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Editor

Nazrul Islam

Associate Editor

S Aminul Islam

Managing Editor

M. Imdadul Haque

Book Review Editor

A.I.Mahbub Uddin Ahmed

Emails:

nislamiub@yahoo.com

editor@bangladeshsociology.org

mneditor@bangladeshsociology.org

breditor@bangladeshsociology.org

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Room No. 1054, Arts Faculty Building, University of Dhaka, Dhaka – 1000, Bangladesh

Phone: 88-02-966-1921, Ext. 6578. Email: bejs@bangladeshsociology.org

Note from the Editor

For a number of reasons the publication of this issue has been delayed. The most important of these is the South Asian Sociology Conference held in Dhaka during March 10 and 11, 2008. All our efforts were diverted to this unique event. This was for the first time that such a gathering of sociologists of the region took place in Dhaka. Sociologists from India, Pakistan and Sri Lanka joined hand with their Bangladeshi colleagues to deliver on a number of issues like gender, environment, poverty, globalization etc. The most important outcome of the Conference was the formation of an ad hoc committee and adopt the draft constitution of the South Asian Sociological Society (SASS) with its Head Office at Dhaka. The formation of such a Society was a long felt need of the sociologists of the region and will give new direction and meaning to sociology in the region as it will project South Asian sociology to the rest of the world. We are very proud to be a part of the occasion and shall render all necessary support to the Society to promote sociology in the region.

The current issue is a very special one as it brings together some current problems faced by the third world countries to day. The most important of these is the use and misuse of power in its various dimensions. Saidul Islam makes a brief review of all the different theoretical approaches to the understanding of power and comes up with a typology of his own. Using Nigera as a case S.O. Adebayo and A.J. Ogunleye look at the psychological dimension of power and build a personality profile of the Nigerian politicians. They characterize the politician as a “receiver”, as “the exploiter”, “the hoarder”, “the marketer”, and finally as “ the producer”. I believe that the personality profile projected in this essay is a very apt presentation of the politician in much of the third world and shall contribute greatly in understanding the ills of politics in most third world countries.

The third article in this series by Olufayo Olu-Olu goes to the direct analysis of the misuse of power, again by taking Nigeria as an example. Using some hard data he shows the extent of corruption in today’s Nigeria, reputed to be the second most corrupt nation in the world. Through a sample survey of the opinions of the different sections of the population he comes to the conclusion that although people are disgusted with the extent of corruption there, the war against corruption would be “hard to win since the acts are perpetrated by the policy makers themselves”.

Shahadat Hossain looks at the state of appalling poverty in the City of Dhaka and argues that the poverty follows the pattern of “urbanisation without development”. He traces the historical growth of the city in its fortunes and misfortunes and shows how in the recent times, mainly because of the unending streams of rural migrants, the city has been turned into a “megacity” without having

the capacity to deal with such growth. Similar studies of Dhaka City have been done before but this is a much more comprehensive presentation of poverty there, with the added advantage of a very exhaustive survey of the literature which will definitely aid other researchers in their work.

There is an ambivalent attitude toward the use of the internet and how it might change the lives of the people. Manouchehr Mohseni, Behzad Dowran and Mohammad Hadi Sohrabi Haghghat take up the issue in terms of the social relationships in the city of Tehran. They work with the hypotheses that the internet use will decrease social isolation and that social use of Internet will reduce social isolation. Working with a sample of 204 cybercafé users in Tehran they find that both internet use and social use of internet is be slightly associated with reduced level of social isolation.

In the last essay Philip O.Sijuwade seeks to determine the relationships between sex roles and fear of success. Using the Bem Sex Role Inventory Short Form (BSRISF)(Bem,1981) and Fear of Success Scale (FOSS) on a sample of 110 working urban women in the city of Lagos, Nigeria, Sijuwade tried to see whether there is a significant relationship between masculine and feminine characteristics in terms of fears of success. The findings show androgynous trends in urban working women. However, Fear of Success was negatively correlated with both masculine and feminine scores. More importantly the study suggests that "it is psychological femininity or undifferentiated sex roles rather than actual femininity that predisposes people to fear of success".

Thus, by focusing on issues like food crisis, urban poverty, internet use and social isolation, the psychology of fear among working women and above all the use and misuse of power, the current issue helps to illuminate much of the problems in the day to day life of the third world. It is hoped that these topics will generate awareness among the general readers and lead to further debates among the academia. We look forward to a future world free from such problems.

The Psychology of Participatory Democracy and the Personality Profile of the Nigerian Politicians

S.O. Adebayo and A.J. Ogunleye*

Abstract

This paper explores the personality profiles of the Nigerian politician as antithetic to the enthronement of participatory democracy in Nigeria. It contends that the antidemocratic and corruptive behaviour of the Nigerian politician is hinged on a lack of sterling personality traits of these Nigerian politicians. The paper argues that although the behaviour impede on national growth and development; nonetheless, the behaviour are a result of entrenched poverty, political ignorance and political alienation of the civic public. The paper, thus, suggests political education, self-enfranchisement and friendly and virile political environment for the production, development and growth of Nigerian politicians with deep vision and sublime mission to turn around the political misfortunes of Nigeria.

INTRODUCTION

The Nature of Politics and the Values of Man

Politics has been defined as the game of who gets what, when and how (Lasswell, 1958). Deutsch, (1974:13) sees it as the process by which values – things or relationships which people will like to have or to enjoy – are allocated in a society in an authoritative manner. Other scholars see politics as more inherent in public arena than in the private sector. In this way, Deutsch (Ibid: 3) defines politics as “the making of decisions by public means”. Here public decision making process qualifies as politics while private decision process does not. Whether this distinction is valid is, however, debatable. The fact, however, is that politics is pervasive. It impacts on all aspects of human life. Indeed it will not be an overstatement to say that politics is a matter of life and death, a game of human survival or perdition. This fact is perspicaciously captured by Deutsch (Ibid: 6). He opines that:

If civilization should be destroyed and most of mankind killed within the next twenty to thirty years, we shall not be killed by plague or pestilence; we shall be killed by politics.


Whichever way politics is defined, it is recognized that there exist values which political practice may help man to configure and actualize. Lasswell (op cit) has discussed eight basic values all of which people will pursue. These are power, enlightenment, wealth, well-being (or health) skill,

* Department of Psychology, University of Ado-Ekiti, Nigeria. Email: lanryadd@yahoo.com

affection, rectitude (which involves both righteousness and justice) and deference. Deutsch (IbidL14) has captured the importance of these eight values to people when he opines that:

People want to be powerful. They have a natural curiosity and want to increase their knowledge, they desire wealth, they value health and sensual joy of a difficult job well done and they possess what Thorestein Veblen called “the instinct of workmanship”; they all need affection. People also want to feel righteous in terms of their neighbours and to receive due deference from them.

Maslow (1967), a celebrated fulfillment and actualization psychologist went further to suggest that these needs and values are in hierarchy and some are more basic than others. Man’s needs according to Maslow are arranged in the following ascending order:



The process of allocation, configuration and satisfaction of these values and needs suggest the existence of an authority in every human society who will ensure that the allocation of these values to people will be done in a manner that will be valid, reliable and legitimate. The authority that does the allocation and configuration of these values in most modern states is the government.

Democracy and Authoritative Allocation of Values

The manner these values are allocated, however, is a function of the nature of government being practiced in a society. While historically, different forms of government like monarchy, oligarchy and aristocracy have existed in different societies; the form of government that is credited with the authoritative allocation of values in a manner that promotes the greatest happiness for the greatest number is democracy.

Democracy as a form of government is difficult to define. This is because its structures and elements vary from state to state. There are, however, some inherent universal qualities in this popular form of government.

Abraham Lincoln, a former American President, has posited the most universal definition of the term. According to him “democracy is a government of the people by the people and for the people (Graham, 1986:13). Deutsch (*op cit*: 20) captures the attribute of democratic government in this most apt manner:

Under democratic government, the majority makes or confirms laws and elects or confirms the government, its officials and policies. But the minority that disagrees today with these policies or laws may become a majority tomorrow.

What the above suggests is that while the majority may have its way in democracy, minority is free to express its views, agitate for them and make attempts to organize and win converts to its side. By this opportunity, power to authoritatively allocate values does not rest perpetually in the hands of an interest group in the society as it is the case in other forms of government.

The freedoms of minority to express its views ensure that all interests, views, values, and needs are considered in democratic government. This is why it may be suggested that it is democracy that provides for the greatest happiness of the greatest number in the authoritative allocation of values.

All democratic institutions are alike on promotion of delegation of authority, representation, control, recall, checks and balances and limitation of government. Democratic government, unlike other forms of government, ensures constitutionalism, rule of law, rather than the rule of men, separation of power, participation of individuals in decision making (through the exercise of representation, referendum, and recall control) about how individual's values, needs and interest become public policies (Awa, 1997).

Further important in democratic institution is the existence of political parties and association and institutions of electoral process. These ensure full participation of people. Civil, political and economic rights also exist for people. The political right of the people otherwise known as franchise ensures that the people can vote and be voted for. With this power of voting, the ruled can become the ruler.

While democracy has the singular quality of promoting the interest of the people, it may not adequately promote them if the people are not fully involved in government consequent upon their ignorance, lack of political education and self-disenfranchisement.

Social-Psychological Advantages of Participatory Democracy

Participatory democracy has the following important advantages.

One is promotion of liberal society: Democracy breeds liberal institutions where respect for freedom and fundamental human rights thrives.

Two, is the promotion of liberal-minded personality: Participatory democracy liberates the mind and makes the citizens to become cognitively complex. Citizens are not likely to suffer from extremity of positions (not likely to be fanatic in religious beliefs or in the belief about the power and potency of science), more likely to value the enjoyment of fundamental human rights by individual and by others. Liberal minded persons are also not likely to be ethnocentric in thought, prejudiced in feeling and discriminatory in behaviour. The opposite of liberal-minded individual is the authoritarian personality. Authoritarian personality is the evil consequence of totalitarian rule and it has a way of reproducing itself.

Three, is the value of justice: The concept of justice is fundamental to participatory democracy. By justice, we refer to the value for the observance of the fundamental rights of individuals and the protection of same by the government. Participatory democracy ensures the existence and functioning of institutions that will ensure promotion of justice. These institutions are professional bodies, such as the judiciary, ombudsman, the press and others.

Four, is the moral tone of the society and moral development of the citizenry: Participatory democracy ensures the participation of professional bodies in governance. Professional bodies have been noted for their role as the pacesetters of moral standard and the promoter of morality in every society (Durkheim, 1961). Participatory democracy also ensures the existence of the two mechanisms by which mature moral development is engendered in the citizens. These mechanisms are role-taking and cognitive disequilibrium. As parts of decision makers in government, citizens often face situations with novel moral dilemmas that challenge the conventional ethics characteristic of their moral stages of development. When individual's ethics are questioned, one is getting prepared to move to higher stages of moral development (Kohlberg, 1980).

Democracy also creates opportunity for role-taking. By becoming a public officer (a leader) at one time and an ordinary citizen at the other time, old conventional moralities are challenged and both the individual and the state or nation moves to the next higher stage of moral development. This enhancement *ipso facto* leads to fall in the rate of political violence, crime, bribery and corruption and other vices.

The Paradox of Apathy and the Psychology of Amotivation

Theoretically, political apathy should be alien to democratic nations. This is because it should be an expectation of a rational mind that people will be eager to, and active in, participating in decision-making process about which of their myriad of values, interests and needs will configurate and become public policies. Practically, however, most modern states that practice democracy have experienced political apathy among their citizenry as responses to the opportunity offered in participating in government.

The motivational basis of individual participation in government can be located in the six hierarchical needs of Maslow and eight Deutschian values. All individuals need justice, enlightenment, skills, affection, wealth and well being. All individuals ought to, when given the opportunity to participate, help in making the values become public policies that will bring about good living like good roads, good hospitals, and other social infrastructures. But all individuals are not willing to participate; although participatory democracy requires the participation of the greatest number. This apparent political motivation, which is true of developed as well as developing nations, should be the concern of psychologist interested in the study of political behaviour.

Social-Psychological Causes of Political Amotivation

Causes of political motivation expressed in the form of political apathy vary from one political environment to another. The following factors may be responsible in Nigeria:

1. Economic Poverty:

Poverty as political amotivation or political mis-motivation has been discussed by Eze (1983). He suggests that the typical Nigerian has an H-G-C-M personality. An H-G-C-M personality, according to Eze, is Hungry, Greedy, Corrupt and Manipulable. Poverty creates hunger in Nigerians and motivates them towards lower order survival needs; unlike advanced countries where the electorate is motivated by higher order needs like esteem, self-actualization and cognitive differentiation. Lower order needs like food, and shelter predispose the Nigerian electorate to corruption and manipulation. Mundane things like salt, beans, rice or money influence them to misdirect their votes. At other times, obsession with procurement of lower order satisfier creates political inertia in the Nigerian electorate. Little or no interest is exhibited for government and those who control its machinery. The consequence, of this inertia is further aggravation of poverty and geometric progression of problems related to the satisfaction of lower-order needs. This, in consequence, further aggravates poverty of the citizenry. This vicious circle of poverty is captured in figure 1.




Figure 1: The Vicious Social-Psychological Circle of Poverty

2. Conditioning to Totalitarian Government and the Development of Authoritarian Personality:

Long time exposure to military rule has conditioned Nigerian electorate to totalitarianism and maximum rule. Thus the idea of democracy and participatory democracy for that matter is somehow perceived as offensive and disgusting. Besides, totalitarian military government has frequently been associated with pleasant promises whenever coupists make their "Fellow Nigerians" broadcast. The abysmal failure of the two previous Republics has also created political aversion in the electorate towards democracy.

Furthermore, the command style of the military administration and avalanche of decrees and their ouster clauses, as obnoxious as they may be, have engendered and developed in the Nigerian civil society authoritarian personality. Authoritarian person are conservative, slavish to rules and authority, prejudiced in thinking and discriminatory in behaviour (Adorno, Frenkel – Brunswick, Levinon & Sanford 1950). It is a personality that is antithetic to the freedom and empowerment that liberal democracy guarantees for the citizenry.

The psychological processes by which military regimes achieved the nurturing of authoritarian personality are compliance, identification and internalization. People had to comply with draconian laws or they were heavily sanctioned. They also identified with some military officers (in the manner the latter used naked power and enjoyed obnoxious luxurious life styles). In no time, the values of the people gradually underwent changes and transformation, and become in concord with the military values of order and command.

3. Political Alienation:

Long time political alienation of a large section of the citizenry led to political apathy, political cynicism and political skepticism. All these are various means of expressing political amotivation. Political alienation is made up of three elements political powerlessness; political meaninglessness and political normlessness.

- a. Political Powerlessness means the extent to which an electorate perceives its voting pattern as potent enough in determining the occurrence of political outcomes or configuration of its values and satisfaction of its needs. The lower the perceived or actual extent the more politically powerless is the electorate.
- b. Political Meaninglessness connotes that an individual is unclear as to what one should believe politically. Should he believe that it is the Peoples Democratic Party (PDP) or Alliance for Democracy (AD) or All Nigeria Peoples Party (ANPP) that will salvage the masses from poverty? Should one believe that PDP is a party of the right and AD a party of the left? Would the similar manifestoes of these parties and their conception and midwifing by ethnic considerations cloud voters' perception of the existence of differences between these three parties?
- c. Political Normlessness is borne from lack or failure of rules to guide the conduct of citizens. During military regimes, the constitution, which is the basic norm of the country, is always supplanted and then replaced by decrees with ouster clauses. Thus, the political recklessness of the military government cannot be

challenged in the court of law. This untoward attitude soon percolates down the civil society where people begin to behave in normless manners. The consequence is indiscipline, display of raw physical power over and above intellectual power, and the inculcation of wrong belief of what is right in the citizens as demonstrated by the emergence of government through *coup de tat* and ethno-religious violence. Corruption also becomes the order of the day; thus making participatory democracy too costly to institutionalize. It is the combination of these three elements of political alienation that has not made the successful nurturing of participatory democracy possible in Nigeria.

4. Education:

There are two types of education: general and political. General education informs the electorate and frees them from irrational decision-making. Political education enables the electorate to be conscious of its fundamental human rights, to make demands for the citizenry's protection when government institutions attempt to encroach on them, fight for these rights when it becomes obvious that they may not be granted by government. It is the combination of the poverty of these two types of education in Nigeria that has prevented the thriving of participatory democracy. Without political education, it becomes impossible for citizens to realize that any emergence of military government through electoral malpractices condoned by power of incumbency is an assault on their fundamental human rights and the need to resist such violation is paramount. Absence of general education may not liberate the mind to see that military rule or maximum rule in a so called democracy is an anathema to civilized conduct.

5. Learned Helplessness:

The complacent behaviours and actions of Nigerians towards changing their political misfortune to political fortune suggests that the psychological mechanism operating is learned helplessness. The mechanism, the syndrome and the concept of learned helplessness were formulated, illustrated and experimented by Seligman (Garber and Seligman, 1980). Learned helplessness is a state of do nothingness to change one's precarious situation. According to Seligman, it is a learnt state that is produced by exposure to noxious, unpleasant situation in which the possibility of escape does not exist (Reber, 1995:332). Political learnt helplessness sets in Nigeria whenever the military takes over government, upturns the constitution and disbands the paraphernalia of the civil society. Opposition ranks are broken down through arrest, sack, summary dismissal and imprisonment through the judgments procured in kangaroo courts. Besides, the shocking realization by the electorate that rigging may make a mince-meat of its commitment to changing the government of the day, may make the voters become helpless. Furthermore, the incident of election annulment characteristic of the Nigerian

situation during Abbasid's government and the incessant election rigging characteristic of the three republics made Nigerians to become fatalistic, external in their locus of control on political issues and helpless in changing the shocking situation through instituting and nurturing of participatory democracy. Helplessness also takes place in pseudodemocracy as subsists in the present democratic situation that is characterized by unprecedented election rigging. In one of the many lamentations over the spate of election rigging in the Nigerian polity, Ayo Fasanmi, one of the leaders of Yoruba socio-economic and political organization described election rigging as having attained the level of national shame. According to him:

“The 2003 election is a shame, not only to Nigerians, but also to democrats all over the world. How would one describe a scenario where in Delta State, for example all the registered voters came out to vote? Or the yet to be unaccounted 600,000 votes in the President's home state, Ogun” (Oropo, 2005).

6. Ethnicity:

One of the major reasons why participatory democracy has not thrived in Nigeria is ethnicity. Ojo (1997) regards it as one of the characteristics of the Nigerian civil society that is antithetical to participatory democracy. Nigeria is a multiethnic society and each of the ethnic groups is attempting to maximize its outcome in Nigeria by outplaying one another (Adebayo, 2001:105). The consequence is that it becomes difficult to establish broad based national political party, which participatory democracy requires. Ethnicity creates the evils of ethnocentrism, prejudice, stereotype and discrimination (Ibid: 105) with ethnic groups trying to outdo one another with the military institutions becoming a ready tool for such (Suberu, 1988). Besides, politics of “indigenes and settlers” has made it difficult, if not impossible, to integrate a united nation. The consequences of ethnocentrism are political instability, lack of opportunity to speak with one voice, political aggrandizement, ethnic violence, injustice, inequity and interethnic and intra-ethnic war (Adebayo, 2001:105; Ugwuegbu, 1995:6). All these are repugnant to the values of participatory democracy.

Personality Profile of the Nigerian Politician

Various authors, including Lasswell and Maslow, have acknowledged the fact of human needs and values. The state, governments, political parties and politicians derive their essence and existence from these values (Adebayo, 1997). They exist to configure and satisfy human needs and actualize human values. Politics, being the game of who gets what, when, and how; is a means by which the state authoritatively allocates these values.

Political parties help members of a state to play politics by articulating human values and providing alternative procedures for their configurations, thus creating elements of choice. But not all citizens of a state can belong to political parties because of the full-time nature of politics and political membership and the sterling personality traits required of politicians. While in advance democracies like Europe and America, politicians have been known to possess sterling traits like intellectuality, discipline, intelligence, honesty, tenacity of purpose, creativity, credibility, reasonableness, patriotism, clear-mindedness, mindfulness, rectitude and altruism; Nigeria politicians have been found wanting in these sterling traits of leadership (Agagu, 1997).

Although it sounds simplistic and reductionistic to attribute the love of development in both human and material resources in the United States of America and Britain to solely the personality traits of the politicians in these polities, but one cannot resist the temptation, especially when their actions and behaviours in promoting participatory democracy are juxtaposed with their Nigerian counterparts whose behaviours have been largely antidemocratic. Western Europe and America have experienced relative political stability of the past five decades; while Nigeria, with 45 years of existence has experienced four Republics, five military interregnums, and, a civil war, in addition to numerous ethno-religious violence. There is no gainsaying the fact that without political stability the state becomes unable to address the issue of configuration of human values. No wonder, there is mass sorrow rather than mass happiness. Nigeria has become one of the twenty poorest nations in the world (World Bank, 1991). The standard of living of Nigerians is at its lowest. The Naira has been devalued beyond imaginations (Essien, 1992)

While political leaders from western Nigeria were hell-bent against interim government and clamoured for the actualization of the June 12, 1993 election success, as evident in the editorial reports of most of the Nigeria Newspapers at the period; their counterparts from the East threatened secession if the issue of June 12 was considered. On the other hand, northern politicians promised fire and brimstone if the winner of the election was allowed to take the mantle of office. The uncoordinated actions of our politicians in the above situations and in many other situations as argued by Agagu (1997) suggest that no sublime democratic values govern the conduct of our political leaders. The values that emerged were the opposite of Lasswellian values; instead of justice, they were mouthing peace and stability, instead of enlightening, they were misinforming, instead of honesty, they were displaying dishonesty; instead of esteem they were demonstrating high self-abnegation, instead of being collaborative, they became avoidant; and instead of being elastic, they were politically corruptive and instead of nationalism they were ethnocentric and egocentric.

The Problematic of Drawing Personality Profile of the Nigerian Politicians

In attempting to analyse the personality of the Nigerian politicians, some contending questions readily come to mind.

- i. Does the Nigerian politician have a personality different from the personality of the general populace or the other members of the civil society?
- ii. Is his/her personality different from the personality of politicians in other places outside the shores of Nigeria?
- iii. What engendered these personality differences; if there are any?
- iv. What proportion of biology and learning is responsible for the Nigerian politician's personality?
- v. Are Nigerian politicians homogenous in behaviour?
- vi. What are the traits of the Nigerian politician's personality?

To answer these questions, there is need to look at some theories and see how they fit into the present attempt at describing the Nigerian politician personality.

A. The Politician as a Leader

This theory suggests that politicians are leaders and like all leaders they possess attributes which may not be found in followers. While followers may be mediocre, leaders are expected to be more intelligent, persuasive, self-confident, and industrious than their followers. The ten often listed areas where leaders excel more than followers are in friendliness, technical knowledge and skill, ability to take action in the pursuit of group goals, human relations skills, need to be effective and to achieve, emotional balance and control, administrative ability, dominance, control and decisiveness (Bakare, 1990).

Although no empirical research work has been carried out to compare Nigerian politicians with other Nigerians on the leadership traits mentioned above, the responses of politicians in facing the challenges of military adventurism has not shown that they possess the above traits in the quantity that could suggest that they are superior to the populace. Indeed Agagu (*op. cit*) has credited them with anti-democratic behaviour both in the First, Second and Third Republics. Ojo (1997:110) has implied that the Nigerian politician is not different from the populace since they are part and parcel of the civil society that is weak, beleaguered by the authoritarian state, divisive, alienated, and "non-combative in the struggle for democracy". Sometimes, however, where the populace had become more proactive in resisting military incursion with vehemence, the political class more often lost its voice. Where the populace had demonstrated that they could not be settled, bribed and corrupted, the politician had often sold out. When monies

changed hands, politicians become ready tools in the hands of megalomaniac military heads of state. It is no surprise that politicians become easily recruited into the Association for Better Nigeria and the two-million man march for General Sanni Abacha. Politicians had often blown hot and cold, issuing communiqués to support the perpetration of military dictatorship and maximum rule and at the same time mouthing democratic tenets.

But to conclude on the basis of this factor that Nigerian politicians lack leadership qualities is to ignore the situation that produced the Nigerian politician and the attendant settlement syndrome.

B. The Nigerian Politician and Poverty

Poverty, as a basis for characterizing the Nigerian politician, is not unique. We have earlier used it to characterize the civil society. Eze (1983) has suggested that the typical Nigerian has a Hungry-Greedy-Corrupt-Manipulable personality. Poverty or the fear of it makes Nigerian politicians hungry and are motivated by lower-order needs unlike in advance countries where politicians are motivated by higher-order needs like esteem, self-actualization, cognitive differentiation, patriotism and altruism. Lower order needs predispose Nigerian politicians to corruption and manipulation. Mundane reinforcement like money, motor cars, buildings and other things often influence them in forming their opinions, pitching their tent, forming consensus in decision-making and crossing carpet. The figure below demonstrates how economic poverty perpetuates itself through lower order needs, negative alignment, and misgovernment.

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


Figure 2: The Vicious Social-Psychological Effect of Poverty on Political Misbehaviour

Consequently, Nigerian politicians lose their orientation as leaders, forget the purpose for which they are elected, make antidemocratic statements and elicit antidemocratic behaviour, loot the purse of the state, misgovern and thereby unwittingly invite military intervention to perpetual economic poverty.

But not all politicians are motivated by lower order needs and those who are so induced may not be because of economic poverty alone. Politician whose actions are governed by higher order needs may still be found in trickles.

C The Politician and the Perception of two Publics

Ekeh (1975), in an attempt to explain corruption, has suggested the existence of two publics; the civic and the primordial public. These publics may be the cause of the undemocratic and corrupt behaviour of the Nigerian politician. These two publics generate in the mind of citizens two different kinds of morality. Money may be stolen from the civic public and used to develop the primordial public. This dual perception is peculiar to colonized states like Nigeria where people have not come to develop psychological sense of community toward the civic public.

Differential perception of civic and primordial public has generated the mentality of sharing the national cake rather than helping to bake it. Politicians are much more concerned about how much of the national cake they could grab to their 'primordial' which is their hometowns or ethnic groups. The consequence is fickleness of thought, corruption of procedure, misappropriation of common wealth, dishonesty in allocating values and the paying of lip service to national peace and stability.

The Business of Metaphor and the Characterology of the Nigerian Politician

Each of the above theories assumes that politicians have similar characters and traits. This may not be necessarily valid. While there are politicians without leadership qualities, there are also politicians with lower-order motivation, while there are others with higher-order motivation and just as there are politicians who experience dual perception of the state there may equally be politicians in whom perception of the public is unitary. The long and short of this is that it is not plausible to posit common personality traits or a uniform personality type to describe all Nigerian politicians.

Metaphor, according to Morris (1972) has become very important among psychologists in describing persons. Morris mentioned six types of metaphor that have been variously used. These are the building metaphor, the engineering metaphor, the agricultural metaphor, the

zoological metaphor, the medical metaphor and the theatrical metaphor. He employed the theatrical metaphor in describing three aspects of the person in social life. While theatrical metaphors may help in the “genuine illumination of human conditions and enables human beings to be seen in their full humanity” (Morris, 1972) they may fail in representing human instinctual drives and disposition which may not necessarily make us human but without which we can not be human.

It is on this note that Cadwallader (1985) employed the animal metaphors to describe four approaches to life. Other psychologists like Kelly (1955) and Fromm (1963) have used the scientist and the business metaphors respectively. Fromm recognizes five business orientations, four of which are unproductive. These are receptive orientation, exploitative orientation, hoarding orientation, marketing orientation and productive orientation. Attempt shall be made to use these metaphoric orientations to characterize types of the Nigerian politician.

1. **The Politician as a receiver:** This politician feels and sees the source of all political good as coming from outside. All political goods must be received from the outside. The outside may be the military, other dominant ethnic groups and a colonial master, etc. The politician as a receiver is discriminate in his/her choice of political objects, because being recognized politically is an overwhelming experience for him/her that she/he falls for anybody who gives him/her the political objects she or he needs. The politician as a receiver is the proverbial political prostitute, good listener and political accommodator; she/he receives without producing ideas. The characterizing traits of the politician as a receiver are passivity, initiativelessness, opinionlessness, servility, self-abnegatedness, unrealisticness, cowardliness, spinelessness, gullibility and sentimentality. Eghagha (1994:9) captured the receptive orientation of the Nigerian politician in his essay titled *Actors in a Political Tragedy*” when he opines that:

In terms of characters therefore, we have had men and women who are flexible to the point of weakness, compromising to the point of impotence, and principled only as men of low honour could be as leaders.

2. **The politician as the Exploiter:** The source of all political good for the politician as the exploiter is outside and must be sought there. Politicians as the exploiter expect no political gains to be given on a platter of love; rather he/she takes political advantage over other politicians and followers by grabbing and by stealing. In conflict management language, the politician as an exploiter is competitive, aggressive, egocentric, conceited, rash, arrogant and seducing. He has a high concern for himself, low concern for other politicians; low concern for the electorate if that will give a political edge and low concern for the nation.

3. **The Politician as the Hoarder:** The hoarding politician believes that all sources of good emanates from him and attempts to hoard this source. He is not disposed towards taking the ideas of other politicians or making his own ideas available. The hoarder as a politician has no faith in anything new. He wants to preserve the status quo, the domination of his/her ethnic group over other ethnic group, his/ her continuation in power at the risk of alienating other people. Characteristically, the politician as a hoarder is unimaginative, stingy, suspicious, cold lethargic, anxious, stubborn, indolent, obsessional and possessive.
4. **The Politician as the Marketer:** He or she sees every political transaction from the market point of view and his/her predominant motive is making he/her sellable. She/he claims the attributes that she/he does not possess and as long as she/he can sell himself, nothing matters. With no committed values or principles his/her predominant values is the exchange value. She/he as a marketer only needs to know what personality is in most demand and only to package himself /herself to meet that specification. The politician as a marketer sees himself as the bride to be pursued by many suitors and neither aesthetics nor rectitude influence her choice of a suitor, but his wealth. She/he, thus, becomes a tool in the hands of other politicians who find him/her a ready tool for their dastardly activities.

Characteristically, the politician as a marketer has the traits of a typical marketer; opportunism, inconsistency, childishness, impulsivity, aimlessness, tactlessness, relativism, over-restiveness, silliness, wastefulness and indiscriminatingness. He/she can be in Alliance for Democracy today and tomorrow she/he is found in People's Democratic Party. Her/his philosophy is "no permanent friend".

5. **The Politician as the Producer:** She/he enjoys her/his freedom and does not suffer dependency and has high productive capacity. The productive politician is reasonable and uses his/her power reasonably. She/he is productively related to his/her own world being capable of living she/he can penetrate boundaries that are apparently impermeable for the receptive, the marketing, the exploiting and the hoarding politicians. She/he as a leader is creative, transcendental, transformational and imaginative. To crown it all the productive politician is a moral exemplar.

Conclusion and Recommendation

From the foregoing, it is evident that a thriving participatory democracy breeds liberal society and promotes liberal - minded personality which invariably brings about a sane society. These are only possible in an instance of the existence of a healthy environment and the existence of sane politicians. The Nigerian politicians however, as noted by ESE (1975) are hungry, greedy, manipulable, and corrupt. Thus, they destroy the Nigerian political, economic and social environment

It seems to be that the failure to attain the disannulment of June 12, 1993 election is consequent upon the types of characterless politicians that walk the political terrain (e.g. receptor, hoarder, marketer, exploiter). These are the politicians that are more eager to negotiate the hard-earned political freedom of democracy for a pot of portage. They are military court jesters, ethicists, political jobbers, and politicians of ethnic exclusion and ethnic domination.

If democracy must thrive in Nigeria, then we need to develop productive politicians; politicians who, with their deep vision and sublime mission, can turn around the political misfortune of Nigeria.

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Power in Social Organization: A Sociological Review

Md. Saidul Islam*

Abstract:

Since power is a pervasive yet contentious feature in social organization and therefore a central concept in sociology, it necessitates an adequate sociological review. As an interactive process with no monolithic character, social power has both intended and unintended effects for either promotive or a preventive purpose. Methods of exerting social power include force, dominance, authority, attraction, ideology, and discipline, though any specific situation may include more than one form, and sometimes in an overlapping manner. This paper discerns four conspicuous perspectives of social power in modern sociology: Marxist, Elitist, Pluralist and Foucaultian. None of these are formal theories; nevertheless, these broad perspectives tend to shape the overall manner in which sociologists view the role of power in social organization.

Introduction:

"Every social act is an exercise of power, every social relationship is a power equation, and every social group or system is an organization of power" (Howley, 1963: 422).

Power is the most fundamental process of social life, and hence one of the most central concepts in Sociology. However, it was perhaps one of the least studied and least understood concepts/subjects for long time. In the 1860s, the notion of power was quite evident in the sociological writings of Karl Marx (1818-1883). In early 1900s, power was a critical factor in Max Weber's (1864-1920) writings. After that most sociologists, especially in North America, overlooked power for several decades. As Olsen and Marger (1993) show that American sociology was for long dominated by two foci that did not involve power: (a) social psychological concerns with the behavior of individual in society, and (b) Parsonian theory with its emphasis on value consensus and normative expectations.

At last, sociology re-discovered social power. The rediscovery began in 1950s with the publication of two pivotal books: Floyd Hunter's *Community Power Structure* in 1953 which demonstrates the exercise of power in communities, and C. Wright Mill's *Power Elite* in 1956 that sparks a lively debate about the role of elite in modern societies. In 1960s many American sociologists began to pay attention to Marx's writings, and tried to interpret and re-interpret his theoretical ideas. In 1960s, over race relations, poverty and other critical problems, conflict erupted in the USA which consequently laid radicalizing effort on the cohort of American

* PhD Candidate, Graduate Programme in Sociology, York University, Canada. Email: saidul99@yorku.ca

sociologists to enter in the field of power and made them aware of the role of power in social organizations (Olsen and Marger, 1993, Lukes 1986). The understanding of power, albeit in a new form, was brought to light in western academia by the writings of Michel Foucault in 1970s and post-Foucaultian authors in 1990s.

Today, the exercise and structuring of social power is a major concern not only within political sociology, but also in other areas of sociology. Recently, power becomes one of the focal points in the areas of environment and development. This paper will make a comprehensive survey and analysis, albeit concisely, on the nature of social power and its role in social organization, and different perspectives on social power.

Nature and Characteristics of Social Power

Power is not a monolithic concept, and hence has no universally accepted single definition. There are, however, some conspicuous problems in defining social power.¹ Nevertheless, we can deduce the essential idea stressed by most writers while attempting to define social power that *power is the ability to affect social activities*.² It is, as Olsen and Marger (1993) claim, a 'dynamic process, not a static possession, that pervades all areas of social life' (p. 1). Sociologists are usually concerned with broad and relatively stable patterns of power, mainly for analytic convenience, rather than with every isolated and minute instance of power exertion. The idea of affecting social activities logically implies overcoming whatever resistance, opposition or limitation may be encountered. Nevertheless, reference to resistance adumbrates that the exercise of power is usually a reciprocal process among all participants, and is rarely determined by a single actor no matter how unequal the situation may appear (Olsen 1986). Hence, two ideas are central

¹ As with energy in physical world, power pervades all dynamic social phenomena; yet it can not be directly observed or measured (Olsen, 1970). Secondly, English language does not contain a verb "to power", and therefore when we discuss power in dynamic terms, we must either attach a verb to it (such as exercising social power) or use verbs as "influence" or "control" (Olsen and Marger, 1993). Thirdly, Dennis H. Wrong (1993) found five major problems in defining social power: First, there is the issue of *intentionality* of power, and secondly, of its *effectiveness*. The *latency* of power, its dispositional nature is a third problem. The *unilateral* or *asymmetrical* nature of power relations implied by the claim that some persons have an effect on others without a parallel claim that the reverse may also be the case is fourth problem. A final question is of *the nature and effects produced* by power: must they be overt and behavioral, or do purely subjective, internal effects count also?

² Bertrand Russell, for example, defines power as 'the capacity of some persons to produce intended and foreseen effects on others' (cited in Olsen and Marger 1993). According to Max Weber (1993) 'power (*macht*) is the probability that one actor within a social relationship will be in a position to carry out his/her own will despite resistance, regardless of the basis on which this probability rests' (p. 37), while quite similarly Robert Dahl (1986) sees 'power as the control of behavior' (p. 37). Weber's and Dahl's approaches both focus on the idea of "power over" which has been rejected by Hannah Arendt (1986) being too narrow. She speaks rather of political institutions as "manifestations and materialization of power". Like Arendt, Talcott Parsons (1986) also rejects the Weberian view of power as 'highly selective'. Power for Parsons is a system resource, a 'generalized facility or resource in the society', analogous to many, which enables the achievements of collective goals through the agreement of members of society to legitimize leadership positions whose incumbents further the goals of the system, if necessary by the use of 'negative sanction' (see also Lukes 1986). Therefore, Parsons' version of power is both 'coercion' and 'consensus', which depends on 'institutionalization of authority'.

to the notion of social power: (a) social power is a generalized rather than a narrowly limited capacity and (b) the exercise of power necessitates overcoming resistance.

The notion of “influence” and “control” are used by some writers as synonyms to “power”, while many distinguish “power” from these concepts usually on the ground that “the effects of power on the recipient are to some extent involuntary, while ‘influence’ and ‘control’ are seen as producing a motivational change within affected individuals so that they more or less willingly comply” (Olsen, 1986: 3). In this view, “influence” refers to overt participation, whereas “control” rests largely on unconscious norm internalization. The distinction may seem arbitrary, since “what begins as wholly involuntary compliance may over time shift to willing cooperation, while what seems to be voluntary compliance may be simply a decision to abide by an inescapable directive” (Olsen 1986: 3). Therefore, a more meaningful use of these terms is to keep social power as the inclusive or generic concept, with “influence” and “control” used to describe the determinateness of possible outcomes as seen from the perspective of power wielder: “the exercise of social power can vary from relatively indeterminate social influence to relatively determinate social control, depending on the type and amount of power being exerted and the relative power of the other actors involved” (Olsen and Marger, 1993: 1-2).

The actors who exercise power can be organizations (from small group to total societies) as well as individuals. In the former case, the activity is sometimes called “organizational” or “inter-organizational” power while in the later case, it is referred to as “personal” or “interpersonal” power (Olsen 1986; Olsen and Marger, 1993). Unlike social psychology, which studies interpersonal power relations, sociology views power as entirely ‘social’ and ‘organizational’. Someone might have ‘personal power’, but that is not an isolated phenomenon, rather connected with, and contingent upon, his/her location in society or social organization. “Although it is of course true that relationships among organizations are carried out by individuals enacting organizational roles, it is nevertheless the organization as a whole- not individual spokesmen for the organization- which is wielding power” (Olsen, 1986: 3).

Within the dynamics of power exertion process, if power relationship becomes an established feature of any pattern of social ordering, they can be regarded as structural characteristics of that organization. Max Weber (1978) and more recently Anthony Giddens (1984) have both referred to such structured patterns of social power as “domination” and have emphasized their perpetuation, stability and relative predictability in social life.

From the analysis and the debate around the notion of social power by different sociologists, we can discern some conspicuous characteristics of social power, as summarized from Olsen and Marger (1993: 2-3):

- (a) As social power is an *interactive process*, it always resides within social interaction and relationships, never in individual actors. A single actor may possess resources that provide a potential basis for exerting social power, but power does not exist until it is expressed in the actions of two or more actors as a dynamic activity. Moreover, both the power attempt made by an exerter and the resistance offered by a recipient are crucial in determining the actual power exercised in any situation.
- (b) The ability of an actor to exercise social power can be either *potential* or *active* at any given time. An actor exercises potential power when he or she possesses resources, is capable of employing them, and indicates that possibility to others. Power becomes active when those resources are actually converted into actions toward others.
- (c) Power exertion is a *purposeful activity* that is intended to others in certain ways, but it may also have unintended effects. Most sociologists restrict the concept of power to actions that are intended to affect the recipient, because otherwise virtually every action by every actor could be labeled as power exertion. The issue of intentionality is clouded in many situations, however, by three features of many power actions. First, for strategic reasons, actors often attempt to hide or disguise the purpose of their power wielding, attempting to influence others without others' being aware of it. Second, power can be exerted indirectly through intermediaries, a process that can mask the primary intentions. Third, in addition to its intended outcomes, an exercise of power can have numerous unintended (and sometimes unrecognized) consequences for others.
- (d) The exercise of social power can effect the actions and ideas in either of two directions. It can enable or cause actors to do things they would not otherwise do, or it can hinder or prevent them from doing things they would otherwise do. In other words, power can be used in either *promotive* or a *preventive* manner. If we wish to emphasize the preventive use of power, we may speak of exercising power *over* others to control them. If we wish to emphasize its promotive use, we may speak of exercising power *with* others to attain common goals. The first expression often conveys the value that power exertion is undesirable because it restricts people's freedom of action, whereas the second expression conveys the value that power is desirable for collective endeavors.
- (e) The interactions and exchanges that occur between participants when power is exerted can vary from evenly *balanced* to grossly *unbalanced*. In relative balanced situations, each actor exerts approximately the same amount of influence or control on the other actor(s), so that everyone receives approximately equal benefits. In a highly unbalanced situation, one, or a few actors, exerts much greater influence or control than everyone else and consequently

receives most of the benefits. Relatively balanced power is usually more stable and is viewed as more desirable than highly unbalanced power conditions, although, for various reasons, the latter often occur.

Forms of social power

There are various ways in exerting social power. Six fairly distinct types or forms of social power are frequently discussed by sociologists: force, dominance, authority, attraction, ideology, and discipline, though any specific situation may include more than one form, and sometimes in an overlapping manner.

(a) Force: According to Olsen (1993), force is a form of social power that involves “the intentional exertion of social pressures on others to achieve desired outcomes” (p. 29). Olsen and Marger (1993) add that when exerting force, an actor brings pressures to bear on the intended recipient by giving or withholding specific resources to threatening to do so. The actor must therefore commit particular resources to that interaction and expend them to whatever extent is necessary to obtain the intended outcomes. Amita Etzioni (1964, 1993) identified three different forces to exert social power. (i) With *utilitarian* force (also called ‘inducement’ or ‘compensation’), the recipient is given desired benefits in return for compliance; (ii) with *coercive* force (also called ‘constrain’ or ‘deprivation’), punishments are meted out or benefits are suspended to obtain compliance; (iii) with *pervasive* force (also called ‘information’ or ‘communication’) messages are conveyed that alter the recipient’s beliefs, values, attitudes, emotions, or motivations in an attempt to produce compliance.

(b) Dominance: Dominance is a “form of social power that results from the performance of established roles or functions” (Olsen 1993: 31). While exerting dominance, an actor effectively carries out a set of established activities or social roles on a regular basis. To the extent that others depend on performances of those activities, they are vulnerable to being enforced or controlled by that actor. This form of power, as Olsen and Marger (1993) explains, does not require the commitment of any additional resources to the interaction, but relies entirely on the successful performance of the dominant actor’s usual activities or roles. The ability to exert dominance depends heavily on one’s position in a social network or organization, so that the closer an actor’s position to the top or centre of the social structure, the greater the possibility of dominance.

(c) Authority: “When exerting authority, an actor draws on a grant of legitimacy made by the recipient as a basis for using authoritative directives” (Olsen and Marger 1993: 4). As the legitimacy has been voluntarily granted by those subject to the directives, they are

expected to comply with them. Olsen (1993) explains that legitimacy is sometimes granted to an actor through direct procedures such as formal votes or informal agreements, but more commonly it is indirectly expressed as one joins an organization, remains a member of it, and supports the action of its leaders who claim legitimacy.

Max Weber (1947: 324-325; 1993: 39-47) identified four bases on which legitimate authority often rests within societies: *rational knowledge* or expertise relevant to specific situations; *legal rights* based on formal arrangements; *traditional beliefs* and values sanctified by time; and *charismatic appeal* of revered leaders to their followers.³ In addition to this, Olsen (1993) mentions another form of authority, which rest on *passive acceptance*. It comes from established customs and conventions. The recipients do not overtly grant legitimacy to the authority wielder but simply follow his/her directives out of habit, an act that constitutes an implicit grant of legitimacy. Authority is by far the most stable form of power exertion⁴.

(d) Attraction: Olsen (1993) defines attraction as a “form of social power that lies in the ability of an actor to affect others because of who he or she is” (p. 33). When exercising attraction, an actor draws on diffuse appeal that he or she has for others in order to influence them. That appeal, unlike a grant of legitimacy, may have no connection with social power. A skillful actor may be able, nevertheless, to transform that appeal into power exertion with which others voluntarily comply. Olsen (1993) identifies three common sources of appeal/attraction, which are cognitive *identification* with, positive *feelings* toward, and attribution of *charisma* to an individual or an organization. Attractive power is often unstable and transitory, but at times becomes extremely compelling.

(e) Ideology: Karl Marx is credited for uncovering and theorizing the concept of ideology, albeit different from what we conventionally understand what ideology is. Ideology, to Marx, is a reified cover – used by the Bourgeoisie, the dominant class in the society who control the means of production and hence difference sources or resources of power –

³ According to the analysis of Olsen (1993), Weber combined the first and the second bases under the headings of “rational-legal authority”, because he thought that they were usually combined in modern societies; but subsequent research has demonstrated that much of the time they are quite separate.

⁴ In the present world, we can discern many other forms of authority in which compliance is often gained through shrewd and unlawful, if not forceful, means, like: (a) *Diplomatic bribery and intimidation* were two major methods adopted by the USA to get formal support from other countries to go for war in Afghanistan and Iraq. (b) *Social construction* is both empowering and disempowering. For example, after the demise of the USSR, Samuel Huntington constructed the world as “Unipolar” in which the USA is the only superpower to dominate the world politics. This kind of construction has two dreadful consequences. First, it gives an unprecedented status and power to the USA, and instigates to strengthen her domination over the globe at any cost. Secondly, it overlooks the consistency and existence of other civilizations alongside the American one. (c) *Authority based on greater causes*, like to spread democracy, human rights, liberation as the USA did in Afghanistan and then in Iraq. Recent efforts have been made to present these “greater causes” for the USA’s justification for the occupation of Iraq. (d) *The principle of might is right*: Forceful compliance, and seeking for legitimization after action. (e) *Institutionalization*: Institution becomes an authority to legitimize. It creates knowledge of who has the authority to speak, and for whom and to what extent.

that obscures the power relation between bourgeoisie and the proletariat, and mask the exploitation of the latter class. Ideology is put forward as not only what is believed in as a form of doing a certain kind of thought or belief, “an active epistemological gesture” (Himani 2001: 27), whose method of production is uncovered by the “three tricks” that have been paraphrased by Dorothy Smith (1990) from Karl Marx:

Trick 1: Separate what people say they think from the actual circumstances in which it is said, from the actual empirical conditions of their lives, and from the actual individuals who said it.

Trick 2: Having detached the ideas, arrange them to demonstrate an order among them that accounts for what is observed. (Marx and Engels describe this as making “mystical connections”).

Trick 3: Then change the ideas into a “person”, that is, set them up as distinct entities (for example, a value pattern, norm, belief system and so forth) to which agency (or possible causal efficacy) may be attributed. And redistribute them to “reality” by attributing them to actors who can now be treated as representing the ideas.

A clear analysis of Marxist notion of power will be discussed in the coming section.

(f) Discipline, Discourse and Knowledge: There is a dialectical relation between knowledge and power: Knowledge is power and power produces knowledge. The notion of governmentality, as propounded by Michel Foucault, is particularly important here. In the coming section, it will be discussed in detail.

Theoretical Perspectives on Social Power

Up to 1970s, three principal theoretical perspectives on social power pervade sociological thought: Marxian (or class) theory, elite theory, and pluralist theory. After 1970s, with the writings of Michel Foucault, a novel understanding of power has been added to the sociological thought. None of these are formal theories; nevertheless, these broad perspectives tend to shape the overall manner in which sociologists view the role of power in social organization. A brief illustration of each theory has been given below:

I: The Marxian Perspective

Political philosophers from Plato onward have written extensively on the exercise of power, and most of them linked their discussion of power to the state, seeing government, and related organizations like military as the main foci of power in society. Karl Marx (1818-1883) must be singled out as he broke sharply with this tradition. He argued instead that power originates

primarily in economic production, that it permeates and influences all aspects of society, that the principal units within power dynamics are social classes, the main wielder of social power in society, and the government is largely a servant of the dominant social class (Bottomore and Rubel 1956; Olsen 1970). Marx thus expanded the concept of power from an especially political phenomenon to a ubiquitous social process and offered a theory of societal development based on the exercise of power.⁵

There are three major components of Marxian theoretical perspective as identified by Dahrendorf (1962) and Schumpeter (1962): a sociological model based on the primacy of economically generated social power; a historical model describing the process of dialectical social change; and a connecting thesis, that is, social classes in conflict.

The sociological model that underlies all Marxian theory is often called “materialistic” conception of history (Heilbroner, 1980), or “base-superstructure” model (Wacquant, 1985). When we relate them to social power, both of them carry inappropriate connotations. Olsen and Marger (1993) use a more precise term “economic-base power model” of society. This model contains two principal arguments.

First, *all societies rest on an economic foundation or base*. Mankind’s need for food, shelter, housing, and energy are central in understanding the socio-cultural system. “The first historical act is”, Marx writes, “the production of material life itself.” Unless men and women successfully fulfill this act there would be no other. All social life is dependent upon fulfilling this quest for a sufficiency of eating and drinking, for habitation and for clothing. The quest to meet basic needs was human’s primary goal.

As people must produce goods and services in order to survive and attain any goals, the economic production processes – which Marx calls “modes of production”- that prevail in a society constitute the foundation on which other aspects of social life rest. Societies may contain several modes of production; nevertheless, one of them, at any given time, tends to dominate the economy and hence is the society’s “dominant mode of production”. Thus feudal society is dominated by a ‘feudal mode of production’ (agriculture) in which the class of landlords extracts a surplus from a rural population bound to the land; in modern capitalist

⁵ It’s important to mention here that Marx’s ideas have been expanded, modified, altered, and to some extent fabricated by different Marxist theorists in countless ways. Consequently, several competing schools of Marxist theory presently exist. The fundamental tenets of Marxist thought expounded here are generally accepted by most Marxists.

society the mode of production is manufacturing. The economic base and its dominant mode of economic production shapes and influences other features of society – known as “superstructure” – that includes all other social institutions such as government, education, culture, ideas, beliefs, and values. It does not mean that the rest of the society is determined by economic base; however, other parts of the society may contain some functional autonomy, and may, to some extent, influence the economic base (Botomore and Rubel 1956; Schumpeter 1962; Olsen and Marger 1993).

Second, a mode of production contains two components – forces of production and means of production. *Forces of production* includes all those factors that determine how that kind of economic production is preferred: it's necessary resources, relevant technology, production techniques, labour force, organizational structures, division of labour, and so on. All these forces are important within the economy; nevertheless, their effects are limited to their own realm of activity. *Relations of Production* consists of the social, economic, political, and legal arrangements that define who owns and/or controls that mode of economic production process. In addition to linking a mode of production with the rest of the society, *the relations of production constitute the primary source of social power*. Because of the functional primacy of the economic base in any society, whoever owns or controls its dominant mode of economic production will have access to its major resources and hence will become the principal wielder of social power in that society. In other words, whoever controls the dominant mode of economic production in a society will determine how the existing technology will be utilized and how the resulting resources will be distributed, with the consequences that these persons will exercise power throughout the total society (Botomore and Rubel 1956; Schumpeter 1962; Olsen and Marger 1993).

This theoretical perspective gave Marx a key to understanding the power dynamics of all societies, but it did not explain long-term trends in human history. For this, he turned to the idea of dialectic social change that Olsen and Marger (1993) calls “dialectic social evolution” (p. 76). From philosopher G.W.F. Hegel, Marx took the dialectic model and applied it to historical social change. This model consists of three stages: (a) An initial thesis, or existing set of social condition; (b) An alternative anti-thesis, or radically different set of conditions that develop from the initial conditions, but not necessarily the complete opposite of the first stage; and (c) An integrating synthesis, or wholly new set of conditions that emerges from both the thesis and antithesis conditions, contains portion of both of them, and resolves the fundamental contradictions inherent in each of them. That synthesis then becomes the thesis for a succeeding dialectic, so that, theoretically, the process can continue indefinitely (Marx et al

1975). The dialectic process was for Marx not an inherent tendency within human society, but rather an analytical tool with which to explain broad sweep of human history – at least in Western Europe. In other words, dialectic change is never inevitable, but when major social changes do occur, they tend to follow the dialectic process (Zeitlin 1976).

Marx would have left two fundamental questions unanswered if he had ended his analysis at this point. First, what are the segments of society, which compete for the control of the means of production and how do they relate to one another? Second, why won't socialism become the thesis for further dialectic change? He answered both questions by bridging the theoretical gap between his sociological perspective and his philosophy of history with the thesis of conflicting social classes. This thesis consists of a definition of classes, an analysis of the nature of capitalism, and an argument for class conflict and revolution. The opening line of *The Communist Manifesto* states: "The history of all hitherto existing society is the history of class struggles" (Marx 1998). Marx believed that the real struggles within any society were between the different classes with every class struggling for mastery. This is true even among the dominant class which must continually conquer for itself the political mastery of its country. The prevailing class must subjugate the working class, while the middle class tries to maintain its precarious position above the lower class. All the while the lower class is trying to climb up to a higher level. He analyzed the capitalist economic system in great depth to discover why it produced the extreme exploitation of workers he observed in all industrialized societies. He concluded that the dialectic social change would end only if social classes were completely abolished (Olsen 1970).

II: The Elitist Perspective

As a response to Marx's economic-based power model, a new outlook of power, elitist perspective, emerged. Many of the ideas of this power model, however, can be found in the writing of Plato, Machiavelli, and many other philosophers. As a theoretical perspective on social power, elitism was formulated by Vilfredo Pareto (1935), Gaetano Mosca (1939[1986]), and Robert Michels (1962[1911]). The common thesis among these scholars is that the concentration of social power in a "small set of controlling elite" is inevitable in all societies, a thesis that negates the Marx's vision of evolutionary change toward a classless society with power equality. At the same time they held that some social change can occur through gradual circulation of elites without overt class conflict or societal revolution. The basic principles of elitism, as summarized from Michels's (1962[1911]) famous "Iron Law of Oligarchy":

- Within all societies and other larger organizations that function beyond the subsistence level, there have been – and presumably always will be – one or a few set of powerful controlling elites. Regardless of the nature of the government or the economy, there is

always oligarchy, or rule of the few over many. The masses can not and do not govern themselves.

- Although the elites are always a tiny minority of the population, they control a large proportion of the available resources, are usually well-organized, and are quite cohesive. Consequently, the elites are highly effective in wielding power throughout society.
- Elites commonly employ all available means to protect and preserve their power and to enhance it whenever possible. They share power with others only if it is in their self-interest, and they never voluntarily surrender power.
- To rule their society, elites employ a wide variety of techniques. These include controlling the government, dominating the economy, using police and military force, manipulating the educational system and the mass media, sanctioning or eliminating those who oppose them, and creating ideologies (beliefs, values, myths, etc.) that legitimize their power and rule.
- Elites may permit or even encourage limited social change, but only to the extent that they see it as contributing to the goals they seek and not threatening their power. Major social transformations are strongly resisted by the elites.
- As societies are getting increasingly large and complex, the power of the elites tends to be less visible, because it is embedded within numerous organizational social structures. As consequence, however, their rule becomes more pervasive and effective.

In short, the elites exercise most of the power in a society; the masses do not. Therefore, to understand any society, we must examine its powerful elites, the bases of their power, the manner in which they exercise it, and the purpose for which they exert power. Apparently, many tenets of the elitism may seem similar to what Marx said about the “bourgeoisie” class who are minority yet control the whole means of production in a given society. However, two clear differences can be drawn between these two theoretical perspectives. First, Marx views that the rule of the few, the bourgeoisie power, is not an essentialized feature of society, exploitation of the powerless, he calls “proletariat” is inherent in this rule, and there is prospect for social change through revolution. To the proponents of elitism, oligarchy is a necessary condition for, and a common feature of, all societies, and hence they do not see any prospect for revolutionary social change. Secondly, none of the proponents of elitism make explicit reference to the central Marxian concern with economic production and economically based power. Elitists generally focus primarily on the polity and give little or no attention to the economy as a source of social power.

III: The Pluralist Perspective

Despite differences between Marxian and elitist model of social power, both hold a common view that the few elite in a society or organization are the one who exercise the optimum power. The theory of social pluralism rejects that idea, and holds that in modern industrialized democratic societies, power is at least moderately dispersed – and could be extensively *decentralized* if the pluralist model were fully implemented. “Pluralism is, thus, partially an empirical-descriptive model of what is and partially a theoretical-ideal model of what might be” (Olsen and Marger, 1993: 83).

The idea of a division of power in a political system, as a means of preventing tyranny, has been discussed by political philosophers since antiquity. Aristotle pointed out the benefits to be gained from differentiating various governmental activities, and Montesquieu in the eighteenth century stressed the desirability of embodying legislative, executive, and judicial functions in separate bodies. In addition, the federal type of government divides political power along geographical lines, with the national state sharing sovereignty with one or more levels of local government (Olsen 1971).

The pluralist model goes far beyond political system, however, to encompass the entire society. James Madison’s *The Federalist, Number 10*, sketched the main features of this model, but it was Alexis de Tocqueville’s *Democracy in America, Volume 2* (1961[1835]), written in 1930s, that fully developed pluralism as a societal model of power structuring. Tocqueville saw mass equality, created by the breakdown or the absence of traditional hierarchies of feudal authority, as providing fertile ground for the emergence of a “tyranny of the majority” in place of a tyranny of the kings or other elites. His conception of socio-political pluralism was intended to prevent from both forms of tyranny in modern societies (Olsen 1971; Olsen and Marger 1993). As pluralism model has evolved, it has taken three somewhat different forms: elite pluralism, mediation pluralism, and mobilization pluralism.

Elite pluralism, presented by Robert Dahl (1956) and his colleagues, acknowledges the numerous sets of competing elites in modern communities and societies. It asserts, however, that in most settings, “no single set of elites is powerful enough to dominate critical decision making or exert control over the entire community or society” (Olsen and Marger 1993: 84). The power remains moderately dispersed, though various sets of elites may compete with one another for dominance.

Mediation pluralism, which was propounded by Toqueville and later by William Kornhauser (1959) and Robert Presthus (1964), also acknowledges the existence of numerous sets of elites, but allows for the fact that, in many settings, one set of elites may largely dominate the others. Empirically it is close to the Marxian and elitist model of social power; however, it differs sharply from them – in its insistence that “power can be structured to allow non-elites to exert some influence on both competing and dominant elites” (Olsen and Marger 1993: 84). In practice, the extent of this non-elite involvement varies widely, but in theory it could come quite influential. To disperse power and involve non-elites in power processes, the pluralist model calls for “a proliferation of autonomous groups, associations, and other organizations” (p. 84) located throughout a society. These are sometimes called “special interest” associations, or “intermediate” organizations. The intermediate organizations must possess several characteristics if pluralism is to operate effectively, such as,

- The overall network they compose, but not each association, must extend from grassroots up to national government.
- Each organization must also have sufficient resources to exert some amount of influence upward, and those that operate at the national level must wield sufficient power that governmental and other elites pay attention to them and involve them in decision-making processes.
- Each organization must be relatively specialized in its concerns and limited in its power exertion, so that none of them becomes so large and powerful that it can dominate the others. In other words, there must be a rough balance of power among all these organizations.
- The organization must have cross-cutting or overlapping memberships that link them together and prevent individuals from becoming too strongly attached to any single organization.
- The organization must be functionally independent and interrelated so that they need to cooperate as well as compete with one another.
- Finally, there must be widespread acceptance of a set of rules specifying how the organizations will operate in their effects to wield power and influence the government (Olsen and Marger 1993: 84-85).

Mobilization pluralism, as outlined by Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba (1963) and Marvin Olsen (1982), is essentially an extension of the mediation form of pluralist model. It addresses the question of how individual citizens can be mobilized to participate in political system through voting and other political activities. The thesis of mobilization pluralism argues that “citizens can

be mobilized for active political participation through involvement in all kind of non-political organizations and activities” (Olsen and Marger 1993: 86). These include not only voluntary-special interest associations, but also neighborhood and community affairs and decision-making processes within one’s workplace. Two features of this mobilization process are especially noteworthy:

- Mobilization can occur even when the level of social involvement is not extensive; non-active membership in one or two local associations will often lead to greater political activity.
- The mobilization process operates at all social class levels and hence can overcome the political apathy and feelings of powerlessness that are widespread among people with low socio-economic status (p 86).

IV: The Foucaultian Perspective

Much of Foucault's works demonstrate the constructed nature of some of our most established assumptions. Our notions such as power, selfhood, sexuality and reason are shown in his work to be historically contingent cultural products. His studies challenge the influence of German political philosopher Karl Marx and Austrian psychoanalyst Sigmund Freud. Foucault offers new concepts that challenge people’s assumptions about prisons, the police, insurance, care of the mentally ill, gay rights, and welfare. The main influences, I found, on Foucault’s thought are German philosophers Frederick Nietzsche and Martin Heidegger. Foucault’s thought explores the shifting patterns of power within a society and the ways in which power relates to the self. He investigated the changing rules governing the kind of claims that could be taken seriously as true or false at different times in history. He also studies how everyday practices enabled people to define their identities and systematize knowledge; events may be understood as being produced by nature, by human effort, or by God. Foucault argues that each way of understanding things had its advantages and its dangers. In all the books of his last period Foucault seeks to show that Western society has developed a new kind of power he calls bio-power, that is, a new system of control that traditional concepts of authority are unable to understand and criticize. Rather than being repressive, this new power enhances life.

Foucault's historical studies that reveal the power relations inherent in social practices may seem sometimes morally disturbing to many people. However, the intellectual sophistication in his writing, the discovery of power in every facet of society, and creation of a new stream between broad conflict and functional paradigms of Sociology are really astounding.

His notion of governmentality is important to understand the prevalence, continual extension and complexity of power in societies. The term 'governmentality' (*'gouvernementalite'*) is a neologism Foucault presented and explored at the end of the 1970s (Foucault 1979; 1991 and 1984) that implies the establishment of complex social techniques and institutions to intensify and expand the mechanism of control and power over the population in the name of what became known as the 'reason of state'. Governmentality, for Foucault, referred famously to the "conduct of conduct" (2000: 211), a more or less calculated and rational set of ways of shaping conduct and securing rule through a multiplicity of authorities and agencies in and outside of the state and at a variety of special levels, which he calls "art of government" (1979: 5), albeit negatively.

There are two aspects to governmentality in the Foucault's writings. First, it is a concept based on the European historical context. Secondly, it implies a novel definition of power, which has profound implications for our understanding of contemporary political power and in particular public policy. For Foucault, the governmentality is the unique combination of three components: institutional centralization, intensification of the effects of power, and power/knowledge (Foucault 1979; Pignatelli 1993), that denotes "governmental rationality" (Gordon 1991). In speaking of governmentality, Foucault was referring not only to the domain of civil/political government as it is conventionally understood but to a broader domain of discourses and practices that create and administer subjects through the presence of a variety of knowledge-making apparatuses. Most significantly, the focus of a Foucaultian study of policy is on the broader impact of state policy or more exactly on the power effects across the entire social spectrum (macro level) down to individual's daily life (micro level). Governmentality for Foucault refers not to sociologies of rule, but to quote Rose (1999: 21), to the:

studies of stratum of knowing and acting. Of the emergence of particular regimes of truth concerning the conduct, ways of speaking truth, persons authorized to speak truth... of the invention and assemblage of particular apparatuses for exercising power... they are concerned with the conditions of possibility and intelligibility for ways of seeking to act upon conduct of others.

For Foucault, governmentality is a fundamental feature of the modern state. Most significantly, Foucault sees state authorities and policies as mobilizing governmentality which tries to incorporate the economy and the population into the political practices of the state in order to be able to govern effectively in a rational and conscious manner (Foucault 1991; Luke 1999). Governmentality, then, applies techniques of instrumental rationality to the arts of everyday management exercised over the economy, the society and the environment.

Recently there have been attempts to extend the concept of governmentality into the realm of development (for example, Watt 2003) and environment (see Luke 1999; Brosius 1999; Escobar

1995; Agrawal 2003; Darier 1999). Éric Darier, for example, deploys Foucault's analytic tools to deconstruct contemporary environmental discourses, specifically the relations and technologies of power/knowledge that underpin them and the effects they have on individual conduct in private, daily life (cf. 1996a, b; 1999). He applies Foucauldian frame to the deployment of citizenship in Canadian environmental discourse to theorize what he calls "environmental governmentality"⁶:

Environmental governmentality requires the use of social engineering techniques to get the attention of the population to focus on specific environmental issues and to instill, in a non-openly coercive manner, new environmental conducts... [T]he challenge for the state is to find ways to make the population adopt new forms of environment conduct. If coercion is not the principal policy instrument, the only real alternative is to make the population adopt a set of new environmental values, which would be the foundation of new widespread environmental ways of behaving. These new environmental values will be promoted by the establishment of an "environmental citizenship" (Darier, 1996b: 595).

The vision of "power-as-repression-and-production" presented in Foucault's *Discipline and Punish* has been both embraced and rejected by many scholars. Foucault himself rejected this vision of power at the end of his life. Lukes (2005) calls it both extreme and misleading. However, Foucault's knowledge/power regime propounded in his theory of governmentality is still a powerful framework for many post-modern scholars.

Conclusion:

Based on our sociological understanding of different model of social power, we can discern the following taxonomy of power in social organization:

⁶ The term "Environmental/ Green Governmentality" or "Environmentalty" has first been used by Luke (1995, 1997) who views it as an attempt by transnational environmental organizations to control and dominate environmental policy and activities around the world, but especially in developing countries. See also the collection of essays in Darier (1999). Agrawal's (2003) use of the term is indebted to Luke for the coinage, but is different both in intent and meaning. He attempts to examine more insistently the shifts in subjectivities that accompany new forms of regulation rather than see regulation as an attempt mainly to control or dominate.

Models	SOURCE(S) OF POWER	POWER DYNAMICS	METHODS OF POWER EXERTION
Marxist	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Power emanates from Economic production • Relations of production: the class that control the key means of production 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Minority class (bourgeoisie) exerts power over the majority (proletariat) • Constant conflict towards social change • Prospect for a society for power-equity 	Ideology (by Bourgeoisie) and force or violent revolution (by proletariat)
Elitist	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Focus primarily on polity, and give little attention to the economy as a source of power • Small set of controlling elite, oligarchy 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Oligarchy is necessary/inevitable for social organization • Hence, no need for social change towards power equity • Masses do not govern themselves, rather need to be governed 	All means: force, dominance, authority, ideology and knowledge
Pluralist	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Many actors (power is not centralized to a few, but decentralized so as to be exerted by many) • Space for everyone to be of power, non-elite, many interest groups involve in power exertion. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Elite pluralism: more than one elites compete for power • Mediation pluralism: among many elites, one set of elite tend to dominate • Mobilization pluralism: to mobilize individuals to participate in decision-making process 	Decentralization, mobilization, cross-cutting membership etc.
Foucaultian	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Knowledge • Discipline • Institutions 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Bio-power: a new system of control that traditional concepts of authority are unable to understand and criticize • Rather than being repressive, this new power enhances life 	Problematization, institutionalization, and normalization of power

Power is one of the most pivotal as well as contentious concepts in sociology. Despite having contested and ambiguous nature, power remains a useful analytic tool in sociology as well as other disciplines of social sciences. Discourse of development is, for instance, comprised of, among many other sub-schools, four conspicuous paradigms: Marxist/dependency, liberal/modernization, community-based resource management (CBRM), and post-modern critique of development, drawn from the understanding of power from different perspectives discussed in this article. Dependency paradigm of development (see, Martin Khor 2001, Hoogvelt 2001) is based on the Marxist understanding of power; modernization paradigm embraces the elitist vision of power (e.g., Rostow 1960, Hunt 1989) while CBRM is drawn from pluralist model of power (Brosius et al 1998; Lynch and Talbot 1995; Li 2002). Post-modern critique of development (development as knowledge/power apparatus) propounded by Ferguson (1990), Escobar (1995), Luke (1999), Brosius (1999), Islam (2005), McMichael (2000) and some others is based on Foucaultian understanding of power. A comprehensive analysis of, and debate around,

all perspectives of power has a good possibility to provide us with a better understanding of this important yet complex and contentious concept in social organization.

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Corruption by Example: Legalizing the Illegal as a Means of Survival in Modern Nigeria

Olufayo Olu-Olu*

Abstract

This study examines the behavioural consequences of the public outcry on corruption by the Nigerian citizens especially the top ranking officers and leaders of government. A sample of 873 respondents cutting across twelve professions was interviewed through a carefully designed questionnaire. The research was complimented with secondary data sourced from other anti-corruption agencies. Findings reveal a total disgust for corruption for its apparent smearing of the country's image in the international community, but that the war against it would be hard to win since the acts are perpetrated by policy makers themselves. It, however, suggested a number of factors which if religiously executed could reduce the cases of corruption to the barest minimum.

Introduction: The problem in perspective

It is an indisputable fact that Nigeria is blessed with abundant human and natural resources. Even though very many of these natural resources have yet to be tapped, the few which are available for our use are enough, given our present population and human resources, to make life comfortable for the average Nigerian. Alarm has been raised in several quarters especially the academic community and by other economic analysts of the inherent danger which our over dependence on the oil sector poses to the nations economy.

This influenced the federal government's determination to source for revenue from other areas such as the Iron and steel, liquefied natural gas, tin oil, all of whose contributions to the Gross national product has remained very insignificant. Efforts are also at top gear to harness other resources such as the gold and bitumen believed to be the second largest in the world. Cocoa, kolanut and groundnut, which were the major sources of foreign exchange before the discovery of oil, appeared to have been revisited due to the encouragement of the government through several inducements to farmers.

It is, however, rather unfortunate that in spite of these human and natural endowments, the nation ranked high among the world's poorest. Hunger exhibits its ugly face in most homes where the average citizen contends with a life of abject poverty. The common man is alienated from himself as he lacks the wherewithal to afford the basic necessities of life such as education, medical

* Department of Sociology, University of Ado-Ekiti, Nigeria. Email: threeolus@yahoo.com

facilities etc. As expected, the life expectancy is low compared with those of the developed nations of the world.

Nigeria's debt just before the recent debt relief pronouncement stood at over \$30 billion with an interest rate which has become unserviceable. The nation became encapsulated in a kind of galloping inflation, which witnessed the collapse of major institutions in the society. The educational sector is bedridden, the manufacturing industries are collapsing, and the health sector is seeking urgent attention while the polity is bedeviled by all sorts of amoral behaviour.

Many have blamed this on several factors including; weak leadership, mismanagement of funds, misplacement of priority and corruption among others. Corruption is one scourge which hinders a nation's growth and development as well as posing serious threats to democratic growth through its promotion of arbitrary rules (Crossette 2004 and Ogus, 2003).

Corruption has no dated history. It is perhaps as old as man and it is endemic in all known societies of the world, be it developed or developing economies. Scolt-Joynt (2001) reported the alarming rate of corruption among top-government functionaries in France, where several of them had criminal charges hanging on them and in Mexico where the people ended a seventy year corrupt regime through a change of baton from the ruling revolutionary party to president Vincente. In the United States, McCain presidential campaign was not without the opposition accusation of graft by the political elite while Germany had a finger sore of kickbacks and favour-broking involving members of the ruling Christian Democratic Party. Even in Vietnam, where leaders of government accused workers of corruption, it was discovered that his own lieutenants were the real culprits.

Moises-Naim (2005) study of some Latin American countries reveals a high level of corruption among others which has either brought about the outright impediment or forced resignation of not less than about a dozen heads of government. The public outcry against the governments of Russia brought about the choice of Vladimir Putin as leader of government. The same could be said of Hugo Chavez of Venezuela and Silvio Berlusconi of Italy (Moises-Naim 2005).

It is disheartening that in spite of the public concern about the issue of corruption in very many of these countries, the scourge persist even to the extent that many believe that society cannot do without it. John Ashcroft, the United Nations Attorney General and a signatory to the pact on corruption eradication expresses the mind of many by describing people's perception of

bribery as “simply part of human nature”, and “a necessary oil to lubricate the wheels of business or even promoted as a normal expense to be deducted from taxes at home”⁷

In Africa, the situation is pathetic, positions of public trust has been turned into a ‘heaven’ for looting public property. Very many past leaders have sold their countries into slavery having looted even loaned money meant for developmental projects. Funny enough, the embezzled money are sent back into banking centers in Switzerland, Cayman Island, Liechtenstein and Luxemburg for further investments in these countries, at the very expense of their impoverished people, (Stevenson 2003).

Nigeria and Zaire were quoted as two nations in Africa which were hard-hit by the act of corruption, losing close to 5 billion dollars each in a couple of years before the signing of the anti-corruption treaty world-wide (Authonio-Costa 2003). This is the situation in very many African countries especially the oil-rich states, where strong Mafia operates, crippling governmental policies and laws aimed at combating it. The founder and the Chief executive of aid agency GOAL, Dishes, provided statistical findings on aids in cash, which were embezzled by the so called leaders of these poor nations. In Indonesia, Mohammed Suharto’s three decades of administration cost his people a whopping 35 billion dollars. Of the 2 billion dollars granted to Zaire (Democratic Republic of Congo) during the over three decades of mal-administration of Mobutu Sese-Seko, about fifty percent of the money ended up in his private account.

In Kenya, an embarrassed Edward Clay, the British High Commissioner, had to recommend the suspension of aid to the country as he considered it of no benefit to the wretched of the earth for whom the aid was meant. He put his reasons aptly thus:

The officials were behaving so gluttonously at the aid, through that they are now vomiting on the shoes of donors’.(Edward Clay: 2004)

It was reported that between 1995 and 2002, countries in sub-Sahara Africa enjoyed over one hundred billion dollars (\$114b) as aid yet they have very little or nothing to show for it.⁸ Based on the aforementioned, Ashea, (2004) advised that corrupt regimes should be excluded from the list of recipient countries saying:

Our government should of course continue to assist the poor, but we must, for our own sake as much as theirs ensure we get the best value for our contribution (O’shea:2004).

This according to him, is to avoid what he called; a waste of tax payers money as well as save donors from such accusation of collusion in ‘criminal activities’.

⁷ (http://www.globalpolicy.org/nations/lauder/general/2003/1210_reveal.htm)

⁸ http://www.globalpolicy.org/nations/lauder/general/2004/1209_aidcorrupt.htm

Given the above, the problem arises as to how to achieve the millennium development goal of reducing at least by half the number of people living in total penury by the year 2015. This is because, in spite of the public outcry against corruption very many countries of the world especially sub-Saharan Africa are perpetrating the act with reckless abandon.

To achieve this objective, the United Nations Convention against Corruption was signed in December 2003. Very many countries of the world have signed the treaty even though many have not fully complied with the rules. Other independent organizations have even formed coalition to fight corruption across the globe. One of such organizations is the Transparency International which has been publishing the corruption perception index in recent years.

Nigeria, which is our focus in this paper, was rated the second most corrupt country in the world during the 2004 corruption perception index. This negative conferment of status has diverted undue attention on the country. The populace especially the media houses have raised alarm on this revealing the known secrets of corrupt officials. The government of President Olusegun Obasanjo has set up commissions to try any identified culprit. The Economic and Financial Crime Commission (EFCC) and the Independent Corrupt Practices and other related Offences Commission (ICPC) was similarly set up with the aim of achieving the objective of minimizing, if not eradicating, corruption in the country.

Several notable Nigerians including past leaders have been accused of corruption but it appears as if the more the allegations, the greater the increase in the corrupt practices of the average Nigerians especially of top government functionaries. One then begins to wonder whether corruption is not just a part of human nature. The questions that arise given the above are:

- (a) Whether corruption is actually seen as an offence or a game in Nigeria.
- (b) Based on (a) above, whether it can be dispensed with in the country.
- (c) Whether the various tribunals and anti-corruption commissions can successfully combat the scourge of corruption in Nigeria.
- (d) Whether the various anti-corruption campaigns can bring about a positive behavioural change especially among Nigeria's leaders

Basic Aim of the Study

The study therefore examines the behavioural consequences of the public outcry on corruption against public office holders in Nigeria.

From the major aim above, the study also seeks the following objectives:

- (a) To highlight incidences of corruption of public office holders in Nigeria.
- (b) To assess the effectiveness of some of the anti-corruption agencies at combating crime.
- (c) To discover the reasons for the seemingly intractable problems of corruption in Nigeria.
- (d) To identify certain reasons why government appears powerless in handling some sacred cows in the war against corruption in Nigeria.
- (e) Knowing the perception and attitude of people towards public office holders in Nigeria.

Method

Two major techniques were employed in this study for the collection of data. A total of 1025 questionnaires were randomly administered to respondents in twelve major professions; viz; Teaching, Legal, Medical/para-medical, Farming, Civil Service, Engineering, Business/Trading, Religion, Banking, Entertainment, Artisan (i.e. Bricklayers, Computer operators/typists, Drivers etc) and Students. Questions were asked on a number of variables measuring the influence of status symbols on corruption, the perception of people towards public office holders etc In all, 873 questionnaires were returned.

This technique was, however, complimented with secondary data sourced from several anti-corruption Agencies. The data were analyzed using the simple percentage distribution technique.

Discussion on Findings

Findings on the social-economic characteristics of the respondents reveal a proportional representation of both sexes in the research. The male gender with 535 (51.3%) represented three-fifth of the population. The opposite sex was about two-fifth of the population. This is not unconnected with the fact that the men are mostly available since they are more in paid employment than the opposite sex who are mostly inaccessible due to certain factors including the sanctity of tradition (see appendix A).

It was also discovered that an overwhelming majority of the respondents were in the economically active population, with about two-third of the total respondents while about one-third (35.6%) were actually below the age of 5 years many of whom were of school age at the time of the

research. This is an indication that, the community in which the research was conducted is literate (Appendix A). This is also attested by the findings on literacy level where only a negligible proportion of the sampled population (3.9%) reported not having basic education. Less than one-tenth (7.8%) had below secondary education while over four-fifth (88.2%) had secondary education and above. Not less than half (58.6%) had acquired tertiary education as at the time of research (Appendix A).

Findings equally reveal the involvement of the adherents to the three known religions. Twenty percent respondents represented the Islamic faith while about 10% reveals their interest in traditional religion. Thirty (30.2%) percent were Christians while two-fifth (2/5) identified with other faith ranging from 'free-thinking' to 'Eckanker', the Roscicrucian order (Armoc), and the Grail Message (Appendix A).

On occupational distribution of the respondents, a little above one-third (37.6%) were civil servants while those in the business, farming and artisan had representations of 12%, 4.7% and 10% respectively. This leaves the student population with an almost one-third (30%) of the total sampled population. This reveals why a large number of the respondents are still single. Two hundred and eighty six (32.8%) representing one-third of the total respondents were yet to be married as at the period of the research while 62% were married. Five percent were either separated from their spouses, divorce or widowed. This is somehow significant given the perception of the society on widowhood and inheritance which by implication increases the number of the dependant population on the relations of the widowed. A clear exhibition of this was revealed by the findings on respondents' number of dependants where, save for the student population, who themselves are dependants, nobody could stick only to himself. The societal attitude toward child bearing and child rearing also impacted on the large number of dependants. About three-quarter (73.7%) respondents reported having over five dependants while less than one-tenth (7.4%) had between three and four dependants, less than one percent had below two, indicating that they entered matrimony only recently.

Of the five hundred and ninety-eight (598) responses on income, about 46% earn below N20,000 per month which is hardly enough to feed an individual for about two weeks in an inflation stricken country like Nigeria, only about seven (7%) percent respondents earn above N50,000. The present researcher considers this just near enough the minimum wage in present day Nigeria. This no doubt corroborates some expressions linking corruption to poor living conditions of the people, especially the low-income earners. This may not be very correct as most acts of corruption are perpetrated by highly placed people and leaders of government businesses.

In an interview with the Tell, Magazine of December 3, 2001, Chief Audu Ogbeh, a political stalwart and the then chairman of the ruling people Democratic Party, confirmed this in his submission that the very complex nature of the Nigerian society makes corruption war difficult to fight! This may not be unconnected with the zoning system in the polity aiming at equitable allocation of power. A critical example of this was revealed in the Tell report of August 14, 2000:

Very many top ranking officers of the Nigeria politics have stolen themselves out of their irresistible urge to wear the cap of corruption.

Examples are found in the upper house (senate) which kept on changing leadership; three times within a four year tenure and five times within 6 years, all on charges of corruption.

Questions were also asked seeking information on peoples perception of corruption in Nigeria. Such questions include their awareness of the scourge in the country and whether it can be dispensed with, the major perpetrators and the factors responsible for its prevalence. It also sought opinions on the efficacy of the various governmental anti-corruption agencies set up to combat the crime of corruption in Nigeria. The study reveals that majority of the respondents, (8.8%) believe that the scourge is endemic and has become part of human nature. This has been aptly summarized by Wada Nas (2003) when he described a life without corruption as a disease in Nigeria. In his submission:

In Nigeria, life without corruption is a disease because corruption is the right thing to do in which only fools do not indulge. It is a country where honesty is a serious crime punishable by ridicule and exclusion from public limelight (Tell, Nov. 2003).

Findings also show that major corrupt practices are perpetrated by public figures in government *parastatals*. An over-whelming majority affirmed this with 93.5% respondents. In fact, none was against this opinion while only less than one-tenth (6.5%) gave no response. This is what has been termed institutional or official corruption in Nigeria, and has been corroborated with facts from a leading Nigeria magazine's report on the oil industry. According to this report, not less than N40 billion was lost to official corruption in the year 2003 only. Over 67,798,490 barrels of crude oil were lost to official corruption in year 2000. By the year 2000, it increased to 294,549,432 barrels and skyrocketed to 115,469,490 barrels just in the first three-quarters of the year 2002 (Tell, Nov. 2003).

On whether corrupt practices are rampant among the male gender, about one-quarter (24.1%) respondents were in agreement while 73.3% vehemently disagreed with this statement due mainly to the fact that most corrupt practices by women are usually covered up even by men.

Dele Omotunde (2003) writing in the Tell Magazine described the concept of first Lady as “a national motif of recklessness and waywardness”.

...”The position of first lady, though was not instituted by the constitution has ever been created under the presidency where the highest cry on corruption crusade has been going on. The office of the first lady was reported to have spent just \$.99 million on traveling expenses abroad within a period of six years” (see Okigbo’s report on Appendix C).

This highly exalted position of the first lady is another way of cleaning up the national treasury under the guise of all sorts of gluttonous foundations whose impacts were hardly felt by the general populace. This, in part must have accounted for international rating of, at least, 50% of corruption in Nigeria being “perpetrated under the Presidency whose officials are leading crusaders of anti-corruption”. (Tell. Nov. 17, 2003).

On the question of corruption being perpetrated by the low-income earners, a vociferous rejection was recorded by 60.7% of the respondents who are of the opinion that corruption at this level are mere crumbs from the richman’s table for Lazarous. Real corruption which the common man hardly observes is perpetrated by the rich and the top echelon of the Nigerian Society. This was supported by available evidences linking top notches in government to mass corruption in Nigeria. Several governors in Nigeria have been accused of corruptly enriching themselves at the expense of the people whose money they are suppose to hold in public trust. Very many could not be dealt with because of the immunity of this caliber of Nigerians.

The recent scandal which rocked the upper house and the Federal Ministry of Education is another case in point. The Senate president and the Professor and Minister of Education are by all parameters of judgement not in the low-income class, neither could it be said, using any sociological binocular that all those involved in the N55 million bribery scandal, which includes a Vice-Chancellor and other Senators, are poor. The trend in the act of corruption increases as the position increases. This was revealed from the findings of this research that very many public figures see their exalted position as an opportunity to loot the nation. Six hundred and eighty four (684) respondents (76.7% were of this opinion while about one-fifth said the contrary. On the reason(s) why this was so, it was gathered that, public office is about the only place where one could easily amass wealth without much sweat and since this position is only for a while, it is expected that such a status holder takes care of himself for the rest of his life. Another reason given was the fact that, the act was encouraged by the society whose goal is ‘money’. The society believes that anybody given the opportunity to serve should utilize the opportunity to get rid of poverty for his entire family and associates. This is epitomized in the way chieftaincy titles and laurels are showered on him/her during his stay in the corridor of power.

The above explains in part why many of the respondents believe that war on corruption cannot be won in Nigeria. To this, another three-quarter (76.7%) were in the affirmative while twenty percent (20.6%) believed that the scourge can be wiped out from our system through a general overhaul. Secondary data collected were used to compliment the above (see appendix C and D) The Okigbo's (2005) panel which was set-up to probe into the activities of former military-president (General I. B. Babangida) revealed the drain pipes of the oil windfall which was realized during gulf-war within a year (1990-1991) and also narrated how \$12.4 billion unbudgeted money was spent between 1988 and 1994. In this report, the panel blamed the presidency for its inability to account for this extra budgetary expenditure.

...that this disbursement were clandestinely undertaken while the country was openly reeling external dept overhang. (Tell, April, 2005)

Several state governors, also colluded with their close associates to loot their states' money, and in cases where there was not much to loot, they quickly went for loan from the international agencies for projects they never executed. Several of such deals were recorded in Abia State, Anambra and Enugu States in Eastern Nigeria, Bauchi, Kaduna and Niger States in the North and Lagos and Osun States in the West (see appendix D).

Some of the reasons given by the respondents for their submission that corruption war cannot be fought and won include, government's seemingly lack of the necessary apparatus to fight it, to which an overwhelming majority (95.1%) agreed. Another reason was that, the crime was also mainly perpetrated by those who are the crusaders of anti-corruption war in the country.

On the involvement of foreign agencies in the massive looting of the treasury, as part of the reasons why the corruption war could be a fruitless exercise, was supported by 63.8% of our 608 respondents while less than one-fifth (16.1%) couldn't agree. This empirical evidence was further supported by the secondary data. In Yobe State, a loan of \$3.62million meant for a biscuit factory contracted to a foreign firm, M/S Integrated Technical services Ltd, United Kingdom was never executed after the payment of the mobilization fee of N270,000 million. The London office address existing before the contract was awarded could not be traced (appendix D). Same was reported in Delta State where a farm project awarded to a foreign contractor, Rockline Ltd. at the cost of 9.6 million was also embezzled while Anambra State was equally robbed by yet another foreign agent, Cross Ocean Ltd, United Kingdom, of 11.9m loan meant for a carpet factory (see appendix D). All this money vanished into thin air and nothing has been done till date to bring culprit to book.

The reasons that there are so many sacred cows that are above the law seem to find solace in the above as another overwhelming majority (98.1%) supported this view. Only less than two percent (1.9%) were of the contrary view. The Tell of September 27, 2004 reported the case of some top Naval officers accused of colluding with foreign powers to steal two ships being used for bunkering in the Country. They were apprehended, and made to face court martial but the result has since gone into the thin air.

In response to public outcry on the presidency to try former military head of state, Gen. Ibrahim Babangida over several allegations of corruption while in office, President Obasanjo announced to the public to bring evidences against the man for him to be tried;

If you find 'IBB' anywhere, come and tell me and I give you my word, that within 24 hours, we would have all the accounts frozen, otherwise no be Obasanjo born me.

Anti-corruption agency in collaboration with Tell Magazine quickly brought out the Okigbo's panel report in one of the Nigeria's widely read Magazines indicting the man but the President has kept a sealed lip since then. In support of the argument for sacred cows, three past leaders who were invited before the Oputa panel which was set up at the wake of the Obasanjo administration in 1999 over certain allegations of Human right violations, never honoured the invitation and nothing happened (*Tell*, August, 2001).

It was revealed by the findings of the research that the various anti-corruption agencies set up would not yield the desired result. Seventy-two (72%) respondents hold tenaciously to this report, this is anchored on the belief that only those without godfathers would be cornered by the wretched hand of the law while the sacred cows would escape the wrath of the law.

Recommendations

In view of the above and the recent public outcry against corruption, the study offers the following suggestions as a way out of the doldrums.

- (a) While the presidency deserve commendations for relieving some of his men including those in the legislature of their duty, spirited effort should still be made to extend the war beyond the house. Other bottle-necks preventing speedy execution of justice should be removed so as to send signals to corrupt governors who always act under immunity.

- (b) The issue of sacred-cows who are not touchable is a blemish on the sovereignty of the nation. Of recent, the Inspector-General of Police; was apprehended and arranged before the court of law. Something should be done to other top ranking officers of the army, the legislators who never left office even after being proved guilty of acts of corruption.
- (c) Where the Federal Government appears deficient at providing evidences against corrupt officials, the private sector should be encouraged to do so by making use of their evidences after scrutinizing. When this is done, they feel encouraged to do more. Such was the newspaper report on former speaker, Hon Busari over his forged certificate which earned him his job.
- (d) It is becoming glaring that, corrupt practices in Nigeria are being revealed by foreign agents while it is concealed in the country. This is a clear indication that the powers that be are behind it and secondly that people are afraid of publishing the truth for fear of victimization. The laws on the abuse of human rights and its violations should be enforced to ensure life security in the country. The assassination of the founder of Newswatch Magazine for which the government has yet to find the killers since 1986 is a case in point. A foreign journalist who exposed the \$128 billion oil money and its misappropriation during Babangida's regime was deported immediately and the news went under carpet since then.
- (e) The names of all corrupt leaders in the country whose scandalous activities have brought untold hardship on the country, dead or alive should be published officially so as to send warning signals to would be criminals, rather than worshipping them like heroes. Such people should be banned from receiving any award or titles in the country.
- (f) The attitude of the society towards government appointee needs be changed. Since the society sees positions solely as opportunity to amass wealth, people rather than being innovative and investing are struggling for political appointment so as to make enough money for life. The National Orientation Agencies should divert attention on the inculcation of values on the people to erase the negative conception that nothing good could come out of Nigeria.
- (g) There should be a quick revisit to all probe-panel reports and justice should be done.
- (h) The various anti-corruption agencies should be made independent of government to operate though with some forms of checks and balances.
- (i) There is the need to empower the Central Bank of Nigeria to perform the function of regulation of the accounting system by removing some decrees (as it often operates under the military) which place supervision of the accounting system in the presidency. Such decrees include the Central Bank of Nigeria decree (CBN) 1969,

the banking decree no 24, 1969 and the Banks and other financial institution decree no 25 of 1991. These decrees should as a matter of urgency be repealed to ensure proper accounting system.

- (j) There is also the need for the restructuring of the Central Bank of Nigeria to ensure its efficiency. The number of departments having several deputy-governors amounts to bureaucratic bottlenecks. In most cases, some of these positions were created to take care of special interest and quite often results into wasteful spending. This should be stopped henceforth. Rather the information system should be updated with competent professionals regardless of their ethnic background.
- (k) It is also suggested in line with other economic observers that dedication and other special accounts should be made to perform its role by wriggling it from the hand of only one-man, Mr. President, who has the prerogative to spend it as he pleases.
- (l) The immunity clause should be removed henceforth.

Any Country committed to its development no doubt should get rid of corruption. The war on corruption in Nigeria should be seen as an endless one until the scourge is totally removed from our body politics. It is only then that Nigeria can occupy an enviable position in the committee of nations.

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Appendix A

Table 1: The Socio-Economic Statistics of Respondents

	Male	N – 873	%
		535	61.3
Sex	Female	338	38.7
Sex	Below 15	311	35.9
Age	16-35	288	31.8
	36-50	190	9.6
	50+	084	
Religion	Christianity	264	30.2
	Islamic	178	20.4
	Traditional	096	11.0
	Others (specify)	345	40.0
Profession/Occupation	Civil servant		
	Business men	328	37.6
	Petty Traders/Farmers	104	12.0
	Artisan	102	4.7
	Students	087	10.0
		262	30.1
			N = 598
Income (per month)	Below N10,000	136	22.7
	N10,000 – N20,000	142	23.7
	N21,000-N30,000	112	18.7
	N31,000-N40,000	088	14.7
	N40,000-N50,000	076	12.7
	N50,000+	043	7.2
			N = 352
Job Status:	Junior	280	79.5
	Middle	060	17.0
	Senior	012	3.4
	None	34	7.9
			N = 873
Literacy level	Below Secondary School	68	7.8
	Secondary School Certificate	250	29.6
	Tertiary	512	58.6
	None	159	(18.2)
Dependants	Below 2	06	(0.9)
	3 – 4	65(7.4)	
	5 – 6	124(14.2)	
	6 and above	519(59.5)	
		N = 873	
Marital Status	Single	286	32.8
	Married	543	62.2
	Separated/Divorced/Widow	044	5.0

Appendix B

Table 2: Variables and Responses

Variables	Responses	%	
	N = 878		
Corruption is Endemic & has come to stay	Yes No N/R	714 112 047	81.8 12.8 5.4
Common among public office holders (government parastatals)	Yes No N/R	816 - 057	93.5 - 6.5
Perpetrated majorly by the male gender	Yes No N/R	210 640 023	24.1 73.3 2.6
Common among the low income earners	Yes No N/R	310 530 033	35.5 60.7 3.8
Influence of status symbols	Yes No N/R	684 103 066	78.4 11.8 7.6
The war against cannot be won in Nigeria	Yes No N/R	670 180 023	76.7 20.6 2.6
(i) Government lack the apparatus to fight corruption	(N=60) Yes No	580 030	95.1 4.9
(ii) Perpetrated by these fighting it	(N=540) Yes No	524 016	97.0 3.0
(iii) There are sacred cows (untouchables)	(N=623) Yes No	611 012	98.1 1.9
(iv) Aided by foreign powers in Nigeria	(N=608) Yes No	510 098	63.8 16.1
(v) Weak Leadership	(N = 563) Yes No	514 049	91.3 8.9
Whether Efforts of the various governmental agencies are yielding result	(N873) Yes No N/R	205 632 056	23.5 72.4 6.4

Appendix C

Table 3: Okigbo's Report on the Misappropriated \$12.8 billion Excels oil money**

1.	Documentary Film on Nig.	\$2.92
2.	Purchase of T.V/Video for the presidency	18.32
3.	Ceremonial Uniform for the Army	3.85
4.	Staff Welfare at Didan Buract/Aso Rock	2.98
5.	Travel of the First Lady Abroad	.99
6.	President Travels abroad	8.95
7.	Medical (Clinic at Aso Rock)	27.25

** From 1988 Sept – June 1994, *The Drainpipes Revealed*.

8.	Gift (Liberia)	1.00
9.	Gift (Ghana)	.50
10.	Nig. Embassy: London	18.12
	Nig. Embassy: Riyadh	14.99
	Nig. Embassy: Teheran	2.76
	Nig. Embassy: Niainey	3.80
	Nig. Embassy: Pakistan	3.80
	Nig. Embassy: Israel	3.07
	T.V Equipment for ABU,	17.90
	Min. of Defence	323.35
	Security	59.72
	Defence Attaches	25.49
	GHQ	1.04

Source: Tell Magazine, April 4, 2005

Appendix D

Table 4: Loan Money Never Used for the Purpose it was Meant

Loan	Project	States	Remark
CHF. 49,100.00	Umuahia water supply scheme	Abia	Not expected
GNP 2,360,000	Awchukwu ohajia water scheme	"	"
DM 24,457,920	Abia Gidem Cjoclem Farm Ltd. Ogwe	"	"
USD 23,577,745	Rural Electr. Project	"	"
CHF 43,300,000	Umuahia Ceramic factory	"	"
GPB, 11,811,023 & USD, 3,00,000	Carpet manufacturing project, ihiala	Anambra	"
USD 53.45 million FRF 16.75 million	Combine water supply scheme Maiduguri Sheraton Hotel Project	Bornu	"
GPB 9,578,151	Wauri farm project	Delta	"
DM 150 million USD 10,511,252	Enugu/Abakalili water project Purchase of immigration pump	Enugu Enugu	" "
FF 60,605, 315.50	Purchase of 100 no Buses	Kaduna	"
US & 37,570,000	The mini steel project	Lagos	"
Us & 12,887,000	Minna-Hydiagbo Invigation pumps	Niger	"
US &, 58.99M	New Ilesa/Ejigbo water scheme	Osun	"
GPB 3.62M	Biscuit factory	Yoba	"

Source: Tell Magazine; July 8, 2005. pg 42 + 44

Rapid Urban Growth and Poverty in Dhaka City

Shahadat Hossain*

Abstract

The paper aims to explore the nature of urban growth and poverty in Dhaka City, Bangladesh. It has highlighted the city of Dhaka as the urbanisation of the whole country is interlinked with the intense development of the city. The paper is based on data collected through surveys of population censuses and relevant studies. It reveals that the historical process of urban development of Dhaka City presents various trends based on its political development. The rapid urbanisation of the city since its emergence as the capital of an independent state is due mainly to massive migration of rural population. The paper also reveals that significant portions of the city dwellers are settled mostly in slums and squatter settlements and are living below the poverty lines as the rapid urban growth of the city is not commensurate with its overall development. The paper, however, argues that the experience of poverty in the city of Dhaka follows the pattern of urbanisation without development, the opposite of the expectations and aspirations of the poor there.

1. Introduction

The paper deals with the urban challenges in Bangladesh focusing on rapid urban growth and poverty in the megacity of Dhaka.⁹ It starts with a general profile of the city highlighting its geography and population characteristics. It is important to note that the urbanisation of Bangladesh is interlinked with the intense development of Dhaka City which has developed as a politico-administrative centre, having gained and then lost its position through the political development of the country. Due to the concentration of both domestic and foreign investment Dhaka City has experienced massive migration from the rural population of Bangladesh in recent decades but a critical downside to this has been the dramatic rise in poverty. In light of this, the paper deals with the trend of poverty in Dhaka City. In addition, the state of Dhaka's infrastructure is inadequate and unable to keep up with growing urban pressures. Significant portions of the city's population are living in slums and squatter settlements and are experiencing extremely low living standards, low productivity and unemployment. The slum population mostly live below the poverty line in terms of both calorie intake and the cost of basic needs. Moreover, despite having lived in the city for a long period of time the urban poor have limited access to the economic and social systems of the city.

* Department of Sociology, University of Dhaka. Email: Shahadat72@yahoo.com

⁹ The term 'megacity' is frequently used as a synonym for words such as super-city, giant city, conurbation, and megalopolis. There has been little agreement about the size of the megacity. Megacities are defined as cities that were expected to have at least ten million inhabitants by the year 2000. Please see World Bank's *Urban Policy and Economic Development: An Agenda for the 1990s* (Washington: World Bank, 1993).

2. A brief profile of Dhaka City

Dhaka City is centrally located in Bangladesh, in the southern part of the district of Dhaka. It is situated between latitudes 24°40' N to 24°54' N and longitudes 90°20' E to 90°30' E and defined by the Buriganga river in the south; the Balu and the Shitalakhya rivers in the east; Tongi Khal in the north and the Turag river in the west. The city has developed on the higher elevated Pleistocene terrace land or Order Alluvium of the central part of Bangladesh, otherwise referred to as the Madhupur-Bhawal Garh Region. In addition, a substantial portion of the adjoining low-lying areas have recently been brought under the structured zones of the city due to the accelerated rate of the urban growth in Dhaka.¹⁰

According to the adjusted population of the 2001 Census the size of Dhaka's population is 10,712,206 of which 5978482 are male and 4733724 are female.¹¹ This makes Dhaka a megacity. The population growth of Dhaka stands at 56.5% in the last decade, which is very high. This means that during the last decade the city's population has grown by 3,868,077. The sex ratio of the population is calculated as 123.4 based on the current population census.¹² Moreover, the sex ratio of Dhaka City has decreased over the years due mainly to the reunion of females to their male partners living in the city and the increase in the number of single females in the urban work force.¹³ The number of the Dhaka City's young population is relatively high due to age selective rural-urban migration.¹⁴ About 40% of the total city's population is in the unproductive age groups of 0-14 and 60 and over, which indicates a high dependency burden on the working age population.¹⁵ The high dependency ratio among the city's population causes poverty, especially among the low income groups in the city.

3. National urban growth and Dhaka City's predominance

3.1. *The trend of urbanisation and urban growth*

The growth of the urban population in Bangladesh prior to the 20th century cannot be termed urbanisation in the truest sense because the change in rural life concomitant with urbanisation was not evident.¹⁶ The growth of the urban population in Bangladesh since 1901 is depicted through the following periods. In 1901 only 2.43% of the country's population lived in urban

¹⁰ Asaduzzaman and Rob, *Environmental Control over Urbanisation of Dhaka City* (Dhaka: The Mappa, 1997).

¹¹ Bangladesh Bureau of Statistics, *Population Census 2001, National Report (Provisional)* (Dhaka: Ministry of Planning, 2003).

¹² Bangladesh Bureau of Statistics, *Population Census 2001 Preliminary Report* (Dhaka: Ministry of Planning, 2001).

¹³ K. Siddiqui, S.R. Qadir, S. Alamgir and S. Haq, *Social Formation in Dhaka City* (Dhaka: University Press Limited, 1993).

¹⁴ *Ibid.*

¹⁵ Bangladesh Bureau of Statistics, *Bangladesh Population Census 1991 Urban Area Report* (Dhaka: Ministry of Planning, 1997).

¹⁶ Centre for Urban Studies, *Squatters in Bangladesh Cities: A Survey of Urban Squatters in Dhaka, Chittagong and Khulna- 1974* (Dhaka: CUS, 1976).

centres.¹⁷ During the next two decades the urban population remained almost static. Between 1911 and 1921 there was only an 8.8% increase in the urban population.¹⁸ Plagues caused large scale depopulation in many urban centres during this period. Since 1921 there has been slow but steady growth - except when thousands left the cities out of fear during World War II. But a famine which ensued soon pushed millions from rural areas back into urban areas.¹⁹

In Bangladesh the first significant phase of urbanisation started in 1947.²⁰ During the 1951-61 decade there was a 45.11% increase in the urban population, more than twice the previous decade's 18.4%. The factors causing this were many, some political, others socio-economic.²¹ Large scale migration of Muslims from India in 1947 and afterwards was a major factor. The emigration of a large Hindu population from Bangladesh to India was mostly from rural areas, while the immigrants from India, mostly concentrated in the urban areas of Bangladesh, thus outnumbering the emigrants from the urban areas. Moreover, there was substantial development of new centres of trade, commerce, industry and administration in Bangladesh after it attained a new political status in 1947.²²

Despite the growth in the urban population, the nature and characteristics of urbanisation has remained similar to the pattern during the British period.²³ During the Pakistan period, the West Pakistani rulers treated East Pakistan (Bangladesh) as their colony. There was no significant industrialisation in this part during the first half of Pakistani rule. During the 1960's there was some industrial development which was not significant.²⁴ The most phenomenal urban population growth in Bangladesh occurred during the 1961-74 inter-census period. Over 6 million people were living in urban areas constituting roughly 8.0% of the total population.²⁵ Thus the percentage increase of the urban population during the 13 years was striking. That accelerated growth is to a great extent the result of the very recent influx from rural villages. The growth rate of the urban

¹⁷ Bangladesh Bureau of Statistics, *Bangladesh National Population Census Report - 1974* (Dhaka: Ministry of Planning, 1977).

¹⁸ Ibid.

¹⁹ Centre for Urban Studies, *Squatters in Bangladesh Cities: A Survey of Urban Squatters in Dhaka, Chittagong and Khulna- 1974* (Dhaka: CUS, 1976).

²⁰ Ibid.

²¹ Bangladesh Bureau of Statistics, *Bangladesh National Population Census Report 1974* (Dhaka: Ministry of Planning, 1977).

²² N. Ahmed, *An Economic Geography of East Pakistan* (London: Oxford University Press, 1968).

²³ Centre for Urban Studies, *Squatters in Bangladesh Cities: A Survey of Urban Squatters in Dhaka, Chittagong and Khulna- 1974* (Dhaka: CUS, 1976).

²⁴ Ibid.

²⁵ Bangladesh Bureau of Statistics, *Bangladesh Population Census 1981, Report on Urban Area: National Series* (Dhaka: Ministry of Planning, 1987).

population was 5.4% during the 1981-1991.²⁶ The total urban population increased to 28.6 million by 2001.²⁷

There was a general decline of urban population in Bangladesh after the British took over in the mid 18th century²⁸ and there were no urban centres left with populations of over 100,000 until 1891. In 1901 there were only 2 and that did not change up to 1951. There were no other urban centres in the range of 25,000 - 49,999 (population) up to 1911, but by 1921 there were. Then there were 5 in 1921. Most urban centres fell in the range of 10,000-24,999 population. They were 14 in 1872 and this increased to 23 in 1911, then decreased to 20 and remained so up to 1951.²⁹ Urban centres within the range of 5,000-9,999 population size increased from 5 in 1872 to 19 in 1941. The total number of urban centres increased from 22 in 1872 to 59 in 1941, an increase of 168% during a span of nearly 70 years. Thus urban growth was rather slow throughout the period of 1872-1947.³⁰

After the partition of India in 1947 Dhaka City became the provincial capital of East Pakistan and the growth of the urban population began to increase substantially.³¹ In 1951, Dhaka City had a population of 411,279 which increased to 718,766 in 1961. Then there was a rapid growth of urban centres followed by an explosive growth of big cities after the liberation of Bangladesh in 1971.³²

Table-1: Urban population growth in Bangladesh (1901-2001)

Census	National population		Urban population			
	Number (million)	Growth rate (% annual)	Number (million)	Share (% of total Population)	Decadal increase of urban population (%)	Growth rate (% of annual)
1901	28.2	0.70	2.43	-	-	-
1911	31.65	0.94	0.80	2.54	14.96	1.39
1921	33.25	0.60	0.87	2.61	8.85	0.84
1931	35.60	0.74	1.07	3.01	22.20	2.00
1941	41.99	1.66	1.54	3.67	43.20	3.71

²⁶ Bangladesh Bureau of Statistics, *Bangladesh Population Census 1991 Urban Area Report* (Dhaka: Ministry of Planning, 1997).

²⁷ Bangladesh Bureau of Statistics, *Population Census 2001, National Report (Provisional)* (Dhaka: Ministry of Planning, 2003).

²⁸ See below.

²⁹ A. Z. Eusuf, 'Urban centres in Bangladesh: their growth and change in rank-order' in N. Islam and R. M. Ahsan (eds.), *Urban Bangladesh* (Dhaka: Urban Studies Program, 1996) pp.7-20.

³⁰ Ibid.

³¹ Centre for Urban Studies, *Squatters in Bangladesh Cities: A Survey of Urban Squatters in Dhaka, Chittagong and Khulna- 1974* (Dhaka: CUS, 1976).

³² A. Z. Eusuf, 'Urban centres in Bangladesh: their growth and change in rank-order' in N. Islam and R. M. Ahsan (eds.), *Urban Bangladesh* (Dhaka: Urban Studies Program, 1996) pp.7-20.

1951	44.17	0.51	1.83	4.14	18.38	1.74
1961	55.22	2.26	2.64	4.78	45.11	3.74
1974	76.37	2.53	6.00	7.86	137.57	6.52
1981	89.91	2.56	13.56	15.08	110.68	10.97
1991	111.45	2.17	22.45	20.15	69.75	5.43
2001	129.25	1.54	28.60	23.1	37.05	3.15

Source: Centre for Urban Studies, *Squatters in Bangladesh Cities: A Survey of Urban Squatters in Dhaka, Chittagong and Khulna- 1974* (Dhaka: CUS, 1976) & Bangladesh Bureau of Statistics, *Bangladesh National Population Census Report - 1974* (Dhaka: Ministry of Planning, 1977); *Bangladesh Population Census 1991 Urban Area Report* (Dhaka: Ministry of Planning, 1997); *Population Census 2001, National Report (Provisional)* (Dhaka: Ministry of Planning, 2003).

The number of urban centres with populations of 100,000 doubled from 2 in 1951 to 4 in 1961. Urban centres with populations of 50,000-99,999 increased from 2 to 5 during the same period, while urban centres of all categories increased from 63 in 1951 to 78 in 1961.³³ However, the overall increase in the urban population and newly emerging urban centres has to some extent been counter-balanced by the declining number of small sized towns. In fact, towns of 5,000-9,999 decreased from 19 in 1941 to 12 in 1974, while towns with population less than 5,000 remained more or less steady from 3 in 1941 to 4 in 1971.³⁴ This declining trend in the lower order towns is partly due to the proportion of smaller cities developing into large cities by virtue of population growth. The persistent decline in the importance of small towns is perhaps an indication of the limited economic functions there and the consequent movement of the population towards bigger cities in search of better economic opportunities.³⁵

After the liberation of Bangladesh, there was an explosive growth of big cities.³⁶ Cities with a population of 100,000 increased from 4 in 1961 to 6 in 1974, 13 in 1981 to 23 in 1991.³⁷ This shows an increase of about 383% during 1961-91. And the total number of urban centres increased from 78 in 1961 to 492 in 1991, an increase of over 647% during a span of 30 years.³⁸ The growth of urban centres by size/class indicates that there is a strong association between city size and city growth rates, that is the large and medium sized cities are increasing more rapidly simply because of the graduation of cities occurring in that class.³⁹ Cities with a population between 25,000 and 49,999 increased from 15 in 1961 to 45 in 1981, an increase of 300%. During the same period cities with a population of 5,000 to 9,999 increased from 21 in 1961 to 129 in 1981 and those with a population less than 5,000 increased from 10 to 168.⁴⁰ In summary,

³³ Ibid.

³⁴ Ibid.

³⁵ Ibid.

³⁶ N. Islam, 'Urban Research in Bangladesh and Sri Lanka: towards an agenda for the 1990s' in R. Stren (ed.) *Urban Research in Developing World* (Toronto: Centre for Urban & Community Studies, University of Toronto, 1994) pp.101-169.

³⁷ A. Z. Eusuf, 'Urban centres in Bangladesh: their growth and change in rank-order' in N. Islam and R. M. Ahsan (eds.), *Urban Bangladesh* (Dhaka: Urban Studies Program, 1996) pp.7-20.

³⁸ Ibid.

³⁹ Ibid.

⁴⁰ Ibid.

the urban population of Bangladesh grew at a much faster rate from 1961-1974 (8.8%) and reached its peak during the period 1974-1981 (10.97%). And about 30% of the total increase during 1974-1981 can be explained by the extended definition of urban areas in 1981.⁴¹

The 1991 Census shows data in relation to only 110 municipalities.⁴² It does not give a complete picture of the total number of urban centres of different size categories.⁴³ The population census report gives the figure of the urban municipal population as 1,22,55,307 and the population of 4 Statistical Metropolitan Areas (SMAs) as 10,40,60,79, which constitutes 84.91% of the total municipal population. Out of the existing 110 municipalities, 28 are in the Rajshahi division where there is an urban population of 16.09%; 33 in Khulna where there is an urban population of 14.98%, 27 in Dhaka Division with an urban population of 45.83% and 22 in Chittagong Division, having 22.95% of the urban population.⁴⁴ Dhaka, Chittagong, Khulna and Rajshahi municipalities constitute 50.26% of the total municipal population. There are 20 municipalities with a population of 50,000-99,999, which constitute 10.70% of the population. The number of municipalities with a population of 25,000 to 49,999 is 41, with an urban population of 12.29%. There are 17 municipalities with population of 10,000-24,999 constituting 3.77% of the municipal population. And the number of municipalities with populations less than 5,000 is one, which constitutes 0.07% of the municipal population.⁴⁵

Some urban centres have recorded a very rapid population growth (above 50%). In the 1951-61 period 12 urban centres recorded a growth of more than 50% in their population with Khulna, Chuadanga and Dhaka showing a very high (above 200%) increase.⁴⁶ Khulna recorded high growth due to industrialisation, Dhaka due to its importance as the provincial capital, and Chuadanga due to the influx of refugees from India. In the 1961-74 period, 36 urban centres recorded a growth of more than 50% in population size with Dhaka showing a 936% increase; due to its importance as the new capital city and due to the expansion of commercial activities. During this period 8 urban centres recorded the highest growth of 180.2%.⁴⁷ The 1991 census recorded 11 urban centres with a 50-112% increase from 1981 to 91.⁴⁸ During that period 4 urban centres recorded growth of more than 100%. Sherpur, Dhaka, Moulvi Bazar, Cox's Bazar,

⁴¹ Bangladesh Bureau of Statistics, *Bangladesh Population Census 1981: Analytical Findings and National Tables* (Dhaka: Ministry of Planning, 1984).

⁴² Bangladesh Bureau of Statistics, *Preliminary Report on Population Census 1991* (Dhaka: Ministry of Planning, 1991).

⁴³ A. Z. Eusuf, 'Urban centres in Bangladesh: their growth and change in rank-order' in N. Islam and R. M. Ahsan (eds.), *Urban Bangladesh* (Dhaka: Urban Studies Program, 1996) pp.7-20.

⁴⁴ Ibid.

⁴⁵ Ibid.

⁴⁶ Ibid.

⁴⁷ Ibid.

⁴⁸ Bangladesh Bureau of Statistics, *Bangladesh Population Census 1991 Urban Area Report* (Dhaka: Ministry of Planning, 1997).

Rangamati and Jessore have shown more than a 50% increase in three consecutive inter-censal periods while Feni and Naogaon experienced over 50% increase throughout the period.⁴⁹

Table-2: Ranking of major urban centres in Bangladesh (1901-2001)

Urban centres	1901	1911	1921	1931	1941	1951	1961	1974	1981	1991	2001
Dhaka	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
Chittagong	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2
Sirajgonj	3	3	5	4	6	-	10	-	-	-	-
Rajshahi	4	4	8	7	7	8	7	6	4	4	4
Bramanbaria	5	8	9	9	9	-	-	-	-	-	-
Comilla	6	6	4	5	5	5	8	9	6	9	-
Barisal	7	7	3	3	3	3	5	7	7	7	7
Pabna	8	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Jamalpur	9	9	10	10	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Madaripur	11	-	6	8	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Nawabganj	-	5	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Mymensing	-	10	7	6	4	6	9	5	5	6	8
Chandpur	-	-	-	-	8	-	-	-	-	-	-
Rangpur	-	-	-	-	10	-	-	-	9	5	6
Saidpur	-	-	-	-	-	4	6	8	-	-	-
Khulna	-	-	-	-	-	7	4	3	3	3	3
Dinajpur	-	-	-	-	-	10	-	-	-	10	10
Narayangonj	-	-	-	-	-	-	3	4	-	-	-
Jessore	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	10	10	8	9
Sylhet	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	8	-	5

Source: Bangladesh Bureau of Statistics, *Bangladesh National Population Census Report - 1974* (Dhaka: Ministry of Planning, 1977); *Bangladesh Population Census 1991 Urban Area Report* (Dhaka: Ministry of Planning, 1997); *Population Census 2001, National Report (Provisional)* (Dhaka: Ministry of Planning, 2003).

In Bangladesh, historically, the major urban centres developed around industrial concentrations of cotton and silk production and indigo processing.⁵⁰ During the British rule most of the urban centres served as tax collection and export-import centres for the British Empire. Other urban centres were used as administrative or religious centres, and many of these centres subsequently

⁴⁹ A. Z. Eusuf, 'Urban centres in Bangladesh: their growth and change in rank-order' in N. Islam and R. M. Ahsan (eds.), *Urban Bangladesh* (Dhaka: Urban Studies Program, 1996) pp.7-20.

⁵⁰ N. Ahmed, *An Economic Geography of East Pakistan* (London: Oxford University Press, 1968).

flourished as commercial and industrial centres. Administrative centres gained momentum due to increasing educational and cultural centres, infrastructure and better communication.⁵¹

There has been considerable movement, up and down, of the relative and political importance of the major urban centres over the years. Dhaka and Chittagong have remained in first and second position respectively since attaining city status at the beginning of the century.⁵² Khulna, the third largest city has gained its ranking since just before independence in 1971 through industrialisation.⁵³ The fourth largest city, Rajshahi held the same ranking in the early decades of the last century but lost it position for socio-political reasons and then again regained its position.⁵⁴ Other cities like Serajganj and Barisal have had a history of ups and downs during the last century. The city of Sylhet has emerged as one of the important cities and occupied 5th position in recent times. It started to grow very rapidly immediately after its establishment as a divisional headquarter.⁵⁵

The historical process of urban development in Bangladesh presents different trends based on the political development of the country.⁵⁶ Although the history of Bangladesh in the early periods is obscure due to a lack of sufficient information, it is evident that Bangladesh acted as a passive periphery of West Bengal and India. Though the rulers of Bengal often revolted against the central authority, these were sporadic efforts and did not have any marked impression on the spatial development of the region.⁵⁷ During the British rule, Bengal attracted many colonial interests. As Calcutta was the primary city of Bengal, Bangladesh (then East Bengal) became a passive periphery of the region. During Pakistani rule, hostile relations developed when Bangladesh attempted to become an active periphery of the country.⁵⁸ Thus historically, the political-spatial development process of Bangladesh has passed through passive and active stages followed by cooperation and accommodations as well as hostile situations.

The legacy of spatial development in Bangladesh has led to the development of a few cities - particularly the capital city of Dhaka. The failure of planning initiatives is directly linked with the

⁵¹ A. Z. Eusuf, 'Urban centres in Bangladesh: their growth and change in rank-order' in N. Islam and R. M. Ahsan (eds.), *Urban Bangladesh* (Dhaka: Urban Studies Program, 1996) pp.7-20.

⁵² Bangladesh Bureau of Statistics, *Bangladesh Population Census 1981, Report on Urban Area: National Series* (Dhaka: Ministry of Planning, 1987).

⁵³ Bangladesh Bureau of Statistics, *Bangladesh Population Census 1991 Urban Area Report* (Dhaka: Ministry of Planning, 1997).

⁵⁴ Ibid.

⁵⁵ Barisal and Sylhet were set up as divisional headquarters in the 1990s. The cities were upgraded to city corporations in recent times. In the latest population census of 2001 Barisal and Sylhet were categorised as Statistical Metropolitan Areas (SMA) along with Dhaka, Chittagong, Khulna and Rajshahi. Please see Bangladesh Bureau of Statistics, *Population Census 2001, National Report (Provisional)* (Dhaka: Ministry of Planning, 2003).

⁵⁶ M. H. Khan, *Urban Social Structure and Urban Planning in Dhaka: A Test of Mauel Castells' and David Harvey's Model* (Research Monograph), (Dhaka: Department of Sociology, University of Dhaka, 1996).

⁵⁷ Ibid.

⁵⁸ Ibid.

urban mismanagement and increasing inequality and poverty in the city of Dhaka during the period of independent Bangladesh.⁵⁹ Like the colonial development of a landed aristocracy, an 'urban housing class' developed in Dhaka City through the process of 'sub-urbanisation' which is one of the main causes of today's urban land crisis and the proliferation of slums and squatters in Dhaka City.⁶⁰

In fact, the urban government needs to play a very significant role in adopting and implementing policies to reduce urban inequality and poverty. While macroeconomic trends have pushed towards a diminished role for the state over recent decades, more recent efforts at rehabilitating the state are increasingly focused on the local level. But the urban government has failed to play its effective role in urban development of Bangladesh due to the multiplicity of institutions and the overlapping nature of their jurisdiction.⁶¹ The result has been rivalry, bickering and blaming each other for inadequate and insufficient services. Due to inadequate funds the local government of Dhaka City is absolutely dependent on grants from donor agencies and hence has to work within limits set by the conditions of such grants. This kind of control adversely affects the quality of urban services provided to the urban poor by the authorities. In addition, a lack of accountability and transparency of Dhaka City's urban government also makes it corrupt and inefficient.⁶²

3.2. *The growth of Dhaka City*

The majesty and peculiarity of Dhaka City has developed over a long span of time. The city was under the suzerainty of different kings and rulers and its growth was hindered and distributed from time to time. Sometimes the growth gained momentum during the reign of some rulers at other times it did not.⁶³

The history of Pre-Mughal Dhaka is very vague. This period ranges from the 13th century to the beginning of early 17th century.⁶⁴ Its importance as a market centre started in that period.⁶⁵ The city began to flourish as a commercial and political centre, expanding in the west up to Chandi Ghat during 1602-1604.⁶⁶ After the Sultans the Mughals took over the city and started to attribute more importance to it. During the early Mughal rule, the city covered an area of about 2.20 sq. km and was confined within the small continuous zone of the present old city.⁶⁷ Dhaka City got its pomp and splendour during the Mughal rule and attained the prestigious position of the premier

⁵⁹ Ibid.

⁶⁰ Ibid.

⁶¹ N. Islam and M. M. Khan, 'Urban governance in Bangladesh and Pakistan' in N. Islam (ed.), *Urban Governance in Asia: Sub-regional and City Perspectives* (Dhaka: Centre for Urban Studies and Pathak Shamabesh, 2000)

⁶² Ibid.

⁶³ M. Asaduzzaman and A. M. Rob, *Environmental Controls over Urbanisation of Dhaka City* (Dhaka: The Mappa, 1997).

⁶⁴ A. M. Chowdhury and M. S. Faruqui, 'Physical growth of Dhaka City' in S.U Ahmed (ed.) *Dhaka: Past Present Future* (Dhaka: Asiatic Society of Bangladesh, 1991).

⁶⁵ A. Haider, *A City and Its Civic Body* (Dhaka: East Pakistan Gov. Press, 1966).

⁶⁶ Ibid.

⁶⁷ Ibid.

city of the empire. The city gained its reputation as a capital during the early period of the 17th century.⁶⁸ To check the attacks of the Magh and Arakanese pirates, Emperor Akbar stationed several hundred soldiers in Dhaka City. It was made capital of the province of Bengal in 1608 by Subader Islam Khan Chisti for its political and military importance, and being a capital, it required more space for administrative, military purposes and accommodation. Centring on the old market, the provincial capital Dhaka began to develop rapidly as a major city of the province.⁶⁹

During the rule of the Mughals Dhaka City grew in a north-western direction. D'oloy shows that the greatest urban growth took place under Subadar Saista Khan (1662-1667 and 1679-1689).⁷⁰ At that time, the city extended from the Buriganga river in the south to Tongi Bridge in the north, a distance of about 25 km (in a north-south direction) and from Jafrabad (Sarai Jafrabad) in the west to Postagola in the east, a distance of about 15 km in a east-west direction.⁷¹ Of course, this huge Mughal city incorporated many villages and suburbs within its urban area and at that time the city had a population of over a million.⁷² The city then started to lose its glory with the shifting of the provincial capital to Murshidabad in 1717 (due to a personal clash between the Emperor Azim-Us-Shan and Subadar Murshid Kuli Khan).⁷³ From that time a number of influences from European traders started to increase in Bengal.⁷⁴ At that time the size of Dhaka City was about 4.5 sq. km and the population was about 1 million.⁷⁵ The main city was confined in a small area on the northern bank of the river Buriganga around the Lalbagh and Chawk-Mughaltoli area where the older part of the city is today.⁷⁶

Under the control of the East India Company after the decisive battle of Plassey in 1757 Dhaka City became a declining urban centre and between 1757-1864 it had a tremendous decrease in population and area.⁷⁷ The population of Dhaka City which was estimated to be nearly 200,000 in 1800 dropped to 51,000 in 1873.⁷⁸ The energetic controller of Dhaka, Mr. Walters founded the Dhaka Committee in 1830 and under his chairmanship began the development of Dhaka town. The inclusion of Rammna Green Pasture, an area from Old Paltan to Nimtoli, Dakesshware Temple to Azimpur under the town's jurisdiction took place in this period. The total urban area during that time rose to a total of 14.5 sq. km and the total population was 51,635 in 1867.⁷⁹ The

⁶⁸ M. Asaduzzaman and A. M. Rob, *Environmental Controls over Urbanisation of Dhaka City* (Dhaka: The Mappa, 1997).

⁶⁹ A. H. Dani, *Dacca: A Record of Its Changing Fortune* (Dhaka: Asiatic Press, 1962).

⁷⁰ C. D'oloy, *Antiquities of Dacca* (London, J. J. Landseer and Company, 1824).

⁷¹ *Ibid.*

⁷² J. Travernier, *Travels in India* (Translated from French Edition of 1976 by William Crooke) (London: Oxford University Press, 1925).

⁷³ A. Karim, *Dacca-The Mughal Capital* (Dhaka: Asiatic Society of East Pakistan, 1964).

⁷⁴ *Ibid.*

⁷⁵ J. Taylor, *Sketch of the Topography and Statistics of Dacca* (Calcutta: Military Orphan Press, 1840).

⁷⁶ M. Asaduzzaman and A. M. Rob, *Environmental Controls over Urbanisation of Dhaka City* (Dhaka: The Mappa, 1997).

⁷⁷ W. W. Hunter, *A Statistical Account of Bengal: Dhaka* (London: Trubner Co, 1976).

⁷⁸ *Ibid.*

⁷⁹ *Ibid.*

urbanised space started to expand towards the north on the Pleistocene terrace high lands during this time, mainly for residential and recreational purposes.⁸⁰

Table-3: Population and area size of Dhaka City (1700-2001)

Year	Periods	Population	Area (sq.km)
1608	Pre-mughal	30,000	2
1700	Mughal period	900,000	40
1800	British period	200,000	4.5
1867	British period	51,636	10
1872	British period	69,212	20
1881	British period	80,358	20
1891	British period	83,358	20
1901	British period	104,385	20
1931	British period	161,922	20
1941	British period	239,728	25
1951	Pakistan period	411279	85
1961	Pakistan period	718766	125
1974	Bangladesh period	2068353	336
1981	Bangladesh Period	3440147	510
1991	Bangladesh period	6887459	1353
2001	Bangladesh period	10712206	1530

Source: J. Taylor, *Sketch of the Topography and Statistics of Dacca* (Calcutta: Military Orphan Press, 1840) & Bangladesh Bureau of Statistics, *Bangladesh National Population Census Report - 1974* (Dhaka: Ministry of Planning, 1977); *Bangladesh Population Census 1991 Urban Area Report* (Dhaka: Ministry of Planning, 1997); *Population Census 2001 Preliminary Report* (Dhaka: Ministry of Planning, 2001).

Dhaka City began to rise from a declining and stagnant condition after the transfer of power to the Crown in 1858 by the British East India Company. The first local administration, the Dhaka Municipality was found in 1864 by Mr. Skinner.⁸¹ After 1864, the lowland areas in the north of Islampur, Tantibazar, Kamrangir Char, Goalnagar were gradually filed for urbanisation and at the same time Wari, Gandaria, Old Cantonment (Purana Paltan) Narinda, Hazaribagh, Nawabganj, Sarai Jafarbad, Race Course Green Pastures and Rayar Bazaar (to name a few) were also brought under the town's jurisdiction.⁸² Moreover, during that period in order to protect the river bank of Buriganga from flooding and erosion and to add a face lift to the river side, the Buckland Embankment was completed. Thus the area of Dhaka City was expanded into 17.0 sq. km. and Dhaka City started to flourish again, its population increasing to a total of some 90 thousand in 1901 and reaching over a hundred thousand in the subsequent ten years.⁸³ In 1941 the population of Dhaka was more than 200,000 and in 1947, it passed 250,000. But within a decade,

⁸⁰ M. Asaduzzaman and A. M. Rob, *Environmental Controls over Urbanisation of Dhaka City* (Dhaka: The Mappa, 1997).

⁸¹ S. M. Taifoor, *Glimpses of Old Dacca* (Dhaka: Saogal Press, 1956).

⁸² P. Geddes, *Town Planning Report on Dhaka, Bengal*, (Calcutta: Bengal Secretariat Pub, 1917).

⁸³ M. Asaduzzaman and A. M. Rob, *Environmental Controls over Urbanisation of Dhaka City* (Dhaka: The Mappa, 1997).

after the annulment of the division of Bengal, again this urban growth of Dhaka declined and it remained as a mere district till the independence of Pakistan in 1947.⁸⁴

The growth of Dhaka City gained momentum again after 1947. The influx of people from India on the one hand and the onrush of people to the newly established administrative, commercial and educational centre on the other contributed to an unprecedented growth of the city.⁸⁵ The need for office space for administrative and commercial purposes as well as residential needs resulting from the increase in population led to the growth of the city on several levels. During this period, the Dhaka Improvement Trust (DIT) was created in 1956 (which was later transformed into RAJUK in 1987) for supervision of the overall planning and development of the city. Beside different urban development projects, DIT developed a number of residential areas to meet the housing needs of the emerging elite class.⁸⁶ A central Business District (CBD) was also developed to meet the demand for space required for increasing commercial and government administrative activities.⁸⁷ Initially, the needs for official, educational, residential and administrative spaces were fulfilled by the expansion of the city in Purana Paltan to Naya Paltan, Eskation to MoghBazar, Siddiheswari, Kakkrail to Kamlapur through Razar Bagh and Shantinagar, the Segun Bagicha, Azimpur, Mirpur, Mohammadpur, Shre-e-Bangla Nagar, Tejgaon, Gulshan Model Town and other areas were encroached on between 1950 and 1960. The Banani and Gulshan areas were acquired by the government in the early sixties under the 1959-Master Plan of Dhaka City and by 1961, the city population grew to 718,766 and the area at that time was about 125 sq. km.⁸⁸

The urbanisation process achieved tremendous growth to meet the needs of the newly independent country's capital. The city's population suddenly increased to 2,068,353 in 1974, it began to expand in all directions including the low-lying areas of the east, such as Jurain, Goran, Badda, Khilgaon, Rampura, and to the west including the areas of Kamrangirchar, Shyamoli, Western Mohammadpur, Kallyanpur.⁸⁹ As very rapid urban growth (along with a fast increase in population and structural development) started to take place a new structural plan was needed. The population leapt to 3 million within a decade of the independence of the country and the city

⁸⁴ Ibid.

⁸⁵ K. Siddiqui, J. Ahmed, A. Awal and M. Ahmed, *Overcoming the Governance Crisis in Dhaka City* (Dhaka: University Press Limited, 2000).

⁸⁶ M. H. Khan and S. Hossain, 'Changing urban environment in Dhaka City' in *Bangladesh Political Science Review*, Vol.1, no.1, pp.93-104 (2001)

⁸⁷ Ibid.

⁸⁸ Bangladesh Bureau of Statistics, *Bangladesh Population Census 1991 Urban Area Report* (Dhaka: Ministry of Planning, 1997).

⁸⁹ *Bangladesh National Population Census Report - 1974* (Dhaka: Ministry of Planning, 1977) & A. M. Chowdhury and M. S. Faruqui, 'Physical growth of Dhaka City' in S.U Ahmed (ed.) *Dhaka: Past Present Future* (Dhaka: Asiatic Society of Bangladesh, 1991).

covered an area of about 510 sq. km. by 1981⁹⁰. During this period the swamps and wetlands within the city started to disappear quickly and new areas of residential, administrative, business and commercial importance began to develop. In addition, slum and squatter settlements also sprang up in different areas of the city.⁹¹ Keeping pace with the magnitude of the urban growth, the new urbanised areas began encroaching on the low-lying areas within the city limits and even on some adjacent outlying areas.⁹²

Dhaka City has faced its highest rate of physical and population growth during 1981-1991, with the population doubling during that decade and the city expanding from 510 sq. km to 1353 sq. km. The city now includes the surrounding areas of Gazirpur, Savar, Narayangong, Bandar thanas and the entire thana of Keraniganj.⁹³ In 1995, a new master plan was prepared for the further development of Dhaka City and the recent construction of a bridge over the Buriganga river has encouraged the expansion of Dhaka City in a southerly direction to the other side of the river. A second bridge which is likely to be completed within the next five years will further increase this process.⁹⁴

However, the expansion of Dhaka City is constrained by physical barriers such as the low-lying flood prone areas around the city. Also, valuable agricultural and forested land will have to be sacrificed if the built-up area is to increase. But as mentioned, the population of the city is increasing very rapidly due mainly to rural-urban migration. The population of the city reached to 10.7 million in 2001 and the population growth of Dhaka has been 56.5% in the last decade, which is very high.⁹⁵ Understandably, these additional people have created tremendous pressure on the urban utility services and other amenities of urban life. This has resulted in an adverse effect on the urban environment where a large number of people have settled in slums and squatter settlements where they live below the poverty line.⁹⁶

⁹⁰ K. Siddiqui, J. Ahmed, A. Awal and M. Ahmed, *Overcoming the Governance Crisis in Dhaka City* (Dhaka: University Press Limited, 2000).

⁹¹ Ibid.

⁹² Ibid.

⁹³ Bangladesh Bureau of Statistics, *Bangladesh Population Census 1991 Urban Area Report* (Dhaka: Ministry of Planning, 1997).

⁹⁴ K. Siddiqui, J. Ahmed, A. Awal and M. Ahmed, *Overcoming the Governance Crisis in Dhaka City* (Dhaka: University Press Limited, 2000).

⁹⁵ Bangladesh Bureau of Statistics, *Population Census 2001, National Report (Provisional)* (Dhaka: Ministry of Planning, 2003).

⁹⁶ S. Hossain, 'Urban poverty and social marginality: the case of Bangladesh' in F. Lovejoy and L. Adorjany (eds) *Celebration, Causes, and Consequences* (Sydney: UNSW Printing Section, 2003) pp.69-76 & 'Poverty, household strategies and coping with urban life: examining 'livelihood framework' in Dhaka City, Bangladesh, in *Bangladesh e-Journal of Sociology*, Vol.2, no.1 (January 2002).

4. Urban poverty and Dhaka City's predominance

4.1. The trend of urban poverty

Bangladesh Household Expenditure Surveys (HES) constitute the main source of information for most of the available studies on urban poverty. These surveys have limitations due to diversity in the method of imputation, lack of data at the household level, uniform methods of recording the data flow and of time sampling, faulty memory recall method and the problems of missing cases.⁹⁷ Despite the limitations of data of HES these are nonetheless mainly relied on for measuring the extent of urban poverty. In fact, these surveys are the only existing source of macro level data on poverty in Bangladesh. Beside these, the Centre for Urban Studies (CUS) has conducted a number of micro level studies on the urban poor. These studies explain the partial scenario of urban poverty in Bangladesh.⁹⁸ Two methods – the Direct Calorie Intake (DCI) and the Cost of Basic Need (CBN) methods are currently used for measuring urban poverty by the Bangladesh Bureau of Statistics.⁹⁹

The Direct Calorie Intake (DCI) method is traditionally used by the Bangladesh Bureau of

Statistics for determining the poverty line. According to this method the urban poor are categorised as 'absolute poor' and 'hardcore poor' based on their daily calorie intake. The poor who take 2122k.cal per day per person fall below Poverty Line-1 (and are known as the absolute poor) whereas the poor who take 1805k.cal per day per person fall below Poverty Line-2 (these are termed the hardcore poor). At the national level the percentage of population in Poverty Line-1 decreased from the 47.8% to 44.3% in the survey year of 1988-89 to 2000. But in urban areas the percentage of population below Poverty Line-1 increased from 47.6% to 52.5% from the survey period of 1988-89 to 2000 due to the migration of the rural poor to the urban areas. In the case of Poverty Line-2 the situation is to some extent different. The percentage of hardcore poor has decreased over the years at both the national and urban contexts. But the rate of decrease is comparatively lower in urban areas.¹⁰⁰

⁹⁷ N. Khundker, W. Mahmud, B. Sen and M. U. Ahmed, 'Urban poverty in Bangladesh: trend, determinants and policy issues' in *Asian Development Review*, Vol. 12, no. 1, pp.1-31(1994)

⁹⁸ Centre for Urban Studies, *The Urban Poor in Bangladesh* (Dhaka: CUS, 1979); *Slums in Dhaka City* (Dhaka: CUS, 1983); *The Urban Poor in Bangladesh* (Dhaka: CUS, 1990).

⁹⁹ The Bangladesh Bureau of Statistics (BBS) uses the DCI and FEI poverty lines for its Household Expenditure Survey (HES) which has been conducted since 1973/74, but in the first 1995/96 survey the DCI and CBN poverty lines were used with the assistance of the World Bank. Please see Bangladesh Bureau of Statistics, *Statistical Yearbook of Bangladesh 2000* (Dhaka: Ministry of Planning, 2002).

¹⁰⁰ Bangladesh Bureau of Statistics, *Analysis of Basic Needs Dimensions of Poverty (Vol. 3)* (Dhaka: Ministry of Planning, 1998) & *Statistical Yearbook of Bangladesh 2000* (Dhaka: Ministry of Planning, 2002).

Table-4: Urban population in Bangladesh below the poverty line (DCI method)

Survey year	Poverty line-1 Absolute poverty (2122 k. cal per day per person)				Poverty line-2 Hardcore poverty (1805 k. cal per day per person)			
	National		Urban		National		Urban	
	Number (million)	% of Pop.	Number (million)	% of Pop.	Number (million)	% of Pop.	Number (million)	% of Pop.
1988-89	49.7	47.8	6.3	47.6	29.5	28.4	3.5	26.4
1991-92	51.6	47.5	6.8	46.7	30.4	28.0	3.8	26.3
1995-96	55.3	47.5	9.6	49.7	29.1	25.1	5.2	27.3
2000	55.8	44.3	13.2	52.5	24.9	20.0	6.0	25.0

Source: Bangladesh Bureau of Statistics, *Analysis of Basic Needs Dimensions of Poverty (Vol. 3)* (Dhaka: Ministry of Planning, 1998) & *Statistical Yearbook of Bangladesh 2000* (Dhaka: Ministry of Planning, 2002).

Table-5: Recent trends in urban poverty in Bangladesh (CBN method)

	Upper poverty line (%)		Change (upper line)	Lower poverty line (%)		Change (lower line)
	1995-1996	2000	1995-96 to 2000	1995-96	2000	1995-96 to 2000
National	51.0	49.8	-1.2	34.4	33.7	-.7
Urban	29.4	36.6	+7.2	13.7	19.1	+5.4

Source: Bangladesh Bureau of Statistics, *Preliminary Report of Household Income & Expenditure Survey- 2000* (Dhaka: Ministry of Planning, 2001).

Table-6: Incidence of poverty in selected urban areas in Bangladesh (CBN method)

Urban areas	Upper poverty line (%)		Lower poverty line (%)	
	1995-96	2000	1995-96	2000
National	51.0	49.8	34.4	33.7
Dhaka	40.2	44.8	27.8	32.0
Chittagong	52.4	47.7	28.6	25.0
Khulna	55.0	51.4	36.4	35.4
Rajshahi	61.8	61.0	46.9	46.7

Source: Bangladesh Bureau of Statistics, *Preliminary Report of Household Income & Expenditure Survey- 2000* (Dhaka: Ministry of Planning, 2001).

Due to the problems of the calorie intake method, the Bangladesh Bureau of Statistics has used the Cost of Basic Needs (CBN) method. Unlike the traditionally used DCI method, the CBN method considers other basic needs (along with food) for measuring poverty. The poor are categorised by an 'upper poverty line' and a 'lower poverty line'. This estimation reveals the alarming situation of urban poverty in Bangladesh despite the overall improvement of the poverty situation at the national level. According to this method, from 1995-96 to 2000 the percentages of the urban population below both the upper poverty line and lower poverty line have increased by 7.2% and 5.4% respectively.¹⁰¹ Poverty is mainly concentrated in urban Dhaka due to the predominance of Dhaka City. In urban Dhaka the percentages of the population below both the upper poverty line and the lower poverty line have increased by 4.6% and 4.2% respectively during 1995-96 to 2000.¹⁰²

4.2. Poverty and slums in Dhaka City

The phenomenon of slums and squatters in Dhaka is as old as the city itself.¹⁰³ But the city has experienced a prolific growth of slums and squatters since the independence of the country in 1971.¹⁰⁴ By the end of 1976 only 10 slums existed with a population of 10,000. The number increased to 2,156 settlements with a population of 718,143 in 1993, and 3007 settlements with a population of 1.1 million in 1996.¹⁰⁵ About 90% of the total number of slums and squatter settlements have developed in the last three decades. The highest concentration of growth (45%) took place between 1981 and 1990 followed by the previous decade's 26%. Only 18% of these clusters were established since 1991.¹⁰⁶

Slums and squatter settlements are not distributed uniformly throughout the Dhaka Metropolitan area but rather they are concentrated mostly on the fringes of the city. Due to an acute demand for land and high land prices, especially in the central zones and in upper class residential areas, the slums and squatter communities have moved or are moving towards the city's peripheries in the search for cheap shelter.¹⁰⁷ According to CUS among the 3007 slums and squatter settlements an overwhelming majority of these poor communities are located on land owned by private individuals (1270 clusters, or 42.2%), or under multiple private ownership (1047 clusters or 34.8%). Only 644 clusters (21.4%) are located on government and semi-government land,

¹⁰¹ Bangladesh Bureau of Statistics, *Preliminary Report of Household Income & Expenditure Survey- 2000 (Dhaka: Ministry of Planning, 2001)*.

¹⁰² Ibid.

¹⁰³ J. Taylor, *Sketch of the Topography and Statistics of Dacca* (Calcutta: Military Orphan Press, 1840); P. Geddes, *Town Planning Report on Dhaka, Bengal*, (Calcutta: Bengal Secretariat Pub, 1917) & C. Arams, *Housing in the Modern World: Man's Struggle for Shelter in Urbanising World* (London: Faber and Faber, 1964).

¹⁰⁴ S.R. Qadir, *Bastees of Dhaka City: A Study of Squatter Settlement* (Dhaka: National Institute of Local Government, 1975).

¹⁰⁵ Centre for Urban Studies, *Survey of Slums and Squatter Settlements in Dhaka City* (Dhaka: CUS, 1996).

¹⁰⁶ Ibid.

¹⁰⁷ A.Q.M. Mahbub and N. Islam, 'The growth of slums in Dhaka City: a spatio temporal analysis' in S. U. Ahmed (ed.) *Dhaka Past Present Future* (Dhaka: Asiatic Society of Bangladesh, 1991) pp.508-521.

while a few settlements (only 35 in number, 1.2%) are found on land belonging to non-government organisations.¹⁰⁸ Slum and squatter settlements did not develop in the central part of the city like Mothijheel, Kotoali, Sutrapur or Lalbagh Thanas in the last decade. They mostly developed in the peripheral thanas of Mirpur, Mohammadpur and Demra.¹⁰⁹ In recent times a number of slum clusters were evicted by the urban development authorities in Dhaka City and the poor were forced to settle in a resettlement slum in the peripheral thana of Mirpur.¹¹⁰

The demographic features of the slum population are to some extent different from the other urban population. There is a high propensity of young people to migrate to the city of Dhaka. More than 50% of 'migrant populations' in the city were less than 35 years of age.¹¹¹ Young populations predominate in urban centres because they are usually not yet integrated into rural traditional systems and they are more likely to leave the village than the older population. The proportion of the elderly population who have lost their ability to perform labour-intensive jobs is negligible in the slum areas.¹¹² Despite the relative increase in the female population, there is still a substantially greater proportion of males in the city owing to the initial high rate of male migration. However, with more single poor women joining the urban labour force, especially in the garment industry it is possibly decreasing.¹¹³

The distinctive aspect of urban poverty in Dhaka City's slums is its close connection with recent migration. The slum dwellers have mostly migrated to the city from rural areas. As Dhaka is well linked to the entire country by land, water and air, and can be reached within a day from any part of the country, there are opportunities for migrants to arrive in the city using transport within their reach.¹¹⁴ The majority of urban poor migrate to Dhaka City from a few districts like Faridpur, Barisal and Comilla.¹¹⁵ The rural poor migrate to Dhaka City due to some push and pull factors. The push factors include over-population, floods and natural disasters, river erosion, growing landlessness and exploitation by the rural elites and moneylenders.¹¹⁶ In this agriculture based countries land is the main means to generate subsistence and surplus and is the most valuable asset to the rural poor. Increased loss and fragmentation of land among the poor and increased

¹⁰⁸ Centre for Urban Studies, *Survey of Slums and Squatter Settlements in Dhaka City* (Dhaka, CUS, 1996).

¹⁰⁹ Bangladesh Bureau of Statistics, *Census of Slum Areas and Floating Population 1997 (Vol.3)* (Dhaka: Ministry of Planning, 1999).

¹¹⁰ S. Hossain, 'Urban poverty, vulnerability and policies in Bangladesh' Paper Presented in The 2005 Social Policy Association Annual Conference, 27-29 June, 2005, University of Bath, UK.

¹¹¹ R. Afsar, *Rural-Urban Migration in Bangladesh: Causes, Consequences and Challenges* (Dhaka: University Press Limited, 2000)

¹¹² Opel, A. E.A, 'Livelihood of the Vulnerable: An Ethnographic Illustration of Life in Dhaka Slums', *Urban Livelihood Monograph-2* (Dhaka: Proshika, 1998)

¹¹³ K. Siddiqui, S.R. Qadir, S. Alamgir and S. Haq, *Social Formation in Dhaka City* (Dhaka: University Press Limited, 1993).

¹¹⁴ N. Islam, Dhaka: *From City to Mega City* (Dhaka: Urban Studies Program, 1996)

¹¹⁵ K. Siddiqui, S.R. Qadir, S. Alamgir and S. Haq, *Social Formation in Dhaka City* (Dhaka: University Press Limited, 1993).

¹¹⁶ T. M. Shakur, *An Analysis of Squatter Settlements in Dhaka*, Unpublished PhD Thesis, University of Liverpool, UK, 1987

concentration of land among the rich, coupled with a high natural growth rate of population raise the number of landless and the hungry. In the absence of other sustenance opportunities in villages, many of the landless in rural Bangladesh are forced to migrate to cities to seek better opportunities although their chances of improving their conditions are limited.¹¹⁷ Along with push factors the pull factors also contribute to the increasing rural-urban migration in Bangladesh. These pull factors are mainly employment opportunities in the informal sectors of the economy, better opportunities in the city and relative freedom for female workers.¹¹⁸

The slum population in Dhaka City faces extreme poverty due to its low level of earnings and the majority are living below the poverty line in terms of both calorie intake and cost of basic needs. What is more, the slum dwellers are mostly involved in low paid jobs in informal sectors of the urban economy. To be precise there is a predominance of day labouring and rickshaw pulling among this poor group of city dwellers.¹¹⁹ Moreover, there are occupational variations between males and females in slum and squatter settlements in Dhaka City. Among these there are eighty different types of occupations held by males in slum and squatter settlements. Females are found to belong only to occupations such as maidservants and housewives.¹²⁰ The urban poor involved in the formal urban sectors of the economy have better economic conditions than the poor in the informal sectors. There is a significant difference in the wage rate between the formal sector poor and informal sector poor in Dhaka City.¹²¹ The formal sector poor receive various benefits, which means that they are better off compared with their informal sector counterparts. There is also a variation in poverty among the poor employed in informal occupations based on their level of skills.¹²² Skill differentials were found to be an important factor in determining differences within the informal manufacturing activities in Dhaka City¹²³

Slum populations in Dhaka City are 'vulnerable' in terms of their access to urban land.¹²⁴ Slum dwellers have mostly settled temporarily on public or private land and they are often evicted from their settlements. In the overwhelming majority of house construction the roof is of tin and the wall beams are of bamboo. Only a small proportion of poor settlements (9%) were made of brick,

¹¹⁷ J. Alamgir, 'Rural-urban migration in Bangladesh: theoretical approaches to understanding the internal and external dynamics' *Journal of Social Studies*, Vol. 59, pp. 26-48 (1993)

¹¹⁸ T. M. Shakur, *An Analysis of Squatter Settlements in Dhaka*, Unpublished PhD Thesis, University of Liverpool, UK, 1987

¹¹⁹ A.T.M.N. Amin, 'Dhaka's informal Sectors and its role in the transmission of Bangladesh economy' in S. U. Ahmed (ed.) *Dhaka Past Present Future* (Dhaka: Asiatic Society of Bangladesh, 1991) pp.446-470.

¹²⁰ Centre for Urban Studies, *Slums in Dhaka City* (Dhaka: CUS, 1983).

¹²¹ K. Siddiqui, S.R. Qadir, S. Alamgir and S. Haq, *Social Formation in Dhaka City* (Dhaka: University Press Limited, 1993).

¹²² Ibid.

¹²³ N. Khundker, W. Mahmud, B. Sen and M. U. Ahmed, 'Urban poverty in Bangladesh: trend, determinants and policy issues' in *Asian Development Review*, Vol.12, no. 1, pp.1-31 (1994)

¹²⁴ S. Hossain, 'Poverty and vulnerability in megacities: the case of slum communities in Dhaka City, Bangladesh' Paper Presented in the 2005 Annual Conference of the Australian Sociological Association (TASA), 5-8 December, 2005, University of Tasmania, Hobart, Australia.

cement and tin.¹²⁵ About 68% of slum families in Dhaka City have a single room unit, 20% have two small rooms and at least 5% have to share a room with other families.¹²⁶ The average floor spaces of poor urban households are only 125sq. ft, with only 100 sq. ft in Dhaka City.¹²⁷ Very often slum and squatter settlements in these areas are prone to annual flooding, and they are environmentally unsuitable for housing as they are located in low-lying areas and along risky canals and railway tracts.¹²⁸

Slum dwellers in the city are disadvantaged in terms of their access to urban services like safe water, electricity, gas supply, toilet facilities and garbage disposal. The quality of these services has been found to be poor and the supply remains highly irregular and inadequate.¹²⁹ Most slum dwellers have access to safe water for drinking purpose only. And most use unsafe water for washing, bathing and other purposes. A small proportion of the urban poor (20%) use sanitary latrines and the majority still use a variety of non-hygienic latrines.¹³⁰ The study shows that 67% use electricity and another 33% still have no access to electricity. The study also found that 72% of the urban poor use traditional fuel for cooking and only 22% have access to gas facilities. More than 60% of the poor just dump their garbage on the road or on the ground.¹³¹ And a very small proportion (12.4%) of these poor households has access to the underground drainage system.¹³² Slum populations also have limited access to health and education. Though theoretically the urban poor have equal access to the public health facilities in the city, in reality very little are available to them.¹³³ They are the most deprived groups in the city as they have very limited access to the existing educational opportunities. This is true for both primary education and general and technical education for adults. It has been evident from official statistics that although enrolment in primary school in urban areas is higher than that for rural areas, the enrolment of the slum population is very low.¹³⁴

¹²⁵ A.Q.M. Mahbub, 'Rent affordability and rent policies for slum dwellers in Dhaka City' in N. Islam and R.M. Ahsan (eds) *Urban Bangladesh* (Dhaka, Urban Studies Program, 1996).

¹²⁶ Centre for Urban Studies, *The Urban Poor in Bangladesh* (Dhaka: CUS, 1979).

¹²⁷ N. Islam, N. Huda, F.B. Narayan and P.B. Rana, *Addressing the Urban Poverty Agenda in Bangladesh* (Dhaka: University Press Limited, 1997).

¹²⁸ N. Islam, 'The state of the urban environment in Bangladesh' in N. Islam and R.M. Ahsan (eds) *Urban Bangladesh* (Dhaka, Urban Studies Program, 1996) pp.21-31.

¹²⁹ Centre for Urban Studies, *Survey of Slums in Dhaka Metropolitan Area-1991* (Dhaka, CUS, 1993); Bangladesh Bureau of Statistics, *Census of Slum Areas and Floating Population 1997 (Vol.3)* (Dhaka: Ministry of Planning, 1999) & S. Hossain, 'Research on slums and squatters in Bangladesh: a critical review' in *Social Science Review*, Vol.18, no.2, pp.67-76.

¹³⁰ Centre for Urban Studies, *Survey of Slums and Squatters in Dhaka City* (Dhaka, CUS, 1996).

¹³¹ R.M. Ahsan and N. Ahmed, 'The urban poor's access to water and sanitation' in N. Islam (ed.) *The Urban Poor in Bangladesh* (Dhaka: Centre for Urban Studies, 1996).

¹³² K. Siddiqui, S.R. Qadir, S. Alamgir and S. Haq, *Social Formation in Dhaka City* (Dhaka: University Press Limited, 1993).

¹³³ K.M. Fariduddin and A.U. Khan, 'Health profile of the urban poor' in N. Islam (ed.) *The Urban Poor in Bangladesh* (Dhaka: Centre for Urban Studies, 1996).

¹³⁴ Government of Bangladesh, *Zila Primary Education Statistics* (Dhaka: Ministry of Education, 1991).

In the adverse urban environment social networking based on kinship and community play a significant role in urban adaptations of slum communities. Such networking works as a source of social capital in the context of migration to the city - by providing information related to migration and adaptation to city life, and by providing initial accommodation and employment information.¹³⁵ Most of the slum dwellers migrated to the city with direct or indirect help from their relatives or fellow villagers who live in the city. These networks are most important in the village before departure although they continue to play a significant role after arrival in the city.¹³⁶ The urban poor have strong kin connections with rural areas, though in their neighbourhoods kinship ties are not so distinctively visible because of the financial crisis of the residents.¹³⁷ The slum dwellers often come to the city from lineage based organisations and extended family, and kinship plays a significant role to encourage the poor from rural areas to come to the city and settle down in their neighbourhoods.¹³⁸ The host community in the city (relatives, friends or fellow villagers) play a significant role in offering the poor their first shelter and food when they arrive in Dhaka City. Temporary residential/sublet arrangements are made until the newcomer finds a job and a suitable rental unit. Kin groups and fellow villagers offer hospitality in the form of food, accommodation as well as finding a job and knowledge about the city, which is as necessary as practical help at the initial stage.¹³⁹

However, poverty of slum population is an extension of rural poverty of Bangladesh. The process seems to be influenced by the existing superstructure which is dominated by the rural rich and which plays a strong role in maintaining and legitimising poverty.¹⁴⁰ Poverty is caused by the stagnation of productive forces and production over time and government policies and development measures which only help the rural rich to get richer and increase inequality.¹⁴¹ Ahmed has outlined a number of factors as causes of poverty including socio-economic and political factors - particularly inequality in the distribution of economic and political power, insincerity and the indifferent attitude of the ruling power elite who control resources, external factors such as the role of metropolitan capital, foreign aid and loans (in which again the role of the national power elite is critical) and lack of poor people's participation in decision making and the development process.¹⁴² CUS has also identified some specific causes of urban poverty and

¹³⁵ S. Hossain, *Urban Poverty and Adaptations of the Poor to Urban Life in Dhaka City, Bangladesh*, PhD Thesis, University of New South Wales, Sydney, 2006.

¹³⁶ P. Dannecker, *Between Conformity and Resistance: Women Garments Workers in Bangladesh* (Dhaka: University Press Limited, 2002).

¹³⁷ M. Mizanuddin, *Social Organisation of the Urban Poor in Bangladesh: A Case Study of Squatter Settlements in Dhaka*, PhD Thesis, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi, India, 1991.

¹³⁸ T. K. Das, *Social Structure and Cultural Practices in Slums* (New Delhi: Northern Book Centre, 2000).

¹³⁹ P. Dannecker, *Between Conformity and Resistance: Women Garments Workers in Bangladesh* (Dhaka: University Press Limited, 2002); R. Khun, 'Identities in motion: social exchange networks and rural-urban migration in Bangladesh', *Contribution to Indian Sociology*, vol. 37, no. 1&2, pp. 311-338.

¹⁴⁰ K. Siddiqui, *The Political Economy of Rural Poverty in Bangladesh* (Dhaka: National Institute of Local Government, 1982).

¹⁴¹ Centre for Urban Studies, *The Urban Poor in Bangladesh* (Dhaka: CUS, 1990).

¹⁴² *Ibid.*

slums in Dhaka City. These include the socio-political and economic structure, that have developed in a long colonial and feudal history and exploitation and social injustice; oppression by the vested interest groups and ruling power elite; corruption of the ruling elite and the neo-rich, foreign aid and debt; natural hazards and consequent landlessness; lack of government assistance for the poor; and population explosion (and lack of its control).¹⁴³

5. Conclusion

The urbanisation of Bangladesh is interlinked with the intense development of Dhaka City. The historical process of urban development in Dhaka City presents different trends based on its political development. Dhaka developed as a politico-administrative city and subsequently economic and commercial activities have also concentrated in the city making it the prominent city of the country. The urbanisation activities in Dhaka City have been achieving tremendous growth for the needs of the newly independent country's capital. Overall, Dhaka City has experienced its highest rate of physical and population growth in recent decades that transformed it into a megacity.

As urban growth of Dhaka City is not commensurate with the economic and social development of the city, significant portions of the urban population are living below the poverty line. The percentage of the urban population in Bangladesh below the poverty line has been increasing over the years. The percentage of the urban population living below the poverty line is comparatively higher in Dhaka City than other urban centres of the country. Consequently, the city has had a massive growth in slums and squatter settlements in recent decades. The fact is, the socio-political and economic structures of the country are generally responsible for urban poverty and the emergence of slums in Dhaka City.

The formation of slums is closely associated with rural-urban migration. Poor people living in the city slums have mostly migrated there from rural areas rather than other cities or towns. Both the pull and push factors - including low incomes in rural areas, river erosion of agricultural land and job opportunities in the city are the main factors behind this rural-urban migration. And urban poverty of Dhaka's slums is closely linked with the participation in the informal sectors of the economy. The poor are mostly involved in informal activities as they are excluded from the formal sectors of the economy through lack of education and employment training. Employment in the informal sectors is generally characterised by a low level of income and high level of vulnerability in terms of risk and harassment.

¹⁴³ Ibid.

In the context of poverty and vulnerability social networks play significant support roles in migration and the adaptations of the poor to the city. Poor people maintain both kin and non-kin based social networks in Dhaka City's slums. After their move to the city poor migrants gradually develop non-kinship social networks, which also play a significant role in their social life. The urban poor often provide and/or receive assistances from their relatives, friends and neighbours to help them cope with their poverty and vulnerability. In fact, social networking generally works as 'social capital' in urban adaptations of poor migrants, who have limited access to the formal sources of support.

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Does the Internet Make People Socially Isolated? A Social Network Approach¹

Manouchehr Mohseni^{*}, Behzad Dowran^{**} and
Mohammad Hadi Sohrabi Haghighat^{***}

AbstractS

The present study investigated whether Internet use and type of Internet use are associated with social isolation within Internet users. There have been hopes and fears of the Internet's social impacts since it emerged. Among different social impacts, this paper focuses on the impact of the Internet on people's social connections. The main question of this study is that whether Internet use affects people's social ties? Based on a social network approach, two hypotheses are suggested; Firstly, Internet use will decrease social isolation and secondly, social use of Internet will reduce social isolation. A sample of 204 cybercafé users in Tehran was nominated to participate in the survey. Analyzing the findings, it appeared that the both Internet use and social use of Internet will be slightly associated with reduced level of social isolation.

Introduction

Since the mid-1850s, scholars have debated how technological innovation affects community. Today, the Internet is becoming a mainstream *medium* (McQuail, 2005: 39) that may soon be as pervasive as telephone and television although the speed of its diffusion seems much faster. The Internet could change the lives of average citizens as much as did the telephone in the early part of the 20th century and television in the 1950s and 1960s (Kraut et al, 1998).

The Internet is a revolutionary method of communication. As Wellman and Gulia (1999: 1) point out, 'for the first time in the history of the world, it is possible to have an ongoing, fast moving conversation with people regardless of their physical location, schedule or other such constraint. With the development of the Internet and with the pervasiveness of communication between networked computers, we are in the middle of the most transforming technological events'.

The social impact of the Internet has been under close scrutiny since its emergence and among the manifold social consequences of the Internet, this paper focuses on the effects of the Internet on people's relations. This issue has generated a great deal of debates among researchers and like any major innovation the Internet has elicited both fear and enthusiasms.

Although computer-mediated communication allows for greater connectivity to resources and information, some critics argue that life on the net, contribute to an incomplete lifestyle that

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* Department of sociology, Tarbiat Modarres University. Email: info@mmohseni.com

* Iranian information and documentation center. Email: Dowran@irandoc.ac.ir

* Department of sociology, Tarbiat Modarres University. Email: m_hadisohrabi@yahoo.com

withdraws people from the full range of in-person contact and by getting them so engulfed in a simulacrum virtual reality, disconnects them from their families, friends and communities (Kraut, Lundmark, Patterson, Kiesler, Mukopadhyay and Scherlis 1998; Nie and Erbring 2000). As Wellman (2002: 3) argued, 'there have been fears that by immersing people in the monitors, the Internet would weaken face-to-face community and domesticity'.

On the opposite side of the debate, there have also been hopes that the Internet would facilitate new forms of voluntary communities based on shared interests and would even form the relational basis for increased face-to-face contacts.

Coget, Yamauchi, and Suman (2002) identify two scenarios on how the Internet will affect people's social connections; pessimists and optimists. The Internet pessimists, Coget *et al.* (2002: 181) maintain, fear the creation of a 'post-modern world plagued with anomie and loneliness'. They believe that 'global village finally destroys local communities'. Internet optimists believe that 'the Internet provides new opportunities to meet people and increases the efficiency and speed of so many transactions that in turn saves time for other activities, including face-to-face interactions'. The purpose of this article is to revisit this issue among Persian Internet users.

Literature Review

Relationship with people is important in both instrumental and socio-emotional domains. 'The closer and stronger our ties with people are, the broader the scope of their support for us would be' (McPherson et al. 2006: 354; Wellman and Wortley 1990).

The current debate over the impact of Internet use on social ties can be traced back to the publication of Rheingold's (1993) influential book on *virtual communities* where the Internet was described as capable of bringing strangers together to form infinite online network.

The debate was later extended to arguments about whether or not the growth of online connections is at the expense of offline relationships. Some studies have suggested that Internet use encourages the creation of online relationships, which in turn replace face-to-face contacts. Some quantitatively oriented researches sought to test the various hypotheses using survey data. Based on a longitudinal quasi-experiment study of 169 people in 73 households over a 2-year period in which they were each given a free computer and free access to the Internet, Kraut et al (1998) found that Internet use was detrimental to offline interpersonal relationships. According to their findings "greater use of the Internet was associated with declines in participant's communication with family members in the household, declines in the size of their social circle and increase in their depression and loneliness". Kraut et al (1998) have laid out a tentative theory that offers two main

explanations for the negative consequences observed. The first involves displacement of social activities, because the time spent online is unavailable for other activities. The second explanation advanced by Kraut is that Internet users replace strong face-to-face ties with weak online ties. In a sense, depth of social relationship is traded for breadth. Kraut and his associates dubbed the findings as "Internet paradox" because use of the Internet, a technology for social contact, actually led to reduction of offline social ties. This paradox argument received further support from "Nie and Erbring" report by the Stanford Institute for the Quantitative Study of Society (Nie and Erbring, 2000). It shows that on average, the more time spent on the Internet, the less time spent with friends, family and colleagues.

However, the opposite findings have been reported as well. More surprisingly, in a follow up study of their earlier sample, Kraut et al (2001) discovered the exact opposite of what had previously been reported. Participants who used the Internet more, had larger increases in the size of their social network and face to face contacts and interaction with friends and family increased.

Another work is a study that analyzed Netville wired suburb. Netville is a newly-built development of approximately 109 medium-priced detached homes in a rapidly growing, outer suburb of Toronto. Hampton and Wellman surveyed residents moving into and living in Netville. In 1997, Hampton moved into Netville and conducted an ethnography for two years while participating in formal and informal community events. Netville residents varied from beginner to expert in their degree of computer and Internet experience. Of the 109 homes that comprised Netville, 64 were connected to the local network while 45 remained unconnected. The key finding is that living in a wired neighborhood encourages greater community involvement, expands and strengthens local relationships with neighbors and family, and helps maintain ties with friends and relatives living farther away.

Based on Netville study, Internet does not replace existing means of communications but 'adds on to it so that the more people use the Internet, the more overall contacts they have with friends and relatives' (Haythornthwaite and Wellman 2002: 28). In other words, 'much like the telephone, the Internet is more useful for maintaining existing ties than for creating new ones' (Zhao, 2006: 846).

Another study in 1998 was a survey of 39,211 visitors to the National Geographic Society web site, one of the first large-scale web surveys. Findings show that Internet use supplements — rather than increases — in-person and telephone contact with friends and relatives, both near and far (Wellman et al, 2001).

Another large scale study was conducted in Catalan society. This research analyses the relationship between social structure, culture, social practices and the Internet uses in Catalan society based on data from a survey carried out in spring 2002. These relationships

are placed within a wider, transformation framework, that of the emergence of the network society as a social structure characteristic of the information era. Catalan society is extremely sociable in comparison with other advanced societies and Internet uses contribute to the development of this sociability instead of weakening it. In summary, Catalan society is extremely sociable in comparison with other advanced societies.

Wellman (2002) asks, 'Does the Internet increase, decrease or supplement other forms of interaction?' and his response is 'the evidence is mixed'. Zhao (2006) aptly asks, 'How did empirical research end up producing such bewildering amounts of contradictory findings?' A number of factors can be identified as possible contributors. Differences in research design may have played a role. Many of these studies were based on cross-sectional survey that could lead to incorrect conclusion regarding casual relationships. Use of differing measurement may also have contributed to the conflicting results.

Conceptual Framework

With the advent of the Internet, a new field of investigation has emerged within computer mediated communication research. It focuses on the Internet and how it affects people's social networks.

The Internet supports the new society in which the interpersonal connectivity is based on social networks. The developed world is in the midst of a paradigm shift in the ways in which people, organizations and institutions are connected. 'The traditional human orientation to neighborhood and village-based groups is moving towards communities that are oriented around geographically-dispersed social networks' (Pew Research Center 2006).

'People communicate and maneuver in these networks rather than being bound up in one solidary community'(Pew Research Center 2006). Although the transformation began in the pre-Internet 1960s, the proliferation of the Internet both reflects and facilitates the shift.

The technological development of computer-communications networks and the societal flourish of social networks are now affording the rise of "*networked individualism*" (Wellman, 2002). The Internet does not produce the networked society, but support it.

As Wellman (2002: 14) puts it, 'If "community" is defined socially rather than spatially, then it is clear that contemporary communities rarely are limited to neighborhoods. They are communities of shared interest rather than communities of shared kinship or locality and people usually obtain support, companionship, information and a sense of belonging from those who do not live within the same neighborhood or even within the same metropolitan area. Many people's work involves contact with shifting sets of people in other units, workplaces, and even other organizations. People maintain these ties through phoning, emailing, writing, driving, railroading, transiting, and flying'. Wellman and Gulia (1999) argue that 'social network analysts had to educate traditional, place oriented, community

sociologist that community can stretch well beyond the neighborhood'. Hence, Wellman (2002: 18) holds, 'with fuzzy network boundaries, individual autonomy and agency become more important, as each person becomes the responsible operator of her own personal network'.

Now let's clarify the social isolation concept. Social isolation is conceptually close to alienation, loneliness and is in the opposite side of social involvement, social capital and social integration. It has been considered as a dimension of alienation (Seaman, 1975). Also it has widely been studied in urban sociology literature (Klinenberg, 2002; Fischer, 1973). In this research we take social isolation into account as contrary to social involvement. Social involvement is mainly related to the size of person's social network and also embedded support within the person's social network (Kraut, 1998). Hence, social isolation is a situation wherein a person lacks enough social ties to get the needed social support. So to answer the question of Internet's impact on social isolation, we ought to know that what Internet does to the people's social networks. Does it provide a new resource of social support with people?

Garton et al. (1999: 81) note that, 'typically, analysts approach social networks in two ways: one approach considers the relations reported by a focal individual. These ego centered (or personal) networks provide views from the perspective of the persons (egos) at the centers of their networks. Members of the network are defined by their specific relations with ego. Analysts can build a picture of the network by counting the number of relations and diversity of relations'. They maintain that, 'this ego-centered approach is particularly useful when the population is large or the boundaries of the population are hard to define'. The second approach, by contrast, 'considers a whole network based on some specific criterion of population boundaries, such as a formal organization, department, club, or kinship group (1992: 82). In this approach, 'a whole network describes the ties that all members of a population maintain with all others in that group'. Wellman (1998: 28) contends that, Egocentric network studies have often meshed well with traditional survey techniques and that, 'researchers have typically interviewed a sample of respondents inquiring about composition, relational patterns and contents of their network'. This approach is used in this research to study personal network of the respondents.

Personal networks can vary in their *range*: that is in their size and heterogeneity. Large, heterogeneous networks are good for obtaining new resources (Garton et al, 1999; Wellman, 1988).

Now let's verify if the Internet increase the range of a social network. How does people's Internet use correlate with the size of their social networks? 'On the one hand, some means of communications such as email allows for flexible interaction because it is asynchronous—messages sit there until they are read—and provides the user more control over the length of time invested in each interaction than either in-person or phone contact. But the accessibility of email may also be burdensome. On the other hand, people are more willing to contact each other by email than by knocking at doors or making telephone calls. It scarcely costs them

any more time to send an email message to many people instead of just one. Hence, email can support the growth of communication, especially as it adds on to—rather than replaces— in-person and even phone contact.'(Pew Research Center 2006c)

Research conducted by Pew Research Center (2006c) shows that, 'the opportunities that large social networks provide are obvious. There are more people to socialize with and to provide social capital. There is the possibility for more diversity in larger networks, and that expands the kinds of experience people share within a network and the kinds of resources they contribute'.

Also, 'as the size of a person's social network increases, it becomes more difficult for people to contact a large percentage of network members' (Pew Research Center 2006a). Studies shows that, 'it is a burden because it takes time and energy to maintain a large network, especially when it comprises not a single solidary group but a fragmented group with many discrete clusters and relationships. More ties can also mean more requests for social capital. Increased opportunity for socializing may bring the burden of too-frequent conviviality'(Pew Research Center 2006c).

Email enables people to maintain more relationships easily because of its convenience as a communication tool and the control it gives in managing communication. Email's asynchronous nature – the ability for people to carry on conversations at different times and at their leisure – makes it possible for a quick note to an associate, whether it is about important news or seeking advice on an important decision. Moreover, it is almost as easy to email a message to many people as it is to email to only one. People use email to contact about the same percentage of those in their social networks, regardless of whether they are small or large.

As indicated by Pew Research Center (2006c), 'email provides more control over time spent on each interaction. In comparison with other communication media, email users have more autonomy over the time spent interacting. Interactions that occur through other media typically require that all parties involved agree to end the interaction. Yet, if one party wants to end the interaction while another wants to continue, the person who wants out of the interaction may feel it rude or awkward to end the interaction, resulting in spending more time. Email allows time-conscious people to avoid these situations, giving them the opportunity to communicate only what they feel necessary' and that, 'email fills a communication void—not by substituting for more in-depth contact, but by augmenting otherwise rarer contact'.

Thus the Net facilitates forming and maintaining connections between people and virtual communities. Wellman et. al (1996) note that, 'people can greatly extend the number and diversity of their social contacts when they become members of computerized conferences or broadcast information to other computer supported social networks members'.

Also Internet increases the heterogeneity of person's social network. Garton et al (1999) argue that, 'by reducing the impact of social cues, computer-mediated communications supports a wider range of participants and participation'. Similarly, Wellman et al (1996) contend that, 'the relative lack of social presence on-line fosters relationships with Net members who have more diverse social characteristics than are normally encountered in person'. This allows relationships to develop on the basis of shared interests rather than to be stunted at the onset by differences in social status.

Social support is theoretically derived from social network (Kraut, 1998). The less the range of a social network, the less the embedded social support. One's personal network is the avenue for help.

Wellman and Gulia (1997, pp. 3,14) assert that 'a community is more than the sum of a set of ties: its composition and network structure affects how it supplies companionship, supportiveness, information and a sense of identity' and 'the focus on shared interest rather than on similar characteristics can be empowering for otherwise lower-status disenfranchised groups'.

Wellman (1990) holds that, people's networks affect their capacity to address various problems in their lives and the Internet and other communication technologies leverage people's social networks. Close relationships usually provide only a few kinds of social support. Those who provide emotional aid or small services are rarely the same ones who provide large services, companionship or financial aid. People do get all kinds of support from community members but they have to turn to different ones for different kinds of help. He maintains that, 'this means that people must maintain differentiated portfolio of ties to obtain a variety of resources'. When strong ties are unable to provide information, people are likely to seek it from weak ties. Because people with strong ties are more likely to be socially similar and to know the same persons, they are more likely to possess the same information.

This idea is supported by research conducted by Pew Research Center (2006b) that indicates, 'The Internet and other communication technologies often serve as bridges to help. But is there a clear "Internet effect" that can be identified in these exchanges in social networks? Perhaps communication technologies are additional channels that open doors to tangible (e.g. loans) and intangible (e.g. advice) sources of help. Or maybe 'they let people cultivate and maintain ties with acquaintances that are called upon to provide help or advice at certain times'.

'People draw on their network capital when they need help. The Internet and other communication technologies play an important supporting role in maintaining or cultivating social networks so that they can be called upon when needed' (Pew Research Center 2006b).

However, information is only one of many social resources exchanged on-line. Despite the limited social presence of computer-mediated communication, people find social support, companionship, and a sense of belonging through the normal course of computer supported social networks of work and community, even when they are composed of persons they hardly know.

Many of Internet ties are weak ties. Weak ties are not free of support, but they are important resources to gain information, spending leisure time, communication, civic engagement and enjoyment (Castells, 2001: 128). By contrast, new information is more apt to come through weaker ties better connected with other, more diverse social circles. The lack of status or situational cues can also encourage contact between weak ties.

Weakly tied persons, although less likely to share resources, provide access to more diverse types of resources because each person operates in different social networks and has access to different resources. The cross-cutting "strength of weak ties" also integrates local clusters into large social systems (Garton et al. 1999).

Based on above-mentioned points, we can conclude that Internet will increase the size and heterogeneity of personal social networks that means more social support. Therefore Internet use will theoretically result in decreased social isolation.

Hypothesis 1: Using the Internet will be negatively associated with user's social isolation.

On the other hand, different kinds of the Internet use (social or antisocial) are important. In general, the activities online fall into two categories:

- a) Social activities such as email and chatting that promote interaction.
- b) Asocial activities such as web surfing and reading the news.

When the Internet is envisioned as just an informational tool rather than a social space, the use of Internet could cause users to be more isolated and engage people in asocial activities, then even more than television, its immersive-ness can turn people away from community, organizations and politic involvement and domestic life. By contrast, when people use the Internet to communicate and coordinate with friends, relatives and organizations – near and far – then it is a tool for building and maintaining social capital (Wellman et al, 2001). Hence it can be concluded that social uses of the Internet will be negatively associated with social isolation.

Hypothesis 2: Social use of Internet will be negatively associated with user's social isolation.

Research Method

In an ego-centered network study, a set of people (selected on the basis of one sampling method) are asked to generate a list of people (alters) who are the members of their personal social network. For instance, 'a person may be asked to report on the people he or she goes to for advice about work matters or personal matters. When the naming of alters is not restricted to a specific group, ego-centered approaches can help identify the different social pools on which people draw for different resources' (Wellman and Wortley, 1990).

When researchers study personal social networks, a key issue is what type of relations they want to measure. The ideal, of course would be to assess several types of relationships (e.g., friends, coworkers, neighbours, family, etc.). In this research in studying personal network, we limited the measuring level just to respondents' friends and acquaintances. In other words, of the different types of relations that a person has, including ties with family, neighbors, friends, relatives and colleagues, we just studied the friends and acquaintances.

The dependent variable, social isolation, as discussed before, has been operationalized through measuring the size and heterogeneity of the person's social network and embedded social support within his social network. These items were, thus, used to construct a scale to measure social isolation.

To measure the Internet use, as Kruat (1998) did, the number of hours spent daily on the Internet was considered as indicator.

To measure the social use of Internet, 12 different types of Internet uses were listed in the questionnaire. Then respondents were asked to rank the items from the most used to the least, thereby it was clear whether each person uses the Internet more socially or antisocially. Also the respondents were requested to mention how many times they communicate with their friends through email, chat, etc. in a 7-point Likert scale (From daily to once a year).

Combining these items, the measure of social use of Internet was constructed.

Both the Internet use and type of Internet use are known to be associated with certain social demographic variables (Cole et al, 2000; Levy et al, 2000). Five such variables are controlled for in the multiple regression models. These include respondent's age, family income, gender (coded into male and female), marital status (coded into never married, married, widow, divorced, else), employment status (coded into full time job, part time job, university student, school student, unemployed, others), education (coded into guidance school, high school, associate diploma, B.S., M.S., Ph.D.).

Survey

Tehran is in a situation where accessing the Internet rapidly increases. Due to low speed of the Internet at homes many people do not use the Internet at their homes and there is an interest in cybercafés which have ADSL.

There are a lot of cybercafés in Tehran whose exact number and location are not available from any organization. Attempts were made to find distribution pattern of these café nets but it did not work out. Finally, to proceed, Tehran was divided into 5 districts including north, south, west and eastern part of the city and city center. Thereafter, in each district, a number of café nets were selected and some users randomly were asked to complete the questionnaire self-administratively. The data for the study were collected in August 2006 from a sample of 204 individuals of cybercafé users in Tehran.

Description of the Sample

We used self-reported measures to assess demographic characteristics of the participants. The mean age of the sample was 22.99 (SD=5.85), with 80 percent male and 20 percent female. As for marital status, 75 percent of the sample were single, 15.7 percent married, 0.5 percent divorced, 0.5 percent widow, 1 percent others (7.3 percent missing data). Regarding job condition, 18.6 percent were unemployed, 16.7 percent were in part time job, 12.7 percent were in full time job, 27 percent university students, 2.3 percent were at military service, 15.7 percent school students and 8 percent others (2.9 percent missing data). The mean number of the family members was 4.7.

In all of the regressions, age, gender, education and income were included as control variables because all have been shown to relate to Internet use (Cole et al 2000; Levy et al, 2000) and they might also be related to the dependent variable.

Each set of regressions ran two nested models, with model 1 only featuring control variables and model 2 both control and independent variables. This allows one to see whether there is a significant R^2 change between the models when adding covariates. In other words, does addition of independent variables lead to significant predictive improvement on the level of the dependent variable? The correlation matrixes used for the first and second type of regressions are shown in table 1 and 2.

Result

A total of 66 percents of respondents said that they have found friends on the Internet and 50 Percent have met these friends out of the Internet.

Hypothesis one was supported. Internet use is slightly associated with a decreased level of social isolation. Time spent online during the day has a negative relationship with social

isolation. The predictive power of this model is limited by R^2 statistics. Only 4 percent of the variance of social isolation was explained.

Hypothesis 2 also was supported. Social use of Internet decreases social isolation. Findings demonstrate negative relationship between social use of the Internet and social isolation. Only 2 percent of dependent variance is explained by the type of Internet use. Regression results have been shown in tables 1 and 2.

Table1: Regression model regarding impact of Internet use and social isolation

<i>Model</i>	<i>R</i>	<i>R Square</i>	<i>Adjusted R Square</i>	<i>Std. Error of the Estimate</i>	<i>Sig.</i>	β
1	0.201 ^a	0.040	0.032	6.07444	0.028 ^a	- 0.186
2	0.242 ^b	0.058	0.042	6.04341	0.031 ^b	-0.135

Table 2: Regression model regarding impact of social use of the Internet and social isolation.

<i>Model</i>	<i>R</i>	<i>R Square</i>	<i>Adjusted R Square</i>	<i>Std. Error of the Estimate</i>	<i>Sig.</i>	β
1	0.181 ^a	0.033	0.025	6.41826	0.042 ^a	-0.161
2	0.230 ^b	0.053	0.037	6.37681	0.035 ^b	-0.141

Discussion

This study was an ~~partially exploratory~~ effort to measure the social impact of the Internet. The contribution of this article mainly involve a new evidence to answer the key question: does the Internet affect people's social relations? How does it do so? An important direction for the research is to verify the possible causal relationship between general Internet use and measures of social isolation.

The most important limitation of this study is its one time correlational design, which does not allow for causal inference. One can not be sure of the direction of causality.

Another limitation of our study is that we relied upon self reports of Internet behavior, and finally the convenience of sample used, restricts the generalizability of the results.

Consistent with the general idea of Wellman and his associates, the Internet has a direct negative impact on social isolation.

It is a quite consensus among scholars that there is no single effect in all societies due to using Internet. Researchers show that like other technologies, in the beginning years of the advent of a new technology some negative effects appear. But after some years and widespread use of it, the negative effects gradually disappear (Kraut et al, 2001). The use of Internet as a new means of communication is rapidly growing, but due to lack of some necessary infrastructures, the speed of Internet is low. Hence, people prefer to access the Internet in cybercafés, governmental organizations and universities which enjoy ADSL.

There is also another important factor in Iranian society which greatly affects the type of Internet usage. Young men and young women are not allowed to communicate free in public places according to some religious and political policies. There are a number of limitations that keep people of different genders separated from each other. Thus, young people look for ways to communicate with people of different gender to overcome the limitations. The Internet in this social context plays an important role. It provides an excellent tool for communication that no one is able to prevent and to pick on them. The results of our research shows that a large portion of the Internet users in Tehran use the Internet for finding friends that in turn leads to reduced amounts of social isolations.

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