Ethnic Nationalism and Conflicts in Africa: Lessons from Nigeria

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Abstract: This article explores the linkages between ethnic nationalism and conflicts in Nigeria. Traditionally, ethnic nationalism typifies a sense of identity, national pride and solidarity, to mention a few. But its configuration today is rooted in deep distrust, idiosyncrasies and the domination of one or more ethnic groups over others, contestation over power and resource control. Unfortunately, such reconstruction has given rise to the growth of ethnic militias or militant groups pitting themselves against the State or opposing groups, and consequently resulting in the eruption of violent conflicts. Attempts were made to resolve this quagmire through the doctrine of necessity for peaceful co-existence by state actors but it has yielded little or no result, and in some instances exacerbated militarism. What does ethnic nationalism portend for Nigeria beyond the centenary? From a positional standpoint using qualitative method of document analysis, this article interrogates the growth and development of ethnic nationalism in Africa and its current trends, focusing on Nigeria. It suggests measures to adopt in order to guarantee peace in a vacillating region.

Introduction

More than other continents of world, Africa has been enmeshed in violent conflicts - much of which could be explicated as by-products of the undulating effects of ethnic-nationalism (Bello & Olutola 2016:70; Nwadike & Ekeanyanwu 2012:3; Bujra 2002:1). Despite the ubiquity of ethnic nationalism crises on a global scale, its gruesome impacts on human lives, and the socioeconomic development of several African countries in recent times, is worrisome.

Colonialism cum imperialism brought about the partitioning, and illogical fusion of territories that were previously occupied by divergent ethnic nationalities, under a single flag (Ake 2000; Gurr 1994). It established several systems with structural imbalances in several African States. These imbalances further engendered wide disparities in the level of development among the various ethnic-nationalities in these countries. For instance, in Nigeria, the establishment of Colonial administrative offices in Lagos and Calabar resulted in antipathies from other deprived region and ethnic groups (Aluko 2009:485; Nnoli 1980). In Rwanda, the Belgian colonialist policies favoured the Tutsi minority than the Hutus majority, particularly in relation to political power. A parallel scenario also played out in Kenya, Uganda, Mozambique, and Angola, to mention a few (Bergmann & Crutchfield 2009:148).

Africa’s ethnic nationalism transcends the era of colonialism, and remains active in contemporary African societies. However, its current configuration is not necessarily in the form of opposition to colonial rule. It is could best be explained in context of reaction to ethnic parochialism, discrimination, idiosyncrasies and the domination of one, two or more ethnic nationalities over others, among others. This imbroglio has frequently led to the emergence and growth of ethnic militias or militant groups, and

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in some instances degenerated into violent conflicts, in the form inter-ethnic clashes and civil wars. Examples abound in several African countries. For instance, since her independence, Uganda has witnessed nine regime changes with the exception of the first government (1962-1971) that was formed through peaceful democratic means.

Most of the upheavals in Uganda were fuelled by ethnic antipathies, ethnic domination and subjugation, leading to incessant military interference in Ugandan politics. Such cleavages led to a political situation which Brett (1995) described as a condition where “bullets rather than ballot” dominated the political scene, resulting in the removal of two regimes by coup d'état, (e.g. Obote I – 1971 and Obote II – 1985). The first occurred through foreign invasion (i.e. the 1979 Tanzania-Uganda National Liberation Front invasion), and the other through armed rebellion (e.g. the National Resistance Army (NRA) and Museveni rebellion of 1981 – 1985, which culminated in the overthrow of Tito Okello) (Frederick, 2009: Xii; Brett 1995).

Unlike the practice in pre-colonial Uganda where ethnic nationalism was employed as a strategic instrument for a united front, particularly against colonialism, its contemporary form is an aggressive tool utilised by certain political assemblages, including the government to establish and maintain hegemony over other political opponents. The aftermath has often been conflict, with one group trying to impose its policies on others, while the other political groups resist and fight back to access State’s authority and resources (Frederick, 2009: Xiii). In point of fact, Africa’s ethnic nationalism was used by past African leaders and regimes to make scapegoat out of their political opponents. It was devised as a scheme to divert public attention from salient political issues. For instance, President Idi Amin of Uganda employed this tactics to expel wealthy Indians and Pakistanis from Uganda (Frederick, 2009). Former Zambian President – Chiluba, also used it to ban his predecessor Kauda from contesting for election on the claim that his parent were of Malawian origin (Frederick, 2009). However, there is a sharp departure from such practices in recent times.

Contemporarily, ethnic-nationalism in most African States is of militarised configuration. According to Zeleza (2007) “militant ethnicity is predominant in several African countries that are currently undergoing the process of democratisation, as the tensions and twists arising from the competitive politics of democracy often find articulation in the entrenched identities, idioms and institutions of ethnic solidarity”. In Nigeria, the democratisation process has led to the resurgence of ethnic identities and proliferation of regional and local struggles over the claims of citizenship, expressed in the language of the ‘indigenes’ and ‘settlers’. These struggles have increasingly snowballed into the formation of ethnic militias that have wrought havoc on Nigeria’s civil society. It has unleashed periodic convulsions of inter-communal violence, resulting in the destruction of properties, loss of lives, poverty and socio-economic retrogression (Agbu 2004; Vickers 2000; Osaghae 1996).

Ethnic-Nationalism in Nigeria: An overview
The magnitude of ethno-political, and somewhat religious crises that engulf the Federal Republic of Nigeria in recent times, cannot be explored in isolation from the historical forces, processes and factors that concretise them (Bello & Olutola, 2016). The legacy of colonialism and imperial incursion of Nigeria between 1914 and 1915 soldered divergent territories populated by various ethnic nationalities within a unitary system (Aluko & Ajani 2009; Aluko 1998). Such legacy laid the foundation for what Ebegbulem referred to as the “ethno-genesis” which culminated into “ethno-tensions” that has affected virtually all spheres of the country till date (Ebegbulem, 2012:76).

The amalgamation of the Southern, Northern and Lagos protectorate into a single entity in 1914 was effected to serve the interest of the British government (Ebegbulem, 2012). Such political transaction took place without any dialogue, as to get the consent of other ethnic nationalities. It could best be described as a deliberate attempt by the colonial powers to thwart the development and sustenance of nationalism in the federation, by sponsoring ethnic-nationalism as a means of capturing power. For example, prior to and during colonialism, the Hausa/Fulani predominantly occupied the Northern part of the country, while the Yorubas and Igbo were preponderant in the Western and Eastern part of the country respectively. These regional divisions produced ethnic tensions, suspicions and rivalry among the three major ethnic groups (Ebegbulem, 2012). Such tension further resulted in the transformation of the nation’s outlook, from ethnic identity into regional identity, to capture political power. This action signalled the beginning of ethnic struggle for power and resource control in Nigeria.

Furthermore, this transformation culminated in the emergence and formation of regional political parties. The Northern region formed the Northern Element Progressive Union (NEPU) and the Northern People’s Congress (NPC) - the NPC was led by Ahmadu Bello. The Igbo in the Eastern region formed the National Council for Nigerian Citizens (NCNC), led by Dr Nnamdi Azikiwe. In the same vein, the Yorubas in the Western region formed the Action Group (AG) - a political party aimed to represent the political interest in the Western region, led by Chief Obafemi Awolowo - (Coleman, 1960). This ethno-regional politics became the bane of Nigerian politics during independence era.

However, in post-independent Nigeria, there has been consistence struggle by these major ethnic groups to capture political power and control the nations numerous resources (Ebegbulem, 2012). Some of such agitations accounted for the remote and proximate factors that led to the Nigerian civil war from 1967 – 1970 (Egbegbulem, 2012:79, 84). In the First Republic, the tripartite nature of national parties spur ethnic rivalry and political struggles that primarily reflected ethno-regional interest, rather than the overall interest of the nation.

These ethno-regional parties resonated in the Second Republic, though with different party nomenclature, but with same ideologies and strong ethnic ties as the former. The Northern region NPC metamorphosed into National Party of Nigeria (NPN), though possessing a national outlook. Majority of its founders and members are northerners, and it represents the interest of the Hausa/Fulani ethnic groups. The same was simulated in the Western and Eastern regions. The Unity Party of Nigeria (UPN)
of the Western regions for instance still had Chief Obafemi Awolowo as its leader and shares the same ideologies as the defunct AG of the First Republic (Edoh 2001:87). Similarly, the bulk of Dr Nnamdi Azikiwe’s loyalist joined him in the formation of Nigeria People’s Party (NPP) – a South-eastern political party representing the interest of the Igbos. All these parties reawakened the spirit of ethnic politics that prevailed in the First Republic.

In the Third Republic, the military regime of General Ibrahim Babangida tend to seemingly crush the tripod of ethnic politics in the country with the introduction of two party system into the Nigeria’s political space. The two parties are the National Republican Convention (NRC) and the Social Democratic Party (SDP). It is pertinent to state that it will be erroneous to argue that its formations had ethnic underpinnings, since both parties had a northerner as either the presidential candidate or the vice-presidential candidate. It therefore marks the first time Nigeria’s political terrain would reflect more of a national than ethno-regional outlook, since she gained independence from the British government. Unfortunately, such historic achievement was undermined by the annulment of the 1993 national election result that produced Chief M.K.O. Abiola of the SDP as the winner of the June 12, 1993 election. It was argued that the annulment of the election was to ensure the northern political hegemony is not lost forever (Çancı & Odukoya 2016:94).

The annulment subsequently resuscitated the old ethnic suspicion and rivalry among the three ethnic groups, with the Yorubas of the South-West feeling cheated and robbed. According to Çancı and Odukoya (2016:94), with the annulment, it is conceivable to discover that stimulation of ethnic awareness easily turns into a conflict in order to get more from the scarce societal resources. And this situation provokes political tensions and cleavages among the ethnic groups. However, Nigeria is not the only country in the world where such things are experienced (Çancı & Odukoya, 2016). The annulment triggered regional protests and riots in the South-West leading to the elimination of northerners in some parts of the South-Western States. Critics of General Babangida’s military regime argued that it was a deliberate attempt by the Northern oligarchy to subvert democracy by preventing the slipping away of power from the North to the West (Çancı & Odukoya, 2016; Ebegbulem, 2012).

The danger this crisis foretell is that Nigerians, who seemed to have overcome the legacy of ethnic cleavages and regional hurdle in the 1993 election to vote Chief MKO Abiola, have been compelled again to put ethnic identity first, rather than national interest. The denial of the tacit winner of the 1993 presidential election reverberated the operations to the Oodua Peoples Congress (OPC) - a curious radical Yoruba group that employs violence as a means to redress the apparent injustice against the Yoruba. Such development also sprang-up a counter-militant group in the northern part of Nigeria – the Arewa Peoples Congress (APC) (Osinubi & Osinubi, 2006:106).

These groups resuscitated and led to a proliferation of ethnic militia groups and other socio-cultural and ethnic based groups across the federation. In the Eastern part, there was the ‘Ohaneze N’digbo, Egbesu Boys, Bakassi Boys, among others (Oluwaniyi, 2012). In the Middle Belt or the Niger-Delta, groups
such as the Middle Belt Forum (MBF), Movement for the Emancipation of Niger-Delta (MEND), Movement for the Survival of Ogoni People (MOSOP), Niger-Delta People Volunteer Force (NDPVF), The Tombolo Boys, Coalition of Militant Actions (COMA), Ijaw Youth Council (IYC), amongst others, were formed. In a similar fashion, the Arewa Consultative Forum (ACF) was formed in the Northern region, while Egbe Omo-Oduduwa (EOO) and Yoruba Council of Elders (YCE) emerged in the South West (Aluko & Ajani, 2009:485; Oluwaniyi, 2012).

The Fourth Republic ushered in a multi-party system. However, the prominent ones were still divided along ethnic lines. For instance, the Alliance for Democracy (AD) and Action Congress (AC) still reflected the ideologies of the defunct AG and UPN - and were of a Yoruba ethnic configuration. The All Progressive Grand Alliance (APGA) which is predominantly of Igbo extraction hold sway in the Eastern part of the country; while the All Nigeria Peoples Party (ANPP) was of Hausa/Fulani extraction and of northern dominance. It is only the Peoples Democratic Party (PDP) that could be argued to have a national outlook, in that it cuts across all the three regions and ethnic groups. After the annulment of the June 12 1993 Presidential election in Nigeria, the election that produced General Olusegun Obasanjo (rtd) as the president under the platform of PDP, with Atiku Abubakar as the Vice-president could be argued to have broken the jinx of ethnicity in the political terrain of the country again. Though debatable, the victory of PDP in the 1999 presidential election was a deliberate act of the northern oligarchy to pacify the Yorubas of the Southwest over the annulment of the June 12 election that produced their kinsman as the winner.

Contemporarily, the incidence of ethnic-party politics is still prevalent in the political landscape of Nigeria, as demonstrated in the activities of AC now Action Congress of Nigeria (ACN), APGA and ANPP. The introduction of Congress for Progressive Change (CPC) led by General Mohammad Buhari (rtd) reverberates and reinforces the ethnic ideology of the Hausa/Fulani NPC party. But the merger of CPC, ANPP and ACN into Action for Progressive Change (APC) further blurred the ethnic picture of Nigerian politics. However, ethnic suspicion, disagreements and power-sharing formula are threatening the survival of this party in recent times, even after capturing power on 29th May 2015.

Moreover, despite the introduction of geo-political zoning into the national political life, ethnicity is still a major factor that is threatening the sustainability of Nigeria’s evolving democracy (Çancı & Odukoya, 2016). For instance, the geo-political zoning arrangement pushes forward the agitations of the South-South people. The South-South region, which is largely made up of minority ethnic groups such as, the Ijaws, Itsekiris, Uhrobo, Agbor, among others, seems to have been sidelined in the political discourse of the country right from independence. Nonetheless, the introduction of geo-politics has brought them to the fore.

The Niger-Delta people who occupied the South-South geopolitical zone of the country have been deprived for years (in comparison to other major ethnic groups) (Çancı & Odukoya, 2016). Colonialism had only favoured the three dominant ethnic groups as earlier enunciated, with the exclusion of the
Niger-Delta people who are in the minority (Oluwaniyi, 2012). It is these injustices, consolidated by heavy cloak of silence on a number of environmental degradations issues that form the bane of the Niger-Delta struggles. Prominent among the environmental problems is oil spillage, which has affected virtually all their means of livelihood, including water, soil, even their health (Oluwaniyi, 2012). More often than not, their demands have often been suppressed by military regimes, which have also in turn triggered a number of agitations and fuelled incessant violence in the region (Oluwaniyi, 2012).

It is imperative to assert that their (Niger-Delta people) grievances were borne out of frustration and deprivation accruing from several years of neglect and rape. The challenges faced by the Niger-Delta people are encapsulated in the work of Oluwaniyi titled “The Post Amnesty Programme in the Niger-Delta: Prospects and Challenges”, (Oluwaniyi 2011:147). According to Oluwaniyi, the Niger-Delta struggles took place in the context of equity and self-determination, ethnic autonomy, lack of political participation and democratic accountability, underdevelopment and widespread poverty (Oluwaniyi 2011:147). Consequent upon these strives were feelings of distrust and dearth of patriotism, which has resulted in the emergence of ethnic-militias in the region and triggered violence conflicts. Feelings of deprivation have made them take their destiny in their hands, thereby causing a dent on the nationalistic image of the country.

In a bid to address the impact of ethnic nationalism on the Nigerian political stage, several actors - national, regional, continental and international have suggested several approaches to resolving this issue. However, in most cases, much of those suggestions have resulted in a scenario where conflicting parties are constantly agreeing to disagree. Worthy of mention is the not-too-far “National Conference” organised by the Federal Government of Nigeria (FGN) to address gaps in the constitution and a range of other national pressing issues, such as: resource control, security, political power sharing, economic, to mention a few. Though the conference could be viewed as a step in the right direction (though debatable), but the credibility of most of the nominees was questionable. There was no transparency in their selection process. In point of fact, it was not subjected to referendum. Moreover, the allowance allocated to each nominee projects the conference as a national bazaar for each representative to share out of the national cake.

**The European Experience**

Ethnic nationalism is not only limited to Africa, it is also synonymous to Europe and the United States. Drawing examples from Central and South-Eastern Europe, using Estonia and Croatia as case-study, Ethnic nationalism in these two countries is technically different from the ones practiced in Nigeria and by extension Africa.

The collapse of Soviet Union re-awakened the consciousness for secession in the minds of the Estonians; however, the country was occupied by both the Estonians and Russian ethnic nationalities. The Estonians complaint of subjection to severe political and economic injustices by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republic (USSR) and the Russians in Estonia, who when compared to the ethnic Estonians
were better off economically. This led to the formation of the Popular Front of Estonia (PFE) as a major political alternative that led the Estonian independence movement and subsequently the Republic of Estonia (Molugno, 2011:7). However, despite Estonian nationalism that deprived minorities from their political and cultural rights, Russians in Estonia preferred negotiations and other democratic measures over coercive means of conflict resolution. Till date in Estonia, ethnic nationalism is a form of collective identity and not necessarily of ethnic identity, even as the Russians in Estonia have also viewed themselves as Estonians and pursue the same ideology as the main Estonians in nation-building and in the development of the Republic of Estonia.

In Croatia, similar to the Estonians in USSR, Croats in Yugoslavia felt marginalised and endangered by Serb domination in terms of their culture and language as well as economy which was above the already strong Croatian ethnic consciousness and led to aspiration of an independent State of Croatia. This subsequently led to the formation of the Croatian Democratic Union (CDU) in 1990, and set the pace for their independence in 1991. Though there were attacks by the Serb forces backed by Yugoslav army but it was unsuccessful (Amnesty International 1999).

For the two case-studies, they both had a high intensity of nationalism, i.e. pursuing inward-looking ethnic nationalism and neglecting demands and interests of other ethnicities. But the democratic outcome of this process vary considerably, with Estonia successfully democratising and becoming a member of the European Union (EU) and Croatia experiencing stagnation in the transition process to democratisation, with high intensity of ethnic nationalism (Munoglu, 2011:12).

Ethnic nationalism as practiced is these two countries is more of civic nationalism which claims that nations are social constructs of the modern era as a result of industrialisation and modernisation of societies (Gellner, 1983) and that intellectuals invent and shape national identity in order to mobilise the mass in nationalistic movement (Guibernau, 1999:90). Civic nationalism conceives nations in terms of citizenship by offering equal rights to all citizens regardless of ethnicity (Kupchan, 1995:3; Munoglu, 2011:3).

**Any Implication for Post-Colonial Nigerian State?**

Despite the merits of ethnic nationalism, especially as a potent weapon for liberation as demonstrated in various African States during independence era; its contemporary form indicate a lot of danger for the fragile peace and security of Nigeria. As earlier enunciated, scholars of ethnicity spotted colonialism as the derivation and propeller of ethnic conflict in several countries, including Nigeria. However, from the post-independence period till date, ethnic nationalism has been an issue that has eaten deep into the fabrics of our nationhood and threatens its continuity.

The nature of ethnic nationalism as practiced in Nigeria today epitomises that of ethnic loyalty to one’s ethnic group rather than to the nation. This is borne out of suspicion and rivalry, especially given the past experiences of the various ethnic groups with respect to civil war and other cogent issues such as
ethnic exclusion, marginalisation, political and resource control, to mention a few. The need to protect each nationality’s interest and resources, led to the emergence of ethnic militias across the three regions and the Niger-Delta as earlier stated. Though the activities of these militant groups are groundswell reactions to deprivation, neglect, resource control, among others, on one hand, it also portend a great danger to fragile peace in the country, on the other hand. It is indeed a major threat to peace and security of Nigeria.

It is pertinent to state at this juncture that Nigeria is sitting on a ‘keg of gun powder’ given the wave of incessant crises in the country, which are mostly of ethno-religious composition. Ethnic identity, and loyalty, which is the main description of ethnic nationalism in the first republic hold sway, and is still deeply rooted in Nigeria. The various ethnic configurations in the country are suspicious and bias towards one another. For instance, a typical Igbo man does not wholesomely perceive or accept the Hausa/Fulani man as a fellow countryman, rather as ‘old time’ sworn enemy, which is somehow not disconnected from the ‘Nigeria Civil-War Saga’. This is therefore a big blow on the collective responsibility effort for the defence of the sovereignty of the country.

Moreover, the political terrain is austere in Nigeria today due to incessant crises arising from the inordinate ambitions of politicians to stay in power indefinitely, through character assassination, outright elimination of opponents and other dastard means. This model of ethnic nationalism is often employed as a strategic tool by politicians and the aristocratic class to pursue parochial interests in a bid to capture political power; mostly among their ethnic groups. Hence, ethnicity is used by this oligarchic group to mobilize, manipulate and/or hypnotise people, mostly of same ethnic group as them, for victory at the poll. This is reflected in the statement of Egwu in (Egwu, 2007) that ethnicity is “an abstraction of the ethnic group because it cannot stand independently on its own, as such, it’s always driven by the political class interest or the quest for power”. Hence, ethnic nationalism today is viewed as an impediment to socio-economic and political development in a multiethnic State like Nigeria.

When voting during election is based on ethnic sentiments and not on merit, even when the contesting candidate is unqualified for the post he/she is vying for; it speaks volume on the nature of output such candidate will produce in terms of performance, when compared to his/her counterpart who is qualified and/or a professional. Buttressing this point, Kaplan (1996) argues that “Africa has witnessed an increasing trend of conflict because its economies have performed so poorly both absolutely and relative to other regions of the World”. Hence, the varying forms of crises witnessed in Nigeria today are linked to the contingent effect of uncompromising economic circumstances and development disappointments. Ethnic nationalism based on sentiments as it’s been practiced in Nigerian context today will hamper developments, which will in-turn have exponential effects on the nation’s economy and socio-political transformation.

Loyalty to ones’ ethnic group rather the State will have adverse effect on social harmony and the unity of the nation be blurred. When social cohesion is eroded and the unity of a country is distorted, national
frontiers become porous for various forms of illegalities. Allegiance to protect the territorial integrity of the country will be compromised by the armed forces and other security operatives, given rooms to unhindered flow of cross-border crimes, such as: smuggling, drug trafficking, human trafficking, organ trafficking, small and light arms trafficking, to mention a few (Haken, 2011). Since most of these cross-border crimes are perpetrated by highly sophisticated international criminal gangs / networks, they could lay siege on a section of the country’s territory and carryout nefarious acts on the vulnerable civilian populace, while the nation is feeble. A classic example is the incessant attacks, maiming, kidnappings, killings and other despicable acts meted out by the dreaded Boko Haram terrorist sect on harmless civilian populations in the North-eastern part of Nigeria.

Furthermore, given the waves of corruption, favouritism/nepotism, misappropriation of funds and money-laundering, dominant in Nigeria’s political terrain, loyalty to the nation will dwindle drastically. Political and national apathy will on one hand breed ethnic suspicion; hatred; idiosyncrasy, and criticism which will turn have adverse effect in the nation building process. On the other, it has the capacity to create and build tension, especially from the deprived or marginalised group; and if not well managed could lead to State failure which may resuscitate secessionism, and spark-off another round of civil war in the country.

Conclusion
This article has been able to bring to the fore the nature and conflict implication of ethnic nationalism in Nigeria and draws out lessons for Africa. The problem of ethnicity is in itself not Africa's problem. It can be harnessed for the stability and socio-economic development of the country. However, politicising it or using it as a political machinery to drive parochial interest will make it a vehicle for violence. Hence, for Africa to soar above the heights of ethnic cleavages in contemporary era and in future times, constant provision of social or public services is inevitable. Public services must be evenly provided to enhance or facilitate economic growth and development in the troubled regions. These variables will serve as palliative against ethnic strife and agitations against neglect and poverty.

Entrenching the tenets of democracy, such as rule of law, respect for fundamental human rights, independence / impartial judiciary, and independent court system, freedom of press, of association and religion will also have far-reaching positive impacts on the polity of the African State. Such system should be neutral such that citizens will be free and allow to exercise their franchise without fear or favour. Without being manipulated and bribed with money, “recharge cards” or through “rice distribution” by political party agents. In addition, there should be vibrant and effective institution and ethnic tolerance. All these will help set in motion the process of nation building.

Nation building is an essential ingredient for peaceful coexistence. However, for there to be nation-building, there must be the cooperation and subordination of all agitating ethnic nationalities and of conflicting interest and loyalty to the State provided that the latter offer to citizens the necessary climate conducive to build a strong sense of national identity. For instance, Tanzania adopted this strategy of
nation building that helped the State to curb ethnic violence. Julius Nyerere of Tanzania pursued a
dogged policy in building a nation whose citizens would only be recognized or identified as Tanzanians
and proscribed ethnicity from official or national records. Till date, Tanzania still doesn't allow political
parties founded on religion, race, colour or gender.

In sum, for peace to be restored in the vacillating regions of Africa, there should be a paradigm shift
from ethnic loyalty to national loyalty. Africans should learn to tolerate one another and live peaceably
among themselves without any suspicion and hatred. Major socio-economic nuances among regions
and ethnic groups, such as inequalities, discrimination, and idiosyncrasy, corruption, amongst others
should be addressed. The dividends of democracy should be felt by all, and not necessarily the
exclusive reserve of the aristocratic class. Poverty, unemployment, social amenities, to mention a few,
should be tackled.

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