 1990, and more than one-third of this growth is due to drug related offences. More than 1.7 million Americans are now serving time in prison, primarily because they committed one drug offence or the other. This figure approximates the population of New Mexico. Some criminologists are concerned with the fact that first-time drugs offenders who spend years in jail will likely return to crime once they are paroled, using the connections they made while serving their prison term. If this happens, it is likely that the prison boom will become a vicious cycle.

Beaukimer and Reuters (2000), in what they called "Facts about Drug-Crime Nexus in the United States of America", noted that: 1) across 35 cities in the US in 1998, between 40 to 80 percent of male arrestees in the Arrestees Drug Monitoring (ADAM) Program tested positive for at least one drug at arrest (Arrestees Drug Monitoring Program, 1999); 2) nearly one-quarter (22 percent) of the federal prison inmates and one-third (33 percent) of state prison inmates (nearly 40 percent of the state) convicted of robbery, burglary, or motor vehicle theft reported being under the influence of drugs at the time of their offence; and 3) among state and federal inmates, 27 percent of those serving sentences for robbery and 30-32 percent of those serving sentences for burglary said they committed their offences to buy drugs.

A more recent study, Jonathan *et al.*, (2001), acknowledged that: (1) the number of inmates in the American prisons has more than tripled over the last 20 years to nearly two million inmates, with 60-70 percent testing positive for substance abuse upon arrest; and (2) hard-core addicts in the same jurisdiction are estimated to commit hundred (100) petty crimes each year. From the findings, the study concludes that if the prison population were to continue growing at the current rate, then by the year 2053 the United States will actually have more people in prison than out, the majority of who would be drug abusers, addicts and or those who commit drug-related offences.

Jones (1999) found a similar predicament in England and Wales. According to her study, a third of all thefts, burglaries, and street robberies are drug related. Urine tests carried out to 839 people arrested in five areas in England (Cambridge, London, Manchester, Nottingham, and Sunderland) showed that nearly two thirds of them tested positive for one illegal drug, and more than a quarter did so for two or more of such substances. Her study also reveals that the drug users interviewed spent an average of 400 pounds (\$640 USD) a week on drugs, although some were spending up to two thousand pounds a week for a mixture of heroin and crack. Very little of this money was raised legally, according to her.

Harrison and Gfroerer (1992) conducted a research with a sample of 32,594 representative households respondents in England with a response rate of 95 percent. They confirmed that the rate of criminal behaviour is higher for a population more heavily involved in drug use, and lowest rates of criminal behaviour found among those who do not use alcohol or illicit drugs. The dependent variables investigated were: involvement in property crimes, involvement in violent crimes, being booked for property offences and being booked for violent offences. While using marijuana and cocaine were the independent variables. The results showed that the dependent and independent variables were significantly related.

The general deviance theory proposes that substance use may not cause violence and violence may not lead to substance use, but rather that individuals "likely to engage in one form of deviant behaviour are also likely to engage in other forms of deviant behaviour" (see Harrison & Gfroerer,

1992). This is conceptually similar to the spurious model, which posits that violence and substance use are not causally related, but rather both result from some common or shared variable, such as antisocial personality disorder (ASPD), parental modelling of both behaviours, poor relations with parents, and genetic or temperament traits (see review by White, 1991). Thus, violence and substance use are both considered deviant behaviours within the context of a general deviance syndrome. In fact, Harrison and Gfroerer (1992) showed that after controlling for alcohol and cocaine use, individuals who used marijuana in the past year were more than twice as likely to report engaging in a violent crime than nonusers.

In developing countries, the story is not different. In Nigeria, for instance, a hard-line approach dominated by interdiction and repression prevails. According to the Nigerian Drug Law Enforcement Agency (NDLEA), drug abuse is a cancer spreading across society, leading to overdoses, the break-up of families, and the collapse of law, and order in the cities. Driven by such fears, the agency devotes the bulk of its resources to interdiction, that is, the arrest of any individual involved in consuming, trading or benefiting from the profits of trading in drugs. The agency's resources are also devoted to seizures of drugs, mainly of cannabis, cocaine, and heroin. Since the appointment of General Musa Bamaïyi, who was the chairman of the Agency (NDLEA) at that time, over 3,000 Nigerians have been incarcerated for drug related offences for terms of up to 25 years. If this trend continues, according to the agency's report of 1996, drug offenders were expected to constitute the majority of Nigeria's prison population by early 2000. Piquero (1999) discussed that the control of narcotic substances by government policies in Nigeria rested for several decades on the unchallenged assumption that drug abuse is medically harmful, socially corrosive, and conducive to violent crimes.

Drawing from the foregoing literature review we hypothesise that there is a significant positive correlation between criminal behaviour and factors like drug abuse, peer group, learning, poverty, broken home, unemployment, urbanization and rural-urban migration.

1.4 Study Materials and Method

To provide answers to the research questions, the data were collected using a questionnaire. The items in the questionnaire were sourced from literature, adapted from Arrestees Drug Monitoring System (ADAM)¹², and others developed by the researcher as described below.¹³

Criminal Behaviour

The dependent variable "criminal behaviour" is defined as an infraction or violation of a criminal law. In other words, crime is what criminal law defined as an offence. In Malaysia, the Malaysian Penal Code is dominated by the notion that all major crimes consist of offences against person, or state (Yakin, 1996). Several questions in the questionnaire measured the dependent variable "criminal behaviour". Examples of such questions are: Have you ever been arrested and charged for breaking a law? With responses ranging from criminal charges, number of times charged,

¹² Arrestee Drug Abuse Monitoring Program (ADAM) is a research program that is based on the interviewing and drug testing samples of arrestees initially called Drug Use Forecasting Program (DUF) funded by the National Institute of Justice which is a research and development agency of the U.S. Department of Justice established to prevent and reduce crime and to improve the criminal justice system. There are several researches that use and adapt the program, including Bennett, (1998 and 2000) Makkai (1999), Riley, (1997), Makkai and Doak (2000).

¹³ A copy of the questionnaire is available on request from the author.

whether found guilty or not and if found guilty, the type of punishment. Other items are if you have not been formally arrested, have you ever been stopped and questioned on criminal activities and number of times. These items were adapted from previous studies (Hirschi, 1969; Navaratnam et al., 1990, ADAM' 1999 and Baron 1999).

Drug Abuse

A drug is abused when its usage is socially and medically disapproved. Thus drug abuse is a situation when a drug is taken out of any medication, at the same time, it is socially disapproved and or the use of illicit drugs and substances. Drug addiction is the continued use of drugs, which leads to dependence on the drug. According to Clinard and Meier (1995), the term "addiction" refers to physical dependence, an adaptive state of the body that is manifested by physical disturbance when drug use stops (ibid: 199). It is understood from this definition that drug addiction is a situation when illicit drugs are continuously used because the addict anticipates pains or discomfort if he/she withdraws from the use of the drug.

Drug abuse was measured via question such as the types of drugs used, categories include Heroin Cannabis (Ganja); Morphine Opium; Psychotropic; Syabu; Candu Inhalant (Sniffing glue/gum); Batuk/Kodein, and others Navaratnam (1990); the age at which respondents began to use drugs; frequency of drug use; the amount spent on drug per day, etc. These are all adapted from Drug Abuse Monitoring System (1999), Bennet (1998 and 2000), and Bernburg and Throlindson (1999).

Subculture

Subculture is defined as an attribute, which the youth possess as a result of joining a specific deviant group. Clinard and Meier (1995) define "subculture" as a culture within cultures, with a collection of norms, values, and belief whose content is distinguishable from the dominant culture. Membership in such a group solidifies a deviant identity. It would not be an over-generalization to say that most, if not all, drug addicts operate in groups. The measurement of subculture has been treated by the Differential Association Theory has built most of its assumptions on subculture (which is one of the integrated theory used in developing the model of this research). Subculture has one dimension peer group. Some of the questions asked which were related to subculture included: Do your friends use drugs? How many of your friends use drugs? Also, questions centred on whether respondents were pressured by friends to use drugs and to get involved in criminal activities. These questioning approaches are also similar to those of Baron, (1999), Hirschi, (1969), and Acarid, *et al.*, (2000).

Socio-economic Factors

Socio-Economic variables include: poverty, broken homes, environment, and urbanization.

Poverty: As used in this study poverty is the inability of an individual to maintain his/her personal need, which includes the necessities of life. Haralambos and Heald (1980) defined "poverty" as a value judgment of the basic human needs that is measured in terms of the resources required to maintain health and physical efficiency (ibid: 140). Most measures of poverty are primarily concerned with the quality of food, clothing, and shelter deemed necessary for a sound life.

Absolute Poverty. Absolute poverty divides the poor and the non-poor by using some objective standards such as the lack of money to purchase adequate food, shelter and clothing (Williams and Cressey 1980: 153-154). In the Malaysian contexts, Ariffin, (1994) argued that in Malaysia absolute poverty is measured on the basis of a Poverty Line Income (PLI). For 1990, the poverty

line income was designated to be RM 370 per month in Peninsular Malaysia. This is for a household size of 5.1. For Sabah, it was RM 544 for a household size of 5.4 and in the case of Sarawak; it was RM 542 for a household size of 5.2 (ibid: 8). The items that measures the variable absolute poverty; questions asked respondents whether the inability to obtain good food, adequate clothing, or proper shelter leads them to commit crime, with responses (1= Strongly Agree to 5=Strongly Disagree). Whereas question item number 114 requested the respondents to respond (1=Strongly Agree to 5=Strongly Disagree) poverty was responsible for their involvement in criminal activities. These items were also adapted from Hirschi, (1969) Ekpenyong, (1989), and Baron, (1999).

Relative Poverty approach holds that people are poor if they have significantly less income and wealth than the average person in the society. In Malaysia for example, Appa Rao (1977) pointed out that although the poverty line in Malaysia is intentionally defined in an ambiguous terms- referring to the minimum household income that enables acquiring the basic nutritional and other non-food requirements sufficient for sustaining a decent living standard- it applies generally to household income, in cash and in kind, of about \$ 150-175 per month (ibid: 95). A person is said to be relatively poor if he/she has less/average income that would enable him/her to obtain a decent living standard. Items nos. 99, 86 and 105 were used as measures of relative poverty. The items for instance requested the respondents to react to the statements that: "there is a clear relationship between my income level and the crime I have committed"; "my inability to financially support my wife and children leads me to commit crimes" with responses (1= Strongly Agree to 5=Strongly Disagree), and "have your parents had financial difficulties in their daily household needs" with responses (1=yes and 2=no).

Broken Homes: A broken home as used in this study is a household, in which the couples are either separated, living apart or dead. This situation often leads to improper socialization of children and young adults. This is often associated with underage offences. The questions asked the respondents whether their real parents are alive (with response categories ranging from 1 = both of them are alive, to 5 = I live with my guardian), and if they were not, then up to what age was the respondent living with them. What is your father's marital status, and what is your mother's marital status? with responses (married, separated, widowed and divorced).

Urbanization: This means the concentration of people in urban areas. Miethe and Meier, (1994) state that crime is associated with mobility in at least two ways: first, individual mobility may be related to crime, if the persons who are mobile are also those who are more likely than sedentary persons to commit crime; and second, communities in which there is greater mobility, reflected in the degree of population change, may be those who also experienced more in crime (ibid: 25). Population growth in cities and urban centres has been associated with criminal offences by various sociological theories. That is primarily because greater mobility results in reduced moral commitment to norms that, in turn, increase the chances of law violation (Miethe and Meier 1994: 25). Urbanization is measured by question items: Questions items measuring urbanization demanded respondents to react if living in cities has a relation with drug use, with responses ranging from 1 = Strongly Agree to 5 = Strongly Disagree, and if the respondents who live in urban centres tend to use drugs more than those who live in rural areas, with answers 1 = Yes, 2 = No and 3= Don't Know, sourced from Miethe and Meier, (1994).

Rural-urban Migration

This is the movement of people from rural to urban areas in search for employment. In the absence of such employment these migrants become a burden to the urban centres and quite

upon join criminal groups. The items that measures rural-urban migration asked the respondents if their movement from rural-urban area predisposes them to commit crime, responses (1=strongly agree-5=strongly disagreed).

1.5 Sample Size

The study is about three hundred drug addicts who were drawn from two government drug rehabilitation centres in the State of Penang, by stratified and systematic sampling procedures. The population was one thousand drug inmates with and without criminal history. To begin with, the sample size was N=300. This figure was arrived at based on Blaikie's (2000), sample determinant for varying populations. According to Blaikie, while large populations may need large samples than smaller populations, the ratio of population size to an appropriate sample size is not constant, for example: for population around 1,000, the ratio might be about 1:3 a sample of about 300 (ibid: 208). To obtain the sample elements, an inmate roster was used. The inmate roster was obtained from the authorities of the two government drug rehabilitation centres.

The sampling process began with stratification of the population into three strata according to ethnicity. This was followed by a preparation of three specific lists. In order to obtain the sample elements, the selection techniques were that for every third person on the list, one was selected. The distribution of the sample elements in the three frames (making up the population) was: 483 were Malays, accounting for 48.3 percent; 305 were Chinese, accounting for 30.5 percent and 212 were Indians, accounting for 21.2 percent. In order to maintain the same proportion in the sample, the researcher employed the systematic sampling procedure in each of the stratum, which enabled the selection of one sample element in each three elements systematically. This sampling process was guided by Blaikie, (2000) who says that the population elements can be grouped into the desired categories, or strata (ethnicity in this case) before selection is made. He adds that by using the same sampling ratio in each stratum, the population distribution on a characteristic (ethnicity as in this case) will be represented proportionately in the sample (ibid: 200).

The rationale for using the stratified sampling procedure in the selection of the study elements/respondents across the three ethnic groups was to ensure that the sample was as homogenous as the population from which it was drawn and was based on the guidelines drawn by Blaikie, (2000) and Kish, (1965). This was done to control for under and over representation of respondents from the three ethnic groups. Furthermore, the sample was a representative ratio reflection according to ethnicity of the total inmates in the two government drug rehabilitation centres, and it was also a representative of the Malaysian drug user population (see, for example, Navaratnam and Foong, 1996a and 1996b, National Narcotics Report, 1998; National Drug Information System January-December 2000, April 2000, January-December 2003, and January-July 2004 all available at the NADI web site <http://www.adk.gov.my/nadi.html>).

1.6 Findings

A total of 143 (49.5 percent) of the total respondents were Malays, 85 (29.4 percent) Chinese, 57 (19.7 percent) were Indians, and only 2 (0.7 percent) were of other ethnic group background. 148 (51.2 percent), of the respondents, were Muslims, 75 (26.0 percent) were Buddhists, 48 (16.6 percent) were Hindus, and 15 (5.2 percent) were Christians. More than half of the respondents, 187 (64.7 percent), were unmarried. About one fourth of the sample, 63 (21.8 percent), respondents were married. Whereas, the remaining respondents: 17 (5.9 percent), 11 (3.8 percent), and 6 (2.1 percent) were widows, divorced and separated respectively.

As far as the numbers of children the respondents have, 81 (97.6 percent) reported having children between 1 - 5 years of ages. There were 44 (18.7 percent) who had between 6-10 children (in number). In addition, a majority among the sample reported having siblings. There were 191 (81.3 percent) respondents with 1 - 5 siblings, and 44 (18.7 percent) with 6 - 10 siblings.

The majority of the respondents had attained some formal schooling, with 95 (32.9 percent) who attended lower secondary 1, 2 and 3 followed by those who attended upper secondary 4, 5 and upper secondary 6, 87 (31.1 percent) and then those who attended standards 1 – 6, 74 (25.6 percent). The remaining respondents 9 (3.1 percent) had no formal education at all, with an additional 12 (4.2 percent) who had attended primary school only. And finally, only 10 (3.5 percent) among the respondents had either attended some vocational/ technical training or had diploma certificates.

More than two thirds of the respondents 220 (76.1 percent) had been gainfully employed before they were enrolled into the drug rehabilitation centres. A total of 62 (21.5 percent) of the respondents acknowledged that they had not had any paying job before their enrolment into the government drug rehabilitation centres. Furthermore, in addressing the other demographic profiles of the respondents, the table shows that the average age of the respondents is thirty-six years (35), with a minimum age of twenty- one (21) and a maximum age of sixty (60).

1.7 Multivariate Analysis

Multivariate analysis is defined as a statistical method for examining the relationship between a numbers of variables. Amongst the several multivariate analyses, the multiple regression analysis was selected. The basis for selecting the multiple regression is because multiple regression allows us to establish the independent influence of a set of predictor variables on an outcome variable (Blaikie, 2003:293). Furthermore, according to Hair, *et al.*, (1995) multiple regression analysis is defined as a statistical technique that can be used to analyse the relationship between a single dependent variable (criterion) and several independent (predictor) variables. Multiple regression analysis would thus be applied in this section to establish the influence of the group of independent (predictor) variables of this research on the dependent (outcome) variable criminal behaviour.

It is further argued that multiple regression analysis is a dependent technique and the basic requirements for adopting multiple regression analysis are: (1) the researcher must be able to classify the research variables into dependent and independent variables; (2) both the variables are to be measured at metric; (3) under certain circumstances it is possible to include non-metric (variable) as an independent variable (by either transforming either ordinal or nominal data with dummy variables); (4) the research problem must be for explanation and prediction; (5) the research must also be concerned with statistical relationship and finally (6) it requires a large sample with many observations (Hair *et al* 1995:149). The above requirements are fulfilled in this research and attempt is made to use the multiple regression to answer the why questions of this research in the next section.

In an attempt to answer the way questions of this research the multiple regression analysis is used. To illustrate how the analysis works with these variables, a bivariate regression will be used first with each of the dependent variable, consistent with the provision of Blaikie (2003; 293-302). The table below present the results of the bivariate regression of criminal behaviour with drug abuse; peer group; broken home; poverty; urbanization and migration. The table shows the result of bivariate regression. There is an indication the total variance explained (R^2) of the variable

In the first stage, all the independent variables are included. The next table shows the contribution of each of the predictor variable to the outcome variable. Table shows the result where poverty, peer group and drug abuse seems to have the highest coefficients.

Table 6 Regression of Crime (Outcome variable) with group of (Predictor variables)

I

Outcome	Predictor	R	R ²	Beta	P	Tolerance	VIF
Crime	Drug abuse	0.48	0.23	0.16	<0.05	0.98	1.02
	Peer group	0.50	0.25	0.17	<0.05	0.84	1.18
	Poverty	0.53	0.28	-0.178	<0.001	0.91	1.08
	Broken/H	0.38	0.14	-0.265	n.s.	0.99	1.00
	Urbanization	0.29	0.08	0.29	n.s.	0.90	1.01
	Migration	0.45	0.20	0.244	n.s.	0.97	1.02

In the last stage the regression analysis was run with the variables with high coefficients using the forward mode. Tables 7, 8 and 9 reports the variable the forward elimination included and the order in which they are entered. However, on the variable selection procedure Blaikie (2003:301) warned that "It is important to note that different decision about which variable to include in the analysis may produce different conclusion, what is important in this process is to be able to justify the decision and, preferably, have theoretical as well as statistical reasoning for making them".

Table 7 Regression of Crime (Outcome variable) with group of (Predictor variables)

II

Outcome	Predictor	R	R ²	Beta	P	Tolerance	VIF
Crime	Drug abuse	0.48	0.23	0.16	<0.05	0.98	1.02
	Peer group			<0.05	0.84	1.18	
	Poverty		-0.178	<0.001	0.91	1.08	
	Broken/H			-0.265	n.s.	0.99	1.00
	Urbanization			0.29	n.s.	0.90	1.01
	Migration			0.244	n.s.	0.97	1.02

Table 8 Regression of Crime (Outcome variable) with group of (Predictor variables)

III

Outcome	Predictor	R	R ²	Beta	P	Tolerance	VIF
Crime	Drug abuse			0.16	<0.05	0.98	1.02
	Peer group	0.50	0.25	0.17	<0.05	0.84	1.18
	Poverty		-.178	<0.001	0.91	1.08	
	Broken/H			-.265	n.s.	0.99	1.00
	Urbanization			0.29	n.s.	0.90	1.01
	Migration			0.244	n.s.	0.97	1.02

Table 9 Regression of Crime (Outcome variable) with group of (Predictor variables)

IV

Outcome	Predictor	R	R ²	Beta	P	Tolerance	VIF
Crime	Drug abuse			0.16	<0.05	0.98	1.02
	Peer group			0.17	<0.05	0.84	1.18
	Poverty	0.53	0.28	-.178	<0.001	0.91	1.08
	Broken/H			-.265	n.s.	0.99	1.00
	Urbanization			0.29	n.s.	0.90	1.01
	Migration			0.244	n.s.	0.97	1.02

In summary, the above multiple regression analysis between crime (outcome) variable and drug abuse, peer group, poverty, broken homes, urbanization and migration (predictor) independent variables allows us to make the following conclusion that poverty to be the best predictor of inmates involvement in criminal behaviour, peer group, i.e. peer influence comes a close second to the prediction, and lastly drug abuse is also a contributing factor of why abusers of drug get themselves in criminal activities.

This conclusion also allows us to support the earlier assumption that is not in all situations abusers of drugs involvement themselves in crime, even in situation they does so, the reasons as while as the causes of their involvement in crime must be adduced to micro and macro factors. The findings here acknowledge micro factor (peer group influence) and macro factors (poverty).

1.8 Discussion and Summary

1.8.1 Drug Abuse and Criminal Behaviour

The findings of this study have revealed that there is a considerable relationship between drug abuse and involvement in criminal activities. This result is in accord with both national and international empirical studies. As documented by the research results, heroine and cannabis were the most popular drugs being abused by the respondents. At the national level, Navaratnam *et. al.*, (1990) also ascertain that heroine was the primary drug used by their subjects. In another research report, Navaratnam, *et.al.*, (1992) acknowledged that heroine was the most widely used drug among addicts in Kuala Lumpur, accounting for 79.5 per cent in 1991, and 87.5 per cent for the first five months of 1992. In yet another study by Hj. Mustapha (1996), he discovered that the two main drugs abused in Malaysia were heroine and cannabis, with 88 per cent abusing heroine and 11 per cent abusing cannabis. Government data in Malaysia also documented that heroine and cannabis are the commonly abused drugs (see, for example, Dadah, 1992; National Drug Information System April 2000; January – December 1999; and January – December 2000).

The police department in Penang pointed out that half of the 120,000 properties related offences are committed by hardcore drug addicts (The Star, Wednesday 23, May, 2001). In the same paper, Datuk Lee Lam, Thye the Deputy Vice Chairman of the Malaysian Crime Prevention Foundation, is reported to have said that, "The Foundation feels that by placing hardcore addicts in prisons and holding them for a period more than the maximum two-year period at Rehabilitation Centres, it may help to reduce drug-related crimes in the country".

At the international level, the National Drug Research Centre of Universiti Sains Malaysia (1996), in presenting the Patterns and Trends of Drug Abuse in selected South Asian Cities, acknowledged that heroine was the main drug abused in Colombo, Dhaka and New Delhi. The findings of this research are also consistent with those found in the United States by Jones (1999). She reported that amongst 11,000 drug addicts who entered drug treatment programs between March and July 1995 the majority were heroine users, and were responsible in part for 700 crimes in the three months before treatment.

Makkai and Doak (2000) also indicated in their sample of police detainees in Australia who are criminally active that: (1) 62.9 per cent had one charge against them, (property offences, 40.9 per cent, as the most common violent offences, 31.1 per cent, and offences against justice procedures 11.7 per cent), (2) trafficking charges, excluding drunk driving 9.4 per cent; (3) among the 28 violent offences, the largest proportion tested positive to cannabis, (46.4 per cent) to opiate 32.1 per cent, and to benzodiazepines, 17.9 per cent; (4) of the respondents charged with offences against justice procedures, 64.0 per cent tested positive to cannabis and 32.0 per cent tested positive to opiates. DUMA (Drug Use Monitoring in Australia) shows illicit drug use to be wide spread among detainees. Of the people who provided urine sample the results confirmed that 75.1 per cent tested positive to at least one type of drug. Participants were most frequently detained for property offences (40.9 per cent) almost similar to the findings of this research. The range of offences indicates that drug use is a factor predisposing persons to a variety of crimes. Makkai and Doak (2000) thus conclude that large numbers of police detainees, regardless of their offence type, are drug users. Policy wise, they suggest that the promotion of

treatment diversion options should be a priority of the government in order to break the drug-crime nexus.

As confirmed by the data of the present study, the majority of those respondents with criminal records self-reported that they engaged in property offences in order to support their drug habits. The results are similar to previous ones, which establish correlation, and not causality, between drug abuse and criminal behaviour. Xuan (1994), in his report of narcotic drug abuse in Vietnam, also found similar results to those of this study. He documented that: (1) a considerable number of drug abusers who have access to opium neglect their responsibilities towards their families and society because of their duping, deceiving and using tricks; (2) among drug addicts in cities and townships in Laos 70 per cent involved in theft, prostitution, and illegal business, 40 per cent of which are criminal offenders (Ibid. P.129). Navaratnam, *et al.* (1996) further documented in their 'Ten Years Retrospective Drug Careers' that those who spent 1 – 2 years in prison had bad criminal records, with a frequent high rate of crime commitment. Furthermore, other findings consistent with the present study like those of Navaratnam and Foong (1996a) reported that most of their respondents were arrested 1- 4 times, and that more than half of these 53.6 per cent self-reported that they have been either borrowing or stealing money to support their drug use habits.

Although the data of this study shows a relationship between drug abuse and criminal behaviour, like other previous studies, the extent of the relationship in this study is unclear. Some drug addicts reported having been involved in criminal activities, whereas others reported that they were not. As indicated by the current data, heroine and property crime were related; similarly Dawkins (1997) discovered that marijuana use was significantly related to twelve offences he studied. White (1991) also found out that, similar to the present findings, the use of drugs and delinquency patterns in the age group 15 to 18 were comparable predictors of marijuana use. Inciardi (1979) also discovered that over 90 per cent of drug users committed crimes to support their drug habits.

Recent data from the Bureau of Justice Statistics of the United States Department of Justice (2002) have revealed the following facts about drug-related crimes. In 1998, an estimated 61,000 convicted jail inmates said that they committed their offences to get money for drugs. Of the convicted property and drug offenders, about 1 in 4 had committed their crimes to get money for drugs. A higher percentage of drug offenders were registered in 1996 24 per cent, as in comparison with those registered in 1998 14 per cent. All these numbers point out that those offenders commit crime to raise money for drugs. In 1997, 19 per cent state prisoners and 16 per cent federal inmates said they committed their current offences to obtain money for drugs. These percentages represent a slight increase from 1991, when 17 per cent of state, and 10 per cent of federal prisons identified drug money as a motive for their current offences; the Uniform Crime Reporting Program (UCR) of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) reported in 2000 that 4.4 per cent of the 12,943 homicides in which circumstances known to be narcotics related (murders that occurred specially during a narcotic felony, such as drug trafficking or manufacturing) again considered drug related (Ibid, p. 1-12).

Moreover, on whether victims perceived offenders to have been drinking or using drugs at the time of their various offences, the National Crime Victimization Survey (NCVS) of the Bureau for Justice Statistics (2002: 5-6) in the US, discovered that: a) about 28 per cent of the victims of violence reported that the offender was using drugs alone or in combination with alcohol; b) based on victim perception, there were about 1.2 million violent victims each year, in which victims were certain that the offender had been using or drinking alcohol; c) for about 1 in 4 - 75 per cent of these violence victimization cases involving alcohol use by offenders victims believed their offenders were also using drugs at the time of the offences. Also, of the victims of violence in workplaces: a) 35 per cent believed the offender was drinking or using drugs; b) 36 per cent did

not know if the offender had been drinking or using drugs; and c) 27 per cent of all workplace offenders had not been drinking or using drugs.

All Arrestee data of Bennet (1998 and 2000); Makkai (1999) Riley (1997) are in support that a significant relationship exists between drug use and criminal activities. Other findings in accord with the present study are Jarvis and Parker (1989); Harrison and Gfroerer (1992). Recently, Denton (2001) found in Melbourne, Australia that drug abusers and dealers commit a wide variety of property offences ranging from fraud, forgery, theft, burglary, shoplifting to handling stolen goods. What, however, may differentiate the empirical research stated above may be the methodology adopted in sorting out their various data.

1.8.2 Drug Abuse and Subculture

The bivariate analysis in the data showed a significant positive relationship between subculture variables (peer group and learning [imitation]) on the one hand and criminal activities on the other. The data shows that peer group and learning [imitation] have great influence on drug addiction and involvement in criminal activities.

The results of this study are consistent with both classical and contemporary criminological research. It is, for instance, similar with that of Becker's (1963) findings on marijuana use, Hirsch's (1969) *Causes of Delinquency*, Goode's (1989) who found substantial evidence that for a proper understanding of the reasons behind both getting addicted to drugs and involvement in criminal activities and in delinquent attitudes, focus should be on social contextual variables, including peer group and learning (imitation).

Baron's (1999) findings also posit a relationship between drinking among peer groups and their involvement in property crimes. Among his subjects who indicated that they are successful property offenders there are some who are reported to drink alcohol more regularly. Other research findings similar with the data of this study are: Farrington (1986), Navaratnam and Foong (1988), Acarid *et al.* (2000), Miethe and Meier (1994), among several others. According to Singh (1997), 62 per cent of his respondents agreed that friends and peer group had serious influence in their getting addicted to drugs. Another 68 per cent, for instance, injected themselves with drugs, greatly assisted by their peer group (*Ibid.* p. 27). Skinner and Fream (1997), also support learning as a correlate of computer crimes. Added with other kinds of deviant activities, one major predictor of crime and delinquency remains associating with friends who exhibit such behaviours, as supported by the Differential Association Theory of Sutherland and Cressey (1974).

It would not be an over generalization to say that the majority of criminological research strongly supports a connection between one's delinquency and that of a friend. But there is disagreement on causal ordering and on the meaning of the two concepts. According to the Subculture Theory, delinquent people teach younger friends delinquency values, as a result; delinquency will follow (Sutherland and Cressey 1974:12). Bernburg and Thorlindson (1999) argued that variables such as peer delinquency and peer victimization are similarly related to violent behaviour and non-violent delinquency. They further reported that peer behaviour has a relatively strong effect on smoking and alcohol use. Sommers and Baskin (1994) reported similar findings to this study. Their results confirm that neighbourhood characteristics such as poverty having delinquent peers, and marijuana use during school years were stronger predictors of delinquency in schools.

Correlates of crime found in this study are also consistent with research that has used the Integrative Perspective. The convergence of social theories tends to yield more reliable data on

the relationship between the use of drugs, criminal activities, and delinquent behaviours. More importantly, social variables like peer group is indeed pertinent, primarily because social interaction among peers within communities and societies provides models for easy access to drugs, teaching peer members, when, where, how to get and use drugs.

Navaratnam and Foong (1996a) while studying on subculture as a good measure of drug use, made a follow-up of former drug addicts in Penang. The study showed that 51.5 per cent had started and continued to use drugs because their friends influenced them. Peer group, they concluded, was strong among addicts, especially in relation to the return to drugs. Other data obtained in Penang, which are in accord with this study have been reported by Navaratnam (1990), show that 30 per cent of the ample elements had friends who drank regularly and /or used marijuana, while 38 per cent had friends who used heroine or other opiates. From this, it was ultimately, concluded that friendship had a great destructive influence on their own drug use.

1.8.3 Socio-economic Factors and Criminal Behaviour

The data of this research indicates that socio-economic factors (poverty, broken home, unemployment, urbanization and rural – urban migration) have an influence on getting involved in drug use. However, it is worth noting that, as was anticipated, these factors are a crucial predictor of crime.

Poverty, according to multivariate results has emerged to be a link to criminal activities among and within the study sample. According to Schinke *et al.* (cited by Cabrera 1999), poverty had stronger influence on drug abuse. Baron (1999) also found that those who were more active in robbery on streets were heavy marijuana users. Homelessness and poverty, he posits, are predictors of hard drug use. On unemployment, his data suggests that it is an important predictor of alcohol use. Consequently, constant need of funds to ensure availability of drugs and alcohol among youth necessitates the undertaking of criminal activities.

The results of Pfeffer and Cole (1998) are also in accord with this present research. Their discovery attests that poverty is an important predictor of drug abuse and committing criminal offences. Making a comparison of youth crimes among British and Nigerian children, they discovered that the Nigerian students more frequently gave environmental explanations such as poverty, (33 per cent) and lack of home training (19 per cent) whereas, the British students, (37 per cent) used drugs for fun.

Unemployment has presently been correlated with criminal behaviour at 0.1 significant levels in the bivariate analysis. However, to what extent unemployment associates with crime, the results do not show, bearing in mind that the majority of the respondents had already been employed before they were enrolled into the Rehabilitation Centres. There is no doubt that even if unemployment correlates with crime, unemployment alone may not explain the criminal behaviour of the subjects. But research like that of Farnwoth and Thornberry (1994) considers the unemployment rate as an index for social stress. Rising unemployment is seen as a manifest expression of anti-social aggression influenced by social stress.

Furthermore, there are a number of studies, unlike this study, which have attributed the increase in crime to be the inability of a population to get employed (See for example Baron 1999; Ekpenyong, 1989; Ramsey and Percy, 1986; Van, 1996; Farrington, 1986; McCarthy and Hagan 1991). According to Cruthfield and Pitchford (1997) time out of the labour force is positively related to criminal involvement, and when workers expect the current employment to be of a

longer duration, they are less likely to engage in crime. Hirschi (1969) found a high rate of self-reported delinquency in families that experienced unemployment and received welfare donations as compared to families in better circumstances.

Like the findings in this study, Farnworth and Thornberry (1994) also discovered a weak relationship between unemployment and crime. What differentiates the present findings with theirs was that unemployment, welfare and underclass status are all significantly related to street and other crimes. Street crimes and delinquency of adolescents from poorer families that persistently benefits from welfare have significant high rate of cumulative delinquency activities.

Socio-economic factors including inequality and poverty have also been found to be associated with delinquency and crime as confirmed by the Anomie and the Strain studies. Attributing these structural factors to crime, Currie (1998) even contended that the links between extreme deprivation, delinquency, and violence are consistent and compelling. In the United States, for example, it was noted that poverty, economic inequality, and social exclusion are causal agents in producing crime and violence by young people (Ibid: p. 7). A comparative analysis on urbanism and crime in Japan, Saudi Arabia, and the United States carried out by Lester (1999), also found a positive association between population density and crime, - larceny in all countries, and homicide in Japan and the United States. Association between population and homicide rates was positively significant for the two latter nations.

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