PATRIMONIALISM AND URBAN DEVELOPMENT:
A REEXAMINATION OF MAX WEBER’S THEORIES OF THE CITY

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Introduction

‘Culture, Patrimonialism and Religion’ might constitute, quite appropriately, a unique subject matter for revisiting Max Weber. Students of Sociology are fully aware of the fact that Max Weber had dealt with these aspects of human civilization and society often passionately as well as very intelligently. The present paper makes a modest attempt to examine whether there is any relationship between Patrimonialism and urban development. And in this connection, a critical review of Max Weber’s theories of the city becomes imperative. Weber presents both ‘Patrimonialism’ and ‘City’ as two different forms of domination. While Weber puts Patrimonialism in the category of legitimate domination he considers city as a kind of non-legitimate one. Analyzing relationship between Patrimonialism and urban development Weber’s main focus of interest is conspicuously the rise of capitalism since city is primarily characterized as a centre of trade and commerce. He discusses patrimonial monopoly and capitalist privileges from that perspective.

In the preparation of this article I have consulted Max Weber’s four major works, Economy and Society, 3 vols. (1968)-an English translation of German classic: Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft (1913), The City (1958), first published in German in 1921, The Agrarian Sociology of Ancient Civilizations (1976), an English version of German (1909), and General Economic History (1927), which is based on a series of lectures in a course Weber gave at Munich University in the winter of 1919-20 just before his death. Although for writing this article necessary facts were collected from the above mentioned four works, it must be admitted that this work heavily relies upon Weber’s monumental book: Economy and Society, vol 2 (chapters: XII, XIII and XVI). It would not be out of context to mention here that what is Capital to Karl Marx, Economy and Society is to Max Weber. Moreover, how a happy coincidence is the fact that these two treatises of Marx and Weber are the byproducts of Grundrisse. For Marx, Grundrisse (1857-58) was the Foundations of the Critique of Political Economy, translated with a foreword by Martin Nicolaus (1973), but Weber’s work needed extraordinary industry and intellect of as many as ten eminent sociologists for English translation of whom G. Roth and C. Wittich were the editors. Besides, Marx and Weber have another pertinent parallel so far as their works are concerned. Since Weber’s tract General Economic History contains an illuminating discussion of feudal and capitalist institutions it is really comparable with Marx’s Pre-capitalist Economic Formations, translated and edited by Jack Cohen and E. J. Hobsbawm respectively in 1964 with a lengthy introduction by the latter. In fact, both Marx and Weber drew to a great extent on the same tradition of scholarship and thus aimed essentially at showing the developments leading to capitalism including that of the urban community. Yet it cannot be said that their approach is wholly the same. When they are equally criticizing the culture of capitalism Weber describes its development in terms of ‘rationalization’ and Marx in terms of ‘alienation’ (Lowith1982:26).

Three intellectual sources shaped Weber’s thinking: historicism, hermeneutic, realpolitik, i.e. in other words, history as a science of reality, interpretation of texts leading to the development of the ‘ideal type’- an important tool of Weber’s method, and his concept of ‘verstehen’ i.e. understanding, and power politics. Weber’s ideas of rethinking and structure were developed into a general method of the cultural sciences by Wilhelm Dilthey. What is important is that Weber used Dilthey’s ideas to integrate all the varied aspects of cultural life- not the least of his aims being ‘to break the Marxist schema’ (Weber 1976:14-20). It must be emphasized here that Weber’s historicism separates him from the many other German scholars of different tendencies.

A glance at a survey of German constitutional theory, for example, shows that as early as 1820 Von Haller distinguished three basic types of states: patrimonial, military, and theocratic; and in 1859 Von Mohl described six types: patriarchal, patrimonial, theocratic, classical, legal, and despotic. Weber being a graduate of the Berlin Law faculty, was undoubtedly familiar with these writings and, in fact, used some of the terms mentioned above in his own works. Furthermore, one of the classic typologies of all time, Tonnies’ distinction between ‘Gemeinschaft’ and ‘Gesellschaft’ (in English: ‘Community’ and ‘Society’), which was propounded as early as 1887 was also known to Weber (1864-1920). In 1853 August Von Rochau developed the concept of ‘Realpolitik’. After 1860 this tendency was strengthened by a new set of ideas deriving from Darwinism, which surprisingly influenced both Marx and Weber (Weber 1976: 20-22). Thus we can say that Weber’s concepts of ‘Patrimonialism’ as a form of state and ‘City’ as a type of autonomous urban community had their intellectual antecedents. Moreover, Weber conceives ‘City’ as a kind of economy – the idea which he had borrowed from Karl Bucher who in 1893 had published a general outline of

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economic history, *The Rise of the National Economy*. His thesis was that antiquity was always dominated by ‘house economy’, in which production, exchange, and consumption all occurred within great households. The next higher stage of economic organization, city economy, did not appear until mediaeval times, and only in the modern age did the highest form of economic organization, the national economy, emerge (Weber 1976:26-27). The corresponding types of society or social structure of the above-mentioned three economies, according to both Weber and Marx, may be termed as ancient, feudal and capitalist respectively.

**Features of Patrimonialism**

Let me now embark upon the discussion of the problem under review on the basis of above premise. According to Max Weber, Patrimonialism is distinguished from Patriarchalism. The roots of patriarchal domination grew out of the master’s authority over his household. Patrimonial domination is a special case of patriarchal domination. But under bureaucratic domination the norms are established rationally. Bureaucratic domination and power has legitimate authority, whereas under patriarchal domination legitimacy of the master’s order is guaranteed by personal subjection. As early as in Babylonian times freemen entered into a “work contract” by selling themselves into slavery, which was considered by Weber as a precursor of “adoption”. Two basic elements of patriarchal authority are piety toward tradition and toward the master. However, our present purpose is to examine that form of domination which developed on the basis of the oikos and therefore of differentiated patriarchal power: patrimonial domination. (Weber 1968: 1006-11). Patrimonial conditions have had an extraordinary impact as the basis of political structures. As we witness, Egypt almost appears as a single effective oikos patrimonially ruled by the pharaoh. The Egyptian administration always contained characteristics of the oikos economy. The ancient Inca state of Latin America under the ‘Asiatic Mode of Production’, according to Marx, was based on forced labour. Yet, we shall actually speak of a Patrimonial state when the prince exercises his political power over his subjects, which is not discretionary. The majority of all “great states” of the East had fairly strong patrimonial character until and even after the beginning of the modern times. In all ancient, Asian and medieval large-scale states which are dependent upon a natural economy (i.e. house economy) the ruler is typically maintained in such a manner that the demands for food, clothing, armour and other needs are apportioned in kind. A communal economy (Gemein-Wirtschaft) which relies on payment and delivery in kind is the primary form of satisfying the necessities of patrimonial political structures. But there were economic differences: the Persian royal household was a heavy burden for the city in which the king resided, whereas the Greek Hellenistic royal household which was based on money economy was a source of income for the city. With the development of trade and of money economy the patrimonial ruler may satisfy his economic needs no longer through his oikos but through profit-Oriented monopolism. This happened on a vast scale in Egypt, where even the pharaoh of the early period of natural economy carried on trade for his own account; in the Ptolemaic period and even more so under Roman rule a great many diverse monopolies and different forms of tax replaced the old liturgical methods (Weber 1968: 1013-14).

However, the sources of power under both patrimonial and non-patrimonial states were the armies. These troops may consist of: 1) patrimonial slaves, retainers living on allowances, or coloni. Egyptian Pharaohs and Mesopotamian Kings, as well as powerful private lords in Antiquity (for example, the Roman nobility) and in the Middle Ages (seniores), employed their coloni as personal troops; in the Orient serfs branded with the lord’s property mark were also used. Therefore, the patrimonial prince regularly sought to base his power over political subjects on troops specifically raised for this purpose. This military force may be made up: 2) of slaves who are actually alienated from agricultural production. Indeed, after the final dissolution in 833 A.D. of the Arabian, tribally organized theocratic levy, the Caliphate and most Oriental products of its disintegration relied for centuries on armies of purchased slaves. The use of Turkish slaves by the Abbasids and of purchased slave soldiers in Egypt turned out very differently. The feudalization of the economy was facilitated when troops were assigned the tax yield of land, and eventually land was transferred to them as service holdings, which made them landowners. 3) The Ottoman rulers, who until the 14th century were really supported only by the Anatolian levies, restored for the first time in 1330 to the famous conscription of boys into army. 4) The use of mercenaries in early Antiquity who are primarily paid in kind, but the real incentive was always given in precious metals. The prince therefore had to have monetary revenues for the mercenaries, which were raised either by trading or by producing goods for the market. In both cases, a money economy had to exist. In the Oriental as well as the Occidental states since the beginning of modern times we observe a peculiar phenomenon: The opportunities for the military monarchy of a despot backed by mercenaries increase significantly with the advance of money economy. In the Orient the military monarchy has ever remained the typical national form of domination, and in the Occident the signori of the Italian cities. 5) The Patrimonial ruler may also rely on persons who have been granted land-lots, just like manorial peasants, but instead of economic services they need render only military ones. The monarchical troops in the ancient Orient were partly recruited in this manner, such as the “warrior caste” of Egypt and the Mesopotamian fief-warriors. 6) For the solidarity of interests that developed between the ruler and his “soldiers” (literally, “hired men”) a sufficiently strong system of selecting the troops became necessary, which is, of course, without tribal heterogeneity. Wherever the patrimonial ruler did not recruit his army from tribal aliens or pariah castes (as in the case of India) but from subjects, he adhered to fairly some definite social criteria. To this extent the patrimonial ruler regularly based his military power upon the property-less, non-privileged and rural masses. Thus he disarmed his potential competitors for
domination. The feudal army of the Middle Ages, just as the Spartan army of hoplites, are such examples. Both armies were founded on the economic necessity of the peasants and a military technology which suited the military training of a dominant stratum. But the army of the patrimonial prince is based upon the fact that the propertied strata were generally the trading and craft bourgeoisie of ancient and medieval cities. Hence the development of patrimonialism and of military monarchy is not only a consequence of purely political circumstances, as in the Roman Empire, but also very often a result of economic changes. The patrimonial ruler customarily draws the economically and socially privileged strata over to his side. Finally, there is a decisive economic condition for the degree to which the royal army is “patrimonial”, which means, a purely personal army of the prince. In the Roman Empire this phenomenon was the consequence of the militarism of the Severans and under Oriental Sultanism it was a regular feature. The result was the sudden collapse of a patrimonial regime and equally sudden rise of a new one, which led to great political instability (Weber 1968: 1015-20).

Yet, as a rule, the patrimonial ruler is linked with the ruled through a consensual community which also exists apart from his independent military force and which is rooted in the belief that the powers of the ruler are legitimate in so far as they are traditional. They are called “political subjects” legitimately ruled by a patrimonial prince. The bearing of arms also obliges the political subjects to follow the princes’ call to arms. Thus in the case of the rebellious German peasants of the 16th century the traditional possession of arms was still important. The battles in the Hundred Years’ War were fought not only by knights but very prominently also by the English yeomanry, and a great many patrimonial forces were intermediate between a patrimonial army proper and a levy. The patrimonial satisfaction of the public wants has its distinctive features, which also occur, in the other forms of domination. The liturgical meeting of the ruler’s Politico-economic needs is most highly developed in the patrimonial state in the Orient. Sometimes it has been assumed that even the Indian castes were at least in part of liturgical origin, but there is no sufficient basis for this opinion. It is also very doubtful to what extent the use of the early medieval guilds for military and political purposes was a really important factor in the widespread development of the guild system. In the Indian case the primary influence must definitely be ascribed to magic-religious and status differences; in that of the guilds voluntary association played the major role. Accordingly, liturgical methods of meeting public needs prevailed particularly in the Orient, but with less consistency these methods were also applied in the Occident (Weber 1968: 1020-23).

Patrimonial officialdom may develop bureaucratic features with increasing functional division and rationalization. But the genuinely patrimonial office differs sociologically from the bureaucratic one the more distinctly, the more purely each type has been articulated. The patrimonial office lacks above all the bureaucratic separation of the “private” and the “public” sphere, which is an essential element of the concept of the “civil society”. It is interesting to note that it was Plato who first introduced the notion of the “public” as distinct from the “private”. Thus we can find Weber’s idea of “civil society” in the above manner. But under patrimonialism political administration is treated as a purely personal affair of the ruler, and political power is considered part of his personal property, which can be exploited by means of contributions and fees. The distribution of these sources of income provides a strong incentive for the gradual delimitation of administrative jurisdictions, which was at first almost non-existent in the political sphere of the patrimonial state. To protect their fees the English lawyers, for example, insisted upon the appointment of judges exclusively from their midst and upon admission to their own ranks exclusively of apprentices trained in law offices. In contrast to other countries, the university graduates trained in Roman law were thus excluded. Consequently for the sake of fees the secular courts fought with the ecclesiastic ones. Thus wherever the administration of a large political realm is patrimonial, every attempt at identifying “Jurisdictions” is lost in a maze of official titles whose meaning seems to change quite arbitrarily; witness Assyria even during the period of its greatest expansion. The conflict between tradition and the legal rights of patrimonial rulers is everywhere irreconcilable wherever they overlap. However, all patrimonial service regulations are ultimately nothing but purely subjective rights and privileges of individuals deriving from the ruler’s grant or favour. It lacks the objective norms of the bureaucratic state (Weber 1968: 1028-31).

The maintenance in the ruler’s household was managed by the granting of benefices or fiefs to patrimonial officials who had their own households. The important institution of benefice implies a definite “right to the office”, which has had the most diverse forms. At first, the benefice was, as in Egypt, Assyria and China, an allowance in kind from the depots and granaries of the ruler (king or God), as a rule for life. Later these allowances became alienable and were negotiable even in fractions (for example, for single days of each month); thus they were something like forerunners, at the stage of natural economy, of modern government bonds. We shall call this type benefices in kind. The second type is the fee benefice: the assignment of certain fees which the ruler or his representative can expect for official acts. It is really based on revenues of a relatively extra-patrimonial origin. In the classical Antiquity this kind of benefice was subject to purely commercial transactions. A large part of those priestly positions which had the character of an “office” (and not of a free profession) were publicly sold in the ancient Greek city-states. It is not known to what extent the trading of benefices was practiced in Egypt and other ancient civilizations of the Orient. Finally, the benefice could also take the form of a landed benefice assigning office or service land (for example, jagir-land especially in Mughal India.) for the incumbents’ own use. This approximates the fief and gives the benefice-holder greater autonomy from the lord.
It was clear, however, that in the case of a secular official who had a family the separation immediately resulted in a drive for hereditary instead of merely lifelong appropriation of the benefice. The appropriation of the benefices took place particularly in the early period of the modern patrimonial-bureaucratic state. This process occurred everywhere, most strongly in France and to a lesser extent in England. In this way the benefice became a patronal possession of the leaseholder or purchaser with the most diverse arrangements, including hereditability and alienability. It should be noted here that it was only on August 4, 1789 that the French Revolution eradicated office appropriation. By and large the Christian clergy in the middle Ages was maintained through endowment with land or fee benefices. Originally the church had been supported by the offerings of the community. This was the normal state of affairs in the old church of the cities, which were then the bearers of Christianity. At this stage, the church was a patriarchally modified bureaucracy. But in the Occident the urban character of religion eventually disappeared and Christianity spread into the countryside, which was still dominated by natural economy. This actually happened also in the case of Islam, which originated as an urban cult in the city of Mecca and then expanded to peripheral tribal or rural areas of the Arab countries. So far as Christianity is concerned, some of the clergymen gave up their urban residence, especially in northern Europe. Many of the churches were secularly owned, either by the peasant community or the manorial lord and thereby the clergymen frequently became the latter’s dependents. Basically the bishops could not prevent the prebendalization of clerical positions. Thus the development of the church hierarchy turned toward decentralization and appropriation of patronage by the secular rulers. This phenomenon marked an important phase in the establishment of the urban bureaucracy, since the subsequent separation of church and state abolished the clerical system of allegiance. Thus the benefice became one of the basic issues in the cultural conflict between church and secular state power of the 14th and 15th century. For throughout the Middle Ages the clerical benefice was the constant resource serving the purpose of “high culture”. Especially in the later Middle Ages, up to the reformation (1529) and counter-Reformation, the benefice developed into the material foundation of that class which was then the bearer of “high culture”. By endowing the universities with the disposal over benefices the clerical authority made possible the rise of that medieval stratum of intellectuals who were engaged in the scientific work in the cities. The secularization of modern times especially in western Europe fixed this prebendal character even more when the economic maintenance of the church and of its officials was transferred to the state exchequer. Only the modern struggles between secular states and the church, and especially the separation of church and state, provided the clerical authority with the opportunity to abolish the “right to the office”. Similar developments were widespread all over the world. We have already mentioned quite significant beginnings in classical Antiquity. But in ancient China the office benefice was not appropriated, and therefore it never became legally marketable. However, just as in the Occident, the obtainment of a benefice is the goal of education and earning academic degrees in China including all other ancient civilizations of the Orient. The benefice of the Islamic *ulemas*, that means, of the status group of examined aspirants for the offices of the *kadi* (Judge), *mufti* (Islamic Jurists) and *Imam* (Islamic practitioners), was often granted only for a short time, not exceeding one and a half year. (Weber 1968: 1032-37).

In a patrimonial state every prebendal decentralization of the administration, every jurisdictional delimitation caused by the distribution of sources of fee incomes among competitors, and even more so every appropriation of benefices signifies not rationalization but typification. Thus the patrimonial state as a whole may tend more toward the stereotyped or more toward the arbitrary pattern. The former can be more frequently found in the Occident, the latter to a large extent in the Orient. In the course of this typification the old court officials became purely representative dignitaries and benefice-holding sinecurists. The more appropriation takes place, the less does the patrimonial state operate either according to the concept of jurisdiction or to that of the “agency” in the contemporary sense. The separation of public and private matters, of public and private property and powers was carried through more or less only in the arbitrary type of patrimonialism; the separation disappeared with increasing prebendalization and appropriation. In the later periods of Oriental history, especially under Islam, the separation of the office of the military commander (*amir*) from that of the tax collector and tax farmer (*amil*), as found during the Mughal rule in India, became a firm principle of all strong governments. It has been pointed out correctly that nearly every case of a permanent merger of these two jurisdictions, that means, the fusion of the military and economic power of an administrative district in the hands of one person (for example, generally noticed in the bordering districts of present Bangladesh during the Mughal rule), soon tended to encourage the disengagement of local administrator from the central authority (Weber 1968: 1038-44).

The first consistent patrimonial-bureaucratic administration known to us existed in ancient Egypt. Originally it was solely staffed with royal clients-servants attached to the pharaoh’s court. Later, however, officials also had to be recruited from the outside, from the ranks of the only class technically suited, the scribes, who thereby entered into patrimonial dependency. It is interesting to note here that almost a similar phenomenon might be observed in the rise of Hindu Kayastha sub-caste as a class or status group of scribes during the pre-Mughal Muslim rule in Bengal, who received immense favour from their patrons. Islam especially in Bengal utilized castes of scribes in opposition to the Brahmans. This phase of Indian administrative history led to the development of various prebends en masse. Above all, it led to the emergence of a stratum of landlords, which developed out of tax farming and military prebendalization. Max Weber maintains that feudal relations were also to be found in India, but they were not decisive for the formation
either of a nobility or landlordism. In India, as in the Orient generally, a characteristic seigniory developed rather out of tax farming and the military and fiscal prebends of a far more bureaucratic state. The Oriental seigniory therefore remained in essence, a “prebend” and did not become a “fief”; not feudalization, but prebendalization of the patrimonial state occurred. Similarly, the vascillation of social structure and political organization created a fluid situation. When the tendency toward feudalization was ascendant the king, as usual, made use of old distinguished secular or priestly nobles; when the tendency toward patrimonialism was ascendant he appointed lower class aspirants to positions of political power. Patrimonialism broke the old monopoly of offices by the knighthood. It corresponds to the nature of patrimonial states everywhere and particularly to the Oriental patriarchalism. As a rule, political authority is a preponderant advantage in the competition for social rank. This is particularly true of the great caste of scribes as, for example, the purely bureaucratic kayastha in Bengal where the Sena dynasty was organized in patrimonial bureaucratic fashion (Weber 1958: 69-75).

As early as the old kingdom of Egypt the entire people was pressed into a hierarchy of clientage. This development was propelled by the overriding importance of systematic centralized river-regulation and of the construction projects during the long season in which the absence of agricultural work permitted drafting on an unprecedented scale. The state was based on compulsory labour. The pharaoh maintained his oikos through his own enterprises and trade monopolies, the domestic production of unfree craft labour, the agricultural output of the coloni, and contributions. There was a rudimentary market economy. However, an intermediate period of feudalism existed in the Middle Kingdom of Egypt where there were no castes in the specific sense of the word. The army was also patrimonial, and this was decisive for power position of the pharaohs. The geographic conditions, especially the comfortable river road and the objective necessity of uniform river regulation, preserved territorial unity of ancient Egypt. The ancient Chinese empire constituted an essentially different type. Here too the power of patrimonial officialdom was based on river regulation, particularly canal construction but primarily for transportation. In addition, the patrimonial bureaucracy benefitted from the even more complete absence of a landed nobility than was the case in Egypt. Although, in practice, some impure vocations were hereditary, otherwise there is not a trace of a caste system or of other status or hereditary privileges. In the main, patrimonial officialdom was confronted only by the sibs as autochthonous power, aside from merchant and craft guilds. Besides, the Chinese imperial regime introduced something new: for the first time in history there appear official qualifying examinations and official certificates of conduct. Nevertheless, Chinese officialdom did not develop into a modern bureaucracy. The specifically modern concept of the functional association and of specialized officialdom would have run counter to everything characteristically Chinese and to all the status trends of Chinese officialdom. The Confucian maxim that a refined man was not a tool—the ethical ideal of universal personal self-perfection, so radically opposed to the Occidental notion of a specific vocation—stood in the way of professional schooling and specialized competencies. Just as patrimonialism has its genesis in the piety of the children of the house toward the patriarch’s authority, so Confucianism bases the subordination of the officials to the ruler. In central and East Europe filial piety plays as the foundation of all political virtues in strictly patriarchal Lutherism, but Confucianism elaborated this complex of ideas much more consistently. This development in Chinese patrimonialism was of course aided by the lack of a landowning seigneurial stratum (Weber 1968: 1044-50).

The dependency of the “governors” of most Oriental and Asian empires was in practice always unstable because of their dual positions. The religious unity of the caliphate did not prevent the disintegration of the purely secular Sultanate, a creation of the slave-generals, into sub-empires. Partly for that reason hereditary division never became customary in the Islamic Orient. It also did not exist in the ancient Orient; the imperative unity of a state-controlled irrigation economy was probably the major technical reason for preserving the principle of indivisibility, which, however, most likely had its historical origin in the initial character of kingship as the rulership of a town. For in contrast to rural territorial domination, the rulership of a town is technically not at all divisible, or only under great difficulties. At any rate, the absence of hereditary division in the Oriental patrimonial monarchies had religious and administrative and, in particular, technical and military reasons (Weber 1968: 1051-54). The continuous struggle of the central power with the various centrifugal local powers creates a specific problem for patrimonialism. In contrast to China and to Egypt this happened in the ancient and medieval patrimonial “states” of the Near East and most prominently in the Occident since the Roman Empire. To some extent for the Near Eastern state, and as a rule for the Hellenistic and the Imperial Roman state, the specific means of creating a local administrative apparatus was the founding of a city. We also find a similar phenomenon in China. We shall later deal with the meanings, which the foundation of cities had, in these various cases: there were indeed great differences. Generally speaking, the economic limits in time and space of city foundation in the Roman Empire also became the boundary lines for the traditional structure of ancient culture. (Weber 1968: 1051-55)

The unstable unity of the Persian Empire for two centuries was made possible through disarmament and theocratic rule, as in the cases of the Jews and of Egypt. Moreover, strong national differences and collisions of interest of local notables were exploited. In the Babylonian and Persian empires we find at least traces of those typical clashes between local notables and central powers which later became one of the most important determinants of western medieval development. The local landlords demand special immunity: exemption from interference on the part of the ruler’s
The oldest large patrimonial polities is closely connected with the function of trade in the cities. The subsequent patrimonialism is compatible with household and market economy, petty-bourgeois and manorial agriculture, absence ideal of transmitting specialized knowledge, particularly prevalent in ancient China. According to Max Weber, prebendally organized, education tends to be intellectualist-literary, which is intrinsically related to the bureaucratic “cultivation” which is diametrically opposite to specialized education in a bureaucratic regime. Wherever domination is thus “refinement” is added first to the purely military-gymnastic training, resulting into a complex type of the development of patrimonialism. The royal trade monopoly can be found all over the world. The location of most of the places it is represented is determined by the specific historical and economic conditions. The characteristic fusion of the rural and urban rentier strata in the type of the gentleman (compare Hindu Bhadralok category of Bengal) was greatly facilitated by their common ties to the office of the justices of the peace. Administration by justices of the peace practically reduced all local administrative bodies outside the cities almost to insignificance. It should be pointed out here that already before the penetration of Puritanism in England the increasing fusion of the landed class with specifically bourgeois, urban rentier and active business strata took place. Similar situation became observable in the fusion of nobility and popolo grasso in Italy. But the modern type of gentleman developed out of the older one only under the influence of Puritanism (compare the founding of the Brahmo Samaj in 1828 at Calcutta on the basis of the monotheistic creed of Brahmoism as propagated by Raja Rammohun Roy of Bengal who is regarded as the architect of modern India). Administration by unrecompensed justices of the peace who were educated laymen was technically no longer feasible under the conditions of the modern city life (Weber 1968: 1058-64).

The structure of feudal relationships can be contrasted with the wide range of discretion and the related instability of power positions under pure patrimonialism. Occidental feudalism is a marginal case of patrimonialism that tends toward stereotyped and fixed relationships between lord and vassal. We can now classify “feudal” relationships in the broad sense of the word as follows: 1) “Liturgic” feudalism: soldiers provided with land, frontier guards, peasants with specific military duties; 2)“Patrimonial” feudalism, a) “manorial”: levies of coloni (for example, Roman nobility and Egyptian pharaoh); b) “Servile” : slaves (for instance, ancient Babylonian and Egyptian armies and Arabian private army in the Middle Ages); c) “Gentile” : hereditary clients as private soldiers (Roman nobility); 3) “Free” feudalism, a) “Vassalic”, characterized by personal fealty without the grant of manorial rights (Japanese Samurai); b) “Prebendal”: without personal fealty, but with the grant of manorial rights and tax revenues (Middle East, including the Turkish siks); c) “Feudatory” : personal fealty and fief combined (Occident); d) “Urban”: characterized by communal association of warriors, based on manorial land allotted to the individual (the typical Hellenic Polis of the Spartan type). Of the above-mentioned three major forms of feudalism including their respective ramifications, according to Max Weber, “free” feudalism that existed only in the Occident is the “ideal type” of feudalism, which did not develop in the Orient where, according to Karl Marx, the “Asiatic Mode of Production” had to evolve. Under fully developed feudalism there was a “hierarchy” in two respects: first, the Seigneurial rights derived from the supreme ruler as the source of power, which were transferable as full fiefs; Second, there was a social rank-order according to the level of subinfeudation as found especially in Bengal land system after the introduction of the Permanent Settlement Act of 1793 by Cornwallis. (Weber 1968:1070-79).

There was a transition from feudalism to bureaucracy through the Polity of Estates (Standaestaat) in the Occident. Feudalism in estate-type patrimonialism, a marginal case that contrasts with patriarchal patrimonialism. Patrimonial or feudal politics also influenced the general cultural development, particularly in the field of education. There was a connection between education and domination. Typically, certain artistic creations (in literature, music and visual arts) become a means of self-glorification and establish and preserve the nubus of the dominant stratum vis-à-vis the ruled. Thus “refinement” is added first to the purely military-gymnastic training, resulting into a complex type of “cultivation” which is diametrically opposite to specialized education in a bureaucratic regime. Wherever domination is prebendally organized, education tends to be intellectualist-literary, which is intrinsically related to the bureaucratic ideal of transmitting specialized knowledge, particularly prevalent in ancient China. According to Max Weber, patrimonialism is compatible with household and market economy, petty-bourgeois and manorial agriculture, absence and presence of capitalist economy. The well-known Marxist statement that the hand-mill requires feudalism just as the steam-mill necessitates capitalism is at most correct in its second part, and then only partially. The hand-mill has lived through all conceivable economic structures and political “superstructures”. Besides, there was an impact of trade on the development of patrimonialism. The royal trade monopoly can be found all over the world. The location of most of the oldest large patrimonial polities is closely connected with the function of trade in the cities. The subsequent
development toward the monopolization of “ground-rent” is very often codetermined by trade gains. The situation is usually not different with regard to the monopolistic land control of the aristocracy in maritime states: debt-serfs are an important part of agricultural labour in Hellenic Antiquity and probably also in the ancient Orient. They till the soil for the urban patriciate for a share in the crops. Direct and indirect trade gains provide the urban patriciate with the means for accumulating land and people. In a natural economy even the moderate possession of precious metals was extraordinarily important for the rise and the power position of a state. It is true that trade typically created the “municipal feudalism” of a seigneurial patriciate, especially in the Mediterranean area. However, in Japan and India as well as in the Occident and in the Islamic Orient, feudalization was closely related to the slow progress, and often to the decline, of the market economy. The “financier” is already known in the period of Hammurabi and the formation of trade capital is feasible under almost all conditions of domination, especially under patrimonialism. But it is different from industrial capitalism. Here the characteristic features of patrimonial capitalism emerged-and the bureaucracy of “Enlightened Despotism” was still as patrimonial as was the basic conception of the “state” on which it rested. The feudal order has a different effect upon the economy than does patrimonialism, which in part furthers and in part deflects modern capitalism. The patrimonial state offers the whole realm of the ruler’s discretion as a hunting ground for accumulating wealth. Patrimonialism gives free rein to the enrichment of the ruler himself, the court officials, favourites, governors, mandarins, tax collectors, influence peddlers, and the big merchants and financiers who function as tax-farmers, purveyors and creditors. Patriarchal patrimonialism is much more tolerant than feudalism toward social mobility and the acquisition of wealth. Diverse circumstances determine the extent to which patrimonialism tends toward more monopolies of its own, and therefore toward hostility to private capitalism. The two most important factors are political: 1) The very structure of patrimonial domination; 2) The privileges of private capital in patrimonial states. Politically privileged capitalism flourished in classical Antiquity, as long as several city-states competed for supremacy and survival; in China, too, it seems to have developed in the corresponding past. It thrived during the age of mercantilism in the Occident, when the modern states engaged themselves in political competition. (Weber1968: 1085-1103).

Among the most important objects of government monopolies is coinage, which was controlled by the patrimonial rulers primarily for purely fiscal purposes. In the Antiquity as well as in the Middle Ages the demand for rational coinage emanated in the cities, and thus urban development in the Occidental sense, specially the rise of independent crafts and indigenous retail trade, not wholesale trade, was reflected in the rationalization of coinage. The structure of domination affected the general habits of the peoples more by virtue of the ethos which it established than through the creation of the technical means of commerce. Loyalty and personal fealty are also at the root of many plebeian forms of patrimonial or liturgical feudalism (slave armies, soldiers settled as cleruchs, peasants or frontier guards, and especially levies of clients and coloni). On the other hand, status honour counts for much in the army of “urban feudalism”. These features were generally characteristic of the early Hellenic armies of hoplites. But the personal relationship of fealty was absent. In the age of the Crusades (1095-1291) prebendal feudalism of the Orient sustained a sense of Kindly status, but on the whole it remained patriarchal rulership in character. The combination of honour and fealty was only known in Occidental feudalism and Japanese “vassalic” feudalism. Both have in common with Hellenic urban feudalism a special status education, which aims at the inculcation of ethos based on status honour. (Weber 1968: 1103-1105).

**Stages of Urban Development**

There are two sociological propositions pertaining to the idea of civilization. These are: ‘civilization is an agricultural phenomenon’; ‘civilization is an urban phenomenon’. Both are equally correct and relevant for comprehension of the concept of city since it is generally considered as the centre of civilization. These statements actually refer to the nature and growth of human civilization. Max Weber himself probably poses this question from that perspective when he appears to maintain that the two ancient civilizations of the Occident are “coastal” (i.e. classical Antiquity of Greece and Rome) while the four ancient civilizations of the Orient are “reverine” (i.e. Egypt, Mesopotamia, China, and India). The former are located on the coasts of the Mediterranean sea whereas the latter’s corresponding locations are the valleys of the great rivers of the Nile, the Euphrates and the Tigris, the Huang Ho and the Indus. The development of the coastal civilizations of the West is mainly attributed to the relatively quicker introduction of commerce and trade. On the other hand, prosperity of the river-valley civilizations of the East is primarily facilitated by the easier beginning of agriculture in the fertile land of the river-valleys. But the cities everywhere emerged as the locus of civilization in the ancient period of world history. (Weber 1976: 40).

It is generally assumed that there are certain stages of organization which were recapitulated by all the peoples in Antiquity from the Seine to the Euphrates among whom urban centres came into being. These stages are: 1) Walls existed to provide defence against attack, and it was within these walls that cities later arose, but at this stage household and village continued to be the centres of economic life. Clan, cult and military associations still provided for security and shaped political and religious institutions. 2) Next there appeared a form of settlement with more urban
characteristics – the fortress whose head was a king, elevated above his subjects by possession of land, slaves, herds and treasure. Two factors were generally necessary for establishment of a fortress kingdom: a) fruitful land, able to support rent payments; b) profit from commerce. It means that agriculture and commerce are the two economic bases of the rise of cities or, in other words, civilization. 3) The next stage is represented by the aristocratic city-states founded among the Mediterranean peoples in Antiquity. Aristocratic clans controlled a citadel. This stage too was reached only where two factors were present: a) rich land, to sustain rental payments; b) proximity to a coast, to permit profits from commerce. It was at this time that the feudal nobility of the old fortress kingdom emancipated itself from royal authority and constituted itself as an autonomous, urban community, in which rank was determined by military criteria and rule was exercised either by a king who was no more than first among equals or else – and this usually developed with time – by elected magistrates. In any case, however, these cities were not administered by bureaucracies, a fact of decisive importance. It should be noted here that the urban character of these communities distinguished the development of antiquity from the analogous development of feudalism in the medieval European continent, although in Italy early medieval institutions were somewhat similar. However, the aristocratic city was in fact a league of great ‘clans’. In this form of society labour-power was the debt-slave, for the aristocracy was at first a class of moneylenders and then became a class of landowners living on rents. The fact that moneylenders usually became landowners – a phenomenon of which is still prevalent in predominantly agrarian Bangladesh. Even in her urban areas this is not altogether absent. 4) Sometimes the fortress kingdom developed in a direction different from the one stated above. When the king gained sufficient economic resources to support his army and retinue, a situation compelled him to create a bureaucracy entirely subordinated to him and organized on hierarchical principles. The city then became no more than the royal capital where his residence and court were located. But often the capital had no autonomy as in Egypt, whereas Babylon enjoyed a degree of unpolitical local autonomy. The decisive factor here was the manner in which the needs of the royal household were met – that is, whether through forced labour services or through ‘taxes’. One can therefore say that the system would tend towards one or another of two types: a regime based on forced labour or one relied on tribute. Generally the former developed out of the latter, and in turn it was transformed by a process of rationalization’, as Max Weber means, into the tax-and-liturgy state (Weber 1976:69-72).

Commerce played a crucial role in the urban development of types 2 and 3, but there were of course many variations of these ‘pure’ types. The type 2 always appeared only when the chief monopolized foreign trade or at least was able to tax it. Accumulation of hoards went hand in hand with the economic subjection of the peasantry. Whether further development tended towards types 3 (aristocratic polis) or 4 (bureaucratic city kingdom) evidently dependent upon the interaction of a complex of factors, some of them geographic, others purely historical. In either case, however, the economic burdens laid upon the populace to satisfy the needs of the government were in inverse proportion to the development of private domestic trade. But as soon as either regime (type 3 or 4) could depend mainly on taxes it then took a natural attitude towards transfers of land. There were also limitations connected with estate tenure (in the aristocratic polis) or military obligations (in the monarchical city). Then under bureaucratic monarchy (type 4) the ruler could rely upon ‘his own’ army as well as a bureaucratic fiscal system leading to granting full freedom of trade in land. The aristocratic families favoured this so far as peasant property was concerned for their position depended in part on the practice of usury. On the other hand, despotic rulers had good reason to oppose the development of autonomous patrimonial lordships. In fact, type 4 was the bureaucratic city kingdom or bureaucratic river kingdom; in it the army and bureaucracy ‘belonged’ to the ruler, while his subjects owed him labour services and tribute. As the state’s needs were met in increasingly rationalized manner a new form of state appeared, namely 5) The authoritarian liturgical state, in which the state’s needs were met by a carefully contrived system of duties divided into following three categories: a) labour services rendered directly to the court and state; b) monopolies based upon labour services and upon coercive laws of different forms; and c) taxes, paid mainly in money or by delivery of goods of money value, but accompanied by a punitive system so often typical of Oriental despots. This type of state did not put limits on commerce, unless its fiscal interests were threatened. Rather it fostered commerce by direct action whenever this meant increased revenue. ‘Enlightened despotism’ of this sort generally developed in the ancient Near East directly out of the more archaic forms of the bureaucratic city kingdom. On the other hand, the third type (aristocratic polis) led to a great variety of transitional forms, among them 6) The hoplite polis of Mediterranean lands, in which the domination of the clans over the city and of the city over rural areas was legally abolished. Participation in city’s military institutions was relatively democratized, and with it full citizenship became entirely dependent on ownership of land. A self-equipped citizen army emerged, from which 7) the democratic citizen polis was established. Here army service and citizenship rights were no longer dependent on landownership. This tendency especially existed in the coastal cities of ancient Greece where all citizens could become eligible for office without regard to property qualification. But this situation could never become dominant even in the most radical period of the Athenian democracy. In the hoplite polis (type 6) the core of the army was recruited from the free citizen Yeomanry. The legislative programmes of hoplite polis were intended to stabilize the social order by the amelioration of class conflict between creditors (aristocrats) and debtors (peasants). Along with this went other efforts to reduce distinctions within the citizen body and to promote a ‘civil economy’. Nevertheless, the interests of the wealthy and of the urban classes prevailed. By the time of the transition to type 7 all land had become entirely or almost fully transferable. (Weber 1976: 72-75).
However, in the Roman Empire, the final phase of classical Antiquity, the centres of culture and population (the latter being of military significance) shifted inland in the west away from the coasts. This meant fundamental changes in the ‘base’ and the ‘superstructure’, in Marxian sense, of the ancient society, which mark the transition to west European feudalism. The analysis of urban development just presented above depends upon the use of various ‘types’: peasant community, aristocratic polis, bureaucratic city kingdom, hoplite polis, citizen polis, liturgical monarchy. Needless to say, these types, according to Max Weber, seldom existed in complete isolation. They are ‘pure types’, concepts to be used in classifying individual states. More than an ‘approximation’ cannot be expected since actual state structure in the most important phases of history are too complex to be comprehended by so simple a classification as the one used here. Indeed, one historically important type has not been mentioned: the military peasant community constituted as a hoplite band. Examples of this type in Antiquity are numerous, but, to Max Weber, these are always secondary; that is, they appear in connection with the partial adoption of urban institutions, as among the ancient Hebrews. Finally, we can say that on the basis of historical sources known to us that the ‘river-valley’ civilization of Mesopotamia which recently came under severe attack launched by the USA–UK axis, had passed through several thousand years of urban development, and Egypt, another ‘river-valley’ civilization, had a similar long history of semi-urban development. They are, in fact, liturgical monarchies. But when we first learn anything reliable about the ‘coastal’ civilization of Rome it has already gone through the phase of the citizen polis. For Greece, the other ‘coastal’ civilization, on the other hand, we have much more fairly dependable evidences tracing back to the aristocratic polis or even to the stage of fortress kingdom. Thus because of this basic aspect of our knowledge of Antiquity, we must be able to combine individual characteristics from various conceptual ‘types’ in order to describe the history of urban development of a particular country in concrete terms. (Weber 1976: 77-78).

Besides, there is another historical factor which creates particular problem to the application of above-mentioned classification concerning urban development. That is the manifest or latent struggle between theocratic and secular-political forces, for often this conflict introduced military institutions from more than one of the above ‘types’. Originally, there must have been a union of political and religious authority everywhere, but with the development of theology and an educated priesthood functional specialization became inevitable. Power remained in the hands of the priests, partly because of their wealth from temple lands and income, partly because the people looked to them for salvation from punishment for sacrilege, and partly because they were originally the only men of learning at that time. From this followed two important results: 1) Priests generally enjoyed a monopoly of legal knowledge permitting them to occupy a position of unassailable dominance; 2) Priests monopolized all education, particularly in the bureaucratic monarchies, where training was essential for employment in the administration. Throughout the Near East the Priesthood strove to gain control of education; we see this tendency clearly in the Egyptian New Empire, where the priests displaced secular officials and secular education.

Hence, certain conflicts are characteristic of early Antiquity: temple priesthood versus military nobility and royal authority in bureaucratic monarchies, commoners versus the monopoly of legal knowledge enjoyed by noble priests in aristocratic states. All sorts of alliances occurred. These conflicts influenced social and economic developments, especially in the cities during the periods of general secularization or restoration. There were important differences in this respect between Near Eastern and Western societies. (Weber 1976:78-79).

Theories of the City

The stages of urban development as determined by Max Weber actually incorporate both types and theories of the city. Louis Wirth, a well-known urban sociologist of America in his classic article entitled: “Urbanism as a way of life” refers to two important sources for the articulation of the theories of the city. The first one is written by Max Weber, and the second is prepared by Robert E. Park. Any way, we are not going to deal with latter’s work since here we are mainly concerned with the former. Interestingly enough, Don Martindale who is one of the two translators and editors of Max Weber’s The City (1921/1958) begins his prefatory remarks on the theory of the city with the following statement of Louis Wirth:

The closest approximations to a systematic theory of urbanism that we have are to be found in a penetrating essay, “Die Stadt”, by Max Weber, and a memorable paper by Robert E. Park on “The City: Suggestions for the Investigation of Human Behavior in the Urban Environment.” (Wirth 1938:8).

It should be noted that the English version of Max Weber’s “Die Stadt” is “The City”, wherein he exclusively engaged himself with the formulation of the theories of the city. According to Louis Wirth, the above–mentioned excellent contributions are far from constituting an ordered and coherent framework of the theories of the city. Even then we can comfortably confess the fact that Weber’s theories of the city are basically socio-historical while Park’s theory is purely ecological. The preface of Martindale is divided into six parts, which may be sub-divided into two: first being concerned with the development of the theories of the city in America and Europe from the socio-psychological and ecological perspectives; the second being especially a critical treatment of Max Weber’s relevance for European and
American urban theories. Since the beginnings of a theory of the city in Europe among which the study of Max Weber stands out as of great importance his theoretical relevance to the question may be well ascertained by way of a review of the stages of the theoretical development of the concept of the city in America. Location and moral consequences are the two phenomena that are connected with the general categories of a theory of the city. As far as we know Charles H. Cooley’s The Theory of Transportation, first published by the American Economic Association probably in the late years of the nineteenth century tries to account for the location of the cities. A more general theory of the same type is represented by Adna F. Weber’s The Growth of Cities in the Nineteenth Century (1899). While Cooley clearly concentrates his attention to transportation problems Adna Weber divides the causes of urban growth into two categories: primary economic factor and secondary causes of socio-political nature.

However, in dealing with Max Weber’s theories of the city one can find Adna Weber’s listing of political causes of city growth more useful and closer. According to Adna Weber, political causes of city growth include: 1) legislation promoting freedom of trade; 2) legislation permitting freedom of migration; 3) centralized administration; 4) free forms of land tenure politically protected in the city. Social causes of city growth were found in the advantages the city offered for 1) education; 2) recreation; 3) a higher standard of living; 4) the attraction of intellectual associations; 5) habituation to an urban environment; and 6) diffusion of knowledge of the values of city life (Weber 1921/1958:16-17). In the notes on a socio-psychological theory of the city Martindale refers to the urban development in ancient Egypt and Mesopotamia where there was a clear concern of fathers for their children to receive education so that they could take up “white collar” jobs of scribes in the imperial bureaucracy. Pressure and social ascent by way of an urban occupation are quite ancient, which are still perceived in modern times even in a developing country like Bangladesh. Basically in Babylonia the high value was attached to urban types of socio-political opportunities. In ancient China the preference for the urban roles is shown by the devotion, patience, and hard work the individual was willing to undergo in preparation for the civil service examinations. In classical Greece and Rome similar attitudes and evidences of civic pride were prevalent. One should recognize the fact that the development of a peculiar urban outlook related to urban occupations and the city environment is as old as the city itself (Weber 1921/1958: 31).

Urbanism as away of life, Wirth suggests, may be empirically approached from three interrelated perspectives: as a physical structure with a population base, technology and ecological order; as a system of social organization with a structure and series of institutions; as a set of attitudes, ideas and constellation of personalities. Thus it is clear that in the hands of Louis Wirth we find an intelligent combination of both Max Weber’s socio-historical theory of the city and Park’s ecological approach toward urban growth. As a student of sociology we know that social life everywhere exists as a structure of interaction, not simply a structure of stone, steel, cement etc (Weber 1921/1958: 40,29). In the European developments in the urban theory we can come across an institutional factor in the rise of a city that was put forward by Fustel de Coulanges in his book: The Ancient City (1956). According to him, the critical institution of the city is to be a religion. The original nucleus of pre-urban society was considered to be the family finding its point of integration in the hearth, its religious symbol, and worship of the father as its priest. The union of several families could establish the hearth of the Phratry.

The tribe, like the family and the phratry, was established as an independent body, since it had a special worship from which the stranger was excluded. Once formed, no new family could be admitted to it. Just as several phratries were united in a tribe, several tribes might associate together, on condition that the religion of each should be respected. The day on which this alliance took place the city existed. (Coulanges 1956:126-27).

Thus, ancient city was a religious community, but definitely without religious fundamentalism of modern times. It means that urban (civil) society is essentially a secular organization. G. Glotz in his The Greek City (1930) greatly advanced Coulanges’ conception of city. Like Coulanges he (Glotz) treated the family as the basic structure from which both state power (compare Max Weber’s conception in this regard) and individualism could emerge. According to Glotz, three stages in Greek city life could be gleaned, each with its characteristic institutional structure: the family, the city and the individual each in its turn predominant.

The history of Greek institutions thus falls into three periods: in the first, the city is composed of families which jealously guard their ancient right and subordinate all their members to the common good; in the second, the city subordinates the families to itself by calling to its aid emancipated individuals; in the third, individualism runs riot, destroys the city and necessitates the formation of larger states (Glotz 1930: 4-5).

This represents a clear improvement upon Coulanges, in that it conceives of the possibility of a more complex inter-institutional development forming the city possible of varied types. The family dominated or patrician city is obviously visualized. A third institutional factor was brought into central focus as determinative for the rise of the city by the students of Comparative Jurisprudence. Henry Sumner Maine, for example, in one of the great pioneering works (Ancient Law, 1894) of social science argued that comparative jurisprudence proves that the original condition of the human society was one of domination by the patriarchal family. From England to India in ancient times, he (as English Vice-Chancellor of Calcutta University from 1863-67) believed, society was organized in patriarchal families under
dominance of the eldest parent with dominion extending even to life and death over his children. At this stage kinship was the only organization for political functions. For all more complex social forms, Maine maintained that a transformation of the legal order isolating the individual from his ‘status’ in the family, freeing him for the flexible entry into multiple ‘contractual’ relations. As Maine put it “The movement of the progressive societies has hitherto been a movement from status to contract”. (Maine 1894:170). It should be noted that contractual relations can fully develop only under capitalism with which Max Weber was so much concerned. The City, in Maine’s analysis, as that of Weber, is a legal structure based on contract and territory rather than kinship and family. The effect of this analysis was to shift the attention of urban theory to the evolution of the law. This was really the beginning for further developments of a whole series of legal or semi-legal phenomena for the growth of the city. These includes the following elements: 1) legal charters of the city; 2) special civic courts and law; and 3) Roman legal notion of a municipal corporation (Weber 1921/1958: 47-48).

The attempt to explain the city in terms of the economic institutions was made by Marx and Pirenne. Especially Pirenne in his Medieval Cities (1946) focused on two factors necessary to constitute a city. These are the existence of middle class population (i.e. bourgeoisie) and an organization for community action. Historically the municipal system of Rome was identified by constitutional law. For Pirenne, cities like fortress, like centers of pilgrimage, and even as weekly market places were not real cities. These towns were actually fortresses and clerical establishments. However, according to him, they played an important role in the history of cities as “stepping stones”. Round about their walls cities were to take shape after the “economic renaissance”. (Pirenne 1946: 76). The actual cities took form as a byproduct of the activities of merchant caravans which settled outside the walls and in crisis could use them for defence.

Under the influence of trade the old Roman cities took on new life and were repopulated, or mercantile groups formed round about the military burgs and established themselves along the sea coasts, on river banks, at confluences, at the junction points of the natural routes of communication. Each of them constituted a market which exercised an attraction proportionate to its importance … (Pirenne 1946: 102).

The pertinent point for Pirenne was the emergence of a new class of merchants who were in conflict with the countryside and who fought for new laws ensuring their private property including a distinct organization for their own community activities. Thus, for Pirenne the city is the community of the merchants, which Max Weber also maintains.

In the context of the development of the European urban theory both Simmel and Weber recognized the need for a more comprehensive concept of urbanism. Simmel sought to solve the problem of the city by way of formalism which has its best expression in his seminal essay “Die Grosstadt und das Geistesleben”, published in Dresden:1903 (English version: “The Big Cities and the Mental Life”). Weber was familiar with Simmel’s formulation and he started his study with the observation that the city is often considered as a densely settled area of crowded dwellings developing into a colony in which personal acquaintance among the inhabitants is absent. That is, anonymity must prevail in city life. Weber also had taken into account the role of cultural factors for the constitution of cities. Max Weber’s theoretical point of view may well be described as a form of social behaviourism. The idea of “social relation” for Weber was a kind of conceptual tool by which one can comprehend the pattern of inter-human actions. His concept of ‘social relation’ pertaining to the institutions of state, family, religion and law, forms a complex “system” or “structure of relations”. According to Weber, all types of European urban theory belong to the “institutional” theories of the city, but they are different from each other. Weber addresses the problem of cities in terms of social action while Simmel sees it in terms of form and content of social interaction. As Weber himself put it:

The city ... has always contained elements from the most varied social situations. Office candidates qualified by examinations and mandarins rub shoulders with illiterates despised as rabble and practitioners of the (few) unclean occupations in East Asia. Many kinds of castes carry on their activities beside one another in India. Blood relatives organized in clans appear together with landless artisans in the Near East. In Antiquity free men, bondsmen, and slaves emerged alongside noble landlords, their court officials and servants. And in the early medieval city ministerial officials and mercenaries, priests and monks encounter one another in the city. (Weber 1921/1958: 52).

Weber’s above statement is essentially sociological in the sense that he not only identifies social groups that existed in both Oriental and Occidental civilizations but also his delineation of social structure or, in other words, social stratification gives us an idea of urban social system from evolutionary standpoint. According to Weber, in the city all classes of people meet and mingle, often without knowing one another. Slums may be separated from well-situated residences by a few hundred yards while there is physical proximity to each other they may be miles apart in points of view. Here we can refer to the recent urban development of Dhaka city. Weber recognized the absence of psychological homogeneity such that the intelligentsia, middle class, political reformers, stand-patters, and go-getters, in Munroe’s phrases (see W.B. Munroe, The Government of American Cities, 1926), all pull apart to such an extent that city dwellers can only think effectively in their own groups. With Simmel, Weber was able to recognize that in the city every occupation, including beggary and prostitution, tends to become a profession. Weber successively identified one
type of concept of the city after another – the economic, the relation of the city to agriculture, the political-
administrative concept of the city, the fortress and garrison concepts of the city, the concept of the city as fusion of
fortress and market, and the social and legal concept of the city, the city as a confederacy, the city as a body of
militarily competent citizens. This might suggest the fact that Weber’s attempt to the theory construction of the city was
eclectic. His theoretical procedure was never mechanical in the sense that conceptual elements are not actually
unrelated. For example, in reviewing the economic concept of the city Weber carefully isolated the distinguishing
property of the city in the conduct of life on the basis of non-agricultural activities. In terms of the dominant economic
features of their life a typology of cities may be meaningfully made. Thus one can differentiate producers’ cities from
consumers’ cities, commercial from industrial cities, capital and satellite cities with many sub-types. (Weber

However, the novelty of Max Weber’s sociological theory construction concerning the city lies in the fact that he
singularly suggests the theory of the urban community in terms of social actions, social relations, social institutions,
and community. According to him, “An urban ‘community’ in the full meaning of the word appears only in the
Occident. Exceptions occasionally were to be found in the Near East … but only in rudiments. To constitute a full
urban community the settlement had to represent a relative predominance of trade-commercial relations with the
settlement as a whole displaying the following features: 1) a fortification, 2) a market, 3) a court of its own and at least
partially autonomous law; 4) a related form of association, and 5) at least partial autonomy and autocephaly … an
administration by authorities in the election of whom theburghers participated.” (Weber 1921/1958: 54-55). Weber’s
general approach was to take into consideration the concept of the city in terms of the evidence from world history. On
this basis he conceived the concept of the urban community. Any community including an urban community, is not an
unstructured congeries of activities but a distinct and limited pattern of human life. It represents a whole system of life
forces brought into some kind of equilibrium. As a peculiar system of forces the urban community could not have
emerged everywhere in the world. Weber argues rather convincingly that it did not appear in Asia and only
fragmentarily in the Near East (in Mesopotamia) for the very reason that the city was a centre of state administration.
Here the problem of the relation between patrimonialism and urban development comes to the fore. Weber’s argument
on this point are also relevant today for some capital cities such as Washington, London and Paris (why not Dhaka of
Bangladesh and Delhi of India), precisely because they are centres of national government, lack some of the political
autonomy of the normal city. They are prevented from becoming full urban communities. Does it mean that political
autonomy of the normal city will only exist in the centres of trade and commerce? This is again a confined concept of
the city. Probably, Max Weber himself admits this fact as he maintains that the establishment of the “city”, in the
Occidental sense, was restricted in Asia, partly through sib power which continued unbroken, partly through caste
alienation. According to him, the interests of Asiatic intellectuality lay primarily in directions other than the political. In
the river-valley civilizations of the East politics and administration represented only their (political intellectuals such as
the Confucians) prebendary subsistences; in practice these were usually conducted through subaltern social groups.
(Weber1958: 338).

Max Weber’s conceptualization and categorization of the city in terms of non-legitimate domination naturally
incorporates his notion of citizenship, which also contains three distinct characteristics, namely economic, political,
social or cultural. First, citizen may include certain social categories or classes, which have some specific economic
interest. As thus defined the class citizen is not unitary; there are greater citizens and lesser citizens; entrepreneurs and
hand-workers belong to the class. Second, in the political sense, citizenship signifies membership in the state, with its
connotation as the holder of certain political rights. Finally, by citizens in the class sense, we understand those strata
which are drawn together, in contrast with the bureaucracy or the proletariat and others outside their circle, as “persons
of property and culture”, entrepreneurs, recipients of funded incomes, and in general, all persons of academic culture, a
certain class standard of living, and a certain social prestige. The third character of citizenship is mainly a mixed one.
That is, wealth and institutionalized education can endow an individual with the mark of citizenship. In fact, Weber’s
concept of citizenship refers to three dimensions of social stratification: class (economic), status (social or cultural),
power or party (political). But his identification of first and third elements is not clearly distinguished, rather blurred.
To him, first type of citizenship (economic) is typical of western civilization where cities mainly developed as centres
of trade and commerce. The citizenship in political sense has its forerunners in Antiquity and in the medieval city. It
should be noted here that the slaves of ancient Greece and Rome were not definitely citizens even if they very much
lived within the politically autonomous city-states. Max Weber categorically did not mention the status of slaves in
terms of his own notion of citizenship. However, according to him, the notion of citizens of the state is unknown to the
world of Islam and to India and China. Similarly, the concept of citizen as the men of property and culture is
specifically modern and it is western concept, like that of the bourgeoisie. It implies that the concept of citizenship has
its different Oriental connotation. The city created the party and the demagogue. The city alone brought forth the
phenomena of the history of art. It has also produced science in the modern sense. The city culture of the Babylonians
practically runs parallel to those of patrimonial state and city as two divergent forms of domination. Finally, it may be
said that his concept of citizenship does not fit well if we consider all adult people of a country in modern times as eligible for exercising their voting rights to elect their representatives to the democratic parliament.

**Conclusion**

On the basis of our above analysis of the problem under present review we can say somewhat accurately that Max Weber’s theory of the city leads us to an interesting conclusion. We can accept phenomenal increase and aggregation of modern populations in the Occidental cities as a concomitant of the industrial revolution. This is not true in case of most of the Oriental cities because here industrialization has not yet preceded urbanization. In the developing countries of the world the heavy concentration of population in towns and cities as noticed in recent times is not so much due to industrial development, but mainly on account of the attraction of urban opportunities and facilities that are being offered for better incomes and better livelihood. What we can observe here is ‘deruralization’ in the name of urbanization from western point of view. Max Weber himself also admitted the fact that the physical aggregation should not be confused with the growth of the city in a sociological sense. According to him, urban community has everywhere lost its military entity. Moreover, it lost its legal and political autonomy in many areas of the world. At present, within the city itself large number of residents pursue inter-local interests, as representatives of the national government, as agents in business and industries of national and international rather than of civic scope. Thus the modern city is gradually losing its external and formal structure. Internally it is in a stage of decline while the new community represented by the nation grows everywhere at its cost. Weber had thus pronounced a pessimistic tone that the age of the city has come to an end. (Weber 1921/1958: 62). His comment about the future of the city will certainly continue to be under constant critical scrutiny. Because with the speedy growth of human civilization which is experiencing profound impact of modern science and technology under globalization a far more new elements are likely to be increasingly incorporated in the existing structure of urban life more or less in all countries of the world irrespective of their differential political, economic and cultural milieu.

**References:**
