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Note from the Editor

Fifty Years of My Sociology

Fifty years is a long time to be associated with anyone or anything. Other than the family, it is well-nigh impossible to endure anyone for that long. That is why it is celebrated as the Golden Year. As far as a career is concerned no one these days expects to carry on with the same of work for fifty years. Changing the kind of work one does a few times is the current norm. Yet, here I am still doing sociology for fifty years!

It was exactly fifty years ago this July in 1968 when I began my career in sociology, my undergraduate training at least. Sociology then was a new subject of study at the University of Dhaka and few knew of it even by name. It was taught as an introductory course in the BA programmes in some colleges and very few liked it. My personal introduction to the subject was a unique event. I had joined the Air Force after completing high school but did not enjoy the regimentation of the military life and quit soon after. I was then squandering away my time while my friends were completing their graduations and I became the "black sheep" of the family in no time at all.

There was tremendous pressure from my middle class family to do "something" with "my life". But nothing appealed to me; university life was not even on the cards, I was hoping to get a job of some sort, preferably a managerial type. That is when a friend of mine who was taking his BA exam approached me with a sociology book, a simplified notebook to be exact, and requested me to read and explain the subject to him, assuming that I knew better English than he did. English then was the medium of instruction at the post secondary level but I had my secondary education in English. So, my friend was convinced I knew better English. Thus, to assist a friend I read the introductory sociology book and, I "liked" it!

Somehow, I felt that the book addressed some, if not all, the "questions" that I was "grappling" with since my teens (?!). It dealt with family, which was a troubling one for me, to say the least, rather I was a trouble for the family; culture, where I was a total misfit, caught between the native culture and the Western culture I was immersed in from my English model "public schooling"; state and politics, politics was heating up in the country, prior to the independence war; religion, the basis of the country then was now being challenged and new secular trends were already in vogue; urbanization, city life appealed to me so much so that I would often picture my small provincial town to be full of skyscrapers in the future; social problems, I was a social problem; etc. etc. With so much to look for in the book I was really impressed, it was my book, it sort of told my story, and hence I decided to read sociology and get to the university. The family was obviously relieved but did not know for a while that I admitted myself in the "Sociology Department" and not the "English Department" as I was directed by my father, who did not accept the switch until my Master’s results.
The first day at the university, sometime during the first week of July, probably the 1st of July, was nothing I can be proud of. Being out of disciplined life and leading a life of a “deviant”, definitely in the eyes of my family and the society at large, I was not the best person to deal with. Being some years older than the rest of the class I got noticed immediately and soon picked up a quarrel with the teacher on the definition of “country” by which he implied the district one came from but I differed, got dubbed as “over smart” and we never saw eye to eye and our differences showed up now and then until his unfortunate demise many years later. It also took a while for the deviant one in me to be tamed and I did not really get to become a “good student” for another year or so. But the BA Honours programme in sociology at the University of Dhaka was really an impressive one that finally got me reading, enjoying and being involved for the rest of my life, never to regret my decision.

The three year BA Honours programme was not very much short of a graduate programme! We were expected to learn “anything and everything” that sociology represented albeit only through eight courses, taught over the three years. The first of these was called “Social Thought” and covered “all” social thinkers from Plato and Aristotle, through the middle ages, social contract theorists and to the current sociologists, including Sorokin, Parsons and Merton. One American professor commented that this one course would require more than three years to study. Indeed, one of the text books was titled, Social Thought: From Hammurabi to Comte, by Rollin Chambliss and then another, the three volume Social Thought from Lore to Science by H, Barnes and HE Becker, both now considered as classics. But these were only the introductory steps and soon we were delving into The Republic and Politics, The Prince, Utopia, Leviathan, The Social Contract, etc. and to supplement these further, The History of Western Philosophy and The Story of Philosophy and so on. In all these readings there was an obvious bias in favour of the Western society, politics and culture. But we had not even started on sociology yet.

The sociology department at the University of Dhaka had teachers mostly with Political Science background and thought that we must read those political thinkers to understand society. One teacher insisted on reading Sabine’s A History of Political Theory, a text from the 1930s. But we did not fare any better with the sociologists either. Contemporary Sociological Theories, written by Sorokin forty years earlier had nothing contemporary about it. An Introduction to the History of Sociology by HE Barnes did help me a lot though, particularly the section on Comte. But much of the chronological history of sociological theory was presented to us by the mammoth two volume Theories of Society: Foundations of Modern Sociological Theories, by Parsons, Shils and others though it only took the readers up to the World War II. In his AJS review (Vol. 67, No. 6, May 1962) of the book Hans Zetterberg noted that the excerpts in the book “do not merely highlight the history of our discipline, but ... continue to serve as inspiration for fruitful ideas in contemporary sociology” and insists that “we will become better sociologists if we read them”. The book took me closer to the sociologists as I began to read the original works of Weber, Durkheim and the others.

But in all these readings Oriental thought was missing and I never really got over that, although I read Khaldun and Kautilya, and Radhakrishnan, bits of Confucian, Taoism, Buddhism etc. I have always felt inadequate with my reading of the Oriental philosophy.
My reading of the sociologists in earnest started with Weber. One day, in my second year at the university, a senior friend handed me the *Religion of India* and more or less ordered me to read it. I was impressed by Weber’s knowledge of South Asian history but did not quite get the connection he was trying to make between religion and the economy. I soon read the translations of Weber’s essays by Parsons and the other by Gerth and Mills, and also his essays on methodology. I was more or less hooked on Weber and followed on during my Master’s year with a thesis on him. One of teachers later in Canada called it a “handsome investment”.

I did not much like Marx from what I gathered from the secondary sources and detested others who read him. But that changed later. Reading *Suicide* was a delight. Here I thought was real sociology being made and Durkheim’s “Rules of Sociological Method” continued to influence me for the rest of my life. I made half-hearted attempts to read Comte, Spencer and Paretto in their originals but never quite mastered those hundreds of pages. My worst experience was with Talcott Parsons. I never properly understood what he was trying to say; I jokingly named him the “Complicated Person”. In a review in either the Time or the News Week magazine someone (my references could be wrong) translated Parsons’ one page writing into one line in “English”. That gave me enough reason not to read him at all, although I had to for various courses and criticised him later in my writings too. But I could never be free of him; my PhD Comprehensive exam fell on the same day Parsons died. The exam was postponed.

The extent of readings in just *one* course that these last few paragraphs indicate will give the reader some idea as to how exhaustive the training was. Indeed, the volume of reading was such that when I began my Master’s programme, there really wasn’t a single book that I needed to read. It may sound like bragging and the university library did not have millions of books but whatever books were there in my areas of interest I had read them all during my undergraduate days. During my Master’s year I read the journals like AJS, ASR, Social Forces, Sociology, British Journal of Sociology etc. often beginning with the first volume, AJS 1895, ASR 1935 etc. These readings built for me such a solid foundation that I went on to call Sociological Theory as my primary area of specialization.

Though these indicate the expected amount of reading, very few students actually read as much. Only a hand full of students did get anywhere close. Most students could get away with reading the secondary and in later years just by reading a few note books. In any case the readings in other courses were no less extensive whether one read them or not. I remember in the course on “History and Civilization” where the teacher on the very first day of class warned us that to be a sociologist you must have the world history on your finger tips! History had always been a subject of choice. Even when I was passing through my deviant period, I would read up on history whenever I came across anything. The warning acted as an added impetus and I went to the book store the same day and the best book on world history the salesman gave me was Toynbee’s two volume paperback *A Study of History*. I read the book with lots of question in my mind and was ready to tell the teacher of my exploit during the next class but he started on the history of Ancient Mesopotamia and was not much interested to hear what I had read. Nevertheless, I followed up on his advice and continued to read
history to the extent that I could challenge most students from the History Department. The standard textbook remained the Wallbank and Taylor’s *Civilization Past and Present*, but I read through as many histories of civilizations as I could lay my hands on, including those of the Far East and the Americas, the Middle East and, of necessity, the histories of Modern Europe, South Asia and Bangladesh.

My reading of history has continued throughout my career and at some point I came to the realization that the crisis that sociology is facing today has much to do with the lack of knowledge of history. This is particularly true of the American (US) sociologists, who have little or no knowledge of the history of other societies or of other times. In more than one of my papers I have argued that you cannot have a sociology without the knowledge of *societies in time and space*. No generalizations about society can be done without taking into account those thousands of societies of the past. Sociologists have failed miserably in this.

The one new subject I studies in my Master’s programme was “Sociology of Development” and learnt, to my horror, that poor countries like Bangladesh was destined to remain poor, because they were poor to begin with. We compared the pathetic plight of the poor countries of Asia, Africa and even Latin America in terms of the number of telephone, radio, television, hospital beds or even skyscrapers as compared to the “modern” and developed countries of Europe and North America. The theories of Durkheim, Weber, Parsons, and economists like Rostow and his “Non-communist Manifesto” were there to substantiate all those. Hosts of articles in the *Economic Development and Cultural Change* proved it with hard data. The only way out was to become “modern” like the West, to build industries and cities and to adopt the life of the West, with the help of the West, if they are so kind as to lend a helping hand through economic aid, investments, democracy and Hollywood movies.

BA and MA exams were completed with major political incidents like the war of independence intervening but with the best possible results in hand I was automatically thrust towards a teaching career. I did not have even two weeks of “unemployed” status nor had the option of looking up the news papers, selecting jobs and going for job interviews. I was called upon to teach and I started on my sociology career in 1974 without giving it a second thought and have been quite good at it throughout my life. I do not know what else I could have become but becoming a sociologist and a teacher has given me immense pleasure and tremendous job satisfaction. I am still proud of my decision to read sociology and never forget the unsolicited role of my friend, now deceased, in it.

It did not take me very long thereafter to realize that if I were to continue teaching I do need a PhD and soon landed in a graduate programme at the McMaster University in Canada in 1976. I knew that with all my readings I was well prepared for the graduate programme. The books that we read in Bangladesh were a few years old as it took some time to procure these but I was up to date on the journals. Yet, I was caught totally unprepared by the intensity of the graduate training in North America, first in Canada and then in the USA. The command with which the professors deliberated and the passion with which the students responded, often raising storms in the classrooms, surprised
me. I knew I had it in me to move to their level but it took me a while and a shift to a university in the USA. While I was applying for admission I had concurrently made applications a number of US universities as well and after I reached Canada, Syracuse University, in the USA informed me that they would admit me directly to their PhD programme. So I left McMaster without completing another MA there.

But before I left McMaster, I faced the first jolt in my learning. While I was proud of my reading of Weber, the modernization theorists and the thesis work on Weber, at McMaster I was suddenly awaken to the fact that it was not Weber or Parsons but Marx that I should have invested in. Sociology had moved beyond the “non-communists”, it was socialist, if not damn right a communist, subject! The split between the “Marxists” and “Non-Marxists” was very clearly drawn, nearly 50-50 among the faculty and almost all the graduate students were Marxists. The Marxist students looked down with disdain upon the remaining few non-Marxist students and definitely with pity on the only Weberian there. If you were not well versed in Marx, you did not exist. Debates raged over “how” to read the Capital and what were the implications of the “unpublished” works. Loud Marxists always won the debates in the classrooms and cafeteria, not that the very timid non-Marxists engaged any of them, they debated it among themselves to establish this or that aspect of Marxism.

Parsons and the Sociology of Development were a laughing stock. The poor countries were not poor but were made poor by the Europeans and that poverty was maintained by the USA, who manufactured all kinds of falsehood, including false theories, like modernization, to ward off communism in these countries and would do so even by forcing a war on them, as was done in Korea and Indo-China. Also, noteworthy is that much of Africa was aided by Marxism, one way or the other, to attain its freedom from colonial rule. A new set of theories arising from Latin America called the Dependency theory challenged modernization theory and better explained all these. I did not spend enough time in McMaster to dwell on these but the damage was done. I got converted!

The faculty at Syracuse was an ensemble of theorists of all shades and colours, including a few direct students of the masters like Mannheim or Parsons. It was, I deemed, the best place to specialize in theory and I took full advantage of it, honing my learning in the area much further. But the best part of my learning was in the area of research, of which I had little formal training by then. A number of highly learned professors through a range of specialized courses including statistics taught me not only the basics of research but the applications in different situations. My thesis supervisor, Professor
Richard G. Braungart engaged me in the theories and philosophies behind the methodologies to the extent that later I could combine all these and design a whole new course that I called “Theory Construction” and taught it to the graduate students after getting back to Dhaka.

Marxism had its day in Syracuse too but that was in the past. Debates there now focused on the two upcoming issues, “phenomenological sociology” and the other on “women studies”, both in their infancy but were becoming increasingly vocal and in the end Syracuse did contribute handsomely to both trends. Phenomenological sociology, based on the phenomenology of Husserl, itself on a weak foundation and heavily criticised, but like other fads in sociology, it caught on very quickly. Yet, it was not the philosophy or the theories being proposed but the qualitative methodology which it espoused that came to stay. Syracuse professors like Bob Bogdan along with West Coast (of USA) universities contributed heavily to establish and spread the eventual “qualitative research methodology”. Being steeped in the positivist philosophy and working with high level quantitative methodology, I had issues with both the phenomenology and qualitative methodology. I wrote scathing criticisms of both and till today consider these as exercises in futility. These and a few other similar fads have ousted sociology from the domain of the sciences as initially intended and, I wrote recently, has landed it squarely among the pseudo-sciences.

In the Kuhnian terms I am, perhaps, the defender of the old paradigm in these regards. But a real “paradigm shift” did take place in me in terms of my exposure to Marxism and Dependency theories. My readings of Marx made me appreciate the man and his work immensely. I could see why in the land of capitalism itself he was stirring up so many minds to the realities of the post Vietnam era, the Civil Rights and women’s movements. Weberian and the main stream sociology seemed so shallow and had already failed to explain these realities, loosing face in the process.

Sociology in the USA never much bothered about the world beyond the oceans. The only time it ventured to study the “third world” was through the modernization studies, thoroughly planted in the Weberian and Parsonsian theories. Picking up on the queues from McMaster, I started to build on the Dependency Theory in my thesis work to find an explanation of poverty in the third world. Not that I was not aware of the colonial past, my own country was a British colony, but I began to see things in a new light. Frank, particularly with his criticism of the modernization theory, built up the most convincing theory of dependency, how the West with hundreds of years of colonial exploitation and continuing the same to the modern times had made these countries poor and dependent. As Dos Santos put it, the development of the poor countries totally depended on the extent the developed countries would allow these countries to develop. Even Marx had failed there. Marx had “nothing” to explain the ill fate of the world outside of Europe. Asiatic mode of production is often used in his defence but it is basically an apology for a theory and stated through a few personal letters and is so full of holes, as I showed elsewhere (1983), that Marx fared better without it.

Building on these arguments I set up my thesis (1982) putting one theory against the others in explaining poverty and development in the third world. With data from 78 countries of Asia, Africa and Latin America, the largest set of data till then. Using high level statistical analysis I ended up
demonstrating in favour of the better explanatory power of the Dependency Theory. This was perhaps
the first real empirical test of Dependency Theory with such a huge data set.

Returning to my country, I resumed my teaching, a career that lasted for over 43 years. As with all
careers, I had my ups and downs, in fighting, silver linings but what I had most was tremendous level
of satisfaction in coaching a good number of excellent students, at least during the first two decades.
At later stages the student quality declined and the university itself became polluted with politics while
academics got lost. Indeed, I became so frustrated that I resigned from the University of Dhaka after
more than 30 years of teaching there and spent the last few years of my career in a couple of private
universities, which had their own issues and nothing much could be achieved there in any case.

Through all those years of teaching my involvement was total. I participated in nearly all academic
and extra-academic activities, including participating with the students on the stage and playgrounds.
But my greatest achievement was in changing the curricula of the Sociology Department. As I noted
at the outset, the BA programme at the University of Dhaka though it did wonders for me was based
on just eight courses taught over three years and MA for one year with four more courses, one less if
you wrote a thesis, probably based on the British university system of the 19th century and remained
unchanged even after twenty five years. Much of the world had already moved into more open
systems so in 1983 I proposed a change to a four year BA and one and a half year of MA programme
with many optional courses, much like the North American system. Indeed, I wrote up a detailed list of
over sixty courses that could be offered in the two programmes. Against tremendous opposition and
over twelve years of fighting at each step I finally got to start the program in 1995. But two months into
the programme, some opposing students locked up the Department and the university temporarily
suspended the programme. After another twelve more years just when I left the University of Dhaka in
2007 the programme was restarted without me.

Fortunately, I had fared better in Sylhet where a new university was being set up. The administration
there was very cooperative and we could start the proposed curricula in 1990 (or around that time, if
my memory serves me correctly). Today, in most public universities and some private universities in
Bangladesh sociology is taught in essentially the same structure I proposed, with perhaps necessary
changes to update the courses and reading materials.

Back during my comprehensive exam I had used Mannheim’s theory of ideology and utopia to
explain Italian election. Upon my return to Bangladesh I picked up on that thread and with the
collaboration of my colleague, Professor S. Aminul Islam we tried to explain the political situation and
the role of the intellectuals in Bangladesh (1988). I later followed up with a number of studies on the
intellectuals like defining the intellectual in a peripheral society (1988), intellectuals in the post-soviet
world (2005) and building a typology of the current intellectuals in terms of “Public, Private and
Platonic” intellectuals (2014). In all these studies I showed how the intellectuals today are different
from the “ideal typical” intellectuals that Mannheim talked about. Because of the huge increase in
education facility all over the world, the number of people who can be counted as intellectuals has
increased many folds, to even millions within one country. With this increase, the nature and the type
of work they do have also changed beyond recognition, in the process their ideologies and political stance have been affected as well. They are no longer the “free-floating” intellectuals just loitering in the cafes and writing criticisms of their government, many are actually working for their government. But most have “unfortunately” become professors, holding no particular ideology or even an opinion and may be completely apolitical leading a private life like any other member of the society (2014). In the post soviet era, the Left intellectuals, who were often considered the real intellectuals, are gone! And almost all over the world the intellectuals from the Right (?) are enjoying their ascendency. I am now working on a complete volume on the intellectuals on these themes.

Even though I had moved far beyond Mannheim but his impact on my studies in sociology of knowledge remains active till date. This had its beginning in the criticism of phenomenology and the qualitative methodology (1983). I followed this with an appraisal of the “paradigmatic status” of sociology in 1984. But as noted earlier I was increasingly feeling that sociology, especially its theory building, was in a crisis, in the Kuhnian sense or not and American sociology was at the root of it all. Thus, I published a paper on “American Sociology: Crisis in Isolation” (1987). Although I dwelt on a number of other areas for some time, the question of crisis in theory building did not go away and the next time I began to work with it I came to the realization that sociological theory was not only in crisis, theory building itself had actually come to an end and wrote about the “End of Sociological Theory” (1999), which was later adopted as the title of my book (2005).

Continuing to work in this area I next looked at the prospect of US sociology in the 21st century and found it “facing a dead end” (2004). Since the 1930s sociology became exclusively an American discipline where it was promoted mainly by philanthropic organizations, mostly based in the church. In fact many of the early sociologists were simply social workers, reporters and even priests or sons of priests who sought to uphold law and order in society. American sociology never got out of it, theory building or study of other societies was not even attempted. During the early years sociological theory was not even addressed in the sociology conferences. But more importantly, sociology in the USA had shifted its unit of analysis from the “society” to the “individual”, giving rise to all kinds of complications and failing to build an appropriate methodology. So it gradually moved away from the scientific stance that it began with in the 19th century under the influence of Comte and Spencer to a position where now sociology is called just a “study” of society so that any methodology is legitimate. Also, sociology is a discipline born out of a crisis, so that sociology fares well when there is crisis in society but suffers in a tranquil situation. “What is good for sociology is bad for society and vice versa”. The US society is far more prosperous and peaceful today than at any other times, has been so since the mid 1970s. Up until then sociology was among the most popular subjects of study in the USA. Sociology books were among the best sellers in the late 1960s and the undergraduate enrolment topped the 36,000 mark in 1976 but then began to slide to the current number somewhere around ten thousand only. As a result there is little need for a sociologist there as is evident from the increasingly low student enrolment and the regular closures of programmes and even departments. So that sociology is dying in the USA!
Since the theories of Weber, sociology has been seeking to justify its stance as a science, or, how not to be a science. Because we deal with humans, and humans are not like atoms and molecules, we cannot use the scientific methodology followed by the other sciences is the primary argument. Anti-positivism and anti-empiricism has dominated the discipline for so long that today we are more comfortable using “qualitative methodology”, which is supposed to be able to capture the finer issues of human life. Added to this has been the recent onslaught of “post-modernism” which negates the very fabric of theory building, it negates concepts and it negates generalizations. Born among the arts它 professes “narratives” or story telling. If story telling becomes sociology, then what is literature for? Not many other sciences respect the claim of sociology to be a science in any case, but today that claim is louder among the sociologists themselves. But we like to be called and definitely claim to be a “social science”. Most introductory text books will open with the statement that sociology is the science of society. My question is, therefore, if we are not doing science, then why do we continue claiming to be a science? By posing to be a science, when it is not, sociology has today turned into a pseudo-science (2008). What a fate for a discipline that began with all the promises to be the crowning glory among the sciences!

The crisis in sociology is even deeper than these. The low undergraduate enrolment is further burdened by the continued high level of graduate enrolment. So that there are many more PhDs in waiting than the discipline can absorb. Therefore, in order to survive the fresh graduates as well as tenured professors continue to create ever newer speciality areas. In the melee of these newly founded areas, often whole programmes and even new departments, the core of sociology gets lost. Population studies, women studies, criminology, gay and lesbian studies, peace studies etc. are only the recent breakaways from the parent discipline as sociology itself faces a dead end. I remember in one of my visits to the Syracuse University in the mid 1990s I went to a book store to check out the new publications. Half the shelves were full of books on gay and lesbians while it was out of classical theory books. The Department of Sociology which was full of theory and methodology professors was now teaching only one required theory course. No student opted for any other.

The situation in Bangladesh is no different though it has taken a bit longer. In the mid 1990s when I was the Chair of the Department at Dhaka, there were 33 faculty members. In my recent visit to the Department I counted only 18, the rest have opened up their own departments to promote their personal areas of specialization. Anthropology, which was among the required courses as sociology itself faces a dead end. I remember in one of my visits to the Syracuse University in the mid 1990s I went to a book store to check out the new publications. Half the shelves were full of books on gay and lesbians while it was out of classical theory books. The Department of Sociology which was full of theory and methodology professors was now teaching only one required theory course. No student opted for any other.

Back in McMaster days, after my pitiful defence of Weber I had parted company with anything Weberian, indeed, turned into a vocal critique. But even if I left Weber, Weber refused to leave me. During the late 1980s, the Goethe Institute in Dhaka requested my assistance in organizing a couple of conferences on the occasion of the visit of two German sociologists. I was associated with the institute earlier during my student days when I went to learn German in order to secure admission in a
German university, what else, to study Weber! I agreed and got out a book on Marx and Weber from the sessions (1988). During my renewed study of Weber, I came to the realization that most sociologists were studying the wrong Weber. The Weber who wrote about the Protestant Ethic and its influence on capitalism and later followed up with the studies of Indian, Chinese and the Middle-Eastern religions was not a sociologist but simply a historian. Sociology, by his own definition, was a generalizing science but these were studies of unique phenomena, namely the influence of Protestant Ethic on capitalism, which never happened elsewhere, and of unique societies. This I demonstrated the difference between through two concepts, “ideal Type” that looks at the unique phenomenon and the “Pure Type” that deals with generalization. The former Weber proposed when he wrote as a historian but the latter was developed while he was working on the Economy and Society, which by his own claim was a work on sociology (1988).

But Weber did have a very well developed sociology of a religion in the essay with the same title, where he built up excellent generalizations about various aspects of religion. Unfortunately, his study of the Protestant Ethic was not a sociological study at all, or even a worthwhile study of the relation between religion and economy. It was flawed on so many levels that I am often surprised how university after university in the USA prescribes it as a “sociology text” to the introductory students! I argued these issues more forcefully in my next work on Weber, again at the invitation of the Institute in 2003. There I took up a detailed study of the Religion of India and the Religion of China and how flawed these were. And combining these all I claimed that the Protestant Ethic hypothesis is simply wrong and these studies are not so sociological ether (2004).

Social inequality, poverty in particular, has always been an area of interest for me. I have studied and taught courses in this area and once in a while wrote about inequality in Bangladesh and USA. So, when one day I came across a study of poverty by the World Bank making unbelievable claims about poverty alleviation, as if they did it, my intelligence was challenged. So, I took on the World Bank and in a detailed study not only refuted their claims but also showed that as much as their data were wrong for most countries, the very methodology they used were also totally flawed making the whole study questionable (2005). To my satisfaction, I noted that some other scholars had made similar observations too. But the World Bank continues to supply similar faulty studies and some of us continue to refute these. I later compiled a collection of poverty studies and published it as a book (2010).

Then, very recently, I noted another fantastic claim made by the World Bank, this time about the middle class and how “billions” of people in the poor countries have moved to the middle class status. On reading the paper I was struck by the names of economists who were the pioneers of the study. The mainstream economists, the World Bank variety, have always shunned the “class studies”, this is the domain of the dreaded Marxists or the left leaning sociologist. So, why did all on a sudden Wold Bank and the economists started taking interest in class analysis? I smelled a rat there and lo and behold, what we sociologists often fail to see is that these billions of the “middle class” people are actually the future “consumers” of goods and services the richer countries are hoping to sell to! That’s the billion dollar reason.
My first objection to the study is that the definition of the middle class based on the income or consumption is wrong (2014). Middle class, more than any other class, is not a class but a culture. Certain amount of income may be necessary to be in that category but is not a sufficient condition to define it. Education, social network, traditions, cultural norms and values etc. are some of the issues that need to be factored in. In this study I also claim that as far as the economists are concerned class analysis is not their “cup of tea”, they have already messed up the poverty studies by measuring humans in terms of what they eat (consume), treating them as animals, now by proposing fantastic definitions, including ownership of cars and electronic gadgets as indicators they are again destroying the notion of the middle class and its culture. I am continuing on the study of the middle class, including in Bangladesh (2017), and hope to do further research in the near future.

Like in other countries sociology in Bangladesh also has its professional organization, a sociological association. I was associated with that too but soon, primarily due to personality clashes and infighting, it split into two. I continued with one faction but that too began suffering from the same problems, so I quit again. Much later, after living in isolation for some time I succeeded gathering around a few serious scholars and set up a very tiny “Society” with a handful of members in 2003. The primary objective was to launch this journal and carry on with research and publication away from the Department or the formal professional associations. With the support from those few colleagues I succeeded in launching this journal, now in its 15th year and recognized internationally. Sociology in Bangladesh or of Bangladesh is today known to the rest of the world because of this journal.

Besides these, I have written on population, migration, development, gender, family and slums etc. but as one of my professors in Syracuse warned me when I decided to get back to the country, I got too involved with administration. I worked as the Chair, Dean, Director of Research, Editor, Secretaries and Presidents of organizations, set up and chaired, seminars, conferences and workshops and often had no time for research of writing. I am sure I could have, nay, should have, done much more but personal tragedies, political situations in the country and host of other work related barriers often held me back.

Yet, I am proud of my students, some of whom are internationally known in their own rights, my contribution in changing the sociology curricula and last but not the least, of this journal. I think I have served sociology well!

But sociology has not fared well over the last fifty years. When I began my career in 1968, sociology was at the top of its popularity in the USA. Sociology books topped the reading lists of even the general public while sociologists were being regularly called upon by the radio, television and the newspapers to comment on the current issues. Students by their thousands flocked to get admitted in the sociology programmes. Sociology was respected as a “science” that could take care of the social ills. But when the social ills showed up in earnest in the form of protest against the Vietnam War, Civil Rights movements, women’s movements, fight against racism, increase in crime rate etc. sociology failed to deliver. Indeed, many sociologists were often at the forefront of these protests.
Yet, it was not these external factors but sociology was crippled from within. Sociology could never
develop a convincing methodology, largely went on with one to one interviews to capture the trends of
the whole society. The proposed alternatives in the forms of qualitative methodology and “narratives”
are even worse as it is impossible to generalize from a few case studies of individuals. In fact,
*sociology was never a discipline of the SOCIETY, it focused on this or that society but never society as
an abstraction, society in time and space*. Sociology never sought to generalize beyond any one
society or community, when it tried, as in the case of modernization studies, it failed miserably. As
such, its status as a science, without being able to generalize or predict, has been repeatedly
challenged, even from within and failed to defend that status. Today, it has more or less turned into a
pseudo-science.

The division and subdivisions of the discipline into specialty areas, primarily in a struggle to survive,
continued throughout these fifty years. Without a properly defined boundary within which to operate, it
was always picking up topics that others ignored or even refused to study, like the gay and lesbians.
On the other hand it also lost its subject matter to other disciplines, even “class” and “poverty”, the
exclusive domains of sociology, are now claimed by the economists. Often, its subject got defined into
new disciplines and new departments were opened by those who were once sociologists. So, a
discipline that was at the top of the ladder fifty years ago is slowly dying with a whimper!

The situation in Bangladesh has not been much different either, given that few knew of sociology in
the 1960s. It has lost its strength over the years, has been depleted of its faculty, has spawned new
speciality areas and departments, while most of the serious scholars, the stalwarts, have retired.
Student quality has declined. Not much has been achieved in terms of research or publication (1997,
2005)), particularly in recent years. Sociology has also lost its prestige in the eyes of the people. This
last has a lot to do with the involvement of its students and faculty in national and campus politics.
Today, few talk of sociology in respectful terms. So that sociology in Bangladesh is also dying, if not
dead already!

NAZRUL ISLAM

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Pondering over the Public Administration Discipline: A Move towards African Epistemology

NE Mathebula

Abstract: It would prove very challenging to meaningfully study Africa, let alone African Public Administration with science based on epistemologies of non-African societies. By this, it is suggested that African scholars have a duty of knowledge generation on Africa using research procedures, methodologies and theories founded on African epistemology. In a similar vein, the relationship between politics and public administration cannot simply be ignored for its long uncertain discourse as it bears repercussions of disciplinary identity particularly in an African context. The question that prominent scholars have attempted to resolve is whether Africa has its own epistemology, let alone African Public Administration? It is for this position that this article attempts to interrogate the state of the Public Administration discipline in Africa and thereby clearing the epistemological confusion. This is the confusion that has resulted in the discipline being viewed sometimes as an art while others argue it is a science. Despite all this, this paper seeks to propagate in an Afrocentric perspective for African epistemology in the field of Public Administration particularly the development of theories and conceptualisations from an African perspective grounded in African knowledge and minds. This paper is purely theoretical and collects literature from secondary sources. It is therefore concluded that Public Administration curricular must be solely based on African epistemology and Indigenous Knowledge Systems.

Keywords: epistemology, public administration, Afrocentric, indigenous knowledge system, pedagogies, Africa

Introduction

It would prove very challenging to meaningfully study Africa, let alone African Public Administration with science based on epistemologies of non-African societies (Narh, 2013: 2). By this Narh suggests that African scholars have a duty of knowledge generation on Africa using research procedures, methodologies and theories founded on African epistemology. This is necessary because if African scholars fail to act in that regard according to Maserumule (2014: 439), Africa runs the danger of being defined by the West in its absence. However, there are several factors inhibiting the creation of an African knowledge hub. Instead of collaboration amongst African minds for African knowledge generation, scholars compete against each other thus weakening the capacity to assert African scholarship (Maserumule, 2014: 440). Against this brief background, the question that prominent scholars have attempted to resolve is whether Africa has its own epistemology, let alone African Public Administration. It is for this position that this article attempts to interrogate the state of the Public Administration discipline in Africa and thereby clearing the epistemological confusion from an Afrocentric perspective. The article does so by conceptualisation the concept of theory and Public
Administration theory with a quest to question African Public Administration theory. Furthermore, the relationship between politics and Public Administration in an African context is provided in this article. The quest and advocacy of Afrocentrism and African epistemology is explored with a view of establishing the effects it has on African epistemology, Public Administration curricular and pedagogies.

**Theory and Public Administration theorisation**

A question that continues to ponder the terrains of the public administration is whether the discipline has its own theory(ies). This is so because most academics and researchers in the field fail to comprehend the normative foundations of the discipline (Coetzee, 1988: 49). This has to be ascribed also to the eclectic nature of the public administration discipline and its reliance on related disciplines to explain, direct and inform study and practice (Thornhill & van Dijk, 2010: 95). One must not be ignorant of the fact that Public Administration has relationships with other dominant social science disciplines and an offspring of political science. To answer a question posed earlier as to whether Public Administration has its own independent theories; it was in the paradigm of Identity Crisis (1948-1970) that the lack of Public Administration theory was established. According to Basheka (2012: 48-49), those in political science started developing theories to understand challenges associated with the lack of contribution to Public Administration as the discipline ‘had a very serious poverty of theories’. The use of the words serious poverty seems to suggest that although there might have been signs of theory development in the discipline, it was not at a stage where it could be universally lifted and applied to solve global challenges. Basheka (2012: 47) is of the view that “a theory of Public Administration in our times means theory of politics also”. A discourse on whether Public Administration has its own theory(ies) or whether it is borrowing from other disciplines is continual. However, one needs to interrogate the concepts of theory and Public Administration theory.

Conceptualising what theory is according to Nixon (2004: 28), is a very big and imposing question. This is so because theorising involves the difficult art of arguing beyond the dead-end of disagreement (Nixon, 2004: 29), something which scholars in the field of public administration do not own. This is evident by the replication and repetition of theories built centuries ago rather than developing theories to befit their own realms. According to Thornhill and van Dijk (2010: 96), the word theory is derived from the Latin *theoria* and the Greek *theoreo* which basically refer to contemplation, speculation and sight. In the light of this, a theory therefore refers to how we mentally view a phenomenon or system which forms the basis for chain of reasoning and suppositions. In an attempt to develop a theory one must be able to attach meanings and contexts to concepts. This according to Coetzee (1988: 49), is for the purposes of preventing semantic confusion. It is in this line that Coetzee suggests that in order to build a theory particularly in the discipline of public administration, concepts such as epistemology, hypotheses, methodology, paradigm, foundation, model, phenomenon and others need to be conceptualised and contextualised. In a nutshell, theory according to Wacker
(1988: 361), must have four basic criteria of conceptual definition, domain limitations, relationshipbuilding, and predictions.

According to Nixon (2004: 29), ‘no science will relieve common sense, even if scientifically informed, of the task of forming a judgement’. By this, Nixon is of a view that answering the most sensitive and difficult questions in the world around us requires theorisation. The lack of theory and theorisation particularly in Public Administration postgraduate qualifications in Africa in general and South Africa in particular pose a serious challenge in the existence and independence of the discipline. It is therefore necessary to interrogate in the real sense Public Administration theories and possibly advocate for theory(ies) of African origin to answer African challenges. A Public Administration theory does not concern an individual human being or a limited number of employees in one (public) organisational structure (Thornhill & van Dijk, 2010: 97). This is the case in African epistemology which is often inducted for being a communal venture that denies individuals the ability to reason and come up with knowledge that is uninfluenced by society and irrationality of the community (Ani, 2013: 304) which is the case with Western epistemology. This Western epistemology and theorisation according to Maserumule (2014: 439), is accepted as a large part by African scholarship with its paradigmatic orientation imbedded by Western philosophies. Such position in turn adversely affects the theorisation of Public Administration in an African context. Chizuma (2014) for example attempted to contextualise corruption in an African environment. The theorisation and the basis of the argument was that giving a chief or traditional leader a gift while expecting favours in the near future could not and does not amount to corruption as it would in Western epistemological theorisation.

**Public Administration as an offspring of Political Science**

As mentioned before in the paper that Public Administration is eclectic in nature due to its theory dependency to other social science disciplines in general and political science in particular. Political science is regarded as the oldest of the social science disciplines and has given birth to Public Administration. Political science is viewed as a science of form and principles of civil government and the manner of its intervention in public and private affairs and politics (Coetzee, 1988: 88). It is concerned with a systematic analysis of government, its processes, and forms of organisation, institutions and purposes (ibid). Despite the relationship between politics and Public Administration, there was a period commonly known as Politics-Administration Dichotomy (1887-1926) which became a key strategy during the epistemological period to separate politics and administration functions of government as a strategy for promoting efficiency and effectiveness (Mafunisa, 2003: 87-88; Basheka, 2012: 35-41). The “divorce” between the two disciplines as Basheka (2012: 44) explains only materialised during the Era of Challenge (1938-1947).

*Woodrow ‘Wilsonian’ dichotomy and depoliticised bureaucracy models*

Making reference to Public Administration without mentioning politics is somehow very unusual. According to Tahmusebi and Musevi (2011: 30), the issue of politics-administration dichotomy in the
field of public administration has had ‘strange history’ for over a century. Waldo (1987) as quoted in Tahmusebi and Musevi (2011) explains that the reason why the debate on the discourse of politics-administration dichotomy continues to be in major debate forums in the field of public administration is that the two are naturally interrelated. Using a metaphor, Dahlström (2014: 321) simply explains this relation in alluding that politics is the mind while administration is the body of government. This relationship is therefore at the heart of government. The use of the word dichotomy in the relationship suggests the rift and ill-health that exist between politics and administration. However, Dahlström (2014: 321) suggests that where possible, harmony must be forged between politics and administration.

Politics-administration dichotomy is often associated with the former President of the United States of America, Woodrow Wilson. In a nutshell, his article titled ‘The study of Administration’ Wilson said that:

The field of administration is a field of business. It is removed from the hurry and strife of politics……. Administration lies outside the proper sphere of politics. Administrative questions are not political questions. Although politics sets the tasks for administration, it should not be suffered to manipulate its offices (Tahmusebi & Musevi, 2011: 131).

It can be analysed from Wilson’s assertions that his idea of separating politics and administration was out of good intentions. Government leaders around the world today are accused of politicising state institutions for personal enrichment which Wilson warned against. In a South African context for instance, the relationship between politics and administration is viewed as interface. This relates to attempting to draw a thin line between administrative and political functions without each interfering with the other. Both politics and administration must in their pursuit of promoting efficiency and effectiveness in government administration perform their separate functions which after all contribute to the same objective. This type of a relationship can simply be understood as what Mafunisa (2003) refers to as the complementarity model of describing and understanding the relationship between politics and administration. He argues that the model is a combination of both the dichotomy or depoliticised bureaucracy model and the politicised bureaucracy model.

A complementary relationship implies separate parts and distinctness while the emphasis is on how each contributes to the whole (Mafunisa, 2003: 89). No matter the model used to analyse politics-administration relations, a government concern would have to adopt what suits them taking into account the existence of both politics and administration. A challenge confronting most governments with relations between politics and administration is the fact that the systems are structured hierarchically with subordination to politics a prerequisite. This makes these administrations more prone to political interference and the institutionalisation of state machines. This type of an arrangement on close examination would appear to be a politicised bureaucracy model. The politicise bureaucracy model argues that political office-bearers have a mandate to control the public service including government administrative appointments (Mafunisa, 2003: 88-89). However, it remains to be seen whether the relationship or politics-administration dichotomy debate in Public Administration will ever be laid to rest. Perhaps it is this kind of squabbles, misconceptions and unresolved discourses
that the state of public administration in Africa is not improving. One is tempted to ask, whether it is about time Africa has public administration of its own based on African conceptualisation. The focus of the paper is now turned to assessing the feasibility of ‘Africa’s Public Administration’. The paper does this using the lenses of Afrocentricity.

Afrocentrism and African Public Administration

Afrocentricity materialised as a theory of knowledge for social change in 1980 under the stewardship of Molefi Kete Asante’s systematic challenge to Western epistemology. The basis for Asante’s challenge was from a notion that perspectives on knowledge require African location as a methodological approach (Bakari, 1997). It is therefore confirmed that Afrocentrism is not a mission of replacing “white knowledge” by “black knowledge”. However, it calls for an epistemological position that places African scholarship experiences inside Africa epitomes framed by African codes, paradigms, symbols, motifs and myths. In the words of Bakari (1997), the understanding of Afrocentricity and its epistemology is more likely to lead to student development which is culturally relevant, thereby useful to African students and be predominant to Western epistemology. Afrocentrism has not been without criticisms. It is viewed as a transformative project rather than theory (Tillotson, 2011). The movement associated with Afrocentrism directs its activities towards achieving the particular end of ensuring the African culture, heritage, history, and the contribution to world civilization and scholarship are reflected in the curricular on every level of academic instruction (Chukwuokolo, 2009). This type of theorisation and progressive thinking will definitely, truly and rightly advocate for Public Administration that reflects the African being.

There is a tendency to associate public administration with Western epistemology. Who said public administration was not there before the European powers came to colonise Africa? Although Maserumule (2014: 439) acknowledges the insufficiency of documentation of African epistemology in general and Public Administration in particular, it does not suggest the discipline and practice is new or at least came post-colonialism in Africa. According to Basheka (2012: 29), there were sound administrative principles to justify the existence of governance in Africa during the ancient and medieval periods (pre-colonisation). For example, African people from all corners of the continent joined together through confederation for purposes of commerce or defence, developed African empires, kingdoms, and chieftaincies (Kisangani, n.d). Hierarchical societies for instance performed functions such as tax collections, and compelling people to abide by the rules among other functions (Ibid). Therefore, the mere fact that all these administrative processes are not historicised and codified is insufficient to negate the fact that Africa has its own epistemological standing particularly in the field of public administration. Limited literature for the building and development of African epistemology and Public Administration confirms that pre-colonial Africa accomplished areas such as tax administrations, grievance handling, arts and crafts, commerce and trade (Basheka, 2012: 30) which in a contemporary Africa is hailed and glorified, modernised, decorated and being associated with western epistemology. It is therefore incumbent upon African scholars to contextualise and package in writing their own knowledge including indigenous knowledge systems, something which
Maserumule (2014: 439) explains “have knowledge of our own to frame our thinking and imagination of the future of the continent”.

In a verge to wake up from the death of Western coloniality particularly in knowledge generation, public administration practice in Africa has been subjected to various reforms from the 1960s (Olowu, 2014: 544). Western management consultants offered advice on how to make administration more attuned to the needs of politico-socio-economic development, borrowing the best practices from developed societies (Ibid). Perhaps this was a mistake to start with. In pursuit of administrative efficiency, public administration is warned that such efficiency must be backed up by consciously-held values (Basheka, 2012: 47). Once again we are warned that Western imposition i.e. “borrowing bestpractice” must be shaped by African theory (Nixon, 1004: 28). As is always the case with West, African civil servants were paid to adopt new principles and procedures which exacerbated the collapse of African public administration.

The quest for African epistemology

Epistemology is a branch of philosophy which investigates the origin, nature, grounds, limitations, criteria or validity of knowledge and with perception or understanding and the processes people use to acquire and value knowledge (Coetze, 1988: 51; Kaputa, 2011: 67; Ndubisi, 2014: 32). According to the Merriam Dictionary (online), epistemology is the study of theory especially with reference to its limits and validity. In simple terms, epistemology is the pursuit of the truth of knowledge. One may be tempted to ask this question; what constitute the ‘truth’ in knowledge? Positivists and empiricists may ignorantly jump into answering that the truth of knowledge can be determined by research instruments subjected to facts for testing. Others scholars such as Ndubisi (2014) may argue differently that forms of knowledge in African epistemology such as perceptual knowledge, common sense knowledge, old age knowledge, inferential knowledge, mystical knowledge and oral knowledge may not necessarily be validated through research instruments, as one might not be in a position to provide evidence for such. In this pursuit of attempting to conceptualise epistemology the focus is now turned into African epistemology.

In their article titled; is there an ‘African’ epistemology, Airoboman and Asekhauno (2012) seem to hesitantly deny the existence of African epistemology which to them is just a notion of “culture-dependent epistemology”. It is argued that this type of theorisation is based on wrong epistemic premises. African epistemology is slammed for being mutt, too simplistic, commonplace, and grieving of “epistemic nitty-gritty”. In an Afrocentric perspective, this type of insulting and myopic conceptualisation must be out rightly rejected as the proponents of Afrocentrism do not advocate replacing Eurocentrism but rather framing African knowledge by an African frame for the sake of the future of the continent. This article argues that the promotion as Kaputa (2011: 67) correctly explains, failure to develop epistemology in African Education may harshly judge indigenous people to perpetual domination by foreign cultures resulting in indigenous cultural dissonance producing
psychological trauma to society. By this, Kaputa clearly calls for the decolonisation of an ‘African-mind’ perpetuated by Western epistemology.

Let us attempt to place this in context. According to Udefi (2014: 108), African epistemology can be understood as using African categories and concepts as provided by the African cultural experience without recourse for Western conceptual framework. This is what Airoboman and Asekhaono (2012: 13) mischievously refer to as the “idea of African peculiar epistemology”. According to Ani (2013: 304-305), African epistemology is accused for being a communal venture that denies individuals the ability to reason and come up with knowledge that is influenced by society and irrationality of community rather than relying on scientific tradition and analytical techniques that may be subjected to analytical scrutiny. This type of analogy is biased notwithstanding the fact that not all knowledge is scientifically produced. As argued before, knowledge which is the basis for epistemology and consequently African epistemology is not only reliant on the truth validated through methodologies but what kind of a truth it produces. This type of analysis can also be accepted by those who ascribe to positivism and empiricism in that unscientifically tested knowledge is not knowledge. There are not enough facts to support the rejection of African epistemology which is simply laughed-off for its potential to decolonise and liberate Africans from the chains of Western epistemology.

According to Bakari (1997), African epistemology dates back as far as 4000 Before the Common Era. However, such knowledge is not sufficiently documented (Maserumule, 2014: 439). Thus, African epistemology placed emphasis on ethics, morality, spirituality, symbols, science, self-awareness, and traditions.

Maserumule and Vil-Nkomo (2014: 445) contend that:

Perhaps this question is pedantic, for, its answer had long been implicated in the body of African scholarship, which remains largely in the margin in the mainstream history of science. As we contend with the challenges of Africa’s development in the 21st century, the decolonisation of knowledge is increasingly becoming an exigency. It is important for our universities to become African universities rather than simply universities in Africa. It would be helpful for the counter-decolonisation narratives to familiarise themselves with the rich body of literature on African historiography.

The above utterances are supported by Ani (2013: 295) who underscores the importance of African epistemology in saying that; ‘a better decolonization of the continent can be achieved with the transformation of the mind-set of Africans to appreciate their indigenous form of knowledge and incorporate it in contemporary education and epistemological discourses. Conversely, Africans favour pedagogies and epistemologies that produce alienated Africans who hate the Africa that produced them and like the West that reject them (Maserumule & Vil-Nkomo, 2015: 445). This in the words of Maserumule (2014: 440) is chasing the gods that are not our own.

**Conclusion**

This article attempted to zoom into the discourse of African epistemology using an Afrocentric perspective while the public administration discipline is a case study. This is one of the heated
debates in modern scholarship which will probably not end today or in a decade to come. From engagement with various literature sources, African scholars demonstrate readiness to advocate and contribute to the knowledge hub of the discourse of African epistemology. However, there are few writers who are of the view that the debate is merely for transformational purposes rather than theory building as the reliance on culture, to them is insufficient for theorisation. The lack of knowledge validity instruments also formed a basis for the critique. However, this is a clear indication of positivism and empiricism paradigms subscribers at the expense for a search for the African knowledge built on ‘truth’. African Public Administration for these reasons succumbs to the criticisms for the lack of African theories, let alone its own theories due to the eclectic nature and the relationship it has with political science and other social science disciplines. In conclusion, it is clear that African knowledge sector according to Kaputa (2011: 67), continues to be guided by inappropriate knowledge systems and proceeds to submit what it terms, appropriate epistemology in African education. It is therefore recommended that African scholars with strong convictions and love for their continent propagate for African scholarship and African knowledge outside the parameters of Western mainstream discourse.

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Why Democracy and Good Governance in Africa after Independence: Critical analyses!

T I Mokgopo¹

Abstract: The gaining of independence by many African countries meant the transition from years of repression and slavery to a democratic era in Africa. Unfortunately, the concept of democracy is perceived by many African scholars and leaders to be foreign to African culture. However, this study provides that democracy and good governance should prevail in Africa after her independence: the main reason being that both these concepts can help in curtailing developmental challenges in Africa. Furthermore, the main reason behind this conclusion as to why the concept of democracy and good governance need to be quantified and explored in Africa is because some African countries are experiencing bad governance as opposed to good governance. As such this study provides that there is a strong linkages between democracy and good governance: one cannot speak of democracy without including the principles of equity, fairness, accountability, transparency, rule of laws and public participation.

Keywords: democracy, Africa, good governance, national affairs, transparency, fairness and accountability

Introduction

There is a robust debate among scholars that the concept of democracy and good governance is foreign to African culture. The same statement was uttered by then Gambian president providing that the concept of human rights is an illegitimate sons of Africa that should be sent six feet under and defining democracy as being foreign (Nigel, 2010). The statement or debate which suggest that autocrats is a way to build the African continent. However, the transition that took place in South Africa in 1990 during the negotiation stages proved that it is possible to build a democratic country where rulers or those in authority can be held accountable by their subjects. There is also a fear of coup d’etat among Africans, however democracy cannot be destroyed by coup d’etat. It will survive every legal assault upon political liberty.

Though being regarded as foreign in African context it should also be understood that democracy in Africa is at an experimental stage but up to so far it has proved to be working in countries like Botswana; and though still fragile and yet to be tried it proved to be working also in South Africa. Having seen how democracy is working in other countries, there is a thirstiness and longing among African people for the breath of democracy in their countries because by it countries can modernize their economies. This includes ameliorating social conditions and integrate with the outside world.

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This paper advocates for democracy in Africa because democracy has the ability to give birth to representative government where members of the public including minority groups and other ethnic groups are represented equally at the national, provincial, regional and local government level.

Some African countries are experiencing civil wars due to unequal sharing or balance of power between the political parties and levels (sphere) of government. This is not how African people want to describe and remember this precious continent after having fought so hard against colonialism to gain independence. While other African countries claim to be democratic on paper, practically it is not so. A democratic country should have a representative system of government, which will ensure that leaders become accountable to their people.

However, many African leaders of the movement of democracy provides that democracy is largely a strategy for power, not a vehicle for popular empowerment and it is a major cause of chronic underdevelopment in Africa (Ake 1993:240). That statement can be dangerous because there is enough evidence and literature that proves that democracy brought government closer to the people in South Africa after the abolishment of the apartheid era. Furthermore, the African Charter for Popular Participation in Development and Transformation (1990) notes that:

> Nations cannot be built without popular support and full participation of the people, nor can the economic crisis be resolved and the human and economic conditions improved without the full and effective contribution, creativity and popular enthusiasm of the vast majority of the people.

Therefore, African countries need to realize that their greatest resource is their people because it is through their active and meaningful participation in the economic and political life of their country that Africa can surmount the difficulties that lie ahead. This means that should democracy be the founding principle or foundation of every state in Africa, regional integration can be achieved. Resources will be fairly distributed between different ethnic communities: by so doing ethnic tensions and division can be minimized.

It is worth noting that African people are seeking democracy not only as a condition of survival, but also from the realization that they must fend for themselves because in most cases ethnic minorities are neglected in the distribution of resources by the ruling majority. However in a democratic dispensation all people are equal irrespective of which ethnic or political affiliation they form part of.

The cry of democracy in Africa is to ensure that all ethnic groups are represented both at the local and national level. The categorization of democracy as a foreign concept in Africa led to Africa as a whole becoming marginalized in the world affairs both politically and economically. Based on that African democracy cannot afford to go down a different path because it must reflect the vital interests of its social base.

For the sake of clarity on the concept of democracy its definition will be of great assistance in this study because it will provide clarity on what is meant by it. This will also marry the concept of democracy and good governance and examine the relationship between the two.
Methodology

The methodology to be explored in this study is based on literature reviews, journal articles, as well as library and internet sources. This study will also rely on the observations by the author as well as what is and was reported in the media.

Defining democracy

In order to examine the relationship between democracy and good governance, it is necessary to start by clarifying what is meant by ‘democracy’. Customarily, the concept of democracy is often understood as a political regime that protects the freedom of individuals and expresses the will of the majority through free and fair elections, which includes the protection of minority rights and respect for basic human rights (Trebilcock and Prado, 2011). Schumpeter (1947:269) define the concept of democracy as a system ‘for arriving at political decisions in which individuals acquire the power to decide by means of a competitive struggle for the people’s vote’.

According to Robert (2000:26) democracy is both descriptive and prescriptive tool. By prescriptive, democracy can be a descriptive concept that set out what countries should aspire to become. Democracy can also be a descriptive concept that measures the degree to which a country has democratized. This means that the status of a country’s democracy is now being viewed as falling along a continuum.

The Centre for Political and related Terminology in the Southern African Language(2015)define democracy as a form of government where the power to form a government and to make decisions by legitimate representatives lies with the voters, in most cases referred to as ‘the people’. While on the other hand Thornhill et al (2014:413) adduce democracy as a political system, in which decision-making power is widely shared among members of the society as a whole.

This is to say that democracy in general means having a constitution that ensures full participation by members of the community including civil society organization in the affairs of the government and in holding officials accountable. This means that the concept of democracy should also exhibit free and fair election, freedom of expression, right to vote, freedom of press and freedom of association as well as the principle of equality before the law in building an effective democratic nation and ensuring democratic governance in Africa. However, there are some difficulties in defining the concept of democracy as there is no consensus among scholars on how precisely the concept of democracy should be measured and defined. This proves that there are varying definition and degrees of democracy.

However, for the purpose of this study, democracy from African context can be defined as the country’s ability to emerge from irreconcilable repressions and conflicts of the past which includes segregation, ethnic exclusions in government’s affairs by colonial or apartheid government in build a free multi party (system) government where the rights of all citizens are protected fairly and equally
while servicedeliveries are being provided to all members of the community in an equitable manner including the previous marginalized. This includes the electorate's ability to hold those in authority accountable while participating in a fair and free elections with one common goal of overcoming developmental challenges faced by the country before and after independence.

In other words, democracy in Africa means freedom from autocratic rule and the adherence of the rules of law to combat corruption and looting of public resources in the public procurement. It also includes a system of political will in handing over power to the successor after the elections to avoid civil wars while building one goal of creating a common nation.

To achieve all these, civil society organizations as well as members of the community (citizens) should be equipped from the grassroots levels to enable a smooth transition of moving from colonial era to independence era. Which will in turn led to the emergence of democracy that has the ability to build a multiparty government or nation with political institution that are predictable to be supportive in culture to the affairs and economic growth of the country.

Building a democratic nation

Building a democratic country takes not just few years but decades with the passing of a generation or more. This study therefore provides that the quality of development in every country depend on the quality of the democracy of that particular country. This study further provides that democracy includes choosing own government; choosing own socio-cultural activities and political institutions as well as having right to self-determination by different ethnic groups in the country. In the words of Newman and Rich (2004) democracy is understood to be a critical precondition for ending scourge of wars. This means that there should be a will (either societal or political will) among the leaders and members of the society to build a strong and accountable nation where members of the society are free from repression and free to voice their opinions and dissatisfaction without any fear of being judged or imprisoned Talbott (1996).

Therefore, to build a democratic nation, countries need to understand that democratic governance relies on three conditions:

a) Firstly, countries need to have a set of good institutions and understanding of democracy and good governance;

b) Secondly, citizens need to be equipped to have a good and through understanding of the principles of democracy. This will help them to develop a character that is consistent with the democratic way of life;

c) Finally, countries need to have a high quality of leadership that displays honesty and transparency while performing their day to day duties.

As such, in order to build a democratic country the above conditions should be meet. This is because democracy promotes free markets, independent labour movements and the formation of political
parties by minorities groups without the domination by majority. Democracy also ensures that countries experiences fair elections because fair elections trump everything in as far as promoting democracy and building a democratic nation.

According to Zakaria (1997:40) the absence of free and fair elections should be viewed as one flaw, not the definitions of tyranny. However this statement can be dangerous because many dictators or tyranny rigged the elections to stay in power and continued to loot state resources and oppressing other political parties and other ethnic groups. By so saying, there is no existence of democracy without fair and free elections. However, Collier (2009:45) highlights that elections are not a sufficient proxy for democracy since using elections as a proxy results in classifying countries as full democracies even though they have only nominally fulfilled election requirements. This therefore led us in this study to discuss and analyse what is meant by democracy and elections.

**What should a democratic country depict!**

Diamond (2008:22) points out that a system is a democracy only if it depicts ethnic freedom, religious, racial and other minority groups to participate in their religion and culture and also to participate equally in political and social life. This includes substantial individual freedom of belief, speech, opinion, discussion, petition, publication, assembly, broadcast, demonstration.

Citizens should be afforded the right to vote and to run for office only if they meet certain minimum age and competency requirements. There should also be genuine openness and competition in the electoral arena by all people and enabling any group that adheres to constitutional principles for form a party and contest for office to make sure that all ethnic groups are represented in government’s decision making on matters that affect the country. This will require an independent judiciary to apply the law neutrally, consistently without biasness while protecting individual and group rights.

Diamond (2008) provide that democracy include due process of law and freedom of individuals from torture, terror and unjustified detention, exile, or interference in their personal lives by the state or non-state actors. This means that there is a need to have institutional checks on the power of elected officials and autonomous independent legislature and court system.

There is also a need to have uncaptured military and state security apparatus. This means that the control for military and state security should be in the hands of certain individuals as this will led to abuse of power and the rebirth of Hitler ruler-ship which will in turn led to the development and the assurance of democracy being undermined in Africa.

**Democracy and elections**

The post-Cold War period witnessed several positive changes with respect to democratization in Africa and saw participatory politics growing in the 1990s and 2010s as the percentage of African countries holding democratic elections increasing from 7 to 40 percent and in 2010 (International Peace Institute, 2011). This saw the Freedom House classifying eighteen countries on the continent
as electoral democracies. However, during the past two decades, the general trend has been toward
greater accountability of political leaders whose domestic legitimacy is largely linked to the means
through which they attain and maintain power.

It is not a secret that elections in Africa facilitated the emergence of democratic governments in Benin,
Cape Verde, Ghana, Mali, Senegal and South Africa. Following autocratic regimes and protracted civil
wars, more stable societies have emerged in Guinea, Liberia, Niger and Sierra Leone. However, in
some cases, elections have been manipulated to legitimate autocratic regimes or to ensure dynastic
successions on the continent (International Peace Institute 2011:1).

The re-introduction of multiparty systems in Africa in the early 1990s led to electoral competition for
state power. The process has now become a norm and has seen many African states managing to
hold more than three successive elections, with South Africa preparing its sixth national elections in
2019.

Though the rising of independence was mostly celebrated by many African countries, some countries
experienced a worrying trend of election-related violent conflict that threatens democracy, stability,
peace and sustainable human development in Africa. Some of the factors that propel such violence
are multifaceted, ranging from flawed or failed elections to structural issues such as poor governance
and exclusionary political practices, to name but a few (Motsamai, 2010:1). For example, in the past
ten to fifteen years there has been serious violent election-related conflicts in the following countries:
(2010-2011). These are some of high profile electoral crises that led to at least four thousand deaths
and hundreds thousands displaced.

Unfortunately in Africa elections did not project democracy as expected. This is because some African
leaders can still influence and manipulate the outcomes on the national elections. This seems to be
the culture that is being followed by most African leaders. Sometimes after losing the elections fair
and square they refuse to step down and hand over power to their successors. This study therefore
finds that elections in Africa did not bring the long awaited democracy after independence in some
countries. According to Tshiyoyo (2012) elections in Africa brought tensions that have divided the
continent and members of the community in some countries. This is because elections are used by
African leaders as a means of holding power (not as a means of building a democratic nation) even
when governments have not been able to implement any single policy towards enhancing the living
conditions of citizens

According to Adejumobi (2000:66) the dominant practice in Africa is that most rulers organize an
electoral “coup d’état” which ensures their selection and appointment in the name of a popular
electoral process. The tactics they employ include stifling opposition parties and reducing them to
docility, covertly corrupting the electoral process or embarking on outright election rigging. However,
countries such as Gambia, Ghana, Niger, Cameroon, Togo, Zimbabwe, Kenya, Uganda, Zambia,
Cote d’Ivoire and Senegal serves as a good literature of African countries where regimes came into
power through popular elections yet they have since relapsed into autocratic rule. In Zimbabwe, it has been very difficult to transform the psychology of liberation struggles into democratic consciousness. This is because opposition parties remain very weak and depreciated, while President Robert Mugabe and his party, have remained in power ever since 1980.

One would say that Africa has over the last few decades seen and experienced good and bad elections which have put different African countries on different trajectories in as far as democracy and good governance is concerned. This is due to the fact that a number of elections have managed to produce expected results and had also managed to place several countries on a firm path of recovery and peaceful transition following years of oppression, repression and civil conflicts. This is evident from the elections in Namibia which led to independence in 1989; South Africa and Mozambique in 1994 to end decades of apartheid and civil conflicts, as well as in Sierra Leone and Liberia in the 2000s. However, elections in some African countries have remained problematic even after independence because winning election is seen as an opportunity and a process of capturing the state and monopolizing access to resources to certain ethnic groups.

Rukambe (2010) write that the use of violence and intimidation has become a common feature in African elections and this is used by both ruling party and opposition leaders and supporters to advance their chances to win elections. This process led to electoral violence in Africa because religious and ethnic cleavages are also mobilized as a basis for electioneering. All these process have had serious catastrophic consequences in several countries such as Kenya, Zimbabwe and Nigeria. This study highlights that the increasing prevalence of electoral violence in Africa projects the challenges faced by many African nations in conducting fair and free elections while building democratic nation. This shows that democracy will never prevails were citizens are being oppressed, threatened, forced and influenced to elect certain leaders with the fear of being marginalized and excluded in the allocation of resources by the dominating majority.

This study therefore provides that some of the challenges of conducting democratic and peaceful elections in Africa can be identified as:

- the entrenchment of a dominant-party system and the absence of tolerant political culture among political parties;
- the election process is very competitive and uncertain: in most cases violence ensues when there is a strong possibility of changing power or existing government and in such situations the incumbents are no willing to cede power;
- the administration and management of votes and elections: elections should be administered or management by an independent body that is impartial because should such body be suspected to be lacking credibility the entire electoral system (process) will be diminished; and might results in serious violence. The lack of credible and independent body to manage elections in African has collapsed the electoral system in many African countries. The way the electoral system is designed can also de-escalate or exacerbate electoral conflicts. According to Motsamai (2010:3)
"the extent to which a system is regarded as fair and inclusive may determine the possibility of post-electoral conflict. Violence often occurs when elections are 'zero-sum' events and 'losers' are excluded from participation in governance".

Motsamai (2010:2) point out that the restoration and establishment of multiparty systems in most of Africa in what has been termed the 'third wave of democratisation' saw an opening up of political space and the formation or reemergence of opposition political parties. This saw almost all African countries adopting new constitutions which reflected these developments, including the principle of regular legislative/parliamentary and presidential elections. However, the violence which ensued after an apparently peaceful presidential poll in Kenya in December 2007 and the circumstances that surrounded the 2008 presidential election in Zimbabwe have recently ignited debates about the challenges to the democratic process in Africa.

The concept of democracy and elections is captured and articulated very well in the writings of Motsamai (2010) when it was stated that:

The post-election political impasses and their devastating consequences in both Kenya and Zimbabwe have compelled analysts and policy-makers alike to ponder the complex question of whether elections in Africa are a curse on or a cure for democratic advancement. This is because many keen observers of Africa’s political scene have pointed to these and other events, particularly the unconstitutional changes in governance, as a manifestation of the regression of the democratisation process on the continent, inferring that democracy is either at a standstill or is backsliding.

African elections have become more robust and competitive, yet in the same vein they are increasingly challenging given the increasing level of sophistication in their rigging and manipulation especially in some countries (Rukambe, 2010:1). However, there is no doubt that Africa has made some advances in electoral democracy since the reintroduction of multiparty politics in the early 1990s. Evidence suggests that the transition to electoral democracy was easier than the process of building and sustaining democracy. This is partly so because elections are only one aspect of a larger process of democratisation and democracy building (Motsamai 2010:6). According to Rukambe (2010), the year 2010 has been dubbed the biggest year in Africa given the quite unprecedented high number of countries on the continent having elections and the increasingly higher population of Africans ready to vote. By democracy and elections we mean the ability and willingness by majority of African voters to hold their leaders accountable through elections and also requiring their elected leaders to translate election promises into public policies which engender democratic governance and development (Sklar, 1983).

Although elections provide opportunities for improved governance and conflict management, they continue to pose challenges to African political systems as observed in Gambia in 2016 where President Jammeh refused to step down after losing the presidential elections. This was also observed in the Democratic Republic of Congo where elections were moved to an unknown date allowing President Joseph Kabila to stay in power even after his term came to an end, making him an unelected president who still occupied the presidential office in Africa.

Electoral-democracy is one of many options of choosing leadership and deposing old governments in a political system (Holm and Molutsi, 1990; Gyeke-Jandoh, 2014). Elections are regarded as core
institution of representative democracy whereby elections are used as the only means to decide who holds legislative and executive power respectively (Linberg, 2006; Bogaards, 2007; Menoal, 2013). This means that individuals who so wish, should also be able and allowed to form their political party and contest in elections on the same conditions as everyone else. Furthermore, all citizens of age and mental sanity should be able to cast their vote based on the principles of one person, one vote (Lindberg, 2004:29).

This therefore led us to discuss the concept of good governance in building a democratic nation. This study finds that one of the main reasons why many African countries failed to develop even after gaining their independence is because the principle of good governance is left out by many African leaders when coming into power, the process which crippled democracy in many countries in the continent. There is a need to explore the application of the principles of good governance in Africa (Gisselquis, 2012). This is the study that needs to be explored and quantified adequately because majority of existing literature in this area focuses on the linkage between democracy and quality of government or corruption. There is a need for good governance in ensuring that democracy prevails in many African counties because of the following observed practices:

a) Many officials are serving their own interests without being held accountable;

b) There is a reliance on personal networks for survival by members of the society including excluded minorities rather than holding the state accountable in providing adequate services to citizens;

c) Personalised politics and patronage

d) Forced and Illegitimate leadership; and

e) Excessive control of information and freedom of associations

The concept of governance is not new; it is as old as human civilization (Mafeje, 1998; Makumbe, 1998; Khan, 2009). By it we simply mean ‘the process of decision-making and the process by which decisions are implemented or not implemented’ (Carothers, 1997; Besancon, 2003; Norris, 2005; Collier, 2009). Government is one of the main actors in governance while other actors involved in governance vary depending on the level of government. Good governance has 8 major characteristics which are: participatory, consensus oriented, transparency, accountability, responsive, effective and efficient, equitable and inclusive and the rules of law. Good governance ensures that corruption is minimized and that the views of minorities are taken into account and that the voices of the most vulnerable in society are heard in decision-making. It is also responsive to the present and future demands and needs of society (Gallie, 1959; Pillay, 2004; Nanda, 2006).

According to De la Harpe et al (2008:6)

Good governance refers to the realization of the fundamental values of democracy, rule of law, human rights and social justice by all governmental or non-governmental authorities whose legal acts or activities affect the position of citizens in the process of the formulation, the creation and the implementation of binding and non-binding legal norms.
There are eight major principles of good governance that is adhered to, democracy can prevail in Africa. These principles are known as: Participation, Rule of law, Transparency, responsiveness, consensus oriented, equity and inclusiveness, effectiveness and efficiency and accountability (Eyasu, 2005; De la Harpe et al, 2008). The main reason why democracy and good governance need to be explored in an African context is because democracy protects the freedom of individuals which includes the minority rights while promoting compliances and respect for basic rights. On the other hand, good governance ensures that the principles of accountability, transparency and participation in building a democratic country are upheld.

Eight major principles of good governance in enforcing democracy in Africa

From the above provided principles what need to be done in ensuring that democracy and good governance prevails in Africa.

a) Participation

Participation refers to a process or the act of taking part in the activities or events of government. Participation by both men and women (citizens) in the affairs and the decision making of government is a key cornerstone of good governance and democracy. Participation governance can be either direct or through legitimate intermediate instructions or representatives. It is paramount to highlight that representative democracy does not necessary mean that the concerns of the most vulnerable in society would be taken into consideration in decision making. According to United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific (2006:2) Participation needs to be informed and organized. This means freedom of association and expression on the one hand and an organized civil society on the other hand. Such participation can take different forms, participation could either be through civil society organisations, political parties, and public meetings as well as through voting processes.

b) Rule of law

To ensure that democracy prevails against all odds there should be fair legal frameworks that are enforced impartially. This is to say good governance requires full protection of human rights, particularly those of minorities. This includes impartial enforcement of laws which requires an independent judiciary and an incorruptible and impartial police force.

c) Transparency

Transparency mean that decisions taken and their enforcement are done in a manner that follows rules and regulations. It also means that information regarding the affairs of the country is freely available and directly accessible to those who will be affected by such decision and their enforcement.
Is also means that enough information is provided to citizens and that it is provided in easily understandable forms and media.

\[d\) Responsiveness\]

Good governance requires government, institution and processes to try to serve members of the community and all stakeholders within a reasonable timeframe. In an African context, this means that the provision of services to members of society within the states available resources should be on time.

\[e\) Consensus oriented\]

There are several actors and as many view points in a given society, this is to say that good governance requires mediation of the different interests in society to reach a broad consensus in society on what is in the best interest of the whole community and how this can be achieved. It also requires a broad and long-term perspective on what is needed for sustainable human development and how to achieve the goals of such development. All this can only achieved if there is a thorough understanding of cultural, historical and social context of a given society or community.

\[f\) Equity and inclusiveness\]

A society's well-being depends on ensuring that all its members feel that they have a stake in it and do not feel excluded from the mainstream of society. This requires all groups, but particularly the most vulnerable, have opportunities to improve or maintain their well-being.

\[g\) Effectiveness and efficiency\]

Good governance means that processes and institutions produce results that meet the needs of society while making the best use of resources at their disposal. The concept of efficiency in the context of good governance also covers the sustainable use of natural resources and the protection of the environment.

\[h\) Accountability\]

Accountability is a key requirement of good governance of building a free and accountable democratic government/nation in Africa. Accountability means the ability of the electorate to hold those in power accountable. The issue of accountability need to be understood that it does not refer only to government and governmental institutions but also the private sector and civil society organisations.
All these institutions must be accountable to the public and to their institutional stakeholders. It is worth noting that who is accountable to whom varies depending on whether decisions or actions taken. In short, government or any public organization is accountable to those who will be affected by its decisions or actions. Therefore accountability cannot be enforced without transparency and the rule of law.

Conclusion

The fight for democracy in Africa exposed that the entire electoral process in many African countries is vulnerable and fraudulent, the process which crippled the emergence of good governance in building accountable and democratic country. As such, those who seek democracy in their country must fight with full force against practices that seek to undermine it. This also requires state parties to commit themselves to promote democracy in ensuring that good governance prevails to overcome developmental challenges in Africa. African countries should promote good governance by ensuring transparent and accountable administration.

This also means strengthening political institutions to entrench a culture of democracy and peace. When democracy prevails, good governance also prevails and public institutions are established to promote and support democracy and constitutional order. This will help African countries to re-affirm their commitment to regularly holding transparent, free and fair elections in accordance with the Unions Declaration on the Principles Governing Democratic Elections in Africa.

This study concludes that democracy will never prevail were citizens are being oppressed, threatened, forced and influenced to elect certain leaders with the fear of being marginalized and excluded in the allocation of resources by the dominating majority.

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A Review of Past Presence of Debi Chowdhurani and the then Societal Structures of Rangpur, Bangladesh

Gautam Kumar Das

Abstract: Debi Chowdhurani was never a female dacoit as described by the Company rulers, rather a savior to her peasantry though evidences in the form of letters, statements, and petition are rare in support of her existence and activities. Still the collected rare documents from the century-old rare books and records turn the ideas into a working hypothesis in the form of an article – Historical Presence of Debi Chowdhurani. This review takes a look at the acquaintances of Debi Chowdhurani, her contemporary zamindars, namesake blunders, societal structure, revenue systems, nepotism, insurrection, oppression, her strolling places, rumours and the last spell of her life. Evidences include authentic and original letters, statements and documents regarding Debi Chowdhurani. This paper focuses on the history and origin of Manthana estate, its contribution to Rangpur peasants’ revolt, its controversial aspects of namesake blunders of Debi Chowdhurani and outcomes of counter-checks and about its probable solutions. This review also focuses on potential research work and thorough survey in the field of social sciences through the records annexed in this article on the assumption that Debi Chowdhurani was not an imaginary figure, but was a real person, and the zamindar of Manthana estate.

Keywords: Debi Chowdhurani, Bhabani Pathak, Rangpur peasantry insurrection, Richard Goodlad, Lieutenant Brenan, Paterson Commission, Rangpur Commission

Introduction
Debi Chowdhurani is undoubtedly a historical figure. Official records and documents give enough evidence of her historical existence. People all over Bengal discard the intentional acts of reports and records of the British rulers to stigmatize the character and life history of Debi Chowdhurani, a stubborn and firm lady of Bengal, though a few records relevant to her zamindari and other affairs are still available, annexed (spelling unchanged) here to draw upon the study of almost all the events about her life. Editor Ven. Walter K. Firminger, M.A., D.D., Lit. B.; Archdeacon of Calcutta; Member, Indian Historical Records Commission reported in brief about the loss of records at the office of the Collector, Rangpur in the introductory part (Page v) of Bengal District Records Rangpur, Vol. II; 1779 – 1782 (Letters Received), Bengal Secretariat Book Depot, Calcutta, 1920 – “The first impression which may be made on any one inspecting the volumes of records at such a place as Rangpur is that, as no records can be found for certain periods, these records have been inevitably lost. On closer study, however, he will find that the absence of the records may be explained by charges in the Revenue Administation, and so in the years when there was a council of Revenue at Dinajpur, he will at once see that what is missing at the Record room at Rangpur, may perhaps be found in the

* The Annexure refered to in the article is attached to the “Individual Article” only and can be accessed from the content page at: http://www.bangladeshsociology.org/Content.htm
1 19, Raj Krishna Pal Lane, Kolkata – 700 075, India.
Records of the Provincial Council at Rangpur. Again, as to the Collector’s letters, in the local office the researcher may only find poorly kept letter copy-book, while, at the archives of the Board of Revenue, the actual holograph letters of the Collectors may perhaps still be recovered."

Debi Chowdhurani took over the charge of a zamindari (estate) during the worst of transitional period when the dynasty of muslim rules were over, Bengal famine ruined almost all the peasants and their family members and the British company people yet to start managing the administration. In this span of time the activities of dacoits were accelerated due to the absence of administrative body and failure of law and order situation, particularly in the remote areas of Rangpur district. Rangpur, covered with dense jungle, was then infested with the bands of dacoits. The then zamindars compromised with the dacoits offering concessions in return getting a share of booty and security of both sides. Regarding such understanding of the landlords with the dacoits, Lieutenant Brenan made the following observations in 1787 –“the principal zamindars in most parts of these districts have always a bandit ready to let loose on such of their unfortunate neighbours as have any property worth seizing, and even the lives of the unhappy sufferers are seldom spared. The zamindars commit these outrages with the most perfect security, as there is no reward offered for their detection, and, from the dependence of the dakaits upon them, they cannot be detected without bribery.”

Debi Chowdhurani, against all odds of the British rules in her entire tenure as zamindar, was the single standing block who put the tyrant Debi Singh’s back to the wall. Debi Singh had an understanding with Warren Hastings, the Governor General appointed by the East India Company to extract more revenue from the peasants. He was notoriously known as leaseholder Raja Debi Singh for his application of the highest degree of torture on the farmers. He not only oppressed the farmers by demanding extra tax, but he physically tortured their children and molested their wives in the presence of all in his kachari bari (revenue collection office of the zamindar). The farmers finally gathered together to start a movement in the form of an insurrection. To enquire into this insurrection, two commissions were set to go through the real facts and after getting all proofs against the oppressions of Raja Debi Singh, Lord Cornwallis finally issued orders on behalf of the Government. But Debi Singh escaped scot free by showing his loss of money against the Government's demand of the large outstanding balances. Harram Sen was the head assistant of the leaseholder Debi Singh who was by position, a sub-farmer under his control. Harram used to treat the farmers tyrannically subject to the continual cruelty during collection of tax obeying the direction of landlord Debi Singh. Harram was imprisoned first for one year by the company administration for his rising oppressions and after its expiration Harram was banished from the districts of Rangpur and Dinajpur. Debi Chowdhurani saved the peasants from the tyranny of beyond description with the cooperation and help rendered by Bhabani Pathak during this period. Ultimately Rangpur had reverted to a land of peace and harmony under the leadership of land-lady Debi Chowdhurani.

During sannyasi revolution, Debi Chowdhurani was closely associated with the well-known dacoit leader, Bhabani Pathak to keep the peace and harmony in the peasant community in and around her estate. Richard Gudlad, collector of Rangpur and Lieutenant Brenan, army commander of British East
India Company feared insurgency and forfeited the Manthana estate from Debi Chowdhurani. During this period Debi Chowdhurani perhaps got involved with the brigandage under Bhabani Pathak levanting herself for few days in order to collect the money and man-power to rescue her zamindari, though all that Lieutenant Brenan stated in his report might not be true. After some days she managed to revive the old zamindari and ruled the estate till 1801. W. W. Hunter in his Statistical Accounts of Bengal – Rangpur (1876) supports such dual role of Debi Chowdhurani and describes her close association with Bhabani Pathak – “In 1787, Lieutenant Brenan was employed in this quarter against a notorious leader of dakaits (gang robbers), named Bhawani Pathak. He despatched a native officer, with twenty-four sepoys, in search of the robbers, who surprised Pathak, with sixty of his followers, in their boats. A fight took place, in which Pathak himself and three of his lieutenants were killed, and eight wounded, besides forty-two taken prisoners. Pathak was a native of Bajpur, and was in league with another noted dakit, named Majnu Shah, who made yearly raids from the southern side of the Ganges. We catch a glimpse from the Lieutenant’s report of a female dakit, by name Debi Chaudhrani, also in league with Pathak. She lived in boats, had a large force of barkandazs in her pay, and committed dakaits on her own account, besides receiving a share of the booty obtained by Pathak. Her title of Chaudhrani would imply that she was a zamindar, probably a petty one, else she need not have lived in boats for fear of capture.”

Debi Chowdhurani used to meander far and wide of the Teesta river basin of Rangpur district and almost entire Karla river basin of the present Jalpaiguri district using mainly the water courses of both the rivers. Rangpur was declared a district headquarters on 16 December, 1769; and on 1st January, 1869, greater Rangpur district was broken down into Jalpaiguri district. Debi Chowdhurani rendered her donation and distribution services to the poor peasants inside the Baikunthapur jungle of the present Jalpaiguri district. So, therefore, in Jalpaiguri district, Debi Chowdhurani is remembered in several places in the form of temple name like Debi Chowdhurani Sashaaan Kali Mandir near Goshala more adjacent to the present Jalpaiguri town; Bhabani Pathak and Debi Chowdhurani temple at Shikarpur tea garden, near Sannyasikata market; Manthani temple on the Belakoba-Rangdhamali road. Wooden images of Debi Chowdhurani are worshipped in these later two temples.

Her noble munificence enabled the villagers of the Manthana kingdom estate to survive through the crisis just after a few years of famine of Bengal with a severe consequence of mortality. She became a zamindar at Manthana estate of Rangpur district and managed the estate for about three decades as zamindar. The word ‘zamindar’ feels or looks small to Debi Chowdhurani, it is better to express her stature of dignity as saviour to her peasantry. She had to collect tax from the peasantry in order to pay tax to her (zamindar’s) higher authority i.e. leaseholder on behalf of the British Company Government. With the collected taxes she never made a large palace for enjoying luxurious life styles for herself or for other family members, but she excavated ponds, constructed roads and advanced financial help to her poor starved peasants. For all these reasons, landlady Joy Durga Roy Chowdhury is known to all as Debi Chowdhurani in Bengal. Debi Chowdhurani, alias Joy Durga Debi Chowdhurani of Rangpur was the most influential and famous ruler of the Manthana estate. All on a sudden a family-event forced Joy Durga Debi Chowdhurani to swear in as a zamindar. Her husband, Narendra Narayan Roy
Chowdhury, son of Raghabendra Narayan Roy Chowdhury of Manthana estate (presently at Pirgacha up-zilla under Rangpur district, Bangladesh) died in 1765 without any legacy. Then Joy Durga Debi Chowdhurani had to govern the Manthana estate for about three decades. Debi Chowdhurani is so popular to her peasants and subjects since then, the people named the village, nearby railway station, school, market, bus stop and road after her name. Her wooden images are worshipped in different temples of the Teesta basin of Rangpur and Karla basin of Jalpaiguri district till date.

Acquaintances

Rangpur is a well-known locality with the flavor of culture and heritage marked with rich history. The name Rangpur, in vernacular, particularly in the naive dialect, means the place of recreation and sensual gratification. As a whole, the meaning of Rangpur is the place of beatitude where the people enjoy the heavenly happiness or happiness of the highest kind. E. G. Glazier mentions the meaning of Rangpur in his book ‘Report on the District of Rangpur’ – “The derivation of the name Runpore is said to be ‘Ronggopore’ (Rangpur), the place of pleasure or abode of bliss – Bhagadatta having here a country residence on the Ghaghatis.”

Rangpur is the place where renowned Debi Chowdhurani once lived and governed her zamindari namely Manthana estate for the period from 1765 to 1801. She started ruling Manthana estate since 1765, in that very year East India Company was granted Dewani of the Bengal Suba (province), although Rangpur district did not receive any administrator promptly on behalf of the East India Company Government. The first appointment was assigned to John Grose in the post of a Supervisor of Rangpur in 1769, four years after the achievement of Dewani by the East India Company. The office of the Supervisor, from then on started keeping all records like letters received and issued, statements, appointments, accounts etc. No records are found before then particularly during the previous Mughol period. There were several records including the letters and petitions of Joydurga Chowdhurani during the entire period of her zamindari, but unfortunately most of those papers were either lost, or have no trace at all. The life-sketch of Joydurga Chowdhurani could be drawn if all those records were available to this author. The limitations as a result of unavailability of all such records made inconvenient for W. K. Firminger to follow up in making the draft of the Bengal District Records Rangpur as he expressed the same troubles detailing most of the problems in the editorial part of the introductory portions of the Rangpur Records – “In past years a number of excellent historical sketches of certain districts have been prepared by Collectors from the records in their local record office. It is only necessary to refer to such works as Westland’s Jessore, Price’s Midnapore, Cotton’s Chittagong, Beveridge’s Bakarganj, Glazier’s Rungpore. These works, although they have served most usefully, were manifestly based on an insufficient survey of the materials. Sir James Westland, for instance, with his attention absorbed by the locally preserved records, took it for granted that until the commencement of the records actually preserved in his Record Room, there was no civil officer of the Company resident at Jessore. A complete mistake! The records published in the present series of Rangpur District Records do not nearly include the wealth of material available.” We catch a glimpse of Joydurga Chowdhurani for the first time in the Rangpur records in 1779 in a letter to the Collector of Rangpur written by G. G. Ducarel, Superintendent of Khalsa Records. But we cannot identify the
actual Joydurga Chowdhurani of Manthana estate as there were three other contemporary female zamindars having the same name and title living during her era. The name in the letter denotes an identity of omission, even it does not prove or ascertain to be the same person of historically famous Joydurga Debi Chowdhurani (Letter – 1; Appendix).

Joydurga Chowdhurani was a ruler, with her supremacy in the zamindari of Manthana estate ruling over 183 taluks or villages in her estate. The name of the villages is enlisted in the records of the Board of Revenue (Miscellaneous), 1795. Curshah, the village name of her birth place, belongs to her own zamindary that she obtained in 1765 after the death of her husband Narendranarayan Roy Chowdhury. The present name of the place where her Manthana zamindar bari (house of zamindary) stood has been changed to Pirgachha that too was under her zamindari. The meaning of the word ‘Kismut’ suffixed in the village names in the list of the zamindari is the village owned by the blessings of the God by the owner and for the ‘Opunchooky’ is that village where revenue is fixed. There are 92 Kismut, 26 Opunchooky, 2 Khord, 1 Serenjamy (Serenjamy - the village which receives allowances for incident at expenses made to the zamindars or farmers) found in the village-list of the Manthana estate during the period 1795-96.

Namesake Blunders

Bankim Chandra created a problem by carefully using only the title of Debi Chowdhurani (central character) in his well-known famous novel ‘Debi Chowdhurani’. Existence of Debi Chowdhurani in different names in Rangpur district makes a serious problem in the peasant insurgence history of Bengal. Several names of Debi Chowdhurani as zamindars in the district of Rangpur simply creates a complexity and confusion in such a manner that even historians get puzzled with the proper identification of real Debi Chowdhurani who was the central character of the novel. Debi Chowdhurani is not a name, but the title of the zamindar’s wives. Almost all the zamindars took the title of Roy Chowdhury, whatever were their surnames previously. The then wives of all those zamindars are entitled to the title of Debi Chowdhurani. All the names of the then zamindars in the name of Debi Chowdhurani in the Rangpur district (presently in Bangladesh) are as the following:

Table 1: The names of Debi Chowdhurani and names of the then zamindar husbands in the Rangpur district (presently in Bangladesh)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sl. No.</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Husband’s name</th>
<th>Estate</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.</td>
<td>Jaymoni Debi Chowdhurani</td>
<td>Man Mohan Roy Chowdhury</td>
<td>Tepa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.</td>
<td>Ananga Manjuri Debi Chowdhurani</td>
<td>Ananda Mohan Roy Chowdhury</td>
<td>Tepa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.</td>
<td>Ganga Sundori Debi Chowdhurani</td>
<td>Tarini Mohan Roy Chowdhury</td>
<td>Tepa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.</td>
<td>Saradamoyee Debi Chowdhurani</td>
<td></td>
<td>Itakumari</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.</td>
<td>Bijoya Debi Chowdhurani</td>
<td>Kartick Chandra Roy</td>
<td>Bamandanga</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Researchers were sometimes puzzled to see that so many Lady Zamindars ruled for years in the same name 'Debi Chowdhurani' in Rangpur district even in the eighteenth century. Out of twelve such 'Debi Chowdhurani', the three nearest contestants with the same name are Joydurga Debi Chowdhurani of Manthana estate, Joydurga Debi Chowdhurani of Ghoraghat and Jagadeswari Joydurga Debi Chowdhurani of Bamandanga zamindari for entitling as the leader of peasantry movement of Rangpur in 1783. Joydurga Debi Chowdhurani took charge of Manthana estate (Pirgacha) in 1765 and Jagadeswari Joydurga Debi Chowdhurani ruled Bamandanga zamindari since 1779. Another Joydurga managed the Ghoraghat (Bardhankot) zamindari on behalf of her mentally sick husband Gokulnath Roy and later for her minor son, Goloknath after the death of her husband. Their same name ‘Joydurga’ and more or less same ruling tenure puzzle the historians and create complexity on sorting out the name of the correct one. With this problematical confusion, the content of the song of Ratiram Das, a Rajbangshi, an inhabitant of Itakumari of Rangpur district, a centre of the revolt, solved this namesake problem. He composed in his song –

"With all the zamindars arriving at Sivachandra’s palace, Itakumari was filled with elephants, horses and soldiers. Also arrived the ruler of Pirgacha, Joydurga Devi. One by one, they were seated in the conference hall adjoining the temple. The raiyats (tenants) kept standing, hands folded and tears rolling down chests." This was the preparatory stage in 1783 when the peasants in Rangpur rose in rebellion under the leadership of Joydurga Debi Chowdhurani, zamindar of Manthana estate (Pirgacha) and Sivachandra Roy, zamindar of Itakumari. Further, Ratiram Das wrote in his jaager gaan –Sivachandra Roy lost his temper and spoke again: “since the Rajput robber (Devi Singh) is a scoundrel, you should all drive him out.” At this stage mother Joy Durga, ruler of Pirgacha, flared up: “Are you not men – aren’t you strong? Though I am born a woman, I can seize him and cut him to pieces with a sword. Nobody would be required to do anything; everything will be done by the subjects." All these words proved Joy Durga Debi Chowdhurani of the Manthana estate (Pirgacha) is the real Debi Chowdhurani who openly led the peasants’ movement and is the central character of Bankim’s novel – Debi Chowdhurani.

Joydurga was born at Curshah Bamanpara of Shib-Konthiram village under Kaunia police station of Rangpur district. Her father’s name was Brajo Kishor Chowdhury. Her father came of a zamindar family as reflected by his title Chowdhury and perhaps that zamindari declined day by day during his
father’s regime. Kaunia is only 10 to 12 miles away from Manthana estate where Joydurga was married to the zamindar of that estate, Narendra Narayan Roy Chowdhury, son of Raghabendra Narayan Roy Chowdhury. Manthana estate was named after gaining this zamindari with payment of only *du-aana* paisa by one of his ancestors Anantaram Roy Chowdhury. Joydurga’s ancestral home is situated at Curshah village on the bank of river Teesta.

Hence, Debi Chowdhurani is a historical character. A few evidences support this fact like – Debi Chowdhurani’s Manthana estate (zamindari) was forfeited by dual treachery of both Rangpur collector and the Board of Revenue and this was reflected in the list of cancelled zamindari where the name of Joydurga Debi Chowdhurani was enlisted. Further, recently found two pattas namely Pirpal and Muskal Chukani were issued in 1769 and 1791 respectively by the then ruling zamindar of Manthana estate, Joydurga Debi Chowdhurani. All these prove that Debi Chowdhurani is an historical character and reigned at her Manthana estate during the period from 1765 to 1801. Further, Lieutenant Brenan reported that she was associated with Bhabani Pathak and Sivachandra Roy, zamindar of Itakumari to make the peasants’ movement a great success. Summing it up, it may be concluded that Joydurga Debi Chowdhurani (1765 – 1801) of Manthana estate (Pirgacha of Rangpur district) is the unanimously accepted leader of Rangpur peasants’ insurgence and is the central character of the novel, Debi Chowdhurani written by the great novelist, Bankim Chandra Chattopadhyay.

**Society**

Manthana estate was one of the 75 zamindaries enlisted in the office of the Collector of Rangpur. The entire area of the Manthana estate containing 183 villages was populated by 12,146 people, out of which the number of men were 4,643, women 4,287 and children 3,216 with admixture of the Hindu and Mohammedans.

Estimates of the members of persons, men, women, and children in the district composing the Collectorship of Rungpore, 28th August, 1789

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Pergunnahs</th>
<th>No. of men</th>
<th>No. of women</th>
<th>No. of children</th>
<th>Total inhabitants</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mantannah</td>
<td>4,643</td>
<td>4,287</td>
<td>3,216</td>
<td>12,146</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

A Report on the District of Rungpore (1873) by E. G. Glazier

Decennial and permanent settlement caused the most disastrous depopulation of the village in the zamindari of Rangpur as per remarks made by E. G. Glazier - “The effects of the stringency exercised subsequent to the decennial settlement in the realization of the revenue have been partly pointed out. Edrakpore collapsed early; Carzeehat suffered much, with the exception of the two anna shares, the Tooshvanda zemindary, the remaining four shares became much reduced by sales. Kankina remained whole, and the Futtehpore and Coondy estates, as a rule, weathered the breakers. The generally disastrous period for years preceding the permanent settlement had depopulated the country. The Zemindars of Munthona, Chakla Futtehpore, on whose estate the town of Rungpore stands, represented in 1790 that large tracts had become depopulated and overrun with jungle, in
which there were tigers, buffaloes, deer, and wild beasts of all sorts.” - A Report on the District of Rungpore (1873) by E. G. Glazier (p. 41)

The Collector of Rangpur was most embarrassed off and on in controlling the female zamindars as reported by E. G. Glazier (Report – 1; Appendix). The society was exposed to the acts of lawlessness during the transitional period between the end of Mohammedan rule and the beginning of the British Company rule. The entire area was infested with dacoits. Among them Narayan and Beerbal dacoits were the most notorious as reported in a letter by the Collector of Rangpur. The Collector of Rangpur wrote to the Chief of the Provincial Council of Purnea for his cooperation to arrest Beerbal dacoit who took shelter in the Purnea district of Bihar (Letter 2; Appendix). The Chief of the Provincial Council of Purnea not only helped the Collector of Rangpur at his best, but he even circulated letters among the zamindars seeking full cooperation by giving immediate information related to the location of the dacoits mentioned in the letter of the Collector (Letter 3; Appendix). Beerbal was captured and confined in the custody of the Rangpur Collector. The Collector of Rangpur informed this success of capture to the chief of the Provincial Council of Revenue (Letter 4; Appendix). The Collector of Rangpur wrote to his higher authority for providing him with a large force of burkandaz for strong security of his collectorship. The Board of Revenue disapproved his proposal after a long discussion in their meeting (Letter 5; Appendix).

During the disturbed time of lawlessness, people were very corrupted, immoral. Most of the employees, even the peace-keeper sepoys were involved in snatching money and costly belongings from the common people (Letter 6; Appendix). Lieutenant Brenan informed the Collector of Rangpur about the lurking of dacoits near Gobindaganj who plundered all the goods and money from the boat of the tobacco merchants as reported by those merchants through a petition which was forwarded to the Collector for necessary and immediate action. The Lieutenant had already detached a party including 18 sepoys, one havildar and one naik for the arrest of that dacoit (Letter 7; Appendix). Surprisingly, the tobacco merchants described Bhabani Pathak a desperate man, as a dacoit in their petition sent to Lieutenant Brenan (Petition 1; Appendix). Lieutenant Brenan, in his public letter, stated his inability for providing the Collector enough force as required from his end because of the security personnel needed as guards for several prisoners in confinement. A concealed letter was perhaps sent along with this public letter addressed to the Rangpur Collector which was famously known as Lieutenant Brenan’s report which is very important for searching the history of Rangpur because it contains the news of death of Bhabani Pathak as well as the name of Debi Chowdhurani as a female dacoit mentioned by E. G. Glazier (Letter 8; Appendix).

The title Debi Chowdhurani was only once recorded in the report of Lieutnant Brenan in 1787 where the fight with Bhabani Pathak with the sepoys of Company force and his death thereon were communicated to the Collector of Rangpur. Debi Chowdhurani was described as a female dacoit and she was associated with Bhabani Pathak as stated in the report of Lieutenant Brenan. Lieutenant Brenan stated Debi Chowdhurani as a petty zamindar without mentioning her full name.
“In 1787, Lieutenant Brenan was employed against a noted dacoit leader named Bhowani Pattuck; in this quarter. He dispatched a Havildar with twenty four Sepoys in search of the robbers, and they surprised Pattuck with sixty of his followers in their boats. Pattuck’s chief man, a Pathan, Pattuck himself, and two other headmen, were killed, and eight were wounded, besides forty-two taken prisoners. Of the attacking party, two sepoys only were wounded. Seven boats, with arms, accoutrements, and ammunition, as the Lieutenant expresses it, were taken. Pattuck’s force consisted wholly of up-country men; he himself was a native of Budgepur, and he was in league with another noted dacoit, Majnoo Shaha, who made yearly raids from the southern side of the Ganges. We just catch a glimpse from the Lieutenant’s report of a female decoit, by name Devi Chaudhranee, also in league with Pattuck, who lived in boats, had a large force of burkundazes in her pay, and committed dacoities on her own account, besides getting a share of the booty obtained by Pattuck. Her title of Chaudhranee would imply that she was a zamindar, probably a petty one, else she need not have lived in boats for fear of capture.” - A Report on the District of Rungpore (1873) by E. G. Glazier (p. 41). Jadunath Sarkar wrote about Bhabani Pathak in the ‘Historical Introduction’ to B. Bandyopadhyay and S. Das centenary edition of the novel (p.1) - “The real Bhabani Pathak was a Bihari Brahmin, a Bhojpuri (Glazier’s Bazpur) from the Ara district.”

Nitish Kumar Sengupta noted regarding the decision to arrest of Debi Chowdhurani by the Collector of Rangpur after getting the report from Lieutenant Brenan in his book “Land of two rivers: A History of Bengal from the Mahabharata to Mujib” (p. 222) - “In 1787, Lt. Brenan led an expedition against Bhabani Pathak, the notorious dacoit. Twenty four sepoys led by an Indian officer were sent and they attacked Bhabani Pathak and his 60 followers who were in their boats. There was a naval fight which ended in the death of Bhabani Pathak and three of his men, injuries to eight others and the capture of 42 men. Lt. Brenan’s report discloses that Bhabani Pathak had contact with a female dacoit by the name of Debi Chowdhurani who lived in a boat and used to be accompanied by a host of paid fighters. She would take part in the raids herself and was allotted a share of the plunder of the Pathak’s gang. From the surname, Chaudhurani, it appears that she was a zamindar. On receipt of the Lt. Brenan’s report, the Collector wrote to him (12th July, 1787) informing him that it was not necessary to arrest Debi Chowdhurani just then and necessary directions would be given on receipt of further information regarding her.”

A few zamindars of Rangpur reportedly had the knack of attachment with the dacoits. They took the share of booty from those dacoits for their cooperation. The Company rulers mentioned zamindars’ involvement with the dacoits in the Rangpur records, though the regulations of 1783 was there regarding prohibition of such unusual incidents of attachment of the zamindars with those notorious dacoit gangs. The Collector of Rangpur, E. G. Glazier lamented over the non-application of that regulation of 1783. He commented – “The regulations of 1783 contained the following rule, which, it seems, was never carried out.”

The Regulations of 1783 for the zamindars
“That whenever a zemindar is proved guilty of having abetted, practiced, or connived at robberies or murder, none of his family be permitted to succeed to the zemindary without the express permission of the Board.”

Julius J Lipner who translated the novel ‘Debi Chowdhurani’ from Bengali stated that the content of the novel as mythical, not historical happenings - “The name of Debi Chaudhurani, Bhabani Pathak, Mr. Goodlad, and Lieutenant Brenan are historical, as indeed are the few facts that Debi lived in a boat, and she had ‘fighter’ and armies etc. But that is all. If the reader would be so kind as not to consider ‘Debi Chaudhurani’ a ‘historical novel’ (aitihask uponyas), I’d be most obliged.” - Debi Chaudhurani by Bankim Chandra Chattopadhyay, or The Wife Who Came Home – translated Julius J Lipner.

**Insurrection**

Tax rebellion at Rangpur is the first organized insurgence of peasants in the soil of Bengal. The villain of this insurgence is the then Collector of Rangpur, Mr. Richard Goodlad along with the direct assistance of leaseholder Debi Singh and his assistant Harram Sen. The Rangpur Collector Richard Goodlad, by nature, a treacherous character, directed Debi Singh and his assistant to collect tax from the zamindars and farmers by any means, just or unjust. This Collector Richard Goodlad started his career as an Assistant Collector of Rangpur as stated by E. G. Glazier in his book ‘Report on the District of Rangpur’ (p. 45) – ‘George Bogle died early in 1781, and Goodlad, who had been assistant here for two years, was appointed Collector and Judge; while the native officers of Goodlad foujdar and tannadar were abolished. Goodlad remained until 1784, when he was succeeded by Moore. He was for a year the Collector of Ghoraghat, and then we lose sight of him.’ The villain of Rangpur insurrection Richard Goodlad was nominated to his most pleasurable post as the Collector of Rangpur on April 14, 1781 against the vacant post of Mr. George Bogle who died early in 1781 (Letter – 9; Appendix). From the beginning of his collectorship, Mr. Richard Goodlad took the utmost help from leaseholder Debi Singh and his assistant Harram Sen for the collection of tax all over Rangpur. Debi Singh and Harram Sen are known as a deliberate scoundrel and a rascal respectively to the peasants of Rangpur. The arch villain Richard Goodlad plotting together with them for the evil purpose of collection of tax through torture and tyranny, operated in harmony with the zamindars which is reflected in his letter to the zamindars (Letter – 10; Appendix). Rangpur Zamindars, realizing the smell of conspiracy of those three Goodlad, Debi Singh and Harram, who combined openly for this unlawful purpose, replied in response to the letter sent by the Collector of Rangpur without any delay. The draft of this letter-in-reply to the Collector was written by Joydurga Debi Chowdhurani in consultation with the other Zamindars of Rangpur (Letter – 11; Appendix). Insurrection was caused due to the constant overall distress faced by the ryots (peasants) economically for over-taxation followed by cruel corporal punishment as a consequence of non-payment of the tax. Still the peasants prayed for justice to Richard Goodlad by requesting the abolition of different tax laying burden over them (Petition - 2; Appendix). E. G. Glazier (1873) clearly expresses the statements of the then peasants with their own words (Report - 2; Appendix).
Richard Goodlad wanted to restrain the insurrection through terrible and dreadful means of firing over the rebels and in order to fulfil his objective, he wrote to the Commandant to send more and more force to enrich his army force (Letter – 12; Appendix). In response to the several letters written by Mr. Goodlad to the Board of Revenue updating the situation of insurrection, the member of the Board managed to send the force to tackle the inconceivable situation at the earliest. The members of the Hon’ble Board of Revenue wrote to the Collector about the dispatch of more than 200 sepoys from Calcutta to Rangpur. They directed Mr. Goodlad to cooperate with Mr. Paterson whom the Board of Revenue sent with fullest authority to give orders etc for laying hold of insurrection (Letter – 13; Appendix). The Board of Revenue set a Commission for searching all the reasons for the insurrection with Mr. Paterson as its Chairperson. To make its full success, Mr. Goodlad was directed to share every information and facts of the peasants’ insurrection of Rangpur (Letter – 14; Appendix). The Rangpur peasants’ insurrection comes to an end after a huge defeat and death in the battle of Patgram between sepoy party led by Lt. Macdonald and the peasants who fought against the English Company-Government resisting its burden for levying tax. It was an uneven war as the rebels bore only indigenous arms like bows and arrows, lances, spears etc, against the arms like guns on of the government party. The fight took place without any din and bustle as the sepoy troop were in disguise covering themselves with white cloths obeying the advice of Lt. Macdonald and fired about 3 rounds from their guns coming nearer to the rebels. Sixty rebels died, 56 were wounded without getting any chance of resistance against the joint troops of Lt. Macdonald and Mirza Mohammad Tuckey’s burkundases force. Rest of the rebels were imprisoned. The report adds that one wounded rebel died on the way to Rangpur. The Lieutenant reported that the entire incident happened near Patgram detailing the rebels’ origin of residence from Bihar and Bengal (Letter – 15; Appendix).

The tyranny and torture upon the farmers by the Rangpur Collector Richard Goodlad, the leaseholder Debi Singh and his assistant, Harram Sen resulted in the insurrection as a consequence. The degree of torture even upon the zamindars is beyond description, the incidents of which is reflected in the Jaager gaan composed of Ratiram Das – the translated form (translated by Amiya Bose) of which is available in the book ‘Bangladesh Readers: History, Culture, Politics’ by Editors, Meghna Guhathakurta & Williem van Schendel (Appendix).

Mr. Richard Goodlad, Collector of Rangpur tried utmost to put down the insurrection, but to no effect as it was not an easy task. Mr. Richard Goodlad, by nature, is a traitor, betraying the farmers upon the issue of deductions of tax that he initially promised to them. But treacherously he did not remove the rate of tax, and that’s why the insurrection broke out again. Ultimately the insurrection was stopped with the interference, assistance and help rendered by his higher authority, Board of Revenue of Fort William, Calcutta. They supplied a large army force from Calcutta and Purnea and the peasantry insurrection came to an end at last after a huge loss of life. Warren Hastings, Governor General and Richard Goodlad had had the same vested interest to earn money from the farmers and zamindars through collection of tax and in order to fulfil their goal they took the assistance of the leaseholder
Debi Singh of same character as they had. The description of the one sided gun-firing over the starved peasants as a “battle” in his letter is the reflection of his character. Mr. Richard Goodlad was showcaused by his higher authority for the incident of Rangpur insurrection and Mr. Richard Goodlad communicated his answer to his higher authority with a delay of about a month seeking another chance to repair insurgency-disturbed Rangpur (Letter – 16; Appendix).

The Paterson Commission started its full-fledged functioning at Rangpur, although Mr. Richard Goodlad, Collector was transferred in 1784 from Rangpur by his higher authority. So the members of the Paterson Commission wrote to the Acting Collector to send Dherajnarayan – one of the leaders and accused in the insurrection for taking him in their custody for relevant questioning (Letter – 17; Appendix). Paterson Commission members further communicated with the Acting Collector of Rangpur to send the Officer-in-Charge of the Police Station as an important attestation of the insurrection (Letter – 18; Appendix). The search of Paterson Commission ended on the 21st May, 1785. The members of the Paterson Commission, which was commenced on the 31st March, 1783, declared the closure of their search and communicated to the Acting Collector directing him to send Debi Singh to the President with proper security as available at his collectorate (Letter – 19; Appendix).

The report of the Paterson Commission is brought to light in 1785 and the Commission’s Report accuses Mr. Richard Goodlad, the then Collector of Rangpur and the leaseholder Debi Singh. The higher authority refused the facts of the overall Report and sat another Commission namely Rangpur Commission. Joydurga Debi Chowdhurani was questioned several times during the progress of this Commission (Report - 3; Appendix). Several important questions, facts and query were put before Joydurga Debi Chowdhurani, the Zamindar of Manthana estate by the members of the Rangpur Commission (Report - 4; Appendix). Final orders were given ultimately in 1789 during the Governor Generalship of Lord Cornwallis after a gap of 6 years from the commencement of Rangpur revolt. The order and judgment have not satisfied the inhabitants of Rangpur (Report - 5; Appendix).

Oppression

The British East India Company rulers oppressed Joydurga Chowdhurani severely and unjustly as she not only supported the peasants of the Rangpur revolt, but led peasants’ insurrection in 1783. Joydurga even had to go in hiding and living incognito and had sufered hardship during her tenure of zamindari. British company rulers started exerting pressure by enhancing the rate of taxation but the zamindars could not pay the tax. We have found the name of Manthana estate, in a letter written by Acting Collector of Rangpur who reported against Joydurga Chowdhurani of the non-payment of tax to the Governor General, Warren Hastings (Letter – 20; Appendix). Zamindars had to pay tax in due time to the Collector’s treasury. Joydurga Chowdhurani went into hiding and living incognito away from her subjects from 1778 as she being a zamindar, was unable to pay the tax which was forcefully
claimed from them by the British Company rulers. Due to non-payment of tax on behalf of the zamindar, the Acting Collector forced sending a sezawal (Company-rulers appointed tax collector) to collect tax in the Manthana estate subject to the approval of appointment from the end of the Governor General in Council.

The Acting Collector in his letter further reported that Joydurga was absent from her zamindari and secluded to Batoriah. The zamindar herself went in hiding, the Gomastah died, so the management on the zamindari was not properly going on including collection of tax (Letter – 21; Appendix). Charles Purling, Collector of Rangpur reported the same in his letter dated 17th September, 1779 as good as the Acting Collector had communicated as on the 24th July, 1779. He prayed for the approval of the appointment of the sezawal till that period of either returning of the zamindar herself or appointing a Gomastah for her zamindari in the post vacated by the death of her former Gomastah. Concealment of Joydurga Chowdhurani from her zamindari continued from 1778 (Letter – 22; Appendix). Warren Hastings was very strict particularly on collection of tax and therefore he directed the Collector of Rangpur to apply the general orders regulated as on the 14th October, 1777 by confinement of the zamindars who did not pay tax and they would be confined up to the date of repayment of arrears as due from them. Further, Warren Hastings approved the post of sezawal appointed for the collection of tax in the absence of Joydurga Chowdhurani from 1778 (Letter – 23; Appendix).

During the rule of the British East India Company, the settlement of the zamindari had to be renewed every year as per terms settled by the Board of Revenue at Fort William, Calcutta. All those temporary appointments made by the local administrators were subject to the approval by the higher authority. Collector of Rangpur sent letter to the Governor General for the approval of appointment of the sezawal for the Manthana estate. Rangpur Collector mentioned in his letter the reason behind the concealment of Joydurga Chowdhurani having absconded from the dread of a warrant (Letter – 24; Appendix). Non-payment of tax fixed from the Government side led to the sale of the portion of the zamindari at a nominal price. The Manthana estate zamindari faced such crisis for non-payment of tax to the Collector’s treasury (Letter – 25; Appendix).

The then Gomastahs were very powerful employees in the zamindari and the post was almost hereditary. Having such back grounds, gomastah sometimes did not abide by the orders of the Company rulers. That’s why the Board of Revenue empowered the Collector of Rangpur for the approval or rejection of the appointment of gomastah of any such zamindari (Letter – 26; Appendix).

Surprisingly we cannot find any documents in the form of letters, statements, notice etc. regarding the management of her or her zamindari from April, 1781 to April, 1787. Joydurga Chowdhurani was still in living incognito. The members of the Board of Revenue ordered the Collector for the engagement of the zamindari, if the gomastah was empowered by her zamindar or if the Ranny (Joydurga Chowdhurani) returned to her zamindari being summoned by the public advertisement in the mean time or any other expedient way of solution, but the peasants of her zamindari were allowed to
cultivate their land. The British Company rulers knew that no tax would be collected from the farmers if they were not allowed farming. The zamindar of Manthana Joydurga Chowdhurani remained absent from her zamindari from 1778 to 1787 as reflected in the letters of the Board of Revenue, although she managed her zamindari keeping herself in hiding (Letter – 27; Appendix).

Due to over-taxation, the Manthana zamindari could not pay the entire amount of Rs. 34,379 fixed for the year 1787 and for that reason, the Manthana zamindar prayed for the deduction of Rs. 3000. The Collector disagreed to that proposal and suggested to appoint a sezawal who promised to collect the proposed amount for the next 10 years (1778 – 1787). The sezawal was appointed at Manthana zamindari only due to the absence of the zamindar or her gomastah from her zamindari. But in the year 1788, the Collector proposed the appointment of sezawal for the collection of the total amount of tax fixed for the coming year of 1788. From this fact and content found in this letter of the Rangpur Collector dated 7th May, 1788; one could consider that Joydurga Chowdhurani returned to her zamindari in 1788 after 10 years of her living incognito (Letter – 28; Appendix). In other letter, Rangpur Collector informed about the tax due for flood at Manthana estate amounted to Rs. 4204 (Letter – 29; Appendix). Members of the Board of Revenue did not approve the remission of the sanctioned tax for the last year in favour of Manthana zamindari due to non-availability of any valid reason (Letter – 30; Appendix). The information regarding zamindar’s refusal of the government proposal at first to pay extra tax of Rs. 2000 induced to decline the management of the zamindari of Rangpur district (Letter – 31; Appendix). Joydurga Chowdhurani ultimately agreed to the proposal of increased tax of Rs. 2000 and she sent her second gomastah to the office of the Collector to put his signature on the modified agreement on behalf of Joydurga Chowdhurani (Letter – 32; Appendix).

Board of Revenue becomes increasingly greedy to go for greater income from the farmers and zamindars of Bengal. Here in this letter the Board of Revenue members directed the Collector to carry on collection of tax from the zamindars (Letter – 33; Appendix). In 1790, the Board of Revenue formulated such a law by which the minor and female zamindars were disqualified as landholders. This is another oppression over Joydurga Chowdhurani by disqualifying her as zamindar from the Manthana zamindari where she has been managing her estate since 1765 after her husband’s death. Collector of Rangpur sent a letter to the Board of Revenue giving details about the disqualified minor and female zamindars adding such list as an annexure to his letter.

The statement of the Collector bears important information about Joydurga Chowdhurani that she is about 47 years of age in 1790 (Letter – 34; Appendix).

It is really splendid to see in black and white that one of the British Company rulers praised Joydurga Chowdhurani, zamindar of the Manthana estate. In their statement, she is one of the most worthy zamindars of Rangpur, she is capable of writing, reading and quite up and doing for managing her own concerns. The Board of Revenue thus has withdrawn the order of disqualification from her and she is then exempted from the General Regulations and able to appoint the gomastah according to her will (Letter – 35; Appendix). The Collector of Rangpur recommends and seeks the approval of the
Board of Revenue for some exemplary punishment levying upon the zamindars because of their negligence in providing documents as directed by the Collector. The name of Joydurga Chowdhurani is seen enlisted among those punished zamindars in the top of the list (Letter – 36; Appendix).

Revenues
The British East India Company planned a lot after achieving dewani of Bengal, but collection of revenue and tax turned into a headache for them. Ignorance of the local language by the British people and no knowledge of English among the inhabitants of Bengal are the prime reasons of inconveniences for the fixation of revenues as well as collection of tax. They left this business in the hands of the local clever people who preferred this type of job and had similar kind of experience before the establishment of the administration by Company rules. Likewise, Madangopal collected tax and maintained accounts for Rangpur followed by Mirza Hossain Reza during that period. Gradually the company rulers understood the local languages and learnt about the fixation of tax. They started to exert pressure by increasing taxes over the inhabitants of Rangpur every year. Such burden of over-taxation causes the tax rebellion in 1783 at Rangpur after 18 years of achieving Dewani by the East India Company in Bengal.

The name of the zamindar, Manthana estate is seen for the first time in the records of the statement of 1777 in an account of deduction favouring the zamindar of Manthana estate; the recommendation of which is sent to the Governor General, Warren Hastings for its approval. The deduction favoured accountability of the Manthana estate by Charles Purling, Collector of Rangpur is Rs. 3,119, Annas 7, Gundah 9 for the session 1776 (Letter – 37; Appendix).

Appointment of Debi Singh, Gangaprasad and Hurram Sen as Dewans of Rangpur in three consecutive years was tendered to the Collector of Rangpur by the Board of Revenue at Fort William, Calcutta. Though Hurram was temporarily appointed as Dewan of Rangpur, he ultimately became the assistant to leaseholder Debi Singh subsequently. Debi Singh and Hurram were marked as the noted villains of the Rangpur insurrection and were accused thereon by the Paterson Commission (Letters – 38 & 39 and Report - 6; Appendix). Hon'ble members of the Board of Revenue ultimately decided to remove the leaseholder Debi Singh from the post of Dewan of Rangpur at the end of the insurrection for his acts of tyranny and torture (Letter – 40; Appendix). Warren Hastings, the Governor General, dissolved the Provincial Council of Revenue that showed no sign of improvement of revenue in the province for which reason the Council was set up (Letter – 41; Appendix).

The statement of accounts reflected the name of Joydurga as the zamindar of Futtehpur 2 Annas Manthana estate for the first time in the records of Rangpur mentioning the amount of deposition and subscription scheduled for her estate by the Rangpur Collector (Statements of Accounts - 1; Appendix).

Joydurga Chowdhurani, disqualified as a zamindar for being a female in terms of the regulations under Company act, was paid monthly allowances (Mashohaara) as a landholder. Revenue of that estate was then collected by the agent appointed by the Collector of Rangpur. The gomastah was
asked several questions related to the ratio of cultivated land and jungle areas, improvement of agricultural lands and increase of revenue thereon after being called to the office (Statements of Accounts - 2; Appendix).

Contemporary
Joydurga Chowdhurani was the most popular zamindar for her forceful personality among all of her contemporary zamindars. Ranny Bhabani, the zamindar of Natore under collectorship of Rangpur, was also contemporary to Joydurga Chowdhurani. Ranny Bhabani managed her zamindari up to 1795. She died in 1795. Shiv Chandra Roy was not only a contemporary zamindar to Joydurga Chowdhurani, but a fan and follower of her. Shiv Chandra liked Joydurga Chowdhurani for her sagacious leadership. There are three contemporary zamindars bearing the same name of Joydurga Chowdhurani. One of them was her neighbour, the zamindar of Bamandanga, namely Jagadeswari Joydurga Chowdhurani. She died early in 1790. The last one zamindar bearing the same name of Joydurga Chowdhurani was the caretaker zamindar of Ghoraghat (Bardhankot) for her mentally disabled husband for the first time and later for her under aged minor son. There are several affairs of those zamindars during that period.

Shiv Chandra Roy, a contemporary zamindar to Joydurga Chowdhurani and one of the most noted leaders of the Rangpur insurgence, made a petition to the Collector for accurate calculation of tax in terms of the fixation of the settlement made between the zamindars and the Collector. The Collector of Rangpur forwarded the petition to the Board of Revenue for its approval (Letter & Petition – 42; Appendix).

The Bamandanga zamindar having the same name of her contemporary zamindar Joydurga Chowdhurani of the Manthana estate died in 1790. The Board of Revenue permitted her adopted son Bhairab Chandra Chowdhury, aged about 21 years, the possession of the Bamandanga zamindari left by her adoptive mother Jagadeswari Joydurga Chowdhurani. Death of Jugdeswari Chowdhra, Zemindar of Bamandangah, leaving an adopted son by name of Bhyrub Chandr of 21 years of age, is reported by the Collector. Board directed Roy Royan to call on the Sudder Canoongoes for a statement of the farming of the deceased (Letter – 43; Appendix).

Nepotism
The Bamandanga zamindar Joydurga Chowdhurani had done with an appeasable incident of unusual daily attendance of two peons at her cutchery (office of the zamindar) through a written petition to the Collector of Rangpur. The Collector of Rangpur, after being confused with the movement of two peons, wrote all about to the Governor General and other members of the Council. Mr. Warren Hastings directed to the Collector of Rangpur to take those fake peons in his custody and must seek to show the warrant from the peons in presence of witness in the office of the Collector, Rangpur (Letter 44; Appendix).
A contradictory decision was taken by the Collector of Rangpur through appointing a ‘Aumeem’ in a land-debate issue between the zamindars of Baharbund and Bhetarbund, where Ranny Bhabani of Natore took appropriate steps for remedial solution of that issue with the request of those two zamindars. The Board of Revenue wanted a query about this legal matter seeking the reasons for the interference by the Collector of Rangpur in this issue as stated by Ranny Bhabani in her petition (Letter 45; Appendix). Rapid changing scenario of Mr. Peter Moore from poverty to affluence within the period of only 18 months of his collectorship set a series of examples of immortality to his native European fellows. William Hichey, once his European neighbour, recalled those early days and included in the Extract from the memoirs of William Hichey, Vol. III, pages 163-164, (Hurst and Blackett Ltd.), reprinted for insertion in Volume IV of the Rangpur District Records: Bengal District Records Rangpur, Vol. IV; 1779-1785 (Letters Received), Bengal Secretariat Book Depot, Calcutta, 1921 (Statement – 3; Appendix).

Mr. Peter Moore was appointed on the 15th April, 1784 as the Collector of Rangpur and served for 18 months in this post before his departure for Europe for ever (Letter 46; Appendix).

After being informed by the Acting Collector of Rangpur, the members of the Board of Revenue were all surprised on the incident that Mr. Peter Moore had not left the letters and documents of public correspondence during his tenure of his collectorship. When the members of the Board came to know Mr. Moore had already sailed for Europe. The Board assigned the Acting Collector to recover those documents through the Attorneys of Mr. Moore. They smelled something fishy about this mysterious conduct of Mr. Peter Moore (Letter 47; Appendix).

Preparer of the Report of the Revenue Department requested the Collector of Rangpur to issue a summon to Indranarayan Bose, Naib of Manthana for his personal attendance at the office of the Collector requiring interrogations regarding illicit receipt of money against the Rangpur Commissioner. The Governor General in Council communicated such irregularities heard about the Rangpur Commissioner and directed to PRRD for an early investigation regarding this matter (Letter 48; Appendix).

Hearsay
Debi Chowdhurani was the ruler of Manthana estate. After the death of her husband, Narendra Narayan Roy Chowdhury, she managed the said Manthana zamindari for more than three decades. Manthana was never a name of a village or of a mouza. Establishment of a zamindari by extradition of the land through extraction from others i.e. ‘Manthan’ in Bengali - that’s why the zamindari is nomenclatured as "Manthana". Debi played a leading role in the Rangpur peasants’ insurgence in 1783, and became a symbol of resistance to the arrogant revenue rule of the British East India Company. Debi Chowdhurani organized an army to defend peasants of Rangpur when the peasantry insurrection broke out, she joined the rebels. She led her soldiers in full warrior regalia, fought bravely and determinedly, but was killed in the battle on 18th April, 1783 in the field of Napai Chandir Math,
about a mile away from her zamindari palace of Pirqachha, Rangpur. Those rebels who were alive after that battle cremated the deceased body of Joydurga Debi Chowdhurani, her younger brother, Kesto Kishor Roy Chowdhury Itakumari zamindar, Shib Chandra Roy and other rebels inside the forest surrounded by the river Aalaikuri and nomenclatured the place as ‘Pabitra-jhaar’. The date of death of Debi Chowdhurani falls on the first Thursday of the month of Baishakh and the local people pay respect in her memory by holding a village fair thereon i.e. at Napai Chandir Math every year on that day. Her unquenchable spirit, courage, and self respect gave the British sleepless nights. The story of the guts and sacrifice of this 18th century warrior queen is truly an inspiration for all Bengalee.

Debi Chowdhurani exists on a foundation of believability. It was rumoured about her defeat and death in the battle of Napai Chandir Math. None witnessed that incident and no historian, surveyor, administrator or gazetteer writer recorded her death in black and white in a fight against the British armies, although the death of Bhabani Pathak in the fight against the armies of the British rulers is clearly visible at the Lieutenant Brenan’s report followed by almost all the books and gazetteers about Rangpur during the British era. The incident of Debi’s death had not been composed in the song (Jager gaan) of Ratiram Das, a member of Rajbangshi community, who lived in the village of Itakumari, a centre of revolt. It’s a common belief that the spirit of self-sacrifice of anybody else for the sake of country either for patriotism or for any revolt would become a more hit song than those of only praise or bravery in the traditional folk lore or folk-song. But Ratiram Das’s tears were a witness to sincerity, wisdom and sagacity to Debi Chowdhurani, not for her dire consequence faced ultimately as a leader of peasants’ insurrection.

The seal of order issued by Debi Chowdhurani are the splendid and powerful evidences of the time span of ruling the Manthana estate during the period from 1765 to 1801. One such firman or patta is Pirpal seal of order issued by Joy Durga Debi Chowdhurani on Magh 5, 1176 Bangabdo (1769 - 1770) and another one is Mushkali Chukani patta issued by Debi on Kartik 25, 1197 Bangabdo (1790 - 1791). Abdul Goffur of Pirqachha collected both these seal of orders issued by Debi Chowdhurani and the publications of those are visible in print at the magazine ‘Unnayan’, vol. 5 no. 7 (Rangpur: Rangpur District Council) edited by Nurul Islam. The date and year mentioned on both these seal of orders issued by Debi finally prove that she did not die at Napai Chandir Math on April 18, 1783. Perhaps she hid herself under the bush hide-away and her appearance was revealed again sometimes during 1787 at her zamindari ruling with full dignity after the end of Rangpur peasantry insurrection. These facts lay hidden for a long time. And again, more facts will be brought to light which are hidden in the womb of future singing the song again for the old times’ sake.

Debi Chowdhurani was the savior to peasantry as she led them well in all possible ways. She had been considered as goddess Chandi in the entire Rangpur areas and all her peasants called her mother Joydurga, her original name (Debi Chowdhurani is just a title to any wife of the then zamindar). She supported the peasants’ insurrection straightway from the zamindars’ conference held at Itakumari by stimulating and energizing both the zamindars and the peasants by her bold
presentation. Almost all the situations and happenings are perhaps debatable and imaginary as described by Ratiram Das in his song. Though the fact comes out that in the second and final phase of insurrection, peasants were not accompanied by Debi Chowdhurani and the justice had gone against the leaseholder Debi Singh and his associates when the Englishmen held the court after the end of the peasants’ insurgency. After being freed from all disturbances, Debi Chowdhurani managed and governed her zamindari peacefully and independently up to 1801 as evidenced by the seal of order issued by her available at Rangpur District Council Publication.

Debi Chowdhurani is an exceptional character ornamented with all Excellencies in the history of Rangpur, although she was described by the British Company rulers as a dacoit queen and an associate of Bhabani Pathak. She lived in a bazra and used to take part in the raids led by Bhabani Pathak. Debi Chowdhurani was accompanied by her paid armies and carried off a share as booty from Bhabani Pathak. Bhabani Pathak, described as gang leader by the British army, was killed in 1787 in an encounter with the armies sent by Lieutenant Brenan. Debi Chowdhurani was then absconding. Hiding away for years Debi Chowdhurani returned to her zamindari with all dignities. Lieutenant Brenan reported everything including her arrival to the Rangpur Collector. On receipt of Lieutenant Brenan’s report, the collector of Rangpur wrote to him (12th July, 1787) informing him that it was not necessary to arrest Debi Chowdhurani just then and necessary directions would be given on receipt of further information regarding her (Land of two rivers: A history of Bengal from the Mahabhara to Mujib by Nitish K Sengupta, p.222).

Departure

Joy Durga Debi Chowdhurani never bid valedictory or farewell address to her obedient subjects of her Manthanah estate zamindari. She had to face trouble during the period of her exit and had to tender petition to the Board of Revenue praying for permission to pay revenue of her estate direct into the treasury without the interference of Rajendra Narayan Chowdhury, her adopted son, who, she asserts, has no hand in the management of her zamindari. She knew nothing about the submission of petition to the Collector in her own name and issuance of order by the Collector allowing Rajendranarayan to pay revenue for Manthana zamindari (Petition – 8; Appendix).

Board’s Order – Ordered that a copy of the above petition be transmitted to the Collector of Rungpore for his report.

Board of Revenue sent the petition of Joy Durga Chowdhurani, zamindar of Pergunnah Manthanah, protesting against the interference of Rajender Narayan Chowdhury, her adopted son, in the management of her estate to the Collector of Rangpur for his report. The report of Alex Wright, Collector of Rangpur, to the Board of Revenue on the 4th November, 1801 then came to the head quarters in Calcutta (Letter – 49; Appendix).

Then the petition sent by Rajendranarayan, the original one, is as following. The content in his petition, either true or false, is only to fulfill that fact that he deserves the transfer of the Manthana zamindari from her adoptive mother without spoiling any more time (Petition – 9; Appendix). Collector directed to ask Joydurga for an earlier reply against the petition of her adopted son.
Ordered that Mussamaat Jey Durga Chowdraine be advised of the above requisition and that a copy be furnished her Gomastah, and an answer be required from her.

Dated 25th February, 1801

A true translate

(Signed) Alex Wright, Collector

The content of the petition by Joydurga Chowdhurani looks doubtful. An iron lady like Joydurga who fought several fights against the British would never submit herself before the Collector writing that her name may be annulled and the name of her adopted son may be registered in the intermediate mutation in the records of zamindari. If this petition is supposed to be genuine and the draft written in her own words, she never complained about this petition before the Board of Revenue accusing its authenticity. She did not hand over the charge of her property and other liabilities of the Manthana estate, but only bequeathed the gift of property by deed to her adopted son (Petition – 10).

The petition of Joydurga Chowdhurani was submitted before the Collector of Rangpur by Gouri Kanta Chowdhury, the then gomastah of Manthana estate. During hearing, when the Collector asked about the authenticity of the signature of the petition, the petition bearer gomastah declared that Joydurga Chowdhurani signed at the end of the petition. The Collector took cooperation from another gomastahs like Ramkanta Roy (former gomastah of Manthana estate) and Bholanath Roy (agent of Coondy pargana) for the identification and verification of the signature of the petition. The question arises – the presence of the gomastah of the Manthana estate, the petition bearer, is sufficient for identification and authenticity of the petition, still other gomastahs attended the hearing. Was this hearing pre-planned? The answer of the query is smoky and the originality of the signature of Joydurga Chowdhurani in the submitted petition is not beyond suspicion. If the signature of Joydurga Chowdhurani in that petition is really a genuine one, the author should be the most obliged. Then order of the Collector was issued (Order – 1; Appendix) and was followed by the Board’s order.

Ordered that the Collector of Rungpore be informed that the Board are satisfied with the explanation contained in his letter, and do not consider the petition of Mossamaat Jey Dourga entitled to any further consideration from them.

Thus, the Board of Revenue finally rejected the petition of Joydurga Chowdhurani, Zemindar of Pergunnah Manthanah, asking permission to pay the revenues of her estate direct into the treasury without the interference of Rajendra Narayan Chowdhury, her adopted son, keeping status quo of the order of the Collector of Rangpur on the 20th November, 1801.

The story of transmittance of charge hand over of the Zamindari began a few months back where Alex Wright, Collector of Rangpur co-operated with Rajendra Narayan Chowdhury whole-heartedly, where the gomastah Gouri Kanta Chowdhury was the main traitor.

Conclusion
Debi Chowdhurani (Joydurga Debi Chowdhrani; Zamindarni of Manthana estate, Pirgachha, Rangpur, Bangladesh), famous for her love and noble services towards peasantry, led the public rebellion and freed the people of Rangpur from leaseholder Debi Singh's torture. Except Bhabani Pathak, Debi Chowdhurani took help and cooperation from another zamindar namely Shib Chandra Roy, elder son of landlord Raja Ray for leading the public rebellion. Shib Chandra Roy, elder son of landlord Raja Ray, was the founder of Itakumari landlord house. Itakumari landlord house is popularly known as the Shiv Chandra's Jamindar Bari. The trio – Joydurga Debi Chowdhurani (Debi Chowdhurani), Shib Chandra Roy and Bhabani Pathak freed the peasants from the burden of tax of greater Rangpur (including present Jalpaiguri) from the tyranny and torture of leaseholder Debi Singh as reflected in all the records inserted in this article.

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Beyond Sloganeering and Damage Control Mechanism: The Vicious Circle of Ethical Transformation and Value Re-Orientation Campaigns in Nigeria

Mike Omilusi

Abstract: Rebranding Nigeria every time a new government comes to power is becoming a permanent feature of country’s political life. Ethical transformation and value reorientation have always been the fundamental focus of governmental agencies and institutions, organizations, and non-governmental agencies due to the decay in values, ethics and morality in the society. This essay examines the President Buhari administration’s “change agenda” within the context of the new rebranding campaign and how monotonous such has become in the polity over the years. It attest to the fact that successive occupants of political offices in Nigeria have never been dialectical in thoughts and action, and thus, their campaigns have suffered from the limitations of superficial bourgeois solutions to deeply structural social problems. Beyond what now appears to be mere campaign sloganeering or conscientious/desperate attempt at redeeming the image of a government that is fast losing its popularity among the citizens, this essay contends that there is the need for a radical development strategy that guarantees inclusiveness as opposed to exclusiveness in governance and that is people-driven from conception to implementation.

Keywords: transformation, orientation, campaign, value, sloganeering

Introduction and Statement of the Problem

Nigeria is one of the most populous countries in the world, with a population of more than 160 million. The nation is immensely blessed with abundant human and material resources. The worrisome truth is that Nigeria, though a sovereign independent nation, is encumbered by a multiplicity of problems that has slowed down her advancement over the years. Some of these problems, unfortunately, are self-inflicted and flow from a morbid, deviant inclination of our politicians to unjustly and blindly engage in self-enrichment and general corruption (Kalu, 2016). It has great potentials in all fields of human endeavour, including the arts, music, sports, science and philosophy, but it has neither exploited them beyond occasional eruptions of creativity nor shown any indication it has the scientific competence to recognise and tackle its challenges in ways that transcend its naturally emotive, violent and short-sighted approach to conflict resolution (Akinlotan, 2016:64).

The image of this country has been dragged in the mud as a result of the people’s anti-social activities. Drug and human trafficking, militancy, advanced fee fraud and moral depravity have soiled the image of Nigeria. There is an unprecedented number of Nigerians sentenced to prison or death...
outside Nigeria for their involvement in criminal activities, immigration crimes, robbery, fraud, smuggling, arms running, prostitution and murder (Umeh, 2015). Nigeria's ruling class is, with few exceptions, notoriously corrupt and unresponsive to societal problems and needs (Kakhee, 2007:9). Thus, in every office, there seems to be a desperate drive by Nigerian leaders to corruptly enrich themselves and stash in foreign accounts huge sums of money. Leaders have turned themselves into sole heirs of public funds and property. Good and adequate healthcare is not without a big price attached to it. The fact that drug and human trafficking, advance fee fraud, anti-social and criminal activities have rocked the country, is now thread-bare (Fabamise, 2015). Many Nigerians have attributed these worrisome behaviours to socio-economic and political challenges bedeviling the country, including an unstable economy, hunger, unreliable power supply, corruption in high places, poverty, structural unemployment and a dearth of social amenities. As succinctly captured by Fayemi (2016:3):

The definitive elements of the national moral condition include a raging culture of instant gratification that feeds short termism, profiteering, and fraud. Without making unsustainable generalizations, we can all agree that too many of us are given to cutting corners and trying to attain inordinately disproportionate returns on relatively small investments. We are not as averse to cheating and exploiting our fellow beings as we should be. In fact, it has been argued that our social, civic, political and economic relationships in Nigeria are defined more by mutual predatory exploitation than anything else. We have succumbed to a feverish individualism that prioritizes the desire and gain of the individual no matter how illicitly pursued at the expense of the common good. The sense of communal being that used to be a cardinal feature of public life has been diminished by the rise of an “every person for themselves” ethos.

Nigeria’s irreconcilable political elites have left the impression of Nigeria as a nation at war with itself as they endlessly engage in politics of expediency. While the majority of Nigerians reel under the yokes of poverty, disease and misery, the ruling elite has not demonstrated serious commitment, discipline and sacrifice in driving growth and progress. According to Obiozor (2016), Nigerian politics and politicians have not developed appreciable level of ethics and moral to distinguish between right and wrong, good and evil in theory and practice. It is therefore, no exaggeration, to say that with the exception of only a few moments of peace, the country’s political history since 1966 under military or civilian regimes has been a continuous failure to build a country with political stability, security or sustainable economy. Since then too, the country’s constant experience has been that of fear, anger and various levels of political violence. And at the root of all these crises is the tendency and propensity to grab power by one political elite group or another with impunity, lack of tolerance, and lack of sense of kindredship.

The decay in the society has reached the point that human life is expendable for material gain. The disturbing aspect of this atrociousness is that it is acceptable. People applaud those who perpetrate evil acts for money. Wealth is idolized irrespective of how it was acquired. The consequence of our depraved attitude towards life has reflected in the demoralized state of the country. Social and political infrastructures have collapsed. Nobody engages in a meaningful agenda with the seriousness of mind to achieve public good. The decline of the common good as an anchor of public morality is
coterminous with the ascent of money as the primary indicator of success in our society. The capacity for conspicuous consumption and reckless financial gratification has become the primary indices of status and accomplishment. According to Adesina (2016),

"there has been a terrible wave of consciencelessness (sic) over the years, leading to an unprecedented impoverishment of Nigerians, their helplessness in the hands of insurgents who abduct, maim, rape, kill as well as occupy their territory. An epidemic of corruption enveloped the nation, afflicted its leadership recruitment processes, stunted its economic growth, crippled its fighting power and rendered the people hopeless".

Many years of colonialism, neo-colonialism and imperialism have fundamentally altered the Nigerian value orientation, belief system, customs and traditions, including our dressing code, food or feeding culture, music, drama, entertainment, language, religion and substituted them with alien ones that constantly contradict and frustrate our development efforts and programmes, thereby giving rise to worrisome paradoxes that have become terrible features of Nigeria (Nwekeaku, 2014:427). Thus, ethical transformation and value reorientation have recently become the main focus or issue addressed by governmental agencies, institutions, organizations, individuals and non-governmental agencies due to the decay in values, ethics and morality in the society. However, as observed by Akinlotan (2016:64), while Nigeria blames every other person but itself for its woes, its leaders have not explained why for more than five decades they have taken no step whatsoever in breaking down and remoulding the fundamental underpinnings of their country’s existence, and delinking themselves from the (neo-colonial and neo-imperialist) apron strings of their pre-independence rulers. The colonialists expropriated their wealth and sucked them unfairly and unequally into the vortex of the world economic system, but Nigerian leaders have said, and thought, nothing of inheriting the abhorrent mantle of becoming the new exploitative and oppressive class to their own people.

Since the All Progressives Congress (APC) launched the change mantra in the run up to the 2015 general elections in Nigeria, the word, “Change”, has become a household name. The change mantra was the magic wand with which the APC defeated the ruling People’s Democratic Party (PDP). Nigerians swallowed change hook, line and sinker because of its irresistible attraction (Onyekakeyah, 2016). However, from the March 2015 elections emerged clearly defined national normative and ethical imperatives against historic impediments that have militated against the Nigerian sense of nationhood: ethno-regional and religious affinities. It may be surmised that a clear power transition from a very destructive status quo elite constituency has taken place in favour of a perceived progressive ethical political charge in Nigeria. This is ready to deconstruct the extant political settlement with a view to dismantling the entrenched regime of national governance as well as upending a political culture rooted in an atrociously efficient Nigerian national prebendal order. It is in this connection that, according to Muhammadu Buhari, his mission is to stop corruption and make the ordinary people, the weak and the vulnerable, the new top priority (Araoye, 2015). This essay examines the President Buhari administration’s “change agenda” within the context of the new rebranding campaign and how monotonous such has become in the polity over the years. It attests to the fact that successive occupants of political offices in Nigeria have never been dialectical in
thoughts and action, and thus, their campaigns have suffered from the limitations of superficial bourgeois solutions to deeply structural social problems.

**Ethical Transformation and Value Re-Orientation: A Conceptual Note**

Transformation is a fundamental shift in the deep orientation of a person, an organization, or a society, such that the world is seen in new ways and new actions and results become possible that were impossible prior to the transformation (UNDP-LDP, cited in Asobie, 2012). It also means the change of the moral character for better through the renewal of the inner-most nature. Pfeiffes (2005) affirms that “national transformation happens when people managing a system focus on creating a new future that has never existed, based on continual learning and new mindset and apply various methods for its actualization”. It is a mandate for a radical, structural and fundamental re-arrangement and re-ordering of the building blocks of the nation. It portends a fundamental reappraisal of the basic assumptions that underlie our reforms and developmental efforts that will and should alter the essence and substance of our national life. The expectation of most Nigerians is for a development blueprint that will transform the economy, reinvent the politics of our nation, secure the polity, care for the underprivileged, and provide responsible, responsive and transformative leadership (Osisioma, 2012:8).

Reorientation on its part is the act of changing, adjusting, aligning or re-aligning something, in this case “social values” in a new or different direction. "Values-reorientation" is therefore, is conceptualized as "the act of deliberately attempting to change the direction which attitudes and beliefs in Nigeria are currently oriented or the act of adjusting or aligning behavior, attitude and beliefs of Nigerians in a new or different direction within the public discourse of contemporary Nigerian politics. This is articulated as a move away from corruption, embezzlements, dishonesty and general indiscipline to the direction of virtues of honesty, patriotism, hard work, and general abhorrence of social vices" (Okafor, 2014:22). Values reorientation, as understood by political actors, media practitioners and citizens, is therefore about changing both normative beliefs and practices with regards to behavior within civil society. This public discourse often conflates attitudes and behaviors (beliefs and practices) and articulates a lineal relationship between value change (attitudes and beliefs) and consequent behavior (practice).

Kluckhohn (2005 cited in Omoegun et al 2009) posits that no society is healthy, creative or strong unless that society has a set of common values that give meaning and purpose to group life. Values are principles, fundamental convictions, ideas, standards or life stances which act as general guides to behaviour or as reference points in decision-making or the evaluation of beliefs or action (Halstead and Taylor, 1996). Generally, the terms social transformation, social change and revival are used interchangeably to explain the significant alternation of social structures within a social system. The re-orientation of value system is conscious development of human resources through ideological appeals, planning, training, productivity and efficiency in achievements through corporate culture. Value re-orientation could therefore, be defined as the ability to bring back the good values of old
back into existence. It could also be the efforts made towards re-enacting the good values and the ability to inculcate these values on the individual or members of a society.

National Re-Orientation Campaigns in Nigeria: History and Current Issue

The need for attitudinal re-orientation had long been recognized as the best way to address the myriad of societal problems confronting the Nigerian society. Consequently, successive administrations have articulated and pursued re-orientation programmes in one form or the other (Agu, 2016). Bolarin (2005), identifies some dominant values which formed the core values upheld by a larger section of the Nigerian society to include the following; detesting laziness, dignity of labour, respect for parent/elders, hospitality, public spiritedness, respect for authority, hard work, respect for sanctity of life, honesty and truthfulness. When these values are grossly compromised, then what you get is greed, corruption, dishonesty, violent crimes, political killings, kidnapping and so many other antisocial behaviours.

The various drives for image transformation or re-branding project in Nigeria, in recent time, spring from the different efforts by Nigerians to address the image crisis in the Nigerian state. The re-branding project involves the use of jingles, rallies, mobilisation and articles in national and international media. In spite of the efforts to transform the image of Nigeria for the international community, reports in Nigerian dailies indicate a rise in the rates of criminal activities (Aboluwodi, 2014:528). Imaekhai (2010 cited in Saale, 2014:141) traced the history of Nigerian ethical revolution from January 15, 1966 when major Kaduna Nzeogwu seized power with the agenda to tackle the ills of tribalism, nepotism, corruption and favouritism. Yakubu Gowon from 1966 to 1975 also accused AguiyiIrons of tribalism, favouritism and nepotism. He had as agenda, reconstruction, rehabilitation and reconciliation to maintain the unity of Nigeria after the thirty months of civil war. However during Gowon’s regime the government became enmeshed in corruption.

Nigerians are used to sloganeering. It has never solved any problem. In the agriculture sector, for instance, the country had Operation Feed the Nation, Green Revolution, Back to Land, Directorate of Food, Roads and Rural Infrastructure (DFRRI) etc, but hunger is still at the top of the challenges holding the nation from realizing its potential (Mahmood, 2016). During the Second Republic, the government of President Shehu Shagari proclaimed an “ethical revolution”. The military regime of Major-General Muhammadu Buhari launched the War Against Indiscipline (WAI) 32 years ago. Mass Mobilisation for Self Reliance, Social Justice, and Economic Recovery (MAMSER) was established by the military administration of President Ibrahim Babangida in the liberal bid to recast the Nigerian political economy. There was also the less remarkable “Not in Our Character” campaign of the regime of the maximum ruler, General Sani Abacha (komolafe, 2016). These different measures are meant to curb corrupt tendencies in Nigerians, to appeal to their conscience and to correct the negative perception of Nigeria as a corrupt and unreliable nation by the global community, a stigma that has led to a skeptic disposition by the international business community to Nigeria’s suitability for business.
At the onset of this fourth republic, Olusegun Obasanjo, as President, launched “Heart of Africa” and also formed an elite team tasked with supervising the project implementation, promoting virtues and urging Nigerians to better behaviour. They took the project to the United Kingdom and the United States but neither launch went too well. Obasanjo massively pumped money into the international media to advertise HOA, positioning himself as the Face of Nigeria; just what the world needs to see to come and invest in Nigeria. The programme was eventually dumped after his tenure expired (Adelakun, 2016). Despite the glaring lessons, Nigeria soon embarked on a similar drive with “Rebranding Nigeria” launched by the late Minister of Information and Culture, Prof. Dora Akunyili.

Despite armed with a cheap logo and a feel-good slogan, “Good people, Great nation,” the project never really took off. Those who conceived it with Akunyili said it was because it never received adequate support by the government but in reality it could not have taken off if Nigerians did not invest in it emotionally (Adelakun, 2016). Akunyili posited that the re-branding project was motivated by the need to find out why some earlier intervention measures to transform Nigeria’s image failed and some succeeded but are not sustained (Aboluwodi, 2014:530).

On his part, the transformation agenda of President Goodluck Jonathan sought to transform the Nigerian people into a catalyst for growth and national development. Under the transformation drive, government was expected to guide Nigerians to build an industrialized modern state that will launch the nation into the first 20 economies of the world by the year 2020. As later witnessed, the transformation agenda brought about a situation in which the government defended and protected corruption to no ends. Indeed, arguably, more than any administration in the history of Nigeria, corruption was more or less the official policy of the state. It was a government that liked to hear the echoes of its panegyrics. It was a government that always played to the gallery and threw money at everything. This was even more noticeable during the 2015 general elections, where raw cash was made available to every Dick, Tom and Harry by the ruling party in a desperate bid to retain political power at all cost.

With the ousting the Jonathan government, Nigerians are confronted again with the latest in the series of vicious cycle of transformation and re-orientation campaigns. While officially launching the current initiative- aimed at educating and enlightening Nigerians to appreciate the values of accountability and integrity- President Muhammadu Buhari (2016) affirms that the long-cherished and time honoured, time-tested virtues of honesty, integrity, hard work, punctuality, good neighbourliness, abhorrence of corruption and patriotism, have given way in the main to dishonesty, indolence, unbridled corruption and widespread impunity. He submits further:

The resultant effect of this derailment in our value system is being felt in the social, political and economic sphere. It is the reason that some youths will take to cultism and brigandage instead of studying hard or engaging in decent living; it is the reason that some elements will break pipelines and other oil facilities, thus robbing the nation of much-needed resources; it is the reason that money belonging to our commonwealth will be brazenly stolen by the same public officials to whom they were entrusted; it is the reason why motorist drive through red traffic lights, it is the reason that many will engage in thuggery and vote-stealing during elections; it is part of what has driven our economy into deep problem out of which we are now working hard to extricate
ourselves. Every one of us must have a change from our old ways of doing things, we cannot fold our arms and allow things to continue the old way.

As many commentators, critics and supporters of the re-launched campaign have indicated, the All Progressives Congress (APC) government will not be the first to embark on a campaign to change public attitude to life, governance and public service. And so whether ethical revolution or national orientation, Nigerian governments are skilful in producing slogans and mantras whose conceptual foundations are sometimes amateurish and often war against facts and reality (Akinlotan, 2016:64). Thus, from Babangida’s Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP) through Abacha’s Vision 2010 to Jonathan’s Transformation Agenda, the nation has only moved one step forward and two steps backward. Part of the problems was that the implementers of the reform programmes paid more attention to popularizing their agenda than summoning the sincerity of purpose needed to drive the process (Mahmood, 2016). Past campaigns of national mobilisation hardly worked and slogans of national orientation soon became unsustainable.

Attitudinal Change and Re-Orientation Campaign: The Realities and Gaps

Imaekhai (2010) observes that each succeeding government in Nigeria promised to eradicate corruption and other social ills and improve on our ethical values but this has been impossible. In 2015 again, the President Muhammadu Buhari-led administration rode to power on a sweeping mandate to give the country a new direction, inject a sense of urgency and purpose into the business of governance. Political analysts believe Nigerians chose the All Progressives Congress (APC) candidate above former President Goodluck Jonathan, because of the perception that as a former military leader, he has the experience and better positioned to tackle Boko Haram insurgency, growing insecurity in the East and the unrest in the Niger Delta region. There was a high expectation that corruption would be tackled head on and policies initiated to create employment opportunities (Mordi, 2016).

The official flag off of the “Change begins with me” campaign brought back memories of the much controversial War Against Discipline crusade that marked the high point of Buhari’s tenure, as a military dictator between December 1983 and August 1985. Thirty-three years after, 2016, Buhari tells his country men and women to unite, as one to make Nigeria great once more, by flushing out indiscipline, corruption and other ills that make us not the giant, but almost the laughing stock of Africa. He calls the new campaign: ‘#ChangeBeginsWithMe’ (Osagie, 2016). Buhari, at the launch of the sloganeering campaign, was naturally enthusiastic about it and thus promised to return Nigeria to the path of discipline and truthfulness. To him, a disciplined and truthful people will record far less of the vices that have crippled the country. The new campaign seeks to use persuasive – rather than coercive – means to achieve attitudinal change in all facets of society. The essence is to emphasise the place of citizens in the attempt to address the decadence of present-day Nigerian society and enthrone the positive change that the country craves.
The challenge of a new Nigeria therefore, places a big responsibility on the current administration of President Muhammadu Buhari who inherited an economy that was over the years badly managed and normal standards characteristics of good governance and high moral grounds were obliterated while anti-social patterns of behavior became very pervasive. Nigerians from all works of life, irrespective of ethnic and religious affiliation invested their trust by voting President Buhari to power. That trust was borne out of their sincere and genuine desire to see a new Nigeria where unemployment, corruption, insecurity, violence and other forms of social vices which pervaded the polity will be fought to a standstill (Agu, 2016).

Suffice it to say that successive leaders, at all levels of government, have been indicted in the court of public opinion for having gone into “service” to empower themselves, families and cronies, while impoverishing the rest of the citizens! (Ukwu, 2016). Indeed, it is a public knowledge that each change of government-military and civilian—since 1966 had been justified by the need to fight corruption, except the change of the military dictatorship of Mohammed Buhari, justified by his removers on account of fostering intolerable tyranny. It is, therefore, not illogical to claim that it is not the average citizen that has brought Nigeria to this low ebb; it is those in positions of leadership and the system and style of governance they have pursued, as well as rulers’ myopic vision about the eternal power of oil to mask all political, economic, and social problems. Emphasis has been for too long on celebration of power at the hands of those who have it and without regard to the feelings of the average citizen far removed from the corridors of power (Sekoni, 2016:14). The change of leadership and administration via electioneering in 2015 - anchored on the promise “to kill corruption before corruption kills Nigeria”- appeared to be a turning point in the political history of the country. The fight against corruption is the sixth issue in All Progressive Congress’ manifesto, which has virtually occupied the attention of the government. That corruption is endemic in Nigeria is not in doubt. That the present government, more than any other past administrations, is committed to fighting corruption is also a common knowledge.

As a matter of fact, since the Buhari administration came to power, it has earned the people’s confidence with its anti-corruption efforts. The President has seized every opportunity to reiterate his disapproval of the ills that bedevil the nation while warning officials working in his government that he would not tolerate corruption in any form. Nigerians have witnessed in this dispensation criminal charges leveled against professional politicians, amongst whom are legislators. With the anti-corruption drive, a number of highly placed government officials, politicians and former officials had been handcuffed and brought to trial to answer corruption charges. Also, a lot of money illegally taken from the public till has been recovered. What Nigerians are skeptical about is an anti-corruption crusade that starts and completes its trials on the pages of newspapers without any fundamental conviction. It is even observed that the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC) and the Independent Corrupt Practices Commission (ICPC) “have, instead of fighting corruption, ended up as the actual victims of the fight. The greed and avarice of the political class have added up to continually frustrate the efforts by the two bodies to stamp out corruption from our body politic” (Kalu, 2016). Even now, there is growing fear that with the help of clever lawyers, poorly prepared
prosecution cases and potentially buyable judges, the culprits might ultimately go free or get light prison sentences (Mordi, 2016).

The fundamental question that seems to be agitating peoples’ minds is: How can a government impose the virtues of patriotism into people born and bred within a country that has never held up its share of their social contract with them? In his analysis of this seemingly vicious circle of value change mantras in the country, Akinlotan (2016:64) refers to the Frenchman, Jean-Baptiste Alphonse Kar, who coined a fitting epigram in the 19th century to capture the wastefulness and futility of such idealistic campaigns. *Plus ça change, plus c’est la même*, he moaned, roughly translated as: “The more things change, the more they remain the same”, it suggests that when change comes at all, it sometimes does so gradually and incrementally, almost imperceptibly. Yet, whether revolutionary or incremental change, over the centuries and from the experience of many nations, the *status quo* has yielded only few inches to the most assertive campaigner. On the on-going change-begins-with-you campaign of the Buhari administration, Akinlotan (ibid) submits that:

President Buhari merely restated the symptoms of Nigeria's diseased past and present. But the nation ought to have got a gleamer of understanding of what he thinks is really the problem with the national attitude. Had he been able to fairly accurately state the conceptual foundation of the issues that war against the needed new national ethos, Nigerians might be fairly confident that the solution they dream about would not remain the chimera past governments had embraced and choked on for nearly 60 turbulent years.

Perhaps, that is why the campaign is seen in many quarters as an afterthought; a calculated diversion from the socio-economic crises that pervade the country; a mere response to grave political pressures from civil and political society; a conscious attempt at rebranding the seemingly resented regime rather than the nation or more likely that, as Agbese (2016) put it “the government was forced to reach for this straw to mollify public feelings for its inexplicable tardiness in marketing its cardinal objective”. With many citizens charging the government with a betrayal of fundamental obligation and poverty of emotional intelligence, this new effort at national mobilization may be an uphill task for the government. The renewal and rejuvenation of national consciousness, according to Alamu (2016),”cannot begin at the deck of the pyramid of fraud. The dominated cannot be made to bear the burden and dereliction of the dominant. Hunger and burning resentment do not conduce to rational and respectful citizens. If President Mohammadu Buhari expected the Nigerian populace to show gratitude and admiration of for the new “Change begins with me” campaign, he must have been appalled and dismayed by the fury and ferocity of the return to sender response”.

The basic flaw of these efforts at forging national orientation is the mismatch of the objective and subjective factors of change. According to Komolafe (2016), “you don’t change a society by merely moralising (worse still with a tinge of hypocrisy); you have to do something about the social structure”. It becomes clear that much of the country’s progress and achievements have been beclouded and damaged by the acts and actions of few individuals, corporate organisations and public officers whose activities have wreaked havoc on the reputation of the largest black nation in the world. The problem
of image building of a country like Nigeria, just like any other African country, is a very arduous task
and must be tackled with utmost caution. What makes news from Africa, including Nigeria in foreign
broadcast stations and print media are gory tales of war, hunger, disease, communal clashes and
endemic corruption. These and other innate problems have undeniably bedevilled the level of our
progress. All these do not augur well for a nation seeking favourable image. However with better
leadership now in place, Nigeria must be rebranded to a model which socio-economic cum political
modernity and glamour would attract love, dignity and respect rather than disdain, name-calling and
disrespect (Fabamise, 2015).

For Agbese (2016) therefore, what the country needs is regimentation, not empty sloganeering.
Leaders drive regimentation by demonstrating their discipline, their incorruptibility, their obedience to
the rule of law, their respect for the rights of others, including and especially the poor. Lack of all
these, no doubt, has exacerbated the level of injustice in the country, precipitating self-determination
agitations from various militant ethnic groups. Little wonder, that “Nigerians are politically angry,
economically hungry and socially militant. Millions of hapless Nigerians are wallowing in abject
poverty, existing under primal standards of living. No jobs for teeming youths and graduates.
Individual and ethnic interests reign supreme” (Ukwu, 2016). This may have informed the pessimism
expressed by Adelakun (2016) with regards to the success of the campaign:

It is very tempting to relate the many problems of Nigeria to our personal and collective faults; to
blame our lack of ethics, and then propound the theory of attitudinal change by telling us that the
change will change our circumstances if we gave up parts of ourselves. The truth is, until the
immediate concerns of the citizen and the many challenges that confront them are addressed, we
may as well be wasting time.

The United Nations is an example of how the global order can restructure itself in response to
international pressures. But this has not stopped international conflicts as new forces of history come
into collision with old forces (Alamu, 2016). In Nigeria, it is 46 years that the last shot was fired in a
tragic civil war with the following slogan from federal side: To Keep Nigeria One is a Task that Must be
Done. Today the separatist impulse is prevalent more than ever before in parts of the country. Ethnic
and regional champions are fundamentally questioning the structure of the federation. Underlying
issues of injustice and underdevelopment have been eclipsed by worsening insecurity in the Niger
Delta. So the simple lesson of history is this: mere slogans are not enough to keep a nation united.
Material conditions need to be created and structural tasks have to be performed to achieve the
desirable goal of unity (Komolafe, 2016). The same point could be made of subsequent campaigns
and slogans.

**Focus on the Real Drivers of Change and other Allied Institutions**

Nigeria is passing through difficult times. But, perhaps, more worrying is the fact that the capacity of
the government that promised to change the situation is increasingly being called into question.
Change was the fulcrum of the All Progressives Congress (APC) and Buhari’s message to Nigerians
while they were campaigning for the 2015 general election, which they won overwhelmingly. But one year after that victory, Nigerians are almost despairing of seeing any change in the attitudes and circumstances that had caused them to reject the People’s Democratic Party government of former President Goodluck Jonathan (Obia, 2016). Nigerians have never been in doubt how their country’s ills manifest symptomatically. Nor have they ever lacked adequate platitudes to hurl at the combustible follies and foibles that manifest as their country’s soft underbelly. What befuddle them, on the contrary, are the conceptual foundations of those ills, and how to engineer the right tools to combat them. Political malfeasance is not Nigeria’s exclusive preserve, nor is it the cause of the ills a re-orientation programme can affect with platitudeous change (Akinlotan, 2016:64).

Today, the word, change, has become a cliché in both private and government circles. It is not because it is a new word; it is based on the thinking that, the present time is different from the past times. It is saying that, the way things are being done now is different from the way they were done in the past. As a point of fact, there has to be dedicated pragmatism for change to occur in any situation. It entails making conscious efforts directed at solving problems in practical ways. It means people have to start thinking and acting differently from the way they used to think and act. This is where orientation comes in; because it is believed that for change to occur, good orientation has to be ingrained in the lives of the citizenry. In essence, if the aims of government and individuals are directed towards particular goals changes will occur. It also implies that, for one to move across divides, change must be present.

President Buhari is of the view that the derailment in ethical values is connected directly to social crimes of whatever hue, insurgency, economic sabotage and corruption. Perhaps, he is correct, if he were to be looking for immediate causes. But a more critical appraisal of the national derailment he talked about could accommodate far more fundamental reasons beyond issues of ethical disorientation (Williams, 2016). According to Sekoni (2016:14), if the new slogan is to have noticeable traction, efforts need to be made to convince citizens that the government is not passing the buck. Nothing changes people’s attitude faster than the power of example. In other words, the ball is in the court of the government at every level to right the wrongs of the past and in the process raise the level of morality through examples from those in power and with access to the nation’s resources. All of the persons standing or awaiting trials for corruption, lack of integrity, transparency and accountability so far have been members of the country’s elite: top politicians, top military men, top bureaucrats.

Since re-branding greatly hinges on changing the psyche of the nation and her people, it requires a multi-sectoral approach to tackle (Alyebo, 2012:104). This paper focuses on some fundamental areas of our national life like Responsive and Value-Oriented Leadership, Vibrant and Pro-Active Mass Media, Symbiotic State-Citizen Relations, Responsible Family Foundation, Cultural Re-Orientation, Value-Inclined National Policy on Education and Religious Institution for further discussion.

**Responsive and Value-Oriented Leadership**
Apart from the real art of governance which, includes among other things, electioneering, stability of democracy, depends on so many variables. In the first place, there is supposed to exist forward and backward linkages between the rulers and the ruled in the socio-political scheme of things. The leadership concern for the followership reduces suspicion on the part of the latter. This in turn spirals into building a more enhanced culture of trust, harmony and peace between and among the political class and the entire citizenry. Severing the relationship between the people while in office means that social contract is no longer respected, and this could lead to unwanted friction in the society (Erunke, 2012:71). Transformational leadership is valued centered, sharing of vision, values, respect, and trust, between the leader and followers and achieving unity in diversity (Carey, 1992). Human relationists confirmed that the coming together of the values of the leader and the followers is morally acceptable only if it comes from participative decision-making with consensus between leaders and the led.

Ozumba (2014:151) identifies two elements are critical in any effort at ethical re-orientation that are also germane to this paper. One is leadership and two, is enforceable laws. As rightly noted by Aboluwodi (2014:538) the effectiveness of the re-branding project in Nigeria rests on leadership rather than rhetoric. Nigerian leaders need to change their value orientation, and understand the essence of governance. They must be able to understand that the central concern of government is how to meet the needs of the people. For the masses, re-branding project begins with the provision of social amenities such as electricity, good schools, drinkable water, good roads, health facilities, and employment opportunities. For Igbugor (2013), what is required are good values, correct ideas, appropriate strategies and policies, strategic leadership, good institutions, political will, state capacity and accountable governance.

It is believed that leadership will necessarily play a leading role in bringing about the much-needed change. The reorientation must start from the top of governance and leadership as an example for citizens to follow. The campaign for “change”, as emphasised in the Vanguard editorial (September 15, 2016)

“will fail if the citizenry continue to see a leadership that preaches one thing and does another, Nigerians will ignore the Information Minister, Lai Mohammed and his team of “change” campaigners unless they see a great change in the nepotism and inequities in the selection of people manning sensitive government posts. Nigerians must have a sense of belonging, and only government can provide it. The role of leadership in changing Nigeria for the better cannot be over-emphasised. Once this is done, Nigerians will eagerly key into it”.

Thus, Nigeria needs a new ethos and a new political culture. To satisfy these needs and to break the mould, new leaders with fiery intellect, deep intuitive grasp of the complex issues shaping the 21st century, and instinctive feel of the yearnings and aspirations of the people whose disparate needs are sometimes too abstract and formless to put in words, must emerge. The new leaders, detribalised and large-hearted, are the ones to act on the demands of the moment. They are the ones to drive the great processes needed to tackle the present challenges as well as brilliantly anticipate the future challenges still embedded in the womb of time (Akinlotan, 2016:64).

Vibrant and Pro-Active Mass Media
According to Voelker (1975: 22), the mass media are important forces in our society. They provide information and entertainment and, at the same time, have persuasive powers that are capable of effecting radical changes. Akinfele (1995) observes that the mass media are effective tools for creating linkages between the society and the type of socio-political ideology—whether democracy, autocracy or socialism—that is in operation. In rebranding Nigeria, the mass media is expected to ensure objective reportage of issues, avoiding sensationalism; bearing in mind that false reportage undermines the democratic experience. The entertainment and art industries are expected to produce art that showcases the exciting mix of Nigeria’s cultural diversity and the very values that hold the African society together (Umeh, 2015).

Cultural, moral and community opinions have been changed largely by the fact that the mass media can provide seemingly uninterrupted news that has influenced community life, indigenous culture and morals as well. The Nigerian media over the years has demonstrated its capacity to galvanize public opinion and engender public discourse among Nigerians. Nigerian media has continued to play significant role in the overall development of the nation. The media can also play a very important role in elevating issues to the systemic agenda and increasing their chances of receiving consideration on institutional agendas. However, since the achievement of the change agenda and ethical transformation depends essentially on the government’s ability to integrate and coordinate policy making and implementation across the public sector, as well as the social, economic and environmental policy portfolios, all the relevant public and private institutions should be actively involved in the mobilization, public education and orientation.

**Symbiotic State-Citizen relations**

Nigeria, according to (Moghalu, 2016), needs to create a social contract between the state and its citizens. This involves, primarily, the obligations of citizens (such as paying taxes) in exchange for the protection of life and limb, civil liberties and its limits, as well as the sustainable provision of basic infrastructure and social safety nets by the state. This gives citizens a sense of belonging, with mutual accountabilities between the government and the governed. For Komolafe (2016), it is the responsibility of government to create the conditions for socio-economic actors to operate in their legitimate quest to meet their needs. Change cannot begin with a people with increasingly limited access to basic needs such as food, water, healthcare, basic education and decent housing. The leadership preaching change would rather find a better audience in a people that could take basic needs for granted.

When citizens see public servants, politicians and senior government officials abusing national laws and getting away untouched, they get the message it is alright to perpetrate crimes against the society (Obijiofor, 2016). Crime and other social vices multiply when the people are suffering. But someone who is comfortable is less prone to crime. Nigerians in the developed countries are more law-abiding than Nigerians at home simply because they are more comfortable than those at home. It is counterproductive to demand fundamental attitudinal change from a mass of hungry, unemployed and dejected population (Onyekakeyeh, 2016). The point is that, the psychological impact of a failing
state on the behaviour of citizens is so strong it can create dissonance in a time of reorientation. That is why many do not want to hear about the change Mr. President is talking about (Williams, 2016). Thus, there is the need for a radical development strategy that guarantees inclusiveness as opposed to exclusiveness in governance and that is people-driven from conception to implementation. This development strategy must be sustainable with the genuine desire to end poverty, provide productive employment, and satisfy basic needs of all categories of citizens and fair sharing of surplus value. Fortunately, the nation’s democratic experiment provides political platform to meaningfully engage the citizens because representative democracy creates an opportunity for groups and individuals to have a voice in government, even though they cannot participate directly in government. However, the mere existence of representative institutions is not enough for meaningful democracy. The real challenge is to forge a link between a society’s numerous and diverse policy preferences and the representatives who govern. This link requires some entity to mediate between citizens and state institutions.

*Responsible Family Foundation*

Throughout history, strong families have helped to make strong societies. The family therefore remains the best arrangement for bringing the children to be mature and credible adults. The family is the first social contact the child has and his experience in the process of development matters a lot because such early experiences are hard to erase. The onus still lies on the president to re-invent the wheel and realize that the greatest resource for national development is human resource. Attitude can be taught, once learnt, they are difficult to change (Agu, 2016). The family’s affective role of nurturing and supporting its individual members includes promoting and safeguarding the health of children as well as instilling moral and social values in them, with the overall goal being to ensure that the next generation is productive and socially responsible (Perrino et al, 2000; Peterson, 2009). Among the social factors that affect individual people in particular are social groups with which a person comes into contact. The most important social group to influence individual’s development, however, is the family. Functioning family environment has in the process of socialization of the individual irreplaceable importance. During socialization one becomes a cultural and social being who acts according to recognized rules directed their behavior towards socially accepted value and meet individually modified roles and expectations. Family provides initial human behavior patterns in an orientation and initial interpersonal relationships. According to Archbishop Akubeze (vertican Radio, 2016), “if the family is dysfunctional, society and nation will also be dysfunctional… any country that wants to build its capacity for development must start with the family. The family is the first place where children are taught values such as honesty, hard work, trust in God, love of neighbour and society”

*Cultural Re-Orientation*

Others, like Ayakoroma (2015), have also advocated for “cultural re-orientation” considered to be capable of creating a process of positive impact on national development. The strategies of national development would thus depend on the understanding of the culture, the adaptation of its elements
for political, educational and economic development, as well as its strengths for social integration and development. According to him, if the Federal Government of Nigeria under the leadership of President Muhammadu Buhari makes culture the centre-piece of its national orientation, the country stands to benefit economically, socially, politically and otherwise. The question is: What then is the caveat? The advice has always been for us to go back to our roots; to our core values system. This is a situation where the citizenry imbibe Nigerian, nay African, culture which encapsulates genuine love for people and the country, knowledge of Nigerian indigenous languages, promoting Nigerian dress culture, respect for elders and constituted authority, hard work, honesty, fear of God, integrity, humility, craftsmanship, accountability, transparency, being our brothers’ keepers, just to mention few. Unarguably, these are attributes that can be used, maximally, for the development of the nation. In his analysis, Obiozor (2015) contends that the Change Agenda should now, while redefining our national priorities, emphasise ethics and morals:

As a nation, Nigeria should adopt the principle of “applied ethics” in all aspects of our national endeavours, from politics to economics, culture to sports, etc. Applied ethics attempts to apply ethical and moral theories to real life situation; and, as a discipline has been successfully utilised by several countries from China to Malaysia. Indeed, it was labour ethics and morals through the strategic discipline they inculcated on the citizens that gave rise to the “Asian Tigers.” Thus, applied ethics which is used in some aspects of determining public policy as well as by individuals facing difficult decisions, will be a useful instrument for implementing the ‘Change Agenda’ of the Buhari administration.

It is a truism that culture can be found in our political institutions, our ancient traditions, our literature, our languages and even in our moral values. The moral value of a particular group of people is an embodiment of their culture. There are many cultural agencies and institutions that are entrusted with the enormous responsibilities of sustaining, packaging, promoting, marketing and protecting Nigeria’s cultural heritage. In achieving these goals, the various cultural agencies have to partner with the media for proper packaging, dissemination, orientation, education, propagation and marketing of the ‘Change Agenda’.

Value-Inclined National Policy on Education

Education is a crucial sector in any nation. Being a major investment in human capital development, it plays a critical role in long-term productivity and growth at both micro and macro levels. According to UNESCO (2000), “education refers to the total process of developing human ability and behaviours”. It is an organized and sustained instruction designed to communicate a combination of knowledge, skills and understanding value for all activities of life. Education and society are inseparable. Society equips education with the values to be transmitted while education exposes each generation of young people to the existing beliefs, norms and values of their culture (Schafer, 2000). Fafunwa (1974) defines education as what each generation gives to its younger ones which makes them develop attitudes, abilities, skills and other behaviours which are the positive values to the society in which they live. As a matter of fact, education develops in individuals those values which make for good citizenship, such as honesty, selflessness, tolerance, dedication, hard-work and personal integrity, all of which provide the rich soil from which good leadership potential is groomed.
The National Policy on Education (NPE), (2004) also specified values system acceptable in the country. This should therefore, be inculcated in the learners through the quality of educational instructions. These include moral/spiritual values, dignity of human person, self-reliance and communal responsibility, amongst other; It particularly tasks tertiary institutions to “develop and inculcate proper values” implying that there are improper or negative values that should be nipped in the bud. As earlier indicated, transformation can also be social when talking about the improvements that have taken place in the realm of the way of life of a people, their social etiquettes, their modes of dressing, food types and the like. It is individuals who have been positively transformed who can transform the society. It is from this perspective that it can conveniently be argued that education can transform a society.

Religious Institution and Moral Teachings

The religious beliefs, values, and practices held by the mainstream in a society are an expression of their basic worldview, a manifestation of assumptions about what exists outside the narrow confines of everyday experience. In most societies, religious leaders provide guidance on interpreting these beliefs and traditions and articulate the appropriate values and correct moral behaviour for living in alignment with these beliefs (Report from an International Inter-Religious Peace Conference, Sweden 2005:7). Religious institution- a place where people seek solace and show penitence- should therefore, preach the right values missing in the society. Religious leaders should place less emphasis on materials things and focus more on teaching their followers how to live an impactful life.

Religion has rules about conduct that guide life within a social group and it is often organised and practised in a community, instead of being an individual or personal affair. All African societies view life as one big whole and religion permeates all aspects of life. Mbiti (1999:1) asserts that Africans are notoriously religious. According to him, religion permeates all departments of life to such an extent that it is not easy or possible to isolate it. Although the African religious consciousness was initially derived from the practice of traditional religion, Christianity and Islam have given further impetus to this consciousness. Conversely, however, as the unfolding of a natural cultural process, both Christianity and Islam have in turn been influenced by traditional religion (Muzorewa 1985:31).

Religion plays an indispensable role in fostering values such as honesty, integrity, openness, forthrightness and tolerance (Tsele 2001:210-211). Such values are crucial for the development of good economic and democratic political systems. Religious leaders and traditional rulers are thus, expected to inculcate moral education in their various programmes and extol the spirit of service and excellence in their congregations and subjects respectively.

Conclusion

It is argued in this paper that one of the most daunting problems which have stunted the growth of Nigeria democratically and advance its stability is the lack of adherence to ethos, rule of law and constitutionality. Curiously, it is universally agreed that Nigeria’s woes are self-inflicted and, therefore,
substantially amenable to functional solutions. Successive occupants of political offices in Nigeria have never been dialectical in thoughts and action. Hence their campaigns have suffered from the limitations of superficial bourgeois solutions to deeply structural social problems. The nation’s socio-political history is replete with campaigns, slogans and rhetoric of change to better ways. In other words, and as established in this essay, Nigerians are used to sloganeering. But, it has never solved any problem.

However, it is widely admitted by both Nigerians and foreign actors alike that the Buhari administration’s choice of anti-Corruption as one of its cardinal agenda is a timely important decision to confront an issue that has dented the image of the country and its citizens world-wide. While it is admitted that it is only individuals who have been positively transformed who can transform the society, there is the need for a radical development strategy that guarantees inclusiveness as opposed to exclusiveness in governance and that is people-driven from conception to implementation. This development strategy must be sustainable with the genuine desire to end poverty, provide productive employment, and satisfy basic needs of all categories of citizens and fair sharing of surplus value. Lastly, the role of leadership in changing Nigeria for the better cannot be over-emphasised.

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The Role of Traditional Leaders in South Africa: Comparison between the Traditional and Khoi-San Leadership Bill, 2015 and the Traditional Leadership and Governance Framework Act 41 of 2003

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Abstract: The role of traditional leaders in a democratic South Africa has been a hot-potato since the dawn of democracy. There has been a lack of clarity on the role of traditional leaders in the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa (1996). The Constitution stipulates that legislation must provide the role of traditional leaders. In accordance with the provisions of the Constitution, the Traditional Leadership and Governance Framework Act (41 of 2003) (TLGFA) was passed in 2003. However, the TLGFA ambiguously provides the role of traditional leaders. As the name speaks for itself, the TLGFA is a framework legislation providing guidelines on how the provinces may enact laws regulating traditional leaders within their borders. Nevertheless, some provinces have repeated what the TLGFA stipulates when it comes to the role of traditional leaders. It is against this backdrop that TLGFA received negative comments from some traditional leaders who continued to appeal for the clarification of their role. The appeal of traditional leaders was sought to be addressed by Traditional and Khoi-San Leadership Bill (2015). The article examines the similarities and differences between TLGFA and TKLB in order to see the changes, if any, that will be brought by TKLB. The article concludes that there are many similarities than the differences between the TKLB and TLGFA.

Keywords: traditional leaders, traditional leadership and governance framework act, Traditional and Khoi-San Leadership Bill, customary law, customs, South Africa

Introduction

The role of traditional leaders in South Africa is recognised by the Constitution (1996). The Constitution instructs the Parliament to enact legislation which will provide the role of traditional leaders. In accordance with this provision, Parliament enacted several laws which attempt to provide the role of traditional leaders. Among those laws, there is TLGFA which is regarded to be a principal legislation when it comes to the recognition of the institution, status and role of traditional leadership.

One of the objectives of the TLGFA is to outline a national framework and norms and standards that will define the role and place of traditional leadership within the democratic governance (RSA, 2003, preamble). Since the TLGFA is framework legislation, provincial laws are to provide details with regard to role traditional leadership. However, provincial laws provide little on the role of traditional leaders and in most cases repeated the words used in the TLGFA to describe the role of traditional leaders. This has left the role of traditional leaders being not clearly defined. The poorly defined powers and roles of traditional leaders in democratic South Africa have given traditional leaders time to mobilise and campaign for recognition (Buthelezi & Yeni, 2016). The debate of the roles of

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traditional leaders has also gained momentum when Khoi-San communities and their leaders appeal for their recognition.

In 2012 the President of the Republic of South Africa, in the State of the Nation Address, announced that the government will table the Bill in Parliament which will provide for the recognition of the Khoi-San communities, their leadership and structures (Zuma, 2012). Finally, the Traditional and Khoi-San Leadership Bill (2015) (TKLB) was introduced in Parliament in 2015 and it is now before the National Assembly committee. Once the TKLB is passed as the Act of Parliament, it will repeal the TLGFA entirely. The aim of this paper is to examine the similarities and differences between TKLB and TLGFA with regard to the role of traditional leaders. This effort will help to identify the changes, if any, on the role of traditional leaders when the TKLB is inaugurated as an Act of Parliament.

The functions of traditional leaders in terms of customary law and customs

The Constitution prescribes that the institution, status and role of traditional leaders are recognised according to the customary law but subject to Constitution (RSA, 1996, s 211 (1)). It furthermore stipulates that a traditional authority that observes a system of customary law may function subject to, apart from legislation, customs as amended (RSA, 1996, s 211 (2)). When it comes to the weighing of customary law the Constitutional Court in Alexkor Ltd and Another v Richtersveld Community and Others stated that whereas previously the customary law was falling within the common law, however, now customary law must be seen as a fundamental component of South African law (Constitutional Court of South Africa, 2003: 51). The Recognition of Customary Marriages Act (120 of 1998) defines the customary law as usages and customs which were customarily obeyed by the aboriginal African peoples of South Africa and which constitute a component of the culture of those persons (RSA, 1998, s 1). Customary law develops when the persons who live by its norms change their patterns of lives (Constitutional Court of South Africa, 2003: 53). In the case of Bhe and Others v Magistrate of Khayelitsha and Others the Constitutional Court stated that due to the dynamic nature of society, official indigenous law as it exists in legislation and the text books is generally a poor reflection, if not a distortion of the true customary law (Constitutional Court of South Africa, 2005: 86).

A custom can be defined as a practice that has been followed in certain community and is to be accepted as part of the law (Law & Martin, 2009: 149). In Van Breda v Jacobs the Appellate Court stated that for a custom to be recognised as a source of law it must meet these requirements: First, the practice must be certain, secondly, it must be uniformly obeyed for a long period of time and thirdly, such practice must be reasonable (Appellate Division of South Africa, 1921: 334). However, in Shilubana and Others v Nwamitwa and Others the Constitutional Court stated that the requirements listed in Van Breda cannot be applied to customary law, where the development of living customary law is at issue (Constitutional Court of South Africa, 2008: 56). The Constitutional Court also stated that customary law must be allowed to develop and the enquiry must be established in the present-day practice of the community at issue (Constitutional Court of South Africa, 2008: 55).
The TLGFA mandates a traditional community to alter and redesign their customary law and customs in order to comply with the relevant principles enshrined in the Bill of Rights in the Constitution, especially preventing unfair discrimination, promoting equality and advance gender representation in the succession to traditional leadership positions (RSA, 2003, s 2 (3)).

During the pre-colonial times, the role of traditional leaders, in terms of customary law and custom, was to adjudicate disputes fairly and to provide for the well-being of their people (Nicholson, 2006: 184). For traditional leaders to exercise their powers and perform their functions, they were vested with secular powers and privileges (Nicholson, 2006: 184). Moreover, traditional leaders had to lead military expeditions, initiate and perform different ceremonies to promote the well-being of the tribe, maintain peace and order as well as to allocate and regulate tribal land (Ntonzima & Bayat, 2012: 92).

It seems clear that the roles of traditional leaders during apartheid were allocation of land held in trust, resolution of disputes, the provision of administrative services at local government, the preservation of law and order, administration of access to education and finance, administration of social welfare and the promotion of education such as the erection and maintenance of schools (South African History Online, 2016). According to Mokgoro (1996), the traditional leadership performed the simultaneous role of development facilitator, law maker, executive, and judiciary.

With the advent of democracy and the Constitution, the role of traditional leaders in terms of customary law and customs was reduced and subjected to the Constitution. It is now trite that every law or conduct must bow before the Constitution, otherwise that law or conduct will be declared null and void by the court of law. It must be noted that traditional leaders’ role in terms of customary law or customs is limited by the Constitution and thus must be amended to be in line with the Constitution. The White Paper on Traditional Leadership and Governance provides that the “critical challenge facing both government and traditional leadership is to ensure that custom, as it relates to the institution of traditional leaders, is transformed in accordance with the Constitution and the Bill of Rights” (RSA, 2003: 15).

As things stand, the role of traditional leaders in terms of customary law or custom has changed tremendously. The White Paper on Traditional Leadership and Governance provides that the traditional leaders may play the following roles:

(a) Promote and preserve the culture and tradition of communities;
(b) Promote the preservation of the moral fibre and regeneration of society;
(c) Promote social cohesiveness of communities;
(d) Promote socio-economic development;
(e) Promote service delivery;
(f) Contribute to nation building;
(g) Promote the social well-being and welfare of communities; and
(h) Promote peace and stability amongst the community members (RSA, 2003: 18).
The changes of the role of traditional leaders in terms of customary law and customs are mandated by the Constitution. Consequently, the Constitution vests certain powers in the democratic government. The traditional leaders can no longer perform the functions of law-making, executive and judiciary. The Constitution vests those functions in the democratic government to the exclusion of traditional leaders. The White Paper on Traditional leadership and Governance provides that traditional leadership is a creature of custom and generally carries out customary functions (RSA, 2003: 16). Moreover, it provides that there cannot be contestation of authority between the institution of traditional leadership and the state (RSA, 2003: 16). In contrast, traditional leaders often argue that they are not given the necessary recognition and treatment they deserve, and that their responsibilities were taken by councillors and mayors (Parliament of the Republic of South Africa, 2015: 10). At worst, the National House of Traditional Leaders (NHTL) and its Mpumalanga branch indicated that municipalities should be replaced by traditional councils as service providers in their areas of control, rather than work in parallel (De Wet, 2012: 42). It is therefore submitted that there is a clear contestation of the roles and functions between the traditional leaders and government, especially in municipalities which incorporate the areas of traditional leaders.

At present, the TLGFA is the principal legislation when it comes to the regulation of traditional leaders and traditional matters. It was hoped that the TLGFA would provide the role and functions of traditional leaders unambiguously. However, the hope did not materialize because the TLGFA provided not much when it comes to the role and functions of traditional leaders. The TLGFA provides that a traditional leader performs the functions provided for in terms of customary law and customs of the traditional community concerned, and in applicable legislation (RSA, 2003, s 19). As Rugege asserted that the TLGFA is framework legislation and the provinces should be able to put more flesh to it depending on the capacities, budgets and other considerations (Rugege, 2003: 188). However, the Limpopo Traditional Leadership and Institution Act (6 of 2005) (LTLIA) repeat the words of the TLGFA. It provides that a traditional leader performs any function provided for in terms of customary law (RSA, 2005, s 18 (1)). Moreover, the Eastern Cape Traditional Leadership and Governance Act (4 of 2005) (ECTLGA) repeats the words of the TLGFA by stipulating that a traditional leader performs the functions provided for by the customs and customary law of the traditional community as stipulated in the TLGFA and in other applicable legislation (RSA, 2005, s 24 (5)). Rugege (2003) has noted that it is not apparent as to what is the role of traditional leaders in terms of customary law and customs.

It is therefore submitted that, although the TLGFA provided a framework for the role and place of traditional leadership within the democratic governance, provincial legislation were unable to clearly define the role of traditional leaders in terms of customary law and customs. Provincial legislation repeated the words of the TLGFA at best, and thus failing to clarify the role of traditional leaders in terms of customary law and customs. Sithole & Mbele (2008) argue that to deal with customary matters can be complicated than a probability of the roles being spelt out in terms of local government roles. Moreover, in the Certification of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa the Constitutional Court stated that the Constitutional Assembly cannot be constitutionally faulted for not
addressing the complicated, varied and ever-developing specifics of how traditional leadership should function in the wider democratic society (Constitutional Court of South Africa, 1996: 197). It is indeed difficult to deal with the role of traditional leader in a democratic South Africa. This is manifested by the debate on the role of traditional leaders which spin over two decades since the dawn of democracy.

It is imminent and inevitable that the TLGFA is about to be repealed by TKLB when it formally becomes an Act of Parliament. However, the TKLB is unlikely to augment the functions and role of traditional leaders. With regard to the functions and the role of traditional leaders, the TKLB repeated the words of the TLGFA. The TKLB prescribes that a traditional leader performs the functions provided for in terms of customary law and customs of the traditional or Khoi-San community concerned (RSA, 2015, s 19). The only adjustment is that of inserting Khoi-San communities. The TKLB provides how a Khoi-San community may apply to the Premier of the province concerned for its recognition provided that such community meets the requirements listed in section 5 (1) (a).

The recognition of Khoi-San communities and their leaders means that the Khoi-San leaders will be given seats in the municipalities of their jurisdiction to represent their communities in terms of section 81 of the MSA. In order to be given a seat as a Khoi-San leader in a municipal council, first, one has to be recognised as a Khoi-San leader in terms of section 10 of the TKLB. Secondly, a Khoi-San leader will then have to be identified by the MEC of local government in the province of that municipality in terms of section 81 (2) (a) of the MSA. Thirdly, the Khoi-San leader must be an ordinary resident within the jurisdiction of that municipality.

Moreover, the TKLB thus extends the role of traditional leaders’ participation to a province which previously had no traditional leaders. The Western Cape did not have any recognised traditional leaders within its borders; however the recognition of Khoi-San leaders will result in Western Cape having traditional leaders within its borders. Currently, eight provinces have traditional leaders in South Africa. Most Khoi-San leaders and their communities are found in the Western Cape and Northern Cape Provinces. Whereas the Northern Cape is having few traditional leaders within its borders, the TKLB through its recognition of Khoi-San leaders will add to the list of traditional leaders in that province. When the TKLB becomes an Act of Parliament, all provinces in South Africa will have traditional leaders participating in their municipalities.

The functions of traditional leaders in terms of legislation

Apart from traditional leaders functioning in terms of the customary law and customs, they may also function in accordance with applicable legislation. It is worthwhile to state that TLGFA provides for the recognition of traditional community and traditional leaders, establishment of traditional councils, the role of traditional leaders and any matter related to customary law and customs.

The TLGFA provides a list of matters which national and provincial government, through legislative and other measures, may consider when providing a role to traditional leaders and councils. These
matters are arts and culture, land administration, agriculture, health, welfare, the administration of justice, safety and security, the registration of births, deaths and customary marriages, economic development, environment, tourism, disaster management, the management of natural resources, the dissemination of information relating to governmental policies and programmes and education (RSA, 2003, s 20 (1)).

The above list of the matters which may be allocated to traditional leaders is not helpful because, first, the allocation of a role to traditional leaders is at the discretion of the national and provincial governments. There is nothing in the law that compels the national and provincial governments to allocate the abovementioned matters to the traditional leaders and their traditional councils. Secondly, the above listed matters are wide. For example, the term tourism comprises of many things. Therefore, the above list lacks specification.

The allocation of function by national or provincial government to traditional leaders represents a system of delegation. The Municipal Systems Act (32 of 2000) defines delegation as a mandate to perform a function (RSA, 2000, s 1). It is clear that almost all matters listed above fall within Schedule 4 of the Constitution. Both national and provincial governments share exercise of power and performance of the functions as listed in the said schedule. Legally speaking, traditional leaders have no power over functions listed in the said schedule, unless and until such functions are delegated to them by national or provincial government. The TLGFA provides that when organ of state (as the holder of the delegated function) has allocated a function to traditional councils or traditional leaders, such organ of state must monitor the implementation of such function to ensure that function is performed and that the implementation is constitutional (RSA, 2003, s 20 (3)).

The TKLB does not provide a list of matters in which may serve as a guideline when national and provincial government allocate functions to traditional leaders. Instead, it provides that the traditional and Khoi-San leaders may be allocated a role in any functional area of the national or provincial department provided that such a role may not include any decision-making power (RSA, 2015, s 25 (1)). In deed decision-making power is reserved for government, even the role of traditional leaders in municipal councils exclude a voting right. Therefore, without decision-making power, a role to be allocated to traditional leaders is to be an advisory role. However, it was criticised that TKLB permits national or provincial government departments to allocate roles that deal with any of government’s functions to traditional council and traditional leaders without any guidelines on how this should be performed or what roles can be allocated (Land & Accountability Research Centre, 2016). It was further pointed that the TKLB is equivocal when it comes to the relationship between elected local government and traditional leaders and traditional councils should the government allocate the roles to them (Land & Accountability Research Centre, 2016).

When a function is allocated to traditional leaders, resources must be made available to ensure the performance of that function. The TLGFA, on the one hand, mandates an organ of state within the national government or a provincial government, when allocating a role to traditional councils or traditional leaders, to ensure that the allocation of a role or function is accompanied by resources and
that appropriate measures for accounting for such resources are put in place (RSA, 2003, s 20 (2) (e)). In passing, it should be noted that even traditional leaders who participate in the proceedings of the municipal councils are entitled to the payment of out of pocket expenses in respect of their participation (RSA, 1998, s 81 (5) (b) (i)). Failure to provide resources will defeat the intention of allocating a function and ultimately lead to poor performance of the allocated function.

The TKLB also provides that the allocation of a role to traditional leaders may be accompanied by conditions and resources as determined by the allocating department (RSA, 2015, s 25 (2)). Moreover, the TKLB provides that the Minister may, by notice in the government gazette, determine the resources to be made available to traditional and Khoi-San leaders as may be necessary to enable them to perform their function effectively (RSA, 2015, s 15 (2)). Before determining the resources for traditional and Khoi-San leaders, the Minister must take into account a recommendation made by the Independent Commission for the Remuneration of Public Office-bearers and consult with all Premiers (RSA, 2015, s 15 (2)).

Both TLGFA and TKLB provide that the allocation of a function to traditional leaders must be accompanied by resources. It follows that no allocation of a function, no resources to be made available to traditional leaders. In Mbhashe Traditional leaders in Municipal Council v Mbhashe Local Municipality the High Court stated that out of pocket expenses are derived from traditional leaders’ roles in the municipal council (Eastern Cape High Court, 2012: 3).

Both TLGFA and TKLB do not spell out or enumerate the roles of traditional leaders. The roles which were previously performed by traditional leaders are now given to democratically elected government, especially local government by the Constitution. For that reason, traditional leaders are performing advisory role in almost all functions accorded to them by legislation. This is even clear from the Bill, which prohibits traditional leaders to perform a decision-making role.

It is therefore submitted that the TKLB will not address the demands of traditional leaders, since they want to be involved in the decision-making role. At worst, traditional leaders call for the amendment of the Constitution and argue that in their areas of jurisdiction, traditional councils should replace municipalities (De Wet, 2016: 42). They do not want work side by side with municipalities; instead they want to be in charge of their areas. This can have adverse effects on democracy. Democracy must enable people to choose their own leaders through regular elections. The traditional councils, inter alia, comprise of traditional leaders who are not elected but born to seat on the throne and lead their people for the rest of their lives. Although TLGFA provides that 40 per cent of members of traditional council must be democratically elected, but this per cent is small as compared to the fact that traditional leader will still elect the remaining 60 per cent of the members of traditional council (RSA, 2003, s 3 (2) (c)). Similarly, the TKLB provides that 60 per cent of the members of traditional councils will be elected by traditional leaders and 40 per cent will be elected be democratically elected by members of the community (RSA, 2015, s 16 (2) (c)).
Moreover, it appears that amending a Constitution to allow traditional councils to replace municipalities in the areas of traditional leaders will be against the spirit of the Constitution. In the case of Certification of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa (1996) the Constitutional Court clearly stated that had the drafters of the Constitution meant to guarantee and institutionalise governmental powers and functions for traditional leaders, they should have incorporated the words “powers and functions” in the Constitutional Principle XIII (Constitutional Court of South Africa, 1996: 190). The Constitutional Principle XIII provides that the institution, status and role of traditional leadership, as per customary law, shall be recognised and protected in the Constitution (RSA, 1993, schedule 4) It is therefore submitted that the governmental powers are reserved for democratically elected government and granting traditional leaders governmental powers will overshadow the intention of having democratically elected government in local level.

The functions of the Houses of traditional leaders

The Constitution prescribes that an Act of Parliament or provincial legislation may establish the houses of traditional leaders (RSA, 1996, s 212 (2) (a)). There are three types of houses of traditional leaders in South Africa, namely the National House of Traditional Leaders, the Provincial Houses of Traditional leaders and the Local Houses of Traditional Leaders (RSA, 2003, s 16 (1) (a) & (b)). The provincial legislation, in the provinces where there are traditional leaders, must provide for the establishment and the role of the Provincial Houses of Traditional Leaders. The houses of traditional leaders are to deal with the matters relating to traditional leadership, the role of traditional leaders and customary law and customs of the communities (RSA, 1996, s 212 (2)). The Act of Parliament intended by the Constitution is the TLGFA which provides for the establishment of the houses of traditional leaders. Since TLGFA is about to be repealed by the new law called TKLB, so below is the comparison of how the TLGFA and TKLB provide for the role of the houses of traditional leaders.

The National House of Traditional Leaders

The TLGFA did not provide for the role of the National House of Traditional Leaders (NHTL) in details. It only provides that any parliamentary bill concerning customary law and customs of the communities must be send to the NHTL in order to make submissions (RSA, 2003, s 18 (1) (a)). This provision is also seen in section 39 (1) (a) of the TKLB. Therefore there is similarity with regard to this provision. The reason why TLGFA does not provide the role of the NHTL in details is that National House of Traditional Leaders Act, 2009 (Act No.22 of 2009) (NHTLA) provides in details the role of the NHTL. It would have been senseless to have two Acts of Parliament providing for the role of the NHTL.

However TKLB provides the role of the NHTL in details when compared to the way TLGFA prescribes. Section 36 of the TKLB prescribes the roles of NHTL as follows:

(1) The duties of the National House are—
   (a) to cooperate with the provincial houses, to promote—
(i) the role of traditional and Khoi-San leadership within a democratic constitutional dispensation;
(ii) nation building;
(iii) peace, stability and cohesiveness of communities;
(iv) the preservation of the moral fiber and regeneration of society;
(v) the preservation of the culture and traditions of communities;
(vi) socio-economic development and service delivery;
(vii) the social well-being and welfare of communities; and
(viii) the transformation and adaptation of customary law and customs so as to comply with the provisions of the Bill of Rights in the Constitution, in particular by—
   (aa) preventing unfair discrimination;
   (bb) promoting equality; and
   (cc) seeking to progressively advance gender representation in the succession to traditional and Khoi-San leadership positions; and
(b) to enhance co-operation between the National House and the various provincial houses with a view to address matters of common interest.

It must be noted that these duties are not provided in the TLGFA, but they are provided in section 11 (1) of the NHTLA. It is submitted that TKLB does not provide new roles of the NHTL but it echoes the roles of NHTL as provided in the NHTLA. This is also seen from the fact that once the TKLB becomes an Act of Parliament it will repeal, inter alia, NHTLA. This can be labelled as copying the previous roles of the NHTL from the NHTLA and pasting them TKLB. In other words, it can be called rearrangement of the roles of the NHTL by removing them from the one Act of Parliament to another.

The Provincial Houses of Traditional Leaders

The TLGFA does not provide the role of the Provincial Houses of Traditional Leaders (PHTL); instead it leaves this issue to the provinces to enact provincial legislation to deal with the establishment and the role of the PHTL within their areas of jurisdiction. It must be noted that both national and provincial legislatures have competence to legislate in the matters listed in schedule 4A of the Constitution. Customary law and indigenous law, among others, fall within the said schedule.

The TLGFA only provides for guidelines on what the provincial legislation must regulate. It instructs provincial legislatures to ensure that women are represented in the PHTL and also to be elected as representatives of the PHTL to the NHTL (RSA, 2003, s 3 (a) (i) and (ii)). Moreover, the TLGFA prescribes that the term of the PHTL must be in line with the term of the NHTL (RSA, 2003, s 3 (b)).

The TKLB provides for the same guidelines provided by TLGFA ensuring that women are represented in both PHTL and NHTL (RSA, 2015, s 49 (2) (a) and (b)). In nutshell both TLGFA and TKLB do not provide for the role of the PHTL. This means that the role of the PHTL is left to the provinces to enact provincial laws which will establish and prescribe the role of the PHTL.
The Local Houses of Traditional Leaders

The Constitution clearly stipulates that the national legislation may provide a role for traditional leadership as an institution at local level on matters affecting local communities (RSA, 1996, s 211 (1)). The national legislation contemplated by the Constitution is the TLGFA. Section 3 of the TLGFA provides the functions of local house of traditional leaders (LHTL) are as follows:

(a) to advise the district municipality or metropolitan municipality:
   (i) matters pertaining to customary law, customs, traditional leadership and the traditional communities within the district municipality or metropolitan municipality;
   (ii) the development of planning frameworks that impact on traditional communities; or
   (iii) the development of by laws that impact on traditional communities.

(b) to participate in local programmes that have the development of rural communities as an object; or

(c) to participate in local initiatives that are aimed at monitoring, reviewing or evaluating government programmes in rural communities.

Section 3 (a) of the TLGFA provides that the LHTL is to advise district or metropolitan municipality whereas section 50 (6) (a) of the TKLB provides that the LHTL is to advice local municipality, district municipality or metropolitan municipality. There was an omission of the words ‘local municipality’ in section 3 (a) of the TLGFA. The exclusion of local municipalities from the advice of the LHTL may be that local municipalities are represented in district municipalities. By providing advice to district municipality will be covering all local municipalities within that district municipality. Despite been represented in the district municipality, a local municipality has its own municipal council and a right to govern its own territory. Therefore there is a need for local house of traditional leaders to provide advice to local municipalities. Cognizance to that omission, the TKLB extended the advice of the LHTL to the local municipality.

Conclusion

It is clear that the TKLB will face the same challenges face by TLGFA, because there are many similarities between the provisions of TLGFA and TKLB with regard to the role of traditional leaders. Unfortunately, the TKLB neither clarify nor spell out the roles of traditional leaders. The TKLB repeats the words of the TLGFA by stipulating that traditional leaders perform the functions in terms of customary law and customs and applicable legislation. These words are even seen in the provincial
legislation, such as LTLIA and ECTLGA. Neither the TKLB nor TLGFA explain what is the role of traditional leaders in terms of customary law and customs. Provincial laws also do not explain the role of traditional leaders in terms of customary law or customs. It must be noted that the Constitution, as the apex law in South Africa, serves as a limit on the role of traditional leaders in terms of customary law and customs. This means that the customary law and customs cannot confer a role to the traditional leaders which is now conferred to the democratic government by the Constitution.

It seems like the debate on the role of traditional leaders is not yet over because it is apparent that the TKLB will not address the demands of traditional leaders. The appeal of traditional leaders that the traditional councils should replace municipalities in their areas of jurisdiction will meet constitutional challenges. It appears that proposed amendment of the Constitution to allow traditional councils to replace municipalities in their areas will be against the spirit of the Constitution because governmental powers are for democratically elected government.

A notable change that will be brought by TKLB is that the LHTL will advise the local municipalities, along with district or metropolitan municipalities. As things stand, the TLGFA allows LHTL to advise district and metropolitan municipalities to the exclusion of local municipalities. Furthermore, the TKLB brings recognition of Khoi-San communities and their leaders in South Africa. This means that the Khoi-San leaders will be granted seats in the municipal councils of their areas of jurisdiction in terms of section 81 of the Municipal Structures Act 117 of 1998. It remains to be seen whether the Khoi-San leaders will use this opportunity to influence the decisions of the municipal councils in their areas of jurisdiction.

References

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Terrorism comes with Economic Underdevelopment: An Appraisal of how Boko-Haram Activities Undermined Nigeria’s Economy during Jonathan’s Regime

Lanre Abdul-Rasheed Sulaiman

Abstract: The rise of Boko Haram insurgency has introduced a criminal dimension, hitherto unknown and uncommon in the Nigerian society. Boko haram has continued to unleash terror on people and has been a major threat to social and economic activities. The influence of security on the economic prosperity of a nation cannot be overemphasized. This is because without a serene environment, industrial activities, trade and production would forever remain elusive. Different studies have examined the horrendous effects of terrorism on national and global economy. However, there is a paucity of studies regarding the effects of Boko haram menace on the Nigeria’s economy, especially during President Jonathan’s regime. This identified gap is the major rationale for this study. The paper was anchored on structural functionalism theory. The paper discovers that the Boko-Haram activities discourage foreign direct investment and trade flows during Jonathan’s regime. Hence, efforts should be geared towards extricating Boko haram insurgency in order to have a viable economic development.

Keywords: terrorism, economy, development, foreign direct investment, and trade

Introduction

The phenomenon of terrorism is now becoming a global malady as there is no country that is completely exonerated from its impact. Terrorism, war and other kinds of transnational political violence are more threatening today than ever before, as killings and destruction of valuable properties have been on the increased (Rourke, 2008).

Indeed, the rife of terrorism and insurgency also abound in Nigeria. The phenomenon has found expression in the emergence of Boko Haram insurgent. Boko Haram, an Islamic fundamentalist sect has been agitating for the Islamisation of Nigeria through violent means such as destruction of lives and properties. It is imperative to note that Nigeria is not alien to violent fundamentalist groups’ crises. However, the emergence of Boko Haram took an unprecedented violent dimension which draws global attention (Adesoji, 2010). The nefarious activities of Boko Haram have received both national and international condemnation. Boko haram has continued to unleash terror on people. In fact, most states in Northern part of Nigeria have not known peace for some years now.

The gruesome activities of the Islamic sect, have unsettled Nigeria to the extent that the precious time and socio-political cum economic resources that ought to have been channelled to the development of the country is being squandered on efforts geared towards extricating the insurgency in the North-
East of Nigeria. The current budgetary allocation to security by governments at all levels in Nigeria is a drive towards underdevelopment and poverty. Though North-East geopolitical zone can be said to be the epicenter of insurgency, its impact reverberates through the country and has constituted a fundamental source of underdevelopment to Nigeria (Awortu, 2015).

The implication of the current insecurity in Nigeria is that, the security apparatus is not capable of securing lives and properties. This would therefore limits the ability of people to develop economically. Also, the state’s ability to attract foreign investors will be limited as a result of the palpable insecurity in the country (Ali, Musa & Fada, 2016). Foreign investors are reluctant to invest in an unsafe environment. They will react to insecurity by either relocating their businesses to environments where they feel the security of their investment is assured or by requesting for higher returns which will serve as compensation for risking their capital (Cam, 2007; Rasheed & Tahir, 2012).

Security precedes economic development. There is no gainsaying that social and economic development can only strive in a serene atmosphere. Terrorism creates insecurity which affects production and consumption patterns, thereby making the market less attractive for both local and international producers. Terrorism causes increase in security measures. Tighter security makes trade cumbersome and more expensive by causing delays in transaction processing and deliveries of goods and services. It also makes trade more expensive in terms of higher insurance premiums, and larger salaries to at-risk employees (Sandler & Enders, 2008). Also, terrorism can damage traded goods and infrastructure needed for the trade.

Different studies have examined the horrendous effects of terrorism on national and global economy. However, there is a paucity of studies on the effects of Boko haram menace on Nigeria’s economy, especially during President Jonathan’s regime. This identified gap is what this study filled.

**Conceptual Clarification**

The term terrorism connotes different meanings to different people. Enders and Sandler (2002:145) defined terrorism as “the premeditated use or threat of use of extra-normal violence or brutality by sub-national groups to obtain a political, religious, or ideological objective through intimidation of a huge audience, usually not directly involved with the policymaking that the terrorists seek to influence”. Terrorism is the intentional use of violence directed at a large audience in order to force a government into conceding ideologically or politically motivated demands.

Thus, terrorism can be said to be a practical response to a political conundrum that resorts to the use of intimidation and violence instead of following political democratic processes. Schmid and Jognman (2005) see terrorism as a method of violence and intimidation directed at civilians with the aim of compelling a perceived enemy into submission by establishing fear, political friction and demoralization in the population under attack.
It is also inescapably about power: the quest for power, the possession of power, and using power to achieve political change (Hoffman, 1998). The Department of Homeland Security defines terrorism as violence perpetrated by sub-national groups or state agents against civilians, in order to influence their target audience (cited by Sandoleet.al., 2004). This definition shows that the perpetrators of terrorism are not only non-state actors and rogue states. In fact, democratic states also commit terrorism in order to achieve economic, political or religious objectives.

The U.S. Department of State as cited by Zumve, Ingyoroko and Akuva (2013) defines terrorism as “premeditated politically-motivated violence perpetrated against non-combatant targets by sub-national groups or clandestine agents, usually intended to influence an audience”.

The objectives which terrorist are seeking are quite different ranging from a change in government policies, a change in the leadership of a government and or a change in the whole structure of government. Others can have quite more complex objective such as changing a state boundary, to seeking an autonomous region, alignment with another state or an independent state of their own.

Domestic and transnational terrorism are the two major forms of terrorism that we have. The domestic terrorism is the homegrown or localized terrorism with consequences for just the host country, its citizens, properties, institutions, and policies. The victims and perpetrators of domestic terrorism are from the host country. Many ethno-religious conflicts are associated with domestic terrorism (Enders & Sandler, 2006).

In contrast, the transnational terrorism goes beyond the host country. It involves more than one country through a variety of possible connections e.g., a domestic terrorist group deliberately targets foreigners or the group has members from different countries (Schneider, Brück & Meierrieks, 2009).

**The Concept of Boko Haram**

Boko Haram is a Nigerian terrorist group that seeks the Islamisation of Nigeria especially the Northern region of Nigeria. Boko haram has unleashed terror on people by killing people and destroying valuables properties. The group is one of the most deadly terrorist groups in the world. The group wants Sharia law to be imposed in the Northern states of Nigeria. Ideologically, the group have an aversion to western education and culture, and modern science (Duma, 2010). Therefore, accepting and imbibing western education and culture such as wearing shirts and trousers, taking part in any social or political activities attributed to the western society, receiving a western education, working in banks and any government establishments, watching television etc., are sins. The group real name is Jama’atuAhliSS-SunnahLidda’awatiWal Jihad. The group’s aversion to western education may be the reason the general public tagged them as Boko Haram (Idris, 2011; Omipidan, 2011).

**Literature Review**
Causes of Terrorism

The significance of understanding the root causes of terrorism cannot be underestimated. It is argued that understanding the root causes of terrorism will go a long way in bringing an end to the menace. Arguments continue to linger on the exact causes of terrorism. There is however, no single cause to explain the cause of terrorism globally. The cause of terrorist activity varies from one terrorist group to another and from one clime to another.

The first point of argument in contemporary terrorism is the use of religion to unleash terror. The use of religion to vindicate acts of terrorism can be dated to antiquity. Terrorists destroy lives and properties to assert the sanctity of their religion or force governments to make laws or govern based on certain religious doctrines (Lutz & Lutz, 2004). It is crucial to note that using religion to justify acts of terrorism is purely misinterpretation of the message of the religion as no known human religion condones the destruction of lives and properties.

Another salient factor put forward to explain the causes of terrorism is the socio-economic variables. The socio-economic condition of people is a force to reckon with when it comes to criminality and violence. Some scholars argue that terrorism is rooted in poverty and inequality. Poverty creates frustration and anger, which in turn makes violence more likely. Sustainable peace is uncommon in a society where poverty and economic deprivation are rife. Terrorists often find it easier to lure people into their camps in a poverty-ridden society.

The role of socio-economic change and not long-run socio-economic conditions has been used to explain the rise of terrorism. The process of modernization generates different kinds of strain, e.g., new ideas (Western ideologies), economic changes, and new forms of living (rural-urban migration). All of these factors create grievances associated with social, demographic or economic strain (Robison, Crenshaw & Jenkins, 2006). For instance, development in medicine leads to decrease in mortality rate, resulting in higher populations with high youth burdens (Ehrlich & Liu, 2002). In general, modernization is associated with social, economic and demographic changes. Modernization lowers the costs of terrorist activity as they capitalize on the grumbles of “modernization losers”, hence, making financing, recruitment or other kinds of support more likely. Also, terrorists often use modern information and telecommunication technology to disseminate their opinions more effectively and to lure people into their camp (Ross, 1993).

Political instability and transformation are also connected to terrorism. Changes in a political system cause political vacuums, which terrorist groups capitalize on. Also, political instability and change are crucial to terrorism as terrorists are less likely to be confronted or challenged by an unstable government, making terrorism a less costly venture in such environment. Political unstable countries may serve as terrorism breeding grounds and safe havens (Rotberg, 2002). Systemic and political corruption can also fuel terrorism. Systemic and political corruption threaten human development and also emasculate the effectiveness of aid and investment which in turn leads to agitations which could be violent in nature from members of the society.
Apart from local politics, international politics may also enter the terrorists’ calculus. Foreign dominance (Western or US supremacy), foreign policy, alliance structures, may incite terrorist activity (Bergesen&Lizardo, 2004). For example, a conflict between a government and a group may be spread to a foreign associate of the government. This is evident in the conflict between Israeli and Palestine which triggered Palestine terrorist activities in USA and Europe (Addison &Murshed, 2005).

Furthermore, contagion may be another factor explaining terrorism (Midlarsky, Crenshaw & Yoshida, 1980). If one society suffers from terrorism, it may infect neighbourhood (spatial contagion) societies. An emerging terrorist organisation may capitalise on the skills of older groups in adjacent societies. In addition to that, when terrorist groups cooperate, this will increase their pay-offs and reduce their costs of unleashing terrors.

Porous borders also fuel terrorism. Achumba, Ighomereho and Akpan-Robaro (2013) observe that the porous borders where movements are largely unchecked have aided insecurity in Nigeria. Porous borders also leads to easy movement of weapons into the country, thereby aiding criminality and violence (Hazen & Horner, 2007).

Lastly, terrorism could be as a result of weak security system in the society. This stems from poor funding and inadequate equipment for the security apparatus, both in training and weaponry. In most cases, the security personnel assigned to tackle given security situations lack the equipment and expertise to handle the situation. Some even get influence by religious or ethnic sentiment and are easily consumed by their personal interest to serve their people, rather than the nation (Achumba, Ighomereho&Akpan-Robaro, 2013).

An Empirical Review of the Impact of Terrorism on the Economy

There is mixed evidence regarding the effects of terrorism on the economy in different regions. Tavares (2004) using a cross-country dataset for the period 1987-2001, examined the influence of terrorism on economic growth. He used ordinary least square regressions to measure the impact of natural disasters, currency crises, and terrorism on GDP growth. He finds that terrorism decreases GDP annual growth by 0.3 percent. Overall, terrorism negatively affects the economy than currency crises and natural disasters which reduce growth by 0.24 and 0.12 percent respectively.

Blomberg, Hess and Orphanides (2004) cross-country study of the impact of terrorism, internal and external wars on economic growth shows that terrorism compared to other forms of conflict, decreases GDP growth by around 0.5% yearly, and increases government spending.

Similarly, Crain and Crain (2006) investigate the impact of terrorism on the economy. They analysed a panel of about 147 countries for the period 1968 to 2002. They discovered that a reduction in terrorist activity increases national income. Specifically, the study reported that eliminating all transnational terrorism would increase global income by US$3.6 trillion and increase in fixed capital investment.
Gaibulloev and Sandler (2008) examined the relationship between terrorism and economic growth in Western Europe between 1971 and 2004. They discovered that terrorism reduces economic activity. They study concludes that both transnational and domestic terrorism affect economic growth differently: while domestic terrorism increases inefficient government spending, transnational terrorism leads to crowding out of investment.

Eckstein and Tsiddon (2004) provided a detailed analysis of the impact of terrorism on the economy of Israel from 1980 to 2003. They used VAR model to estimate the effect of terrorism on GNP, GDP, export, non-durable consumption and investment. Among the five economic variables tested, investment and export are the variables that are most sensitive to terrorism. Terrorist activities reduced quarterly GNP and GDP growth by 0.67 and 0.46 percent respectively. On a yearly basis, GDP growth is reduced by 2 percent.

It is imperative to note that some country specific features could be the factors that determine the extent of the effect of terrorism on economic growth. For instance, Tavares (2004) while analysing the effect of terrorism on GDP growth, controls for socio-political environment. He finds that the cost of terrorism is lower for democratic countries than non-democratic countries.

The level of terrorism, in most cases, does not determine the degree of the economic consequences. For instance, Blomberg, Hess and Orphanides (2004) observe that despite the higher terrorists’ activities in OECD countries, the economic cost of terrorism (GDP growth) for these countries is not higher than other parts of the world. In contrary, Africa has the least number of terrorist attacks compared to other continents, but the economic consequence of terrorism in the region, is significantly higher than the rest of the world.

Tourism is another sector which suffers greatly from terrorism. Terrorism affects tourism as result of increase (perceived) vulnerability or increased security measures. Enders and Sandler (1991) investigate the impact of transnational terrorism on tourism in Spain. They discovered that terrorism scares away more than 140,000 visitors, combining all monthly impacts. Similarly, Enders, Sandler and Parise (1992) calculate the exact losses in tourism revenue for Austria, Greece, and Italy to amount to US$ 4.538 billion, US$ 0.77 billion, and US$ 1.159 billion, respectively, from 1974 to 1988. For the same period, terrorism caused Europe as a whole US$16.145 loss in tourism revenue.

International trade is another economic variable that receives attention when it comes to terrorism. Many empirical studies confirm the negative impact of terrorism on trade (Nitsch& Schumacher, 2003; Eckstein & Tsiddon, 2004; Walkenhorst&Dihel, 2002; 2006; Blomberg& Hess, 2006). For example, Nitsch and Schumacher (2003) use gravity model to evaluate the impact of wars and terrorism on trade flows and volumes in 200 countries from 1968 to 1979. Their findings show that terrorism and wars lower bilateral trade by 4 percent.

Terrorism raises frictional trading costs such as insurance, customs, transport and handling. Research by Walkenhorst and Dihel (2002) focuses on these frictional costs to calculate the losses generated by the incidence of terrorism on trade. They used the Global Trade Analysis Project
(GTAP) model to analyse the GTAP database. The findings show that 1% increase in frictional costs leads to a worldwide welfare loss of about $75 billion per year.

Another macroeconomic variable that is sensitive to terrorism is foreign direct investment (Eckstein & Tsiddon, 2004). This is because foreign investors are reluctant to keep their investments in volatile environment. Study by Rasheed and Tahir (2002) concluded that FDI reduces in a country with increase incidence of terrorism and the reason for this is that investors have no confidence in such economy. Shahbaz, Javed, Dar and Sattar (2012) use ordinary least square regression model to investigate the relationship between foreign direct investment and terrorism in Pakistan. The study shows a negative relationship between terrorism and foreign direct investment.

Anwar and Afza (2014) focused on the impact of political instability and terrorism on inward foreign direct investment along with other economic variables such as infrastructure, investor’s incentives, inflation, exchange rate, trade openness and market size. Their findings confirmed that there are negative impacts of political instability and terrorism on inward foreign direct investment along with other economic variables such as infrastructure, trade openness exchange rate, inflation, investor's incentive and market size. Similarly, Abadie and Gardeazabal (2007) study of over 110 countries shows a negative relationship between terrorism and country Net Foreign Direct investment (NFDI).

Theoretical Framework

The paper is anchored on structural functionalism theory. The theory was first used in Biological sciences and later adopted by scholars such August Comte, Emile Durkheim, Herbert Spencer, Talcott Parson etc., to explain the human society. Structural functionalism revolves around two major concepts: structures and functions (Nwaorgu, 2002). The theory assumes that the society is made up of parts and these parts contribute positively or functionally to the operation and functioning of the system as a whole. Structural functionalism holds that each part of the society is necessary for the functioning and survival of the social organism that is the society. The theory sees the human society as an entity in which all the components, work together cooperatively and cohesively for the betterment of the overall society (Ogunbameru, 2013: 20).

Structural functionalism sees the human societies as coherent, and bonded relational constructs that function like the organisms, with their various parts or components (social institutions) working together to maintain and reproduce order and stability. Structural functionalism also asserts that since the human society is composed of different interdependent parts, a change in a part or component affects other parts (see Parsons, 1951; Turner, 1991).

The key assumption of structural functionalism which posits that the human society is composed of interdependent parts, components or organs, in which problem with one component would ultimately affect the other components, explains the nexus between terrorism and economic underdevelopment. This is because without an enabling environment in which production, industrial activities and trade can take place and prosper, economic growth would forever remain elusive.
Boko Haram Activities and Nigeria's Economy during Jonathan's Administration

Since the gradual incarnation of Boko Haram into a terrorist organisation in Nigeria, the country on a daily basis experienced the death of innocent souls through either exchange of gun fires between the military and Boko Haram or bomb blast by Boko Haram. The sect has paralysed business activities in Nigeria and led to investors moving out their investments from the country. The country’s foreign direct investment has been dropping sharply since 2009. For instance, World Investment Report (2013) unveils that in 2011, Nigeria’s inward foreign direct investment was $8.9 billion, while in 2012 it reduced to $7 billion. This shows that the country’s inward foreign direct investment reduced by $1.9 billion (21%) in just one year, a figure considered very huge for a country in need of shoring up its revenue.

One salient way through which Boko Haram activities affect the foreign direct investment is the decline of the tourism industry. Tourism in Nigeria has been negatively affected by the rife of Boko Haram phenomenon with some countries placing travel warning on the country. It is estimated that the number of tourists who visit Nigeria declined from 1,555,000 in 2010 to about 486,000 in 2012. The negative impression created by the Boko Haram insurgents accounted for the dwindling of fortunes in the hospitality industry (Okereocha, 2015).

Tourism experts revealed that the Northern region of Nigeria had lost over 30 billion naira due to the continued insurgency. In fact, the region experienced the highest inconclusive business visits, closure of amusements of parks and bars, gross stifling of revenue and lowest tourists’ arrival. Awosika (2014) notes that millions of jobs could be created by the tourism industry in Nigeria. Sadly, this may not happen if the war against insecurity fails. Hence, ending the insurgency is a fundamental aspect in the restoration of the economy.

Boko Haram activities have negative impact on trade flows and volumes in Nigeria, especially in the North. Terrorism can damage traded goods and infrastructure needed for the trade. Asike (2013) observes that many farm lands and agricultural products were destroyed by Boko Haram. The commercial sector has been paralysed by the insurgents. The small and medium scale enterprises, road side shops and stores, local markets in the Northern region of the country have been close down. All these affect the trade flow and volume in Nigeria. The effect of Boko Haram activities on grain market in Gamboru and TashanBaga markets in Borno from 2009 to 2015 will be used to give a semblance of how the menace of Boko Haram impedes trade flow and volume in Nigeria.

Mohammed and Ahmed (2015) captured the trend of grain business before and during the insurgency. The Gamboru and Baga grain market collects grains (maize, beans and sesame seeds) from neighbouring states and countries. The flow and volume of grain was greatly hindered by insurgency in the North-Eastern part of Nigeria. The grain flow as captured by Mohammed and Ahmed (2015) is presented in Table 1.
Table 1: Grains flow from Gamboru Market to Neighbouring Countries (2008-2014) in Tonnes

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Items</th>
<th>2008</th>
<th>2009</th>
<th>2010</th>
<th>2011</th>
<th>2012</th>
<th>2013</th>
<th>2014</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Maize</td>
<td>33,600</td>
<td>35,000</td>
<td>31,000</td>
<td>28,500</td>
<td>25,000</td>
<td>20,000</td>
<td>16,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Millet</td>
<td>5,040</td>
<td>7,500</td>
<td>8,200</td>
<td>6,000</td>
<td>5,200</td>
<td>3,600</td>
<td>3,600</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Beans</td>
<td>88,200</td>
<td>82,000</td>
<td>80,000</td>
<td>72,000</td>
<td>64,000</td>
<td>43,000</td>
<td>21,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sorghum</td>
<td>27,300</td>
<td>30,000</td>
<td>24,000</td>
<td>19,000</td>
<td>20,000</td>
<td>15,200</td>
<td>7,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>154,140</td>
<td>154,500</td>
<td>143,200</td>
<td>125,500</td>
<td>114,200</td>
<td>81,800</td>
<td>47,600</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Table 1 revealed that in 2008, an estimated 154,140 tonnes of grains (maize, millet, beans, sorghum) flowed in and out of Gamboru en route sub markets in the hinterland. The quantity increased a bit to 154,500 in 2009. However, grain volume in Gamboru market experienced a dramatic decline when the insurgency was at its peak (22010-2014). This is because a substantial amount of these grains comes through the Boko Haram annexed communities of Monguno, Baga, Gubio and Dabarmasara.

Table 2: Grain flow from Baga market to Neighbouring Countries (2008-2015) in Tonnes

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Items</th>
<th>2008</th>
<th>2009</th>
<th>2010</th>
<th>2011</th>
<th>2012</th>
<th>2013</th>
<th>2014</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Maize</td>
<td>38,400</td>
<td>38,600</td>
<td>30,200</td>
<td>24,500</td>
<td>16,700</td>
<td>15,900</td>
<td>13,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Millet</td>
<td>18,900</td>
<td>22,000</td>
<td>16,500</td>
<td>14,000</td>
<td>12,600</td>
<td>7,000</td>
<td>3,700</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Beans</td>
<td>58,300</td>
<td>52,900</td>
<td>43,000</td>
<td>45,000</td>
<td>33,000</td>
<td>30,000</td>
<td>16,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sorghum</td>
<td>25,200</td>
<td>21,000</td>
<td>19,000</td>
<td>22,000</td>
<td>16,000</td>
<td>14,000</td>
<td>14,200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>140,800</td>
<td>134,500</td>
<td>108,700</td>
<td>105,500</td>
<td>78,300</td>
<td>66,900</td>
<td>46,900</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


The Baga market which is also noted for transaction in cereal and grains products was also greatly affected by the activities of the Boko Haram. The market can be said to be the gateway to other parts
of the country for grain commodities such as beans, millet, sorghum-bicolour, maize and sorghum-vulgare. Grain flow to/from Baga market as captured by Mohammed and Ahmed (2015) is presented in table 2

Table 2 revealed that in 2008, grain flow to and from Baga grain market was 140,800 tonnes. It decreased to 134,500 tonnes in 2009. A very significant reduction was witnessed between 2010 and 2014.

Table 1 and 2 showed that grain flow was greatly affected by the insurgency. The grains sold in these markets are sourced mostly from Niger, Tchad and Cameroon and transported through the various local government areas controlled by the insurgents. Thus, movement of goods through these routes was very difficult.

Conclusion and Recommendation

Terrorism in any society threatens lives and properties, impedes business activities and discourages investments, all of which hinder the socio-economic development of a country. In a nutshell, terrorism can be said to be the antithesis of humanity as well as socio-economic development. Hence, all hands must be on desk to ensure that Boko Haram insurgency is curbed as doing this would not only bring peace to the society but also sustainable economic development. In order to curb the menace of Boko Haram, the following recommendations are essential:

1. The activities and preachings of the clerics must be censored.

2. The security apparatus should be strengthened by recruiting capable people, increase their welfare and by giving them sophisticated weapons. All these will encourage the security personnel to confront the insurgents.

3. There is need for a sincere and robust regional collaboration in terms of training, intelligence gathering and sharing etc., among the neighbouring countries like Nigeria, Cameroon, Niger and Tchad.

4. Government at all levels should ensure that poverty, unemployment and illiteracy are curbed.

References


The Contribution of Co-operatives to Rural Economic Growth and Poverty Alleviation in South Africa: Lessons from Bangladesh

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Abstract: Developing countries, particularly in Africa are on a constant bid to discover and find ways to improve the living standards of their citizens, particularly those that are living in the rural remote areas. Co-operative societies and banks are one of the many forms of business that are being formed to empower everyone in the society especially women and the youth in order to increase steady economic growth and alleviate poverty. In South Africa, co-operatives have been given full recognition by the state as a lucrative form of business to assist Historically Disadvantaged People to participate in the new economy, hence the introduction of the Co-operatives Act of 2005 and recently the Co-operative Banks Act of 2007. This article examines the impact of co-operatives in South Africa and the contribution they are making towards economic growth and poverty alleviation. It highlights the problems of registration challenges that potential co-operative banks face in meeting requirements for the establishment of a cooperative bank. More importantly, it draws useful lessons from the Grameen Bank in Bangladesh for the purposes of improving and strengthening operations and sustainability of co-operatives in South Africa. Bangladesh is chosen against the backdrop that it has similar socio-economic challenges with South Africa in terms of chronic and extreme poverty, particularly in the rural areas and amongst women.

Keywords: cooperative bank and society, economic growth, rural areas, poverty alleviation, South Africa, Bangladesh

Introduction

South Africa is still undergoing socio-economic development to remedy the injustices brought about by the apartheid in order to improve the quality and standard of living of its citizens (Huschka and Mau, 2006). The government, since attainment of independence in 1994 has introduced policies such as the Reconstruction Development Policy (RDP) and introduction of the Broad Based Economic Empowerment (BEE) to empower and emancipate Historically Disadvantaged People (HDP) (Khatleli, 2009). These policies are meant to allow black people to participate in the new economy and improve their living conditions. The legislature has also promulgated acts meant to allow economic equality in South Africa and these include the Co-operatives Act of 2005 and the Co-operatives Banks Act of 2007. These acts were inspired by the traditional stokvel in South Africa. Stokvel is defined as “an informal savings pool or syndicate, usually among black people, in which funds are contributed in rotation, allowing participants lumpsums for family needs (esp. funerals).” Stokvels are usually on the invitation of people who come together say for instance about 12 in number to form a club where members contribute fixed sums of money to a central fund on a weekly, fortnightly or monthly basis.

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The name “stokvel” originated from the term “stock fairs”, as the rotating cattle auctions of English settlers in the Eastern Cape of South Africa during the early 19th century were known (WBS, 2012).

The stokvel movements emerged as an attempt by black people to create co-operatives back in the mid-19th century and amidst a hostile legislative environment (DTI, 2012). The movements are practised by average South Africans in communities, thus the Government deemed it fit to provide them with a regulatory framework that allows for the registration and management of these movements into co-operatives in order to monitor their development and ensure their sustainability.

The Co-operatives Banks Act was drafted to regulate and manage financial co-operatives and to ensure that after registration they graduate to become Co-operative Banks. The Act made provision for the establishment of the Co-operative Development Agency (CBDA) which oversees all Co-operative Financial Institutions (CFI) and assist them in the process of acquiring the requirements for registration and recognition. However, the supervisors of the CBDA have noted challenges debilitating such institutions from registering to become co-operative banks. These challenges range from inadequate capital levels, poor management of information systems, and lack of accounting expertise to weak governance structures. With such challenges affecting CFI, only two banks have managed to register since the Act came into force about 10 years ago.

Since its inception in 2007, the Act has made an insignificant impact towards its goal of promoting socio-economic development in South Africa, majorly due to the inability of most Co-operative Financial Institutions to meet the requirements outlined in the Act to qualify for registration as Co-operative Banks. It must be pointed out that there has been relatively low public awareness in disseminating the opportunities of forming and joining co-operatives and the people mostly affected by the Act are mainly poor black people who are illiterates and do not understand the procedures to meet the registration requirements. This article identifies some of the challenges preventing CFI from meeting the requirements for registration as Co-operative Banks. More importantly, the article highlights that while registration is the first step, operation and sustainability of a co-operative bank is critically imperative for the purposes of delivering credit and loan assistance to the poor. Bangladesh’s approach to poverty alleviation was the establishment of a credit programme known as the Grameen Bank for the extreme poor (Hossain, 1988). The word Grameen means village. Against the backdrop of this and in order to ensure sustainability in operation, lessons were drawn from Grameen Bank in Bangladesh. Grameen Bank is a perfect model of a successful co-operative bank till date that had been established in a developing country. The article also showcases and highlights the economic potential of co-operatives in reducing poverty and creating self-employment.

**Theoretical Framework**

A co-operative is defined by the International Co-operative Alliance as an autonomous association of persons united voluntarily to meet their common economic, social, cultural needs and aspirations through a jointly owned and democratically-controlled enterprise (Birchall, 2004). Co-operatives differ
from joint-stock companies primarily in their governance because in a co-operative, voting right are based on membership as opposed to the size of shareholding in joint-stock companies (Bernardi, 2007). Co-operatives also differ from philanthropic foundations in that they are set up to benefit the needs of their members rather than the needs of others (Novkovic, 2008). There are several types of co-operatives and most of them focus on a particular economic sector, but others focus on the nature of membership. Major types include agricultural cooperatives, financial cooperatives, housing cooperatives, health and social care cooperatives, consumer cooperatives, and worker cooperatives (Nair and Todd, 2007).

Co-operatives exist under various guises in South Africa. Sometimes they are referred to as ‘projects’, ‘self-help groups’, ‘mutual societies’, ‘village banks’, ‘credit unions’ ‘consumer store’ and sometimes even the word ‘association’ is used to describe cooperatives (Birchall, 2010). Essentially, “co-operatives are member-owned and democratically controlled institutions” (Novkovic, 2008). They are not-for-profit in the sense that voting in a co-operative is not based on the number of shares owned but instead on the universal principle: one member, one vote (Satgar, 2007).

**Literature Review**

Co-operative Financial Institutions have been in existence in South Africa for decades. The Cooperative Banks Act Act 40 of 2007 was enacted to regularise these types of financial institutions. The Preamble of the Act clearly states that it is meant:

To promote and advance the social and economic welfare of all South Africans by enhancing access to banking services under sustainable conditions; to promote the development of sustainable and responsible co-operative banks; to establish an appropriate regulatory framework and regulatory institutions for co-operative banks that protect members of co-operative banks; to provide for the registration of deposit-taking financial services co-operatives as co-operative banks; to provide for the regulation and supervision of co-operative banks; and to provide for the establishment of co-operative banks supervisors and a development agency for co-operative banks; and to provide for matters connected therewith.

The Act recognises the importance of co-operatives in South Africa, in that a viable, autonomous, self-reliant and self-sustaining co-operative movement can play a major role in the economic and social development of the Republic of South Africa, in particular by creating employment, generating income, facilitating broad-based black economic empowerment and eradicating poverty.

The role being played by co-operatives in South Africa is very significant as they are formed to eradicate poverty and unemployment (Philip, 2003). Co-operatives have been promoted in many developing countries as a mechanism for driving agricultural growth and rural development (Nganwa et al., 2010). In terms of Financial Co-operatives, they are regarded as the third-tier of banking in South Africa which is made up of member-based financial institutions; across a spectrum that includes *stokvels*, burial societies, savings and credit unions, village Banks, and Mutual Banks.
(Henama, 2012). While not all of these would define themselves as co-operatives, many in fact meet the essential criterion of member ownership and control. A lot has been made of the role and potential of *stokvels* as forms of ‘rotating savings and credit’ associations (Philip, 2003).

The National *Stokvel* Association of South Africa (NASASA) estimates that there are a total of 800,000 *stokvels*, burial societies and rotating savings and credit associations in South Africa, with about 8.25 million members, and an estimated R400 million a month in savings (Philip, 2003). While NASASA’s membership of 15,000 *stokvels* is significant, the formalisation of a wider membership network of *stokvels* has proved elusive, making accurate data hard to come by (ECI Africa, 2003). The statistics demonstrate the economic potential of financial co-operatives in South Africa once given proper corporate governance, skills development and research.

According to Lyne and Collins (2008), “the availability of dedicated support suggests that cooperatives will also play an important role in the management of community-owned resources acquired through land reform, including reforms planned for the country’s communal areas. The Cooperatives Act explicitly targets black people in rural areas.

Mpalwha (2005) points out that “African intellectuals and leaders favour cooperatives to empower marginalised communities because African society is ideally suited to working in cooperatives.” South Africa’s 2003 Presidential Growth and Development Summit endorsed special measures to support development-oriented cooperatives. Following this commitment, government responsibility for cooperatives was transferred from the Department of Agriculture (DoA) to the Department of Trade and Industry (DTI). The DTI drafted new policy on co-operatives and a Bill that was gazetted in 2003, the Bill was enacted in August 2005. (Mpalwha, 2005).

The Finance Minister, Pravin Gordhan in the 2010/11 published a Combined Report of the Supervisors of the Cooperative Bank Agency and the South African Reserve Bank where it was stated that, “Co-operative banks should not be seen as an appendage to the current banking sector, but as an alternative in providing access to sound financial services. The effective implementation and enforcement of the Act, through increased registration of co-operative banks, should not only promote access to finance, but also support the economic and financial empowerment of communities. Organic growth of co-operative banks has the potential to increase effective participation of community members in the economy resulting from responsible member-based funding of new economic activities.”

The Minister went on to point out the challenges being faced currently by the sector and remarked that “the level and quality of member participation, the skills of members of boards of directors and managers, and general knowledge of co-operative principles are relatively low at present. The extent to which co-operative banks’ financial outreach will improve over time, and the level of interaction between communities and the broader economic sectors will largely depend on the success of the CBDA in achieving the development objectives of the Act, and on the Supervisors’ role in ensuring that registered co-operative banks are appropriately and effectively regulated and supervised” (CRSCB, 2010).
The Supervisors of the CBDA in their 2010-11 report stated that, “in view of the developmental objectives of the Act, the Supervisors have not yet initiated the winding up of any co-operative that failed to apply for registration in terms of section 92(2) of the Act. There is currently close co-operation with the CBDA, Capacity Building Unit and the self-regulatory bodies to ensure that the outstanding applications are received in due course.”

Until a clear policy decision has been taken regarding the future regulation of deposit-taking CFI not registered as co-operative banks, either by not being approved for registration as a co-operative bank or not meeting the minimum criteria to apply for registration, such CFI will continue to operate under exemption notices and will continue to be regulated by the self-regulatory bodies as designated in terms of the existing exemption notices (CRSCB, 2010).

These challenges are still being encountered presently, thus a way forward has to be put forward to allow for the registration of co-operative banks. Internationally, Cooperative Financial Institutions play a pivotal role towards the socio-economic development of their countries. According to Phillip, “a few international case studies of co-ops have been selected to give some context to the debates taking place here. These include the Italian Leganazionaledelle Cooperative (Legacoop)-which is the largest co-op federation in Italy, where co-ops are sufficiently influential in the economy to be defined as ‘the third sector’; the Mondragon Co-operative Corporation, in Spain – probably the most famous success story of all; the role of co-ops and ESOP’s in China’s transition economy; and the case of Kerala, in India.”

According to the Department of Trade and Industry, “international studies reveal that countries which have created an environment conducive to promoting co-operatives, by developing legislative instruments, supportive programmes and delivery institutions, grow rapidly and contribute positively to economic development, employment creation, economic ownership by local communities, and human resource development. Canada, Spain, Kenya, Italy, India and Bangladesh have proven to be successful in the development of co-operatives and best practice was drawn from their experiences to inform the Strategy” (CRSCB, 2010). It is against the backdrop of the successes achieved through these co-operatives that this article utilised Grameen Bank in Bangladesh to amplify the intrinsic role and contribution of cooperative banks to poverty reduction, job creation and rural economic growth.

**Rationale and Methodology**

Co-operative banking is a business venture that can contribute significantly towards socio-economic development and growth in South Africa (P Agupusi 2007). Therefore, the study aims to highlight the economic potential of co-operative banks once effective and appropriate supervision of CFI is put in place to monitor and advise them on ways to maintain liquidity and capital adequacy. This in turn would ensure that co-operative banking acts as a powerful drive for development in South Africa by providing employment, alleviation of poverty and increased participation of the HDP in the commercial business sector. The research methodology used in this study is qualitative where secondary data sources such as textbooks, reports, legislations, regulations, case laws, articles and so on were robustly reviewed and applied for the purposes of addressing and offering solution to the problem. It
also draws success story from Grameen Bank in Bangladesh and presents useful lessons that would help shape co-operatives in South Africa so that they can be profitable and sustainable. Bangladesh is chosen because it has similar socio-economic challenges similar to that of South Africa where there are chronic and extreme poverty particularly in the rural areas and among women.

Challenges facing Cooperative Banks and Societies in South Africa

The state and nature of co-operative banks in South Africa exhibits challenges in the application of the Cooperative Banks Act as a tool to drive socio-economic development and growth. Co-operative banking has for the last 10 years failed to grow. This is attributed to certain factors that have been noted by the supervisors of the CBDA as major concerns preventing CFI from becoming potential co-operative banks. For example, CFI were given opportunity to apply for registration, however, every year they exhibited the same weaknesses which prevented them from registering as co-operative banks. In their reports, the Supervisors also mentioned that they offer support to the CFI in order to allow them to meet the prudential requirements for registration, but the situation has remained the same, applications for registration have been denied on one or more grounds. The reasons for failing to register are discussed below:

Inadequate capital levels

The Supervisors of the CBDA noted that majority of CFI lack capital to sustain their business. This poses risks to the restoration of confidence in member-based banking. The regulation (Gazette No. 9110, 1 July No. 32357 Vol. 529 Pretoria, 2009) passed by the Minister of Finance stipulated that the minimum capital adequacy ratio must be 6% of the total assets held by the co-operative bank. However, most of the applicants fail to meet this requirement.

For purposes of calculating the minimum capital adequacy ratio referred to in regulation 4(2) of the gazette 2009, only the following qualify as capital:

(i) Membership shares issued by the co-operative bank

(ii) Indivisible reserve requirement in terms of the Act

(iii) Non-distributable reserves created or increased by appropriations of surpluses (retained earnings)

(iv) Any other non-distributable funds of a permanent nature not subject to a legal claim by any person held by a co-operative bank approved by the Supervisor in writing.

It is clear that the sector is inadequately capitalised with the consolidated capital adequacy ratio averaging 2% per over the four-year period. The poor capital position is attributable to the low member capital base and high losses of loans which resulted in negative institutional capital. This means that CFI still need to grow their capital base by increasing the number of members, and finding ways to recover losses in order to meet the minimum capital adequacy ratio. Coupled with this is the fact that most applicants regard the capital adequacy ratio as too high, and are failing to meet the
requirement. They further alleged that they are concerned about the weak capital position in general, compared to international standards

Inadequate credit risk management practices

CFI credit risk is one of the aspects that need to be considered based on the nature of business of these institutions. According to the Supervisors of the CBDA, credit risk is arguably one of the main risks facing CFI. The Supervisors further state that, training is also required as far as the monitoring and management of delinquent loans is concerned. In some of the pre-registration assessments conducted, it was clear that management reacted too late, especially in instances where no provisions for bad and doubtful debts had been made. In addition, as evident from the management accounts that were scrutinised, bad debts were often not appropriately written off to reflect the true financial position of some of the applicant CFI.

The 2010/11 report further observed that, while credit committees were generally found to be active, there were often cases where credit committee members had approved loans that exceeded their authorised limits in terms of the applicable loan policies that were in place at the time of the assessments. This in simple terms means that granting loans in excess of the amount prescribed would pose a great risk to the CFI in the event that the loan is not repaid. This is one of the major challenges facing CFIs.

Weak governance structures

Generally, corporate governance in the co-operative banks sector is very weak. Members of supervisory and audit committees seldom meet. Some of the committees that meet on a regular basis often fail to provide effective oversight. Furthermore, members’ active participation through annual general meetings (AGMs) is generally inadequate, with some of the CFI not holding AGMs at all. Members are in need of training, especially in respect of committee and board responsibilities. Training should not be limited to existing board members, but should be extended to all interested members in order to increase the pool of suitable members who could be appointed to the board.

Therefore, the CBDA should conduct training exercises for developing CFI to ensure that there is corporate governance. Principles of corporate governance as outlined in the King III report should be taught and applied thus: “Ethical leadership and corporate citizenship, Boards and directors, Audit committees, The governance of risk, The use of information technology, Compliance with the laws, codes, rules and standards, Internal audit, Governing stakeholders relationships, and Integrated reporting and disclosure.”

Effective application of these principles would assist towards proper governance of CFIs.

Weak operational capacity

The Supervisors also stated that another challenge facing CFIs is weak operational capacity. While credit and savings policies are available, they are often outdated or not implemented. Evidence
suggests that CFIs merely adopt policy templates provided by the self-regulatory bodies without the necessary expertise to implement the relevant policy proposals successfully. For example, the majority of institutions that were assessed did not have liquidity or cash flow policies to guide them in managing their liquidity positions.

Lack of accounting expertise

There is hardly any member in the CFI with the necessary accounting experience and qualifications for keep the financial records of the institution, especially in the rural areas, where the need for access to finance and economic development is the greatest. Consequently, financial statements and management accounts are often found to be in disarray. Providing basic training in accounting skills and use of accounting software to CFI will be crucial for the development of member-based banking, especially in the rural areas.

Poor management of information systems

Urban-based CFI use basic computerised accounting and management information systems (MISs). These are, however, in most instances considered inadequate for basic banking operations. For example, loan portfolio performance is not properly monitored in many instances. Rural CFI are using manual systems to open accounts and record transactions. Such institutions will not be able to submit their prudential returns on time to the Supervisors to conduct effective off-site supervision. It is evident that they are in need of technical support to provide accurate and effective management information in a timely manner.

Addressing registration Challenges facing cooperative banks and Societies in South Africa

Over and above, more needs to be done to address the situation preventing CFI from meeting the requirements for co-operative bank registration. It is also crystal clear that the CBDA Capacity Building Unit (the Capacity Building Unit determines the training needs for the cooperative banking sector and develops appropriate capacity enhancement programmes in conjunction with relevant stakeholders) is not doing enough to ensure that these institutions receive the necessary guidance to meet registration.

According to Padi (2016), the major challenge facing CFI is the fact that there is poor growth in terms of membership. This means that a lot of people are unaware of the services provided by these institutions. As a result of a low membership base, the CFI may not be able to meet the capital adequacy ratio; hence it would eventually fail to register. Therefore, aggressive and effective marketing is needed so that the CFI reaches out to a large number of members. This will increase the capital base and build on capital adequacy which is a requirement for registration.

Adherence to co-operative principles is also an important aspect which will eventually persuade the Supervisors to grant the application for registration. Supervisors state that such adherence is a precondition for registration. In addition, the CFIs should foster ethical values of honesty, openness and social responsibility. The adoption and maintenance of co-operative principles and values
contribute to the stability and growth of CFI, and improve the co-operative image and reputation that should restore confidence in the sector.

Padi asserted that CFIs should be guided by the seven cooperative principles namely: voluntary and open membership, democratic member control, member economic participation, autonomy and independence, education, training and information, cooperation among co-operatives and concern for community

The ability to establish and maintain adequate and effective processes of corporate governance that are consistent with the size, nature, complexity and inherent risks of the activities and the business of the institution is crucial. This includes the proper evaluation of the processes that have been established to achieve the institution’s strategic and business objectives efficiently, effectively, ethically and equitably. Co-operative banks must have proper governance structures in place, including the implementation of a supervisory committee, governance committee and audit committee (Tricker and Tricker, 2015).

There is need for proper governance which places greater responsibility on the Board and the management. The board of a co-operative bank must craft a strategic plan with vision, mission and objectives and should organise an Annual General Meeting. The board should make sure financial statements are prepared and the co-operative bank is audited. Management and board should also develop policies and revise the policies to suit the operations and principles of the bank. The policies include savings policy, loan policy, liquidity management, membership recruitment, investment, training, performance appraisal, procurement, information technology, and security. All these should conform to the corporate governance principles.

Co-operative banks are required to meet and maintain minimum prudential requirements. In South Africa, the capital-adequacy requirement is set at 6 per cent of total assets. Additional capital, calculated as 2 per cent of all loans, is also required for co-operative banks that provide loans to members. Adequate provisioning for delinquent loans and sufficient liquidity are essential. Minimum liquidity requirements prescribe that at least 10 per cent of total deposits must be held in liquid investments and loans may not exceed 80 per cent of total assets. The potential of applicants to reach these levels within a reasonable period is taken into account for registration purposes.

Also, there is a need to comply with all the prudential regulations, the cooperative banks act and the cooperative act. This however has been a huge impediment to CFI because they state that the prudential requirements are difficult to comply with since the percentages are too high, and it is almost impossible to meet them. This has been the major reason why most applications have been denied.

Furthermore, matters relating to human resources, such as capacity building and staff training, are critical for the effectiveness and sustainability of co-operative banks. To this end, education and training are one of the key factors affecting the growth and sustainability of co-operative banks. Succession planning is also pivotal, especially at senior management and board levels. It is a requirement that every co-operative bank must have sufficient human capacity to operate efficiently
and competently. Each co-operative bank has to appoint suitable qualified and experienced members as directors and executive officers. Once again, the nature and size of the co-operative bank are taken into consideration when determining whether directors are considered to be "fit and proper."

The Supervisors also noted in the 2010/11 report that, co-operative banks should be fully committed to sound risk management standards and practices commensurate with their nature and size. A co-operative bank must, *inter alia*, ensure that:

- policies and procedures that are in place are consistent with its vision and business strategies;
- realistic benchmarks and limits have been set to guide its risk appetite;
- appropriate systems are in place for reporting, monitoring and controlling risks; and
- independent checks and balances are in place to monitor compliance with prudential requirements.

Co-operative banks must have appropriate means to interact effectively with their members, suppliers, regulators and counterparties. Furthermore, an appropriate MIS must be in place to support their business operations as information technology is vital for the sustenance of a co-operative bank.

More advanced technology is required by larger cooperatives, especially those operating closer to cities and towns to cater for the needs of their members. This would also enhance their competitive ability and result in improved access to finance for members. Some of the challenges experienced in the industry are the ways in which co-operative banks are regulated. They went further to also outline that amendments in co-operative legislation will go a long way in ensuring the survival of co-operative banks, since the current regulations make it difficult for upcoming CFI to thrive. Competition from major banks in the country is also one of the major reasons preventing the growth of more co-operative banks in South Africa.

### Overcoming Challenges facing Cooperatives in South Africa: Lessons from Grameen Bank, Bangladesh

Cooperative Banks are formed to offer institutional credit facility to the poor to be able to partake in the developing entrepreneurial activities (Hossain, 1988). In Bangladesh, one of the most inspired co-operative banks is the Grameen Bank which was established in 1983 to provide credit to the rural poor for the purposes of improving their economic condition (Egger 1986). Though the bank faced some management challenges at the initial stage just like what co-operative banks are experiencing now in South Africa, Grameen has progressed rapidly over the years. Remarkably, loans are issued without any collateral and with little interest rate. This is contrary to what obtains in South Africa where the interest on loans might be as high as 300% making repayment difficult or impossible (Hietalahlhti and Linden, 2006). More importantly, women are at the centre of the lending activity in Bangladesh in order to empower them (Rahman and Milgram 2001). These credit facilities and loans help women, especially poor women to generate new employment in the activities of their choice. Majority of these women are now economically and socially empowered to be self-employed. They are also able to create employment for others as their enterprise blossoms.
Usually, in Bangladesh, Credit facilities are issued to different groups for collective enterprises such as investing in irrigation machines, rice hullers, oil mills and power looms and so on (Hossain, 1988). The reasons for lending to these groups are for the groups to take advantage of improved technology and economies of scales.

Gameen bank sources and develops its liquidity portfolio by bringing large numbers of low-income people into the discipline of economic development derived from a credit system that has virtually no overdues or bad loans (Harper and Arora, 2005). Bad loans are being controlled and contained because the bank has an approach that keeps overdues and loan losses at close to zero. This is done through strong management style and approaches which utilises skilled people and experts in managing credits and loans portfolios of the bank. Robust capacity is at the fore front of the management style. However, this does not mean that there are not instances of repayment defaults. The ability of the bank however to confine credit services to the extremely needy; strong management; provisions of loans for activities that generate regular incomes; the collection of repayments in small amounts suitable to the circumstances under which the poor earn and live has made loan recovery effective and excellent.

Grameen bank is a rare success story in the history of rural credit programmes in developing countries amidst policy makers who would like to use credit programmes as an antipoverty programme (Bateman, 2011). The bank has made positive contributions to the alleviation of poverty in its area of operation. What makes this programme very remarkable is the concept of generating self-employment for the poor through availing credit facilities without collateral. South Africa should adopt this approach in view of the widespread poverty, inequality and unemployment/underemployment the country is currently going through.

South Africa can draw useful lessons from Bangladesh by improving and strengthening their cooperatives societies and banks by encouraging many people to participate in the scheme. Ensure that the interest rate chargeable on loans facilities is very low unlike what obtains in South Africa currently. The loans should be channelled to productive use. Engaging experts and skilled persons in the management of loans/credit facilities and also skilled and experts in managing defaults and challenges sometimes faced by enterprises that was initially thriving but on the brink of failing. Women should be at the centre of credit advances in order to capacitate them as self-employed entrepreneurs. There is need to address the challenges that affect the co-operative bank in order to sustain continuity, safe and sound bank.

The nexus between co-operative banking and socio-economic development

The introduction of the Co-operative Banks Act has made tremendous strides towards uplifting socio-economic development in South Africa. The Act has managed to provide a platform wherein Financial Co-operatives may develop and thrive. The Act targets people in communities, by giving them access
to member based banking and affordable loans through their own co-operatives. This in turn ensures that people in communities can emancipate themselves through projects that improve their standard of living. The Act, through the Co-operative Banks Development Agency continues to give guidance and training to current and newly emerging Financial Co-operatives.

The Government recognizes that the main purpose of co-operatives is to render services to members. Co-operatives contribute to the development of the communities and the nation at large through the improvement of the socio-economic situation of their members (DTI, 2004). It further acknowledges the specific potential of co-operatives, as enterprises and organizations inspired by solidarity, to respond to members’ needs and ensure greater black participation in the mainstream economy, especially persons in rural areas, women, persons with disability and youth. The Government shall also continuously engage with stakeholders in the youth and women sectors to design appropriate support programmes (DTI, 2004).

The CBDA records show that there are currently only two registered co-operative banks regulated by the South African Reserve Bank. These contribute toward 40 per cent of the sector's total assets. Eleven institutions are eligible for registration as co-operative banks as they have met the Act’s regulatory threshold of more than 200 members and R1 million in deposits. However, they have not met other prudential requirements, regulated by the CBDA. They make up 53 per cent of the assets of the sector. The CBDA also supervises and regulates thirteen ‘other’ CFIs. The industry has a total of 24 722 members, and a combined total of R236 533 481 in assets. This clearly shows the economic potential of financial co-operatives and how they contribute to socio-economic growth in the country. The main deterrent has been the failure to meet the requirements for registration as co-operative banks which the CBDA must address. It is dominated by women and the youth which makes it the perfect tool to emancipate and develop communities.

The Department of Trade and Industry also noted that the Government shall also consider introducing support measures for the activities of co-operatives that meet specific social and public policy outcomes, such as employment creation and the development of activities benefiting disadvantaged groups or geographical areas (DTI, 2004).

Promoting co-operative enterprises is a key programme component of the Government’s Broad-Based Black Economic Empowerment (BEE) strategy that seeks to address the imbalances of the past and equitably transfer the ownership and control of economic resources to the majority of its citizens. The BEE strategy will, among other things, encourage and support efforts by co-operatives and other forms of enterprise that support broad-based economic empowerment (Broad-based empowerment models-ESOPs, community trusts/groups, worker co-operatives, stokvels, burial societies and so on. To assert ownership and control of economic activities in new and existing enterprises and break into new sectors of the economic activity, government is committed to work with the co-operative movement to ensure that an increasing portion of the ownership and control of the economic activities is vested amongst co-operative enterprises (DTI, 2004).
Conclusion

This article clearly shows that there is still need to develop and ensure growth in the co-operative banking industry in terms of new policy frameworks, research and training. The industry has so much potential in terms of socio-economic growth, as such; the government must dedicate more support for this industry. More co-operative financial institutions need to register, therefore the Co-operative Banks Development Agency (CBDA) and Capacity Building Unit must ensure that all CFI are properly trained and understand the legislative frameworks that regulate their industry. Grameen Bank in Bangladesh operations have shown that with the right skills and expertise integrated into the sector, cooperative banks and societies will thrive and deliver essential socio-economic empowerment to the poor in the rural areas. By so doing, there will be increase of economic activities because there is access to credit and loan facilities, self-employment, poverty reduction and increase in the quality and standard of living in the rural areas.

Recommendations

It is evident that the regulatory threshold of minimum of 200 members and R1million in deposits imposed by the Act oseems to be too high since most CFI are failing to meet these criteria. It is therefore recommended that since the industry is still developing, the threshold should be reduced to allow more Co-operative Banks to be registered, however they can be placed under a probationary period to evaluate if they are able to sustain themselves. The Supervisors would also have to pay close attention to such banks and give them the necessary guidance.

Furthermore, there should be more public awareness of services provided by Co-operative Banks. As it stands, most CFI have small membership size and the increase in membership numbers is very sluggish since people are not aware of such banks, resulting in the failure to meet the 200 member threshold. The CBDA must come up with advertising campaigns about what these institutions have to offer.

The situation is made worse by the competition such banks receive from the big established commercial banks. Thus, more awareness must be made about CFI.

It is also recommended that further training must be given CFI, to acquaint them with corporate governance, especially on the roles and duties of the board of directors to allow them to exercise practical and ethical leadership. This would ensure the development and sustainability of such banks because they would have knowledge of risk management, audit, and information technology.

The lessons drawn from Bangladesh should be used to improve and strengthen weak aspects of stokvels and cooperatives so that they can be self-sustaining, give more credit and loan facilities to the poor and more importantly the indigent women in the rural areas.
References


Abstract: This study critically examines the relationships between occupation and illicit substance abuse and deviant behaviours in Nigeria especially among the commercial motor drivers in Lagos State. Several relevant literatures were reviewed so as to lay a solid explanatory foundation for the study. The study is anchored on three major models of the social learning theory. The study adopts survey research method. Surulere local government area was scientifically selected as the study location. Simple random sampling technique was used to select a sample size of one hundred and sixty-five (165) respondents for the study. The research instruments used for data collection were self-administered questionnaire and in-depth interview (IDI). The data gathered from the field were analysed using frequency distribution (univariate analysis) and chi-square ($\chi^2$) (bivariate analysis) to test the relationship between the variables. Content analysis was also used to analyse the qualitative data generated from the field. Out of the three hypotheses tested, two of the findings revealed that there is no significant relationships between Old age and illicit substances abused among the commercial vehicle drivers in Lagos State, while there is significant relationships between illicit substances abused and antisocial behaviours among the commercial vehicle drivers in Lagos State. The study then recommends among others that government must place strict ban on the sales of illicit substances in public places especially in the public motor parks.

Keywords: substance abuse, commercial vehicle drivers, alcohol, marijuana deviant behaviour

Introduction
Abuse of substances has become a global problem causing both social and health havoc in many countries including Nigeria. Without doubt availability of substance in the country has been of tremendous benefit to mankind but it has been acknowledged that the inappropriate use of the same can do incalculable harm not only to individuals but to the society at large. Substance abuse has been defined from several perspectives by several scholars and authors alike, the World Health Organisation (WHO) (1981) define it as any use of drug or substance that cause physical, psychological, legal or social harm to the individual or to others affected by the substance user’s behaviours. This definition reveals to some extent how the impact of substance abuse can be felt in various forms of human life. For instance, if someone becomes accustomed to a particular substance whether licit or illicit the abuse of it is inevitable. And whatever you do cannot eventually control you (Olaniyi, 2016). There are several cases in which some people abuse the substances like cough mixture, pain relief medicines like aspirin, panadol and several others without proper medical prescription, which in turn becomes addiction. In fact, some people are so much addicted to taking items like sugar, coca-cola drink among others. These have been found to have affected their physical well-being by causing dangerous and terminal illnesses like diabetes, chronic-diarrhoea etc.
Substance abuse can be viewed sociologically, psychologically, medically, legally and morally. Whatever way one perceives drug abuse, it interferes with the health and normal social functioning of an individual. An alarming number of people engage in abusing drugs with the impression of being euphoric, self-confident, energetic and invulnerable. Furthermore, drug abuse invariably leads to intoxicant-related problems such as suicide, drowning, disruption of schooling and family life, delinquency, drunk-driving and accident. It also leads to loss of productivity, loss of jobs, legal difficulties, violent or aggressive behaviour, disordered social relationship and avoidable deaths. Not only do alcohol intake and drug abuse contribute to the above mentioned problems they also threaten the fundamental of the social fabrics of society such as values, beliefs and cultural systems, and can cause a wide range of mental illnesses which are not necessarily reversible (Adekoya, B. J., Adekoya, Adepoju, and Owoeye, 2011).

The use of illicit substances has been associated with the way some people behave. Violent behaviours and other anti-social behaviours often stem out of substance intake. Although every society has a way of measuring acceptable behaviours, a behaviour that is anti-social in one place may not be in another place. The behaviour that deviate from the acceptable behaviour of the people in a particular society is always referred to as antisocial behaviour. Scholars are of the view that antisocial behaviours could be covert or overt. For instance, Halluhan, (2006) defined it as destructive acts characterized by covert and overt hostility and intentional aggression towards others. This form of aggression and hostilities are commonly found among the commercial vehicle drivers in Nigeria. Antisocial behaviours exist along a severity continuum and include repeated violations of social rules, defiance of authority and of the rights of others, deceitfulness, theft and reckless disregard for self and others. Antisocial behaviour can be identified in children as young as three or four years of age. If left unchecked these coercive behaviour patterns will persist and escalate in security over time becoming a chronic behavioural disorder (Ikediashi and Akande, 2015). Alcohol and marijuana were the top two on the list of substances abused (Adegboro, 2014) especially by commercial vehicle drivers. Adegboro also reported that violent behaviours like sexual assault and violent crimes were common among substance abusers. The aim of this study is to investigate the abuse of illicit substances and various criminal activities and deviant behaviours perpetrated by the commercial vehicle drivers in Lagos State. Commercial vehicle drivers in this context comprise of those who operate big buses, mini buses, cars and tricycles for commercial purposes within the state. They would be selected depending on the various motor parks from which they operate in Lagos State.

Statement of the Problem

The problem of substance abuse is so endemic that it was estimated that there are about fifty million addicts in the world and three times as many alcohol, hemp and tranquilizer users. It is clear that the problem of drug abuse adds to other social problems as a result of which the reputation of the Nigeria has been greatly at stake. The issue of substance abuse and crime is cyclic. They happen at regular intervals. This is very common among the public vehicle drivers in all motor parks across the country. One finds people selling several kinds of substances ranging from alcohol, India hemp and the like.
These have created opportunities for the motor drivers and their assistants at the parks to patronize them and feel high at all times.

Consequently, it has been observed that substance abuse is a common phenomenon among commercial vehicle drivers in Nigeria especially Lagos State. It has also been noted that the society contributes immensely to the alarming rate of substance abuse among this group in the society. This is why the sales of Central Nervous System (CNS) active agents like alcohol herbal mixture also known as “paraga”, Indian hemp and the rest are commonly found in all the motor parks in the state. Oluwadiya and Faroye (2012) aver that “paraga”, an alcoholic herbal preparation that comes in different varieties had been shown to be commonly available to commercial vehicle drivers in southern Nigeria. Oyeniyi (1980) support this fact that “there have been numerous anecdotes and newspaper reports that paraga makers sometimes include psychoactive herbs such as cannabis and cocaine as well as alcohol in paraga to add some ‘kick’ to their product.

Several forms of deviant behaviours and criminal activities like, rape, fighting, robbery or dispossessing commuters of their valuables and other forms of deviant behaviours have been linked to the operations of commercial vehicle drivers. There have been cases in which these drivers connived with the ritualists and armed robbers on the high way to supply them innocent commuters who eventually became the victims of crimes. They molest or beat up their spouses at the slightest provocation whenever they have either ingested or injected strong substances. Hence they exhibit disorderly behaviour in both their private and public lives. Therefore, the study seeks to achieve the following objectives 1) to determine the relationship between age and substance abuse among the commercial vehicle drivers in Lagos State, 2) to examine the relationship between education and substance abuse among the commercial vehicle drivers Lagos State, and 3) to examine the relationship between substance abuse and antisocial behaviours by the commercial vehicle drivers Lagos State.

**Research Hypotheses**

In order to achieve the general objective of the study these hypotheses have been formulated for this research work to be able to provide solutions to the problem.

1. Older commercial vehicle drivers do not abuse illicit substances than the younger ones.
2. Education does not determine substance abuse among the commercial vehicle drivers in Lagos State.
3. Illicit substance abused do not determine commercial vehicle drivers’ antisocial behaviours in Lagos State.

**Significance of the Study**

- The result of this study will contribute to the public understanding of the level of consumption of illicit substances by the commercial vehicle drivers.
• It will facilitate better understanding of the factors that are responsible for an increase in violent crimes that involve commercial vehicle drivers.
• It will expose the possible disadvantages and dangers associated with the use of illicit drug by commercial vehicle drivers.
• It will bring to public glare the factors behind various forms of crimes and deviant behaviours that are prevalent among commercial vehicle drivers both in private and public spheres.

Conceptual Discussion

Substance Abuse Defined

The term “substance abuse” refers to the use of a drug abuse excessively and persistently or self-administration of a drug without regard to the medically or culturally accepted patterns. It could also be viewed as the use of a drug to the extent that it interferes with the health and social function of an individual (NAFDAC, 2000 cited in Haladu, 2003). World Book Encyclopedia (2004) defined substance abuse as the non-medical use of a drug that interferes with a healthy and productive life. In his own definition, Manbe (2008) defined it as the excessive, maladaptive or addictive use of drugs for non-medical purpose.

Substance abuse, according to Ajayi and Ayodele (2002), is the wrong use or inappropriate use of chemical substances that are capable of changing functions of cells in the body. Bayer, as cited in Egbochuku and Akerele (2007), saw stimulants, which are substances that cause an increase in the activity of an organ in the body, as chemicals that excite certain activities of the central nervous system. Ajayi and Ekundayo (2010) also saw substance abuse as over-dependence and misuse of one particular drug with or without a prior medical diagnosis from qualified health practitioners. They further identified dangerous drugs like cocaine, Indian hemp (marijuana), morphine, heroin, tobacco, ephedrine, valium five and Chinese capsules as few among the drugs commonly abused.

Mersy (2003) described substance abuse as problematic use of alcohol, tobacco, or illicit and/or prescription drugs and it has been referred to as nation’s number one health problem. While, David, Derald and Stanley (1990) refer to substance abuse as a pathological pattern or excessive use, intake of a substance even though it may be causing physical damage, jeopardizing safety (such as driving a car while intoxicated) or impairing social relationships and occupational functioning. Need for substance may lead to a pre-occupation with its acquisition and use.

Substance abuse according to Laver (1978) simply means the improper use of substances to the degree that the consequences are defined as detrimental to the user and or the society. The WHO (2009) also defined it as a “state” of periodic or chronic intoxication, detrimental to the individual and to the society, produced by the repeated consumption of a drug (natural or synthetic). Its patterns include all aspect of drug or substance usage ranging from how much, how often and what sort of substance, where, who, with what circumstances and so on.
Traditionally, the term substance abuse refers to the use of any drug prohibited by law, regardless of whether it was actually harmful or not. This meant that any use of marijuana for example, even if it occurred only once in a while, would constitute abuse, while the same level of alcohol consumption would not. The analysis of contemporary social problem has consistently proved more and more controversial because of the variables involved in their analysis, with the incidence of substance abuse, being of utmost concern to the abuser himself, his family, the government and the entire society in which he lives (Egbe, 2013).

Oshodi, Aina and Onajole (2010) reported that, despite worldwide concern and education about psychoactive substances, many people still have limited awareness of their adverse consequences. They further explained that curiosity, social pressure and peer group influence are noted to be primary reasons for substance misuse. In an attempt to control sleep or energise themselves while on steering, most commercial vehicle drivers experiment with tobacco, alcohol, ephedrine and other caffeinated substances such as Nescafe and red bull. Science and Nutrition (2009) also noted that excessive chewing of kola, consumption of bland coffee and other substances to stay awake, could lead to addiction and substance abuse.

Infact, the manufacturers of alcoholic drinks in the country have made the consumption of alcohol very easy for their consumers. By way of rebranding, they now pack alcohol in a small nylon sachet. This has made access to alcohol easy for the drivers. They can buy a handful of these packages and put them in their pockets so as to drink while driving especially when they are in traffic. Also, easy availability of Indian hemp in the motor packs cannot be over emphasized as the odour of this substance fill the air in most motor pack. The alcohol vendors at the park also sell marijuana to whomever that wants it, but not openly as in the case of alcohol or cigarettes and or tobacco.

Currently, substances ranging from alcohol, cigarettes, marijuana, even sometimes cocaine, heroin and many others are readily available in major motor parks in Nigeria and this has made many street urchins a.k.a “area boys” and bus conductors in the motor parks to be perpetrators of social vices in the society. Sanni, Udoh, Okediji, Modo and Ezeh (2010) identified vandalism, drug abuse, weapon carrying, alcohol abuse, rape, examination malpractices, school violence, bullying, cultism, truancy, and school drop-outs as anti-social behaviours often associated with juvenile delinquents.

Oshodi, Aina and Onajole (2010) also explained in their study that marijuana is the most commonly used substance followed by tobacco. They also discovered that alcohol hypo-sedatives, tobacco and psycho stimulants were commonly abused substances with varying prevalence rates found for both overall and specific substance use.

Ajayi and Ekundayo (2010) in Abdu-Raheem (2013) identified some of the reasons for the substance abuse are to reduce pain, anxiety and tension, isolation and loneliness, and sometimes resulted in urge to commit crimes. People see the use of stimulants in positive terms for relief from pain and
problems, elevation of mood, wakefulness, increased confidence, feeling and psychomotor activities and athletics, and feeling of euphoria (Linhardt, 2001 cited in Abdu-Raheem, 2013). Furthermore, Alan (2003) noted that the motive behind substance abuse may be sociological (status-seeking, peer pressure), psychological (to banish pain or discomfort, to attain euphoria, fantasy or to escape from unpleasant reality), out of curiosity, boredom, to alleviate fear, derive sexual and physical pleasures and so on.

**Anti-social Behaviours Defined**

Anti-social behaviours are inimical to people and those in their environment. Kimberly and Jacob (2002) defined it as any act that imposes physical or psychological harm on other people or their property. According to them, lying, stealing, assaulting others, being cruel to others and being sexually promiscuous are all examples of antisocial behaviours. Also, such behaviours may sometimes constitute a violation of legal codes, and it is often accomplished by disturbance of thought of emotion. Similarly, Clare (2006) aver that antisocial behaviours as destructive acts characterised by covert and overt hostility and Intentional aggression towards others. According to him, high risk factors in the family setting can cause antisocial behaviour in the child. These factors include:- parental history of antisocial behaviours, parental alcohol and drug abuse, chaotic and unstable home life, absence of good parenting skills, use of coercive and corporal punishment, parental distrust due to divorce, death or other separation, parental psychiatric disorder, especially maternal depression and economic distress due to poverty and unemployment. Other causes of antisocial behaviours are heavy exposure to media violence through television, movies, internet, video games and cartoons (Clare, 2006 cited in Ojo, 2015). He posited further that engaging in antisocial behaviours poses great risk to an individual's mental and physical health. It puts one at increased risk for alcoholism, cigarette smoking, illegal drug use, high risk of sexual behaviour, depression and engaging in violent acts towards other and self. In other words, the high risks of interpersonal and intra-personal implication of antisocial behaviours are readily apparent.

**History of Substance Use in Nigeria**

Thus, Oni (2013) argued that substance abuse became a public health issue in Nigeria in the 1960s with the discovery of cannabis farms in the country, arrests of Nigerian cannabis traffickers abroad, and reports of psychological disorders suspected to be associated with cannabis use. By the 1980s, the abuse of cocaine and heroin was added to the public health burden. Soldiers and sailors returning from Second World War introduced cannabis into Nigeria. The later introduction of cocaine and heroin into Nigeria was attributed to Nigerian Naval Officers in training in India who were involved with trafficking activities in the early 1980s (Obot, 2003).

Nigeria is a transit point for heroin and cocaine intended for European, East Asian, and North American markets. Since 2004, drug trafficking organizations have been increasingly using West African countries including Nigeria for smuggling large amounts of cocaine from South America into Europe and North America consequently increasing the availability and use of cocaine and heroin.
Nigeria currently has the third highest one-year prevalence of cocaine and opiates use in Africa at 7% for both drugs (UNODC, 2011).

The most abused illicit substance in Nigeria is cannabis, mainly in its herbal form. This is due to the fact that cannabis is home grown and relatively cheap. The price of one unit of cannabis is often about the same as that of a bottle of beer (UNODC, 2013). At 14.3%, the country has the highest one-year prevalence rate of cannabis use in Africa (UNODC, 2011) (Onifade, Adamson and Ogunwale, 2011). The average globally assessed prevalence rate of cannabis use is 3% (UNODC, 2013).

Adelekan & Adeniran (1993), in a follow up study among 62 drug abusers at the Drug Abuse Unit of the Neuropsychiatric Hospital, Aro, Abeokuta reported that the patients were mostly single, males with formal education, with cannabis being the most commonly abused drug with over half (53.5%) of the cohorts below 30 years of age. Similarly in the same centre, another study gave the mean age of onset of drug use among inpatients to be between the adolescent age range of 15-19 years within a span of 1992 to 1997 and 2002 to 2007 (Adamson et al, 2010).

**Causes of Substance Abuse**

Haladu (2003) in Fareo (2012) gave the following as the main causes of substance abuse: Experimental curiosity, that is, Curiosity to experiment the unknown facts about drugs thus motivates people into substance use. The first experience in substance abuse produces a state of arousal such as happiness and pleasure which in turn motivate them to continue. Peer group influence is another one which plays a major role in influencing many into substance abuse. Then, Lack of parental supervision in which many parents have no time to supervise their sons and daughters and these phenomena initialize and increases drug abuse. Also, People with personality problems arising from social conditions have been found to abuse drugs. The social and economic status of most Nigerians is below average. Poverty is widespread in the country, broken homes and unemployment is on the increase, therefore our youths roam the streets looking for employment or resort to begging. The need for energy to work for long hours also seems to be symptoms with the commercial vehicle drivers. They often want to work for long time so as to make money. Also, increasing economic deterioration that leads to poverty and disempowerment of the people has driven many parents to send their children out in search of a means of earning something for contribution to family income. These children engage in hawking, bus conducting, head loading, scavenging, serving in food canteens etc and are prone to substance taking so as to gain more energy to work for long hours. Others are, availability of the substances, the Need to prevent the Occurrence of Withdrawal symptoms.

**The Use of Substance and Occupation**

According to WHO (2002) in Okpataku, (2015) the use of alcohol and other substances is increasing in most parts of the world and there is a growing concern about this trend and its consequences. The variation of psychoactive substance use with occupation is also an important occupational health
problem. Some studies had investigated how drug use is influenced by different occupations (Lucas, 2005; Coggon, Harris and Brown, 2009), as well as the occupational risks of drug use (Slaterry, Anderson and Bryant, 1998). Vehicle drivers have been known and documented to use psychoactive substances while driving (Labat et. al, 2008; Beimess and David, 2006; Drummer et. al, 2004 and Harwood and David, 2000). However, drivers from whom these reports are generated were essentially involved in routine day-to-day driving activities as against those who engage in commercial driving as an occupation.

Makanjuola, Oyeleke and Akande (2007) argued that long distance commercial driving is arguably the most common means of transport in Nigeria and indeed some other parts of the world where alternative means of transportation are not well developed. This means of transport is run by young and middle aged men, largely with partial or no formal education who resort to this as a means of earning a living. They have been reported to use and abuse psychoactive drugs (Lasebikan and Bayewu, 2009), although, reasons for the use of substances have been noted to include “keeping awake and reducing fatigue while driving”. Abiona, Aloba and Fatoye (2006) averred that these substances are often used excessively even when it has been shown to be causally related to road traffic crashes and adverse health consequences for drivers.

Various researches done on the use of substances by drivers as indicated above have been predicated on assumptions that substance use began after the commencement of driving as an occupation. In which case, it may be inferred that the driving job was the direct risk factor for the use of substances and drugs. The starting point of substance use in relation to driving is key to understanding some of the motivation surrounding this behaviour. Furthermore, commercial drivers’ level of formal education and knowledge about the health and other consequences of drugged-driving are also crucial in designing, implementing and evaluating the impact of substance use control programme.

Other risky behaviour that is very common among the commercial vehicle drivers is uncontrolled appetites for sex. Studies have shown that commercial vehicle drivers especially the long-distance truck drivers and women who sell at the motor packs and also along the roads contribute to the spread of sexual infections like sexually-transmitted-diseases (STD) and HIV/AIDS and many others. According to the 1991 study of the truck drivers, Orubuloye et al. (1993) reported that the drivers reported an average of 6.3 current sexual partners, 12 sexual partners during the previous year and 25 partners besides their wives during a lifetime. This shows that most of the drivers take multiple sexual relationships for granted and as a way of life. This, combined with the drivers’ carefree attitude towards life, poses a serious danger to themselves, their sexual partners and above all to their wives who often do not know what their spouses do outside the home (Orubuloye and Oguntimehin, 1999).

Substance Abuse by the Nigeria’s Commercial Vehicle Drivers
In a research study report published online by World Highways in 2014 on the commercial vehicle drivers in Nigeria mega-city and commercial nerve centre, Lagos, it was revealed that 39% or 781 of the 2,002 bus drivers tested drive while under the influence of alcohol. Also revealed was the fact that 940 of the drivers have visual impairments, with 13% having been given special glasses. And 22% of the drivers, 441, tested positive for either marijuana or cocaine use (and in some instances both) (www.worldways.com/sections/general/news/drink-and-substance-abuse-for-nigerias-commercial-drivers/). These data show the sorry situation of state of consumption of illicit substance among the commercial vehicle drivers in Nigeria mega-city and commercial nerve centre of Lagos. It has nonetheless become worrisome for all and sundry in the city especially those that patronise these drivers. Furthermore, it was added that 30% of the drivers (601) were revealed to be hypertensive. The study was carried out as part of the Lagos State Motor Park Health and Safety Initiative programme. The study tested drivers from Under Bridge Motor Park and Alaagba Motor Park at the Iyana Ipaja Area. Following the study, the Lagos State government reinforces its campaign against alcohol and substance abuse amongst drivers. The study also highlights a more widespread problem in Nigeria, which has serious safety issues on its road network and with drink and drug use common amongst drivers.

In the same manner, Fekjaer (1992) enumerated some of the social problems associated with substance use especially alcohol and alcoholism as accidents such as motor vehicle crashes and trauma resulting in disability and/or spousal abuse which is a branch of domestic violence, fire and burns, poverty, under nutrition and malnutrition, unemployment, family divorce, social conflicts, social maladjustment, reduced productivity, criminal behaviours, and decreased sexual arousal in both sexes.

Plant (1979) further buttress on the assertion of Fekjaer on substance abuse that when a person drinks heavily, it is usually for social reasons, and this drinking habit may be influenced by the type of job the person does. Some occupational groups have far greater alcohol use rates than others, and the high risk of such an occupation is probably due to factors such as the availability of alcohol during working hours, strong pressure from workmates, and freedom from supervision which seems to be the major factors that influences the excessive intake of substances by the commercial motor drivers. Particularly, the Federal Road Safety Corps (FRSC) of Nigeria has initiated some actions aimed at control of alcohol use by drivers of commercial vehicles (Ebosele, 2010).

Recently, the FRSC mandated the commercial vehicle owners and operators to install the newly introduced speed limit device in their vehicles as this will limit the alarming rate of road crashes (accidents) that the nation is experiencing by the devil on the highways. With the excessive intake of substances like alcohol and marijuana which seem to be the influencer of high speeding by the drivers on the road. Federal Road Safety Corps (FRSC) National Boss, Mr. Boboye Oyeyemi in Mohammed (2016) noted that after a careful assessment of the numerous accidents in recent years, 50% of the major road crashes was a result of excessive speed. Studies have shown that when the
drivers are high on substance intake they speed without control on the road thereby causing the premature death of so many innocent commuters and other road users (The Guardian, 2016). The rigid nature of the commercial vehicle drivers in abusing substances have over times contributed to the series of madness being perpetuated by them on the roads.

Theoretical Framework
The theories of substance abuse indicate that some people truly depend on certain substances for their survival or performance due to a number of factors. The major emphasis of the theories is that people have their individual reasons for depending on one type of substance or the other. It is to this end that this study will be anchored on the following theories to further explain why the research problem under study exists.

Social learning theory is propounded by Albert Bandura who posits that learning is a cognitive process that takes place in a social context and can occur purely through observation or direct instruction, even in the absence of motor reproduction or direct reinforcement (Bandura, 1963). In addition to the observation of behaviour, learning also occurs through the observation of rewards and punishments, a process known as vicarious reinforcement. The theory expands on the traditional behavioral theories, in which behaviour is governed solely by reinforcements, by placing emphasis on the important roles of various internal processes in the learning individual (Bandura, 1971).

Bandura in 1997 postulated that observational learning can occur in relation to three models. Live model – the process in which an actual person is demonstrating the desired behavior. Verbal instruction – the process in which an individual describes the desired behaviour in detail and instructs the participant on how to engage in the behaviour; and Symbolic – the process in which modelling occurs by means of the media such as television, also, movies, internet, literature, and radio. This type of modelling involves a real or fictional character demonstrating the behaviour. The theory sees learning behaviour on a macro level, unlike differential association which sees learning on micro level (one-on-one or intimate interaction/association with personal group).

The relevance of the theories to this study is that, social learning of substance abuse as theorized, maintained that usage of dependence on a substance is either as a result of conditional learning or social learning. The exposure to drugs being used is a contributory factor, and among the factors associated with such are the prevalence of drug use in one's social environment and the general availability of drugs in one's surroundings, as well as social norms favouring drug related behaviours. The above statements show why substance abuse is prevalent among commercial vehicle drivers in Lagos State. The social environment and the availability of substances/drugs at the motor parks largely encourage its consumption. Hardly can one find a single motor park where sales of substances like alcohol, marijuana and others are not prevalent. There are indications that a new non-substance-abuse-driver in the parks may join the league as he mingles with other abusers because
the tendency to learn how to abuse substances is very strong in such environment. Hence, this environment coupled with other forms of reinforcements encourages substance abuse.

**Methods**

The study research design adopts survey research method. The study made use of both quantitative and qualitative methods (Questionnaire and In-depth Interview (IDI) in collecting data. The study location is Lagos State precisely Surulere Local Government Area of the state. The study population comprise of the entire commercial vehicle drivers in Surulere Local Government Area of Lagos State whose age falls within the official driving age of 18 and above. There are five major approved motor garages in the local government area which are located in the following places; Aguda, Lawanson, Masha-Kilo, Ojuelegba, and Yaba (by Tejuosho Market). This was based on the information gathered from the Senior Traffic Officer at the Local Government headquarters in corroboration by the Secretary to the Road Transport Employees Association of Nigeria (RTEAN), Ojuelegba Motor Park. Three (3) motor parks were scientifically selected using ballot system; these were Aguda, Ojuelegba, and Yaba (by Tejuosho Market). Te study made use of simple random sampling method a probability sampling technique. The sample size for the study was one hundred and sixty-five (165) commercial vehicle drivers and fifty-five (55) respondents were selected from each of the selected motor parks. Also, the sample size of the In-depth Interview (IDI) were twelve (12) respondents, three (3) respondents each from the law enforcement officers closer to the parks, senior officials of the motor drivers’ union (NURTW and RTEAN), head of business operators around the parks and the commuters patronizing the parks. Data generated from the questionnaires were scientifically processed through SPSS (Statistical Package for Social Sciences). The hypotheses were tested using Chi-square statistical tool to determine the relationship between the variables. Also, the qualitative data generated through the instrument of In-depth Interview (IDI) were to support the validation of the findings in the tested hypotheses.

**Test of Hypotheses**

The chi-square decision region is based on the rules that if the p-value (i.e. symptomatic value) is less than 0.05, there is a significant relationship. But if the p-value is higher than 0.05, then there is no relationship.

**Hypothesis One:** Older commercial vehicle drivers do not abuse illicit substances than the younger ones in Lagos State.

The study reveals that old age does not determine the use of illicit substances abused among commercial vehicle drivers. The result of chi-square analysis shows that the calculated value ($\chi^2$) is 3.28, the degree of freedom (df) is 2 and the significance (p-value) is 0.19 which is higher than the level of significance of 0.05. This implies that the hypothesis is rejected and we conclude that there is no significant relationship between old age and illicit substances abused among the commercial vehicle drivers. However, the table analysis further reveals the percentage distribution among the age groups analysed. Out of the total percentage 56.0% of the young age, the majority 40.9% admitted
that they take substances, while the minority 15.1% do not take substances. Also, out of the total percentage 44.0% of the old age, the majority 27.0% admitted that they take substances, while the minority 17.0% do not take substances. The total percentage of those who take substances 67.9% is higher than those who do not take 32.1%. Hence, the percentage of the young age who takes substances 40.9% is higher than the old age 27.0% who take substances. This implies that the young take substances more than the old ones.

**Hypothesis Two:** *Education does not determine substance abuse among the commercial vehicle drivers in Lagos State.*

The study reveals that education does not determine substance abuse among the commercial vehicle drivers in Lagos State. The chi-square test analysis shows that the calculated value ($\chi^2$) is 3.74, the degree of freedom (df) is 4 and the significance (p-value) is 0.44 which is higher than the level of significance of 0.05. This implies that the hypothesis was accepted and we conclude that there is no significant relationship between education and substance abuse among the commercial vehicle drivers in Lagos State. That is, both educated and uneducated among the commercial vehicle drivers in the state abuse substances.

Furthermore, the findings from the in-depth interview agreed with the above result that the level of education attained by the drivers does not really determine their abuse or intake of substance there are several of them that abuse substances like alcohol, marijuana and others not minding whether they are educated or not.

"Whenever we (policemen) arrest them and we asked them to write statement, we realized that several of them are well educated and also abuse substances. Also, whenever we arrest them you could smell the odour of extreme intake of alcohol or Indian hemp oozing out from them their bodies."

(A police officer whose station was around Yaba (Tejuosho Market) garage)

**Hypothesis Three:** *Illicit substance abused do not determine commercial vehicle drivers’ anti-social behaviours in Lagos State.*

The study reveals that commercial vehicle drivers who abuse illicit substance are not likely to be involved in anti-social behaviours. This decision was taken based on chi-square analysis where the calculated value ($\chi^2$) is 17.47, the degree of freedom (df) is 8 and the significance (p-value) is 0.03 which is lower that the level of significance of 0.05. This implies that the hypothesis is rejected and we conclude that illicit substance abuse determine commercial vehicle drivers’ anti-social behaviours in Lagos State.

The qualitative data collected through the In-depth Interview (IDI) reveals the correlation between anti-social behaviours and substance abuse among the commercial vehicle drivers in Lagos State.

"Yes, deviant behaviours seem to be part of the daily life of commercial drivers in Lagos. As they constantly exhibiting of these behaviour, one may want to conclude that it is the nature of the work. Drunk-driving and the use of illicit drugs are mostly the root cause of these attitudes. A responsible and sensible human being will not behave the way these people do. I’ve noticed over time that"
anti-social behaviours are minimal among those that do not take substances. Although, there are other factors that may determine the display of these behaviours by these people these are; parental upbringings, frustration, transfer of aggression, personality traits, and social and economic conditions of the country among many others. Also, some may deliberately behave anti-socially in other to show the level of rascality in him.”

(A 36 years old female commuter at Ojuelegba Motor Park)

**Discussions of the findings**

The study from the socio-demographic characteristics of the respondents reveals that majority (98.7%) are males while only 1.3% are females in the entire sample. This indicates that most of the commercial vehicle drivers in this local government area are males. Also, the minimum age of the respondents is 18 year; the maximum age is 62 year;, while the average is 34.5 year. The majority of the respondents (53.5% and 40.3%) practice Christianity and Islamic religion respectively, while 4.4% practice traditional religion. Furthermore, the study revealed that 50.3% of the respondents were single which constitute the majority. On the respondents’ level of education, it was revealed that the majority (75.4%) had primary and secondary education which represents 24.5% and 40.9% respectively. Lastly, it was also discovered in the employment status of the respondents that 45.3%, 8.2% and 44.7% are self-employed, employed and employee respectively, while 1.9% were short-time drivers who occasionally borrow vehicle to carry passengers in other to make their daily ends-meat.

The study revealed that 87.8% takes strong substances in which alcohol, marijuana, termador and refrnor, gbana and snuff are the most taken. Furthermore, our findings already indicated that 67.9% of the respondents either take or abuse substance. The larger percentage (88.1%) take only one type of substance, while 11.9% take more than one types of substances for the following reasons; to catch fun and pleasure, peer pressure, to get more energy to work (drive), to release tension and stress, to be stimulated for one form of activity or the other, to clear nose, eyes and throat and because of its availability.

The result of the hypothesis tested showed in **hypothesis 1** that there is no significant relationship between old age and illicit substance abused among the commercial vehicle drivers. However, we can reasonably assert from this result that the percentage of the young age who takes substances 40.9% is higher that the percentage of the old age 27.0%. Therefore, the young drivers abuse substances more than the older ones. The result of the tested hypothesis negate the follow up study of Adeleke and Adeniran (1993) but support the fact that young people abuse substances more than older ones. They reported that among 62 drug abusers at the drug abuse unit of the Neuropsychiatric Hospital Aro, Abeokuta, the patient were mostly single, males with formal education, with cannabis being the most commonly abused drug with over half (53.5%) of the cohorts below 30 years of age. Similarly in the same centre, another study gave the mean age of onset of drug use among in-patients to be between the adolescent age range of 15-19 years within a span of 1992 to 1997 and 2002 to 2007 (Adamson et al, 2010).
Hypothesis 2 revealed that there is no significant relationship between education and substance abuse among the commercial vehicle drivers in Lagos State. That is, both educated and uneducated among the group abuse substances. Out of the total percentage (5.0%) of those without formal education, 8.05 abused substances, while 2.4% did not. From the total percentage (24.5%) of those with primary education, 20.0% abused substances, while 28.6% did not. From the total percentage (40.9%) of those with secondary education, 19.5% abused substances, while 21.4% did not. From the total percentage (24.5%) of those with post-secondary education, 11.9% abused substances, while 12.6% did not. Lastly, from the total percentage (5.0%) of those who were graduates, 2.5% abused substances, while also 2.5% did not.

Lastly, the result of hypothesis 3 revealed that there is significant relationship between illicit substance abuse and anti-social behaviours among the commercial vehicle drivers’. This suggests that, illicit substance determines commercial vehicle drivers’ anti-social behaviours in Lagos State. Adekoya, Adekoya, Adepoju and Owoeye (2011) posit that intake of substance and its abuse threaten the fundamental of the social fabrics of society such as values, beliefs and cultural systems. As a result of the broken down of social values several forms of deviant behaviours such as commercial drivers’ yelling at commuters, use of vulgar languages on people/bullying other people, indiscriminate fighting, fighting/verbally abuse, sexual assaults, and the rest spring up. Hence, Adegboro (2014) aver that violent behaviours like sexual assault and violent behaviours were common among substance abusers.

Conclusion

The result of the findings in this study revealed that illicit substance abuse is a central factor to the rising waves of criminal and anti-social behaviours among commercial vehicle drivers in the state. The situation surrounding substance abuse among the commercial vehicle drivers in the country, specifically in the commercial nerve centre has been on the leap. This has resulted into negative social vices. Fekjaer (1992) in a study enumerated some of the social problems associated with substance use as accidents such as: motor vehicle crashes and trauma resulting in disability, spousal abuse, fire and burns, poverty, under nutrition and malnutrition, unemployment, family divorce, social conflicts, social maladjustment, reduced productivity, criminal behaviours and decreased sexual arousal in both sexes.

Anti-social behaviours and drug abuse are dangerous factors that are capable of producing devastating problems for the abusers and the society at large, especially when left uncontrolled. The study helps to further understand other connecting factors that predispose drivers to abuse substances and anti-social behaviours. Among which are; peer pressure, availability of the substances, source of awareness and many others. The learning theory of substance abuse by Bandura maintains that dependence on substances occurs as a result of learning. The leaning could be through the aforementioned factors enumerated. While Sutherland concludes that all criminality is learned in a process of social interaction. These theories reveal the nexus between criminality and
substance abuse in the society. In conclusion, in whatever ways we look at it, the general public is the one mostly at the receiving end of the social vices perpetrated by the drivers. The frequency of substance intake and criminality among the driver will continue unabated as long as the stakeholders fail to take the bull by the horn and find lasting solution to the menace.

**Recommendation**

As an ameliorative measure towards curbing the recurrent and continuous use of substances by the commercial vehicle drivers, the following recommendations are hereby suggested:

1. Government must endeavour to place a strict ban on the motor park sales of all forms of illicit substances and intoxicants that are ingested or injected by the drivers nationwide.

2. The law enforcement agencies saddled with the responsibility of enforcing the laws that prohibits substance intake and abuse must intensify efforts more on enforcing these laws.

3. The state government and the Non-governmental Organisations (NGO) must embark on a comprehensive and continuous education and orientation programmes for the commercial vehicle drivers on the harmful effects of the use of substances and drugs not medically prescribed.

4. Likewise, the religious organisations must intensify their effort more by inculcating moral value on the people so as to raise moral standard.

5. The leadership of drivers’ Unions association like NURTW and RTEAN should play the role of watch-dogs on the drivers’, especially on intake of dangerous substances. They must make concerted efforts to read their mist off from wolves in sheep’s clothing i.e. those that hide under their umbrella to perpetrate heinous crimes.

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Livelihood Resilience and Diversity in the Face of Socio-economic Challenges: Exploring the Experiences of Urban Youth in Harare (Zimbabwe)

Clement Chipenda

Abstract: The article is aimed at unearthing the livelihood and survival strategies which the urban youth in Harare (Zimbabwe) have adopted as a response to socio-economic challenges which have been witnessed in the country over the past decade and a half. Deteriorating socio-economic conditions characterised by high poverty and unemployment levels in the face of reduced and poor economic performance have left young people vulnerable to poverty and unemployment in the country which has led to them adopting various formal and informal livelihood activities aimed at improving their lives. Employing sociological theories on structuration, agency and social organisation, this article argues that the young people in the urban area of Harare have adopted survival strategies which have seen them being able to meet their individual, family and community needs in an environment which has been very difficult and challenging. Using qualitative research methodologies and various data gathering instruments, the article shows how the youth have organised themselves as individuals and groups to make a better life for themselves in the face of what would otherwise be perceived as insurmountable challenges.

Keywords: agency; informal sector; economy; social organisation; youths; Zimbabwe.

Introduction

Over the past fifteen years, Zimbabwe has faced severe economic challenges which has been a consequence of the culmination of various factors but whose overall impact has been negative on the population. Poor management of the national economy by the ruling Zimbabwe National African Union Party – Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF), the adoption of disastrous neo-liberal economic policies, a poorly planned and executed land reform programme, an ill conceived and incoherent foreign and domestic policy which was at odds with western countries, participation in an expensive war in the Democratic Republic of Congo, corruption, massive brain drain, an unprecedented inflation record which broke world records are often cited as some of the examples which have made the country to face economic and social challenges (see Addison and Laakso 2003, Bond 1998, Raftapolous 2009, Meldrum 2001). What is important at this juncture is to take note of the negative consequences which poor economic performance has had on the livelihoods of the people in the country in the long term. Social and economic consequences of the economic challenges which the country have faced have resulted in lack of investment in social services, hyper-inflation which in 2008 reached unprecedented

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levels resulting in the abandonment of the Zimbabwe dollar in favour of multiple currency system, company closures resulting in high levels of unemployment, brain drain and a sharp drop in the country’s Gross Domestic Product (GDP) which had a ripple effect of negatively impacting on the lives of the people (see Makochekanawa 2009, Raftopoulos 2009, Pilossof 2009, Crush and Tevera 2010). Of interest to this study is the impact which these economic challenges have had on the young people called the youth who are aged between the ages of 15 and 34. The study seeks to explore the specific socio-economic challenges which young people are facing in the face of the wider socio-economic challenges facing the country.

In the study young people are presented as a group of people who are just starting their lives having for years been provided for, cared and protected by their families and communities. This group is seen being in a process of transition from childhood to adulthood but in the process they are seen as being exposed to a real and oftentimes brutal situation culminating from a challenging socio-economic situation in which they have to adjust and embrace as they meet their present needs while preparing for their future roles founded on their dreams and aspirations which need contextualisation to the reality of the socio-economic realities of the country. Against this background the study was aimed at exploring the socio-economic realities and the current situation of the urban youth in the country. Having understood this background the study was interested in getting the views of young people on their perceptions of the current situation and their future aspirations and how they believed they would attain any goals and milestones which they had set for themselves. In the face of high unemployment levels, company closers and poverty; the study had an interest in unearthing the different income generating activities which young people are currently engaging in and the available opportunities as well as challenges which they face. In doing this exploration the study employed the theoretical frameworks of structuration and agency as postulated by Giddens (1984) and that of social organisation. It was conceived to be important not only to understand the current realities of the youth in Harare but also to understand how they as individuals and societal members are dealing with the adverse socio-economic conditions and using individual abilities and societal resources to be resilient and to put in place measures and initiatives which have improved their lives.

This article in its attempt to present on the socio-economic realities of the youth in Harare will briefly present on the theoretical framework employed in the study, the socio-economic realities of the youth, issues on informal activities, the research focus and methodology employed, presentation as well as discussion of results from the study and a conclusion.

**Theoretical Framework**

The study employed the theories of structuration, agency and social organisation in its attempt to understand the youth in Zimbabwe urban areas and how they are surviving under challenging conditions. The theory of structuration and agency is found in the ideas of Anthony Giddens and how he viewed the relationship between individuals and social forces. Giddens (1984) conceptualises structures as rules and resources that actors use in interaction. They are recursively implicated in the
reproduction of social systems resulting in a recurrent patterned arrangement which influence the individual. For Giddens rules are defined as ‘generalizable procedures and methodologies that reflexive agents possess in their implicit stocks of knowledge that they employ as formulas for action in social systems’ (Giddens cited in Turner 2001: 972) These rules of structure are seen to be informal, widely sanctioned and used in daily routines, conversations and rituals (Giddens 1984). These rules are seen as restricting social action but resources facilitate it (Lamsal 2012). Structures also involve the use of ‘material equipment’ and ‘organizational capacities’ which social actors are seen using in order to facilitate social change. Giddens (ibid) indicates that traditions, institutions, religions, social class and moral codes exemplify structures.

In explaining structuration Giddens is seen trying to emphasise the duality which exists between structure and agency. Agency refers to the ability of an individual to work independently and to make their own free choices. Actors for Giddens (1984) are agents who have the capacity to rationally ‘transcend the whims’ which are seen as being imposed by social structures so that they are able to exercise their own free choice. Emirbayer and Mische (1998:970) define agency as ‘… the temporally constructed engagement by actors of different structural environments – the temporal-relational contexts of action – which, through the interplay of habit, imagination, and judgment both reproduces and transforms those structures in interactive response to the problems posed by changing historical situations.’ The duality of structure and agency becomes important when it comes to change and the structuration theory sees agency as important in facilitating any kind of social change. Decisions to act according to (Mestrovic 1998) are seen as consciously and unconsciously creating agency within the social structure.

This structuration-agency theory was used as a basis for the study in addition to the theory of social organisation. Social organisation is seen as referring to as patterned social interaction and in these social interactions, social actors are portrayed as co-operating to produce a stable social structure which is characterised by social relationships (Charon 1986, Wheelan 2005). Sneath (1993) postulates the view that social organisation is best understood through understanding co-operative activities in societies which are patterned, multiple and fluid which form the basis of social relationships and have their basis on residence, joint resource use, kinship and other principles. Just like the ideas on structuration, social organisation places agency as being at the centre of social relationships which plays an important role in the lives of individuals, families and communities.

For the purposes of the study structuration, agency and social organisation were considered as important and integral in understanding the current circumstances of the youth in urban Harare. Using structuration theory, agency and social organisation it was seen as possible to understand how the youth are using the current social systems, social structures, available physical and non-tangible resources as well as individual and group initiatives to make a living and survive under difficult socio-economic circumstances. The theories were used to show how individual youths use socially acceptable and at times non sanctioned behaviours and activities to make a living in an environment
which at times is unfavourable to their progress and development. Individual youths as ‘agents’ are seen as using their individual and mental capacity to undertake in various money making and at times innovative activities to raise money and they do this through available social structures or at times they defy these structures and do things in their own way as these structures may be seen to be an impediment to their goals and aspirations.

Research area and methodology employed
The research was conducted in the city of Harare focusing specifically on the city centre. The city centre was seen to be ideal as it has diversity and dynamic socio-economic relationships. The study was grounded in an interpretive research paradigm and it employed the qualitative research approach which entailed the use of in-depth interviews, a semi-structured questionnaire (which was borrowed from quantitative research but modified to suit the research), focus group discussions, observations which also included participant observation and the use of secondary data. The total number of persons who informed the study was 60.

Youth socio-economic realities in Zimbabwe
The research which informs this article was aimed at finding out the survival strategies which the youth have adopted in the backdrop of a challenging socio-economic environment. As stated earlier, Zimbabwe has seen several economic challenges which have been a consequence of various factors and these are seen to have negatively impacted on society especially the youth and the study was especially interested in unearthing these challenges and the response of the youth to these challenges. In Zimbabwe the youth population (15-34 years) according to the 2012 National Census stands at 4 702 406 or 36% of the total population of which they are seen as comprising of 56% of the total economically active population (ZIMSTAT National Population Census 2012). The youth thus form an integral and important part of the population who are seen as relevant not only in the present but also in the future of the country. This importance has been seen in the way they have been portrayed in the National Youth Policy (2000 and amended in 2013) and the Zimbabwe Agenda for Sustainable Socio-Economic Transformation Document (which is guiding the country from October 2013 to December 2018). Under these policy documents the youths are portrayed as an important constituency who need to be economically empowered and afforded an opportunity to contribute to the socio-economic development of the country. This has been in the backdrop of Zimbabwe being a signatory of the African Youth Charter effectively binding itself to look out for the interests, needs and aspirations of the youth.

By looking at socio-economic indicators in literature and the media one can see several issues socially and economically in Zimbabwe which can be seen as affecting the youth and the study sought to understand these issues and use them as a basis for understanding the current situation of the youth in the urban areas of Harare. According to the Zimbabwe National Statistical Agency (ZIMSTAT) the unemployment rate in the country in 2011 was 10.7%, 11.1% in 2012 and 11.3% in 2014 (ZIMSTAT [O]). These statistics have been disputed and are of major contention and are seen
as not being reflective of the true situation on the ground and are based on unreliable data. The contestations on the data are exemplified by Chiumia (2014) who quotes Morgan Tsvangirai as saying that in 2014 the country’s unemployment rate stood at 85%, Japhet Moyo the Secretary General of the Zimbabwe Congress of Trade Unions put the figure at 80-90%, ZANU (PF) in its 2013 election manifesto put the unemployment figure at 60% while the National Association of Non-Governmental Organisations in 2011 put the unemployment rate at 95%. The Zimbabwe Labour Force and Child Labour (ZLFCLS) indicated that the average unemployment rate in the country rate of those aged 15-34 stands at 15% while 87% of the employed youth are in the informal sector (ZIMSTAT 2011). ZIMSTAT indicated that in 2011, 5.4 million (84%) Zimbabweans worked in the informal sector while 606 000 (11%) worked in the formal sector. This is the situation which the youth now find themselves in, a situation of high unemployment and available employment opportunities now only being found in the informal sector. This has occurred in a situation where the educational sector according to the ZLFCLS (2011) reported that the educational system was churning out approximately 300 000 school leavers a year of which only 10% were being absorbed through employment showing low employment generation capacities by industries.

Youths in Zimbabwe now find themselves in a socio-economic environment which is very much difficult. Despite high educational levels, most of the youth find themselves unemployed and have to make a plan in order to survive. Lack of income can become a source of many social ills like crime if uncontrolled and it brings to the fore social inequalities and social stratification which can be a basis of societal imbalances. It can also be a burden to families, communities and the government as they are forced to provide for an otherwise economically active social group whose capacity to take care of themselves is seen as being curtailed by existing socio-economic conditions. Lack of income and effective social support in an unfavourable environment has forced the youth to seek alternative survival strategies so as to meet their current and everyday needs while preparing them for the future. The situation of Zimbabwean youth is not much different from the youth in other African countries who face similar socio-economic challenges. Due to these challenges there can be seen initiatives by the African Union to enhance the capacity and efficiency of the labour market in order for it to absorb young people while at the same time developing their ability and skills.

It is in this context of socio-economic challenges that the majority of urban youth in Zimbabwe have now resorted to working in the informal sector which is seen offering more opportunities. The section below briefly explores the literature on the informal sector in Zimbabwe.

**Issues on the informal sector in Zimbabwe**

Studies on urban income generating activities in Zimbabwe with special focus on residents, governance systems, housing, formal and informal employment, youth and development are so numerous and vast that it is impossible to capture all of the works in this single article but it is important to highlight some of the works which can be seen contributing to understanding issues on urban realities, the youth and the informal sector in Zimbabwe which inform dominant debates on the
subject which inform this article. The nature and extent of the informal sector in Zimbabwe which has become a refuge for most urban youths is captured by Crush, Skinner and Chikanda (2015) who indicate that in 1980 the Zimbabwean informal economy was small absorbing ten percent of the labour force, in 2003 it accounted for 70 percent of the labour force with its contribution to the Gross National Income having grown to 60 percent and 2011 84 percent of the population was employed in the informal sector with the dominant activities being in retail, wholesale trade followed by motor vehicles and cycle repairs then services and manufacturing. These important observations by Crush et al (2015) are complimented by Bukaleya and Hama (2012) who cite William (1999), Jenkins (1998) and Kobb (1997) as indicating that 80 percent of American’s find their first job in the informal sector, 97 percent of non-farm businesses contribute to 40 percent of America’s GDP. The informal sector contributes to more than 70 percent of Africa’s labour force and in Tanzania the informal sector alone is seen contribution 90 percent to the country’s GDP and this aptly summarises the importance of the informal sector.

Issues raised by Crush et al (ibid) raise important issues to this article and to the debate on the informal sector. Firstly they raise the issue of whether economic collapse as was experienced in Zimbabwe can result in the growth of the informal sector while the formal sector gradually becomes much smaller. Secondly with the collapse of the economy and the growth of the informal sector Crush et al (ibid) question whether there can be positive outcomes to such a collapse as evidenced by the growth in entrepreneurial and motivational skills in Zimbabwe. These issues are quite important and based on empirical evidence in this article there is an exploration to see the extent which they are applicable in understanding the informal sector and urban youth in Zimbabwe.

The urban social landscape has been extensively researched on and this article seeks to add on to this research while presenting a contemporary outlook to the youth and urban livelihoods in Zimbabwe. An example to existing works on urban livelihoods in Zimbabwe are the works of Mupedziswa and Gumbo (2001) who have undertaken longitudinal studies on the informal sector in Zimbabwe in the years from the 1990’s. The findings in their studies are quite well documented as they show how the informal sector in the country has developed over the years and they touch on the Economic Structural Adjustment Programme and its effects on the economy and labour, the economic crises which the country has witnessed over the years and its impact and they show patterns, trends and differentiation which have occurred on the informal market. They also trace government support and interventions that have been put to support the informal sector, its growth over the years, the impact of the informal sector on growth and livelihoods, the role of civil society and banks in the informal sector among other important issues which highlight the importance of the sector as well as its genesis over the years. This work on genesis of the informal sector in Zimbabwe is complemented by the works of Kamete (2004) who also cites the works of Mhone (1995) who explore the informal sector in Zimbabwe particularly the home industries in urban areas which since independence in 1980 have been seen as developing and are enterprises which are centres of production, industry and commerce in urban areas. Though they are important centres for informal trade they are often seen
as areas of illegality and vice and these issues are extensively explored by the works of Kamete (2004) and Mhone (1995). These works while a new understanding of the informal sector and its functions as well as challenges in an African set up also contribute immensely to the debate on the relevance, importance and contribution which the informal sector can play not only in securing the livelihoods of the people who are employed by the sector but also the contribution which the sector can play in the national economy and how it can be a tool for development.

To understand socio-political dynamics centred around the informal sector in Harare, Kamete (2001 and 2002) explored governance relationships in urban Zimbabwe particularly between the governing and political class and the urban poor and he was able to unearth important issues. He shows that despite the recognition of the interrelationship between the central government, local government, private sector and civil society the poor are never recognised or acknowledged as important but they are able exercise some form of power and dictate some measure of control in the flow of events and processes. They to some extent determine their destiny and put in place tactics and strategies which allow them to survive in a difficult urban environment and have a voice in many important issues which affect them and this is despite the perception which views the urban poor as being powerless, useless and voiceless. Kamete explores these perceptions of the urban poor as being labelled as helpless, as liabilities, as useless and as a resource and he is able to dispel some of these notions and is able to show the important roles which the urban poor play as well as the power dynamics that exist in urban areas. In a follow up on urban governance issues, Kamete (2007) focuses specifically on the urban youth and the contribution which they are making to governance issues in urban areas which they view as transient and he shows the interesting relationship between the youth and politicians as well as between the youth and technocrats who can be seen conveniently the youth with no prospects of partnerships or the youth being taken seriously as used generally as ‘foot soldiers’ or ‘pawns’ that further the interests of the politicians and the technocrats.

In addition to the works highlighted above there can be found some works which present contemporary issues on informal traders in Harare. The work by Chirau and Chamuka (2013) brings to the fore some of the pertinent issues which affect those that engage in informal income generating activities. Through an empirical study of traders at Magaba in Mbare, Harare they show that traders are also affected by political issues as well as institutional and organisational issues. They highlight how the urban space has become highly politicised through the police; militia and customs officials who play an important and oftentimes authoritarian role in the lives of the traders. They see the government as deploying these institutions to disrupt the activities of the urban traders such that for the traders it becomes necessary to have some form of affiliation or allegiance to these institutions in order for their business to survive or the urban space to remain habitable to them to be able to undertake their activities. Despite the confiscation of goods, destruction of crops and limited profits due to harassment by these government institutions, Chirau and Chamuka (2013) show that Magaba women are able to engage in productive activities and contribute to household income and food security. Other works on the informal sector in Zimbabwe include works by Njaya (2014) and Dube
and Chirisa (2012) who show how there has been an influx of vendors in the Harare Central Business District due to socio economic challenges in the country which has seen constant conflict between the vendors and the City Of Harare especially the Municipal Police who are in constant conflict with the vendors as they seek to enforce the city’s by laws with traders found doing their business all over the city’s pavements, shopping centres, parking lots and at traffic intersections. In his contribution Njaya (2014) shows how important street vendors have become as they have reduced unemployment significantly, increased incomes and through street food vending urban dwellers have access to cheaper, inexpensive and varied traditional meals.

Tawodzera (2010) has explored the urban poor household survival strategies and how urban people have managed to adopt new strategies and resilience in order to survive in an increasingly difficult and challenging urban environment and meeting their food requirements and needs under conditions of extreme material deprivation. Other important works which have been done on the informal sector in Zimbabwe include works by Hansen (2004), Grant (2003), Jones (2010), Mujeri (2007) and Musoni (2010) among others which have gone at great lengths to explore the socio-economic and political dynamics in urban areas and it is these works which have laid the groundwork for this study which attempts to build on the already existing knowledge base.

Basing on the works done on urban livelihoods in Zimbabwe it can thus be seen that there are many issues and contestations which are at play. In addition to issues captured above, Lindell (2010) on the informal sector brings to the fore important issues in Africa on urban areas and the informalisation and causalisation of economic activities and how the informal economy has grown in Africa and attempts are now being made to regulate and bring this growing informal economy under state regulation. The article by Lindell (ibid) brings to the fore one of the most important debates in urban studies which is the issue of how to deal with the urban informal sector which is increasingly growing and thriving in the face of a shrinking state regulated formal sector. There can be seen to be an increasingly fluid border between the two sectors but which is characterised by confrontations which at times are violent between workers in the informal sector and the state. Using various sources Lindell shows contestations that have arisen in the formal sector as exemplified by their forced removal in Lusaka, Zambia as well as in South Africa before the 2010 World Cup and this brings to the fore one of the old arguments in urban studies which is the beautification of the city against the informal sector which includes vendors who are oftentimes accused of making city’s dirty and the holding of premier events like the World Cup with clean up measures being seen as disguised for the events but they would actually be guided by ulterior motives. There can be seen to be existing politics in the informal sector as well as human agency among informal actors which is important for their survival which is very important.

Thus there are a lot of debates and issues in the informal sector in Zimbabwe and in Africa which literature has captured. The main issue is to locate this research in the context of these contestations and debates with the most important issue being to understand how the informal sector has actively
absorbed the urban youth and how they are using it to their advantage to make a living and adapt to a difficult socio economic environment by socially organising themselves and using their agency.

Presentation and discussion of findings
In the face of challenging socio-economic activities, the study found out that young people in Harare are engaging in various income generating activities in order to raise money for their livelihoods. In the different activities which they undertake they are seen as using social structures, their own agency or socially organising themselves and engaging in various economic activities which are briefly outlined in sections below.

Car washing as a survival strategy
Washing cars has become a popular business that young people are undertaking in Harare city. Young people can be seen washing cars in car parks, parking bays, on the streets and in bus terminus around the city. Youths who are undertaking this activity indicated that one just needed to identify a busy place with high visibility to motorists to set up the business and there was no need for any paperwork or payments to the city council as these car washes are not registered. Not much capital is needed to start the business with one needing buckets, access to water (which is usually drawn from council tapes at no cost), detergents, brushes, cloths and wax polish. Those who would have been in the business for longer can be seen having vacuum cleaners, pressurised pumps and generators which they use to clean cars in the interior and on the outside. The youth who are into this business can be seen working as individuals or as groups usually in two's or threes. Information on youth engagement in the car washing business was provided by Simba who is a young man aged 19 who runs his ‘car washing business’ along Harare’s Speke Avenue at a parking bay. He indicated that he had chosen this business after 5 years without employment after leaving school. Having tried his hand at several things he had settled for the car wash business after noticing some young people who were doing it who seemed to be making ends meet with money which they were generating. He had also noticed that there was a high influx of cars mainly from Japan in the city centre and having people not having the time to wash their cars it was for him an excellent business opportunity. Starting with only 2 buckets, washing powder, mutton cloth, ‘a couple of lemons’ and free water from the nearby public toilet he had seen his assets grow to seven buckets, two drums, 6 brushes, 2 vacuum cleaners and a pressure pump. He now has 2 assistants who are helping him to wash cars on a full time bases and he has managed to rent a small place at the backyard of shop where he keeps his equipment. Charging on average between $3 and $5 per vehicle with prices being negotiable and going down to as little as $1 for a simple wash without polishing, Simba indicated that he usually took not less than $15 a day after sharing with his assistants, paying the municipal police at times (to turn a blind eye) and rentals. In addition to doing the car wising business, Simba was seen also selling airtime, cigarettes and directing cars into parking bays for a fee ranging from $0.50 to $1 depending on negotiations with the driver and they were usually paid extra to ensure that vehicles were not clamped by the municipal authorities for not having the requisite parking permits. Through the car
washing business he indicated that he was managing to take care of his family comprising of a wife and a child and to rent a small room in the high density suburb of Dzivarasekwa.

Across town at the Fourth Street bus terminus there was Tatenda, a 31 year old man who was washing cars usually the commuter omnibus taxis at the terminus. For him the business was an important means for survival and unlike Simba he did not have much equipment except his 1 bucket and a few detergents, cloths and brushes. His target business was the commuter buses which would be in a queue on the terminus waiting for their turn to load. For anything between $1 and $3 he was given jobs to clean the cars and on a good day he could clean up to 11 cars but this differed depending on how busy the terminus was. With the money from the car wash he indicated that he was able to take care of himself and rent a room in Epworth. His family which comprised of a wife and four children was resident in the rural areas of Mutoko at his rural home and he said that he was managing to feed and clothe them with the little money which he was making from the car washing business.

A casual walk around the city indicated that there were many young people who were running small car wash businesses around the town and their charges to clean a vehicle ranged from $1 to $5 depending on the negotiations made between the two parties of the car owners and car washers. While car owners were busy in their workplaces, shopping or attending to other business in town they would leave their cars at the car washes where they would be given a thorough cleaning and polish. Their work is so informalised that it is done in total disregard of the city’s by-laws with law enforcement agents seen as being given a small ‘cut’ by the car washers in order to turn a blind eye. Over time it was due to frequent visits to car washes it was noticed during the study that there have developed strong relationships between car owners and those who was cars with car owners showing a lot of trust for the car washers whom they leave their cars with and they can negotiate credit in cases where they do not have cash with them and pay later.

**Foreign currency trading**

Foreign currency trading is also popular money making venture which young people can be seen engaging in Harare. Observations showed that foreign currency traders are mainly concentrated at the Roadport bus terminus and the nearby Fourth Street bus terminus as well as the Copacabana bus terminus and the Eastgate shopping mall. Holding batches of cash comprising of South African Rands and United States Dollars these foreign currency dealers are easily recognisable with their catch phrase ‘tokupai ma rands kana madollars here’ (can we give you rands or dollars). Mai Tanaka who is a 29 year old woman trading in foreign currency at the near the Eastgate mall indicated that selling foreign currency for her was a means of making ends meet after years of unemployment having lost her job three years earlier. She indicated that they took advantage of loopholes in the formal foreign currency system in the country and their main customers are people who are travelling to and from South Africa or those have relatives in the Diaspora who are remitting money home which needs to be traded so that it can be used in the country. She indicated that she made profit for example by
buying the South African rand at US$5.50 for a R100.00 note which she in turn sold for US$6.00. The key was that she provided a link between those who wanted a particular currency and those who wanted to dispose of it. She said she had her *ma big dhara* (big men) to whom she provided foreign currency and on average she would take home around $15 as profit but this changed depending on supply and demand of the foreign currency. With the money she was making, she indicated that she was able to send her child to school, take care of herself and her parents and rent 2 rooms in the Mufakose high density suburb. She indicated that the business was being negatively affected by the very high number of people who were trading in foreign currency whose number continued increasing due to high levels of unemployment in the country. She indicated that some of the people trading in foreign currency were just employees of even bigger persons including business people and politicians who were the ‘real’ owners of the money while others were in fact working as groups or associations scattered all over town who shared profits after a certain period. Observations from around the city indicated that quite a large number of young people are trading in foreign currency in the city centre where they can be seen seated or standing at different places holding large bundles of cash.

*Chihwindi* (touting)

Chihwindi is another popular money making strategy which young people were seen to be engaging in. *Chihwindi* involves people known as *mahwindi* (touts) working at designated bus terminuses or undesignated or illegal terminuses popularly known in Harare as the *mushikashika*. At these pick up points for commuters the hwindis can be seen being very active in calling and seeking customers to board the commuter buses or cars so as to be transported to different destinations. Observations around the city centre showed that there are a high number of the hwindis in town despite several attempts to get rid of these people who are associated with harassment and abuse of commuters looking for transportation or people who would be doing their business in town. Interactions with hwindis operating along Robert Mugabe Street and the Copacabana bus terminus revealed a lot of issues on the touting issue in the city centre. Two hwindis Tichaona (aged 23) and Ras Weli (aged 34) indicated that touting is is a job just like any other job. It involves them being in charge of a commuter loading or drop off bay where vehicles would come to pick up passengers and provide transportation to different destinations. As the owners of the place they charge an average of US$0.50c to a $1 per vehicle which would have picked passengers and this was dependent on the time and how busy it was with peak periods being more expensive. Their duties included loading the vehicles and keeping a look out for the municipal police, traffic police and the Vehicle Inspection Department which have vehicle and personnel regularly patrolling the streets and impounding vehicles that are not roadworthy and those which pick up passengers at these illegal loading bays. Tichaona and Ras Weli indicated that they keep a record of all vehicles that would have loaded and depending on the loading bay and the agreement between the hwindi’s they either share the money at the end of the day or each hwindi is allocated vehicles during the day which they load and the money which they receive is theirs. The daily takings differ depending on how busy it is but according to Ras Weli he averages between US$10 and US$12 a day and this is subject to how busy the day is
and his brushes with law enforcement agents whom he said he ‘greases’ with anything between US$1 and US$5. Observations around the city showed that *chihwindi* is very popular among young males in the city. They are especially evident in places which were once set aside for the transportation of the public by the City Council in the city centre which have since been changed but which remain accessible and convenient to the public who would rather use these illegal points. The *hwindi*’s can also be found along the main roads leading out of town and at the different bus terminus were they are very active in calling out destinations. For Tichaona and Ras Weli, *chihwindi* has meant that they are able to feed themselves and their families and to rent accommodation in Warren Park and Tynwald respectively.

**Vending**

Vending is the most popular income generating activity which the youth are undertaking in the city centre of Harare. Vending in the city centre has included the selling of vegetables, fruits and other food stuffs as well as the selling of new and second hand clothing as well as other non edible items. In 2015 there was a proliferation of vendors in the city centre when there was a relaxation of the city by laws resulting in thousands of vendors invading the city centre and trading their different wares. Vending in the city centre by the youth has seen some of them applying and being allocated market stalls at designated markets while others have tended to trade illegally in the city centre where they are continuously on the lookout of the municipal police who at times seize their goods and arrest them. The majority of vendors operating in the city centre are not licensed and they sell their goods at undesignated areas making them be in danger of arrests or seizure of their goods. During the study it was noticed that these illegal vendors whose majority are young men and women usually come into the city centre and sell their products after 4pm when they know that there are many potential clients in town and the municipal police officers would have knocked off work. Their goods would be displayed and laid down on the pavements on sacks or cardboard or in two wheeled carts popularly known locally as the *(ngoro)*. When the municipal police carry out raids vendors can be seen running and hiding their goods and trying their best to evade arrest.

At the Charge Office flea market there can be found a young man called Amon (aged 30) who trades in *mabhero* (second hand bales of clothing) which he gets from Mozambique as well as new clothes, shoes and toiletries which he buys from Musina, South Africa. At his market stall which comprises of a table for which he pays a daily rate $15 he has two other people whom he shares with in order to minimise his costs thus the daily rental for the table is $5 for him. He has an assistant who helps him to sell his wares and shout out to customers so that they know what is on sale and what he has to offer given the stiff competition in the flea market where there are over a hundred tables. His monthly profit ranges between US$150 and US$200 but it changes depending on his ability to sell and the demand for goods. Through this business he manages to rent a house in Glen Norah and look after his family of four as well as his extended family. Amon indicated that vending either in town or in busy areas is highly politicised with those who have access to stalls being in the ‘correct’ party which is ZANU (PF) and being active in the party structures. For him being in the party has had direct and
indirect benefits of which having access to the table has been one major benefit. He indicated that the majority of the people who owned market stalls were influential politicians or businessmen who rented out the stalls to traders thereby realising a profit without putting much effort or even selling a single thing.

Rudo who is a young woman aged 23 is another young person who is into trading in the city centre but her business is very much different from that of Amon. She sells bottled water, sweets and freezits (ice cools) at the Market Square bus terminus, carrying them in a pack and selling them mainly to passengers who frequent the terminus for transportation to different destinations. Vehicle drivers and their conductors are also some of Rudo’s big customers. Rudo has never been formally employed before and has been vending since the age of 15 after dropping out of school due to lack of money for school fees. She does not pay anything for fees or licences and the expenses which she has are for storing her products in the fridge at shops nearby and paying off municipal police who sometimes arrest vendors in the city centre. For Rudo expenses are not much and profits on a daily basis range from $6 to $8 a day. She had to say the following about her business and life in general:

‘Life is tough there are no jobs and it is worse for us without an education. I have to sell these things here at the terminus but the money which I make is very little it just is enough to try and make ends meet. This bottled water here gives me a profit of US0.10 cents so you can imagine that I have to sell ten just to make a dollar. With changes in weather when it is not hot, sales are very low. I live with my husband in Mbare; he too is a vendor so with the money which we make we combine and try to stretch it to meet our expenses but it is not easy. I know I am not educated but I wish I could just get a job so that I don’t do this hustling for customers and I am guaranteed of a salary at the end of the month.’

In addition to packaged products, fruit and vegetables it was noted that young people are also selling beef, fish and chicken pieces on the streets of Harare. The meat can either be raw or cooked depending on individual preference. This is in violation of the by-laws of the city as well as health standards and normally this product should be sold under hygienic conditions in butchery. One of the vendors Sarudzai (aged 33) who sells fish and chicken outside OK Supermarket at the corner of Albion and Mbuya Nehanda Streets indicated that they are forced to do it because ‘zvinhu zvakaoma hanzvdzi unotokiya-kiya kuti zvifambe’ (things are tough my brother you have to do what you have to do to make ends meet). She orders fish from Norton with other women as a group and a bucket costs them between US$15 and US$20 depending on the season and it is shared equally among them. The fish are then sold for US$1, US$1.50 or US$2 depending on their size to people who would be passing by. In addition to fish chickens are also sold by Sarudzai costing between $6 and $8 a bird. For those who do not want the whole bird chicken pieces are sold costing US$1 for two drumsticks or wings, US$1 for 10 Chicken necks and feet and US$0.50 for half a cup of chicken intestines. Sarudzai indicated that they are part of a larger market chain of a small and unique chicken market which has young people breeding chickens at household level in communities like Warren Park, Kuwadzana and Highfield. These people purchase day old chicks for between US$60 to US$80 for 100 and they rear them until they are fully grown. They then slaughter the chickens and sell them in bulk to the vendors...
and the prices of the chickens differ depending on their size but usually they did not cost more than US$5. The market chain was seen as allowing for cash to flow between consumers, vendors and breeders at reasonable prices which Sarudzai said was favourable to all people in the market chain in the face of a challenging socio-economic situation.

In addition to chickens, Sarudzai also indicated that they occasionally sell zvihuta (quail birds) or their eggs. Further probing about these zvihuta showed that they are now very popular in the country with people of all ages scrambling to rear them and sell their meat and eggs which are said to be nutritious and possessing healing abilities for diseases like cancer and diabetes. The birds are being bred in bulk in incubators in the Warren Park Suburb of Harare were their chicks are sold in batches of either 25, 50 or 100 at US$1.40 each while slaughtered birds cost between $3 and $5. Demand for the zvihuta is said to be high from individuals, hotels, restaurants and supermarkets. They are then bred as chickens and sold with vendors like Sarudzai taking advantage of capturing them for resale to both meat and eggs or sold to individuals and companies making a profit out of it. According to Sarudzai and basing on investigations undertaken by the study, zvihuta have become an important source of income generation by young people in Harare who are using them to increase their income and exploiting the high demand for the birds.

Other young men and women can be spotted around town in the later of hours of the day roasting gizzards, maize, chicken livers, chicken feet and chicken intestines around town on small stands using charcoal. These stands are very common close to bars and nightclubs as well as bus terminuses where there was seen to be a large customer base with many people buying the roasted meat and maize. On enquiry, they indicated that they sell their products for between US$0.50 and US$2 and the profit which they were receiving from the sales was fairly reasonable but one could not solely depend on it there was need to diversify into other activities like vending foodstuffs or selling airtime. Additionally outdoor cooking spots have become very very commonplace at different places in Harare were young women and men cook sadza or rice and target workplaces and places where people drink beer. They usually have unique dishes of mazondo (cow feet) or zvemukati (offals) which are popular with clients at US$1 for a plate.

The three mobile phone operators in Zimbabwe namely Econet, Netone and Telecel have also given a lifeline to young people in Harare with every corner and the majority of shops in the city centre having vendors who sell airtime. Many young people can be spotted at corners and street intersections wearing reflective yellow or orange bibs with the names of the service providers indicating that they sell the airtime. The vendors will be very busy looking for customers and there is stiff competition for customers. The airtime vendors buy their airtime in bulk and sell it as singles for a profit and an airtime voucher costing US$1 can give them a profit of between US$0.08 to US$0.10 and the more the airtime which one sells determines how much one realises as a profit. Mandebvu who is an airtime vendor aged 24 and sells his airtime along Samora Machel Avenue at the Karigamombe Centre indicated that the airtime vending business is not too lucrative but it can boost
ones income especially during month ends but it has its challenges especially these days when there are too many vendors selling the airtime. Profits from vending differ but according to Mandebvu they are not enough for one to depend on for a living. One has to have other activities which bring in money and to show this Mandebvu had his ngoro which was full of bananas which he was selling and additionally he was also selling sweets, flags, belts and deodorants. Mobile phone operators have also given young people in Harare another opportunity by providing them with the chance for them to become agents for their mobile money transfer operations. In every corner and on every street in Harare there can be seen these money transfer agents operating under Ecocash, Telecash and Onewallet brands. For one to become an agent they need to meet minimum requirements as per the requirements of the mobile operator and if they meet the requirements they are given the go ahead and necessary hardware and documentation to begin operations. The agents are given a commission for each transaction in which a person can send or receive money using the agents and basing on observations done during the study it was seen that in addition to selling airtime for mobile phone operators, money transfer agents who work independent of the mobile phone operators have also become an important feature of youth employment in urban Harare.

**Application uploading and phone and computer hardware sells**

Toisa watsaap (we can upload WhatsApp), screen guard fon i yese idollar (screen guards for all phones available at US$1), ma earphones ma earphones dollar for two (earphones available at US$1 for two), to flasher mafoni (we can flash your phones), ma pouch ma pouch nema face ne ma cover emafoni (pouches pouches and phone covers) are some of the popular phrases which young people will be seen shouting to prospective customers along most busy pavements in Harare. In addition to shouting some will be holding cardboard boxes were the services which they offer will be written. The phrases are used to lure potential clients to services which are offered by these young people which include uploading and updating applications on mobile phones like the popular WhatsApp, placing screen guards on phones to protect their screens, flashing and repairing mobile phones which would not be performing well and selling all kinds of mobile phone hardware as well as computer hardware and software to the people. Roads like Jason Moyo, Cameroon Street, Robert Mugabe Road, and Mbuya Nehanda Street among others are quite popular with these young people who offer these services. The study on this money making initiative by the young people showed that they usually rent an office as a group with each individual person concentrating on their own line of business. The young people usually have a desk and either a laptop or desk top computer which they use to serve their clients. Given the demand for mobile phone applications like WhatsApp and lacking knowledge by some people on how to upload, activate or update these applications the youth indicated that they are able to make money offering the service.

Wilson who is a young man aged 29 operates along first street in Harare and indicated that he charges between US$2 or $3 to upload popular mobile applications like WhatsApp, Photo Collages and Facebook which cost him between US$0.50 and US$0.70 to upload making him a large profit. He also puts screen guards on phones at a cost of $1 and sells earphones for all types of phones which
he buys in bulk and he indicated that he realises a profit of 100% from all the sales which he does. When it comes to repairing of phones he indicated that he has limited knowledge and he uses his friends to repair phones for his clients who would have come to his office. For all repairs made on phones he puts a mark up which acts as his profit. In addition to the mobile phone business, Wilson also indicated that he loads computer software into desktop computers and laptops in addition to buying and selling computers and computer consumables. On top of these services which he offers Wilson is also an agent of the Ecocash and Telecash money transfer systems indicated above and these boost his income and profits as he views his business as being very diversified and offering a variety of services hence when one thing is not performing well he has other things which he can fall back on. For Wilson, working like this is the only means available to him to earn a living as he has tried and failed to secure employment in the past despite having a degree in political science. His situation is very similar to a large number of urban youth in Harare who provide services for mobile phones including the loading and updating of mobile applications, the selling of phone and computer software and hardware and being money transfer agents. The young people who were interviewed indicated that they work as individuals running their own businesses, as groups who share profits made or they work for someone who would be the owner of the equipment and office space who gives them either a daily, weekly or monthly target of a certain amount of money which they must pay to him or her.

Multi level marketing

The use of the multi-currency system in Zimbabwe has attracted a lot of international companies and brands in the country who are attempting to also reap some kind of benefits from the system. In Harare there can be seen to have arisen a new type of business model or strategy known as multi-level or network marketing which has been joined by a significant number of people. Scornfully referred to as a new brand of a pyramid scheme in the country, the multi level marketing system has nevertheless been a hit mostly among young persons who are either formally or informally employed or those who are unemployed. Sibongile who is a young lady aged 25 exemplifies a young lady who is passionately into multi-level marketing. In an interview she indicated that she has been doing this multi-level marketing for 2 years in addition to her hair salon business and she is the one who explained the concept of multi-level marketing. She explained that the multi-level marketing system involves the sale of products to the public with health and beauty products being the most popular. She said that it involved the marketing products by any means necessary usually by word of mouth while at the same time recruiting potential marketers or distributors as well as selling the product to the public for a commission. For all the sales which those recruited distributors make, a percentage or commission will go to those who would have recruited them and in time with more recruitments it becomes a large network. With more people being recruited distributors attain higher in rankings which bring them benefits. The ranking system according to Sibongile was in the form of a star system with every star bringing with it different benefits. The advantages of engaging in this kind of business was said to be that it did not limit the amount of income which was paid to an individual for example when compared with corporations and the more hardworking an individual was in recruiting.
distributors the higher the income. There was also seen to be continuous income flows if one had developed a high distributor network with income from commissions flowing in even when one was preoccupied with other businesses.

Observations carried out through the city indicated that the multi level marketing system has become very popular with many young people seen attending workshops on the system and soliciting for potential clients and distributors in town. Promises of rewards if someone reached a certain distribution status including trips to China, receiving cash and cars like the Mercedes Benz were seen to be motivators for people to join the marketing networks. Green World International with its natural health products, Forever Living, World Ventures and Table Charm are some of the popular companies which were seen being active with young people working for them as distributors and those who work in these networks are distinguishable by their neat apparel including suits with the logos of the companies in the city centre. Although Sibongile could divulge the exact amount of money which she was making a month as she indicated that it was dependant on the level which distributors in her network worked as well as her efforts, she said she averaged between US$150 and US$250 each month and claimed that those who have large networks can gross up to US$5000 a month although this could not be verified. For Sibongile she indicated that the work which she does and the income which she receives from the multi-level marketing is important as it helps her to meet her expenses and to support her husband to take care of the family. The income is seen as going a long way in feeding the family and extended family and Sibongile felt that multi-level marketing was important and making a huge difference in her life.

Other income generating initiatives
In addition to the different activities mentioned above there can be seen to be other diverse activities which the urban youth in Zimbabwe are seen as doing in order to earn that extra dollar in the face of the challenging socio-economic environment which is prevailing in the country. During research in Harare, some of the youth in addition to other income generating activities indicated that they belong to credit groups known as mukando or they run money lending schemes known as chimbadzo. Under the mukando system they indicated that they form a group and depending on agreed terms and conditions they provide a certain amount of money to the group on a daily, weekly or monthly basis with the total money realised being availed to a single member with each member being given a chance to benefit from the lump sum cash payments in rotation. The money availed to members is for them to do as they please and members of the mukando groups indicated that it helps them meet their expenses and it acted as a kind of informal banking system which was good as it did not have exorbitant service charges. On the other hand the chimbadzo system functions in such a way that a person who has money will lend out money to those who are in need of it but the money has to be returned with an agreed interest on top. In Harare those who indicated that they give out money through chimbadzo charge interest of between 20 to 50 percent and they usually hold on to items as collateral which they sell in the event that there is failure to pay. In addition to these there were seen to be young people who sell pirated music and videos mostly from international artists with local
music and films not being displayed on their stalls due to fears of arrest and anti-piracy initiatives by the local artists although it was noted that if one requested for local material it was readily available and this business was considered to be quite lucrative.

Some of the youths were seen to be into music especially the new dancehall music which has taken the country by storm. Those who are into this music indicated that they are being rewarded for their efforts through selling their music and performing at live shows but they were experiencing challenges due to piracy and unwillingness by the general population to pay for their music preferring free downloads and sharing of the music on social media with nothing coming to the artists. Some youth in the city centre were seen engaging in illegal activities which included participating in the smuggling, buying and selling of the cough syrup BronCleer popularly known as bronco which has become a hit in Zimbabwe and is being used as a drug which produces heightened psychological effects. A lot of youths were seen to be involved in trading this product which is very popular and in high demand with young people abusing it and those who were trading in it were seen to be making a lot of money from it. A bottle is being sold at US$2.50 to US$3 and it was an advantage to the traders given the weak exchange rate between the United States Dollar and the South African Rand where it was being purchased at R30. Profits were being realised from this product especially from those who were trading it in bulk and this was despite its negative effects on individuals and communities. Lastly another money making craze which was observed as having hit the urban youth was gambling. There was seen to be a proliferation of sports betting shops in the central business district of Harare and these shops were seen spreading their wings to the high density suburbs. Some of the youths indicated that they are making a living out of sports betting with bets being placed on football matches, horse racing and greyhound racing. Knowing the processes and being calculative was seen as important with some individuals claiming to average between US$30 and US$100 a day after betting which they were using to take care of their families and meet their needs. There were observed to be some individuals who are not engaging in any form of income generating activities but who spend their days at the sport betting shops and betting on different competitions hoping to cash in if their bets are correct.

Conclusion
Such are the different ventures which youths are undertaking in a bid to make a living in Harare urban. The activities which the young people are undertaking support the point of view in dominant debate that the informal sector in developing countries like Zimbabwe has become very important as a form of livelihood in the face of non absorption of the citizens by the formal sector especially young school leavers. Although this article has not touched on all the different activities which the urban youth are engaging in order to make a living in a challenging socio-economic environment or to explore critical debates on youth employment and informal economic activities it has attempted to exhaustively explore contemporary informal activities which the youths in Harare are resorting to in the face of socio-economic challenges. It has brought to the fore some of the survival strategies which the urban poor are employing just to earn an extra dollar in urban Harare and it has shown the
different political dynamics and contestations which similar studies have highlighted as existing in urban areas characterised by informal activities. The different ventures which the urban youth engage in show how important social structures, social agency and social organisation are in any social system. Given the realisation by the urban youth that the socio-economic system in the country will remain difficult and challenging for a long time to come the youth are seen analysing the social structure and social systems which are in place and they employ socially acceptable and at times unacceptable means to undertake different initiatives which provide them with a means of income. Economic hardships are seen as stimulating and developing agency in the youth which they use to come up with innovative means to make a living. They are seen as studying the situation in the city centre and capitalising on available situations and opportunities. In addition to their own individual initiatives, the youth are also seen organising themselves as small groups or co-operatives which they use to set up their different initiatives which generate income for them. In the face of a difficult socio-economic environment the youth in the city of Harare have developed and adopted diverse livelihood initiatives which are making their lives move forward and they have displayed amazing resilience in the face of challenges.

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Relationship among Job Insecurity, Psychological Climate and Pay Satisfaction in Survivor Employees

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Abstract: The study examined the relationship among pay satisfaction, psychological climate and perceived job insecurity. Respondents were 189 workers selected among employees of a major company in the downstream oil and gas sector in Nigeria. Respondents were administered questionnaires that measured pay satisfaction, psychological climate and job insecurity scales. Data were analyzed to predict influence of job insecurity on pay satisfaction and psychological climate. Results showed that job insecurity influenced both pay satisfaction and psychological climate. Specifically, perception of job insecurity was positively associated with pay satisfaction and psychological climate. Also, there was significant negative influence of education on job insecurity. It was concluded that job insecurity played a role in the perception of pay satisfaction and psychological climate of employees in unstable jobs.

Keywords: job insecurity, pay satisfaction, psychological climate, Nigeria

Introduction

Forced termination of employment due to organisational restructuring exercise may result in the perception of job insecurity by survivor employees. Survivor employees are believed to experience survivor syndrome, a condition described as “a set of attitudes, perceptions and behaviors of workers who remain following involuntary employee reductions” (Robbins, 1999). Since the goal of a restructuring program is to improve organisational effectiveness (Sitlington & Marshall, 2011), success in managing the psychological transition of survivor employees towards contributing effectively to organisational efficiency require that managers understand how the felt threat of job loss affect survivor employees attitudes and perceptions.

In Nigeria, job insecurity alongside other variables has been studied in sectors such as banks (e.g. Adejuwon & Lawal, 2013; Okurame, 2014), telecommunication (e.g. Ugwu, & Asogwa, 2017), hospitality (e.g. Karatepe & Olugbade, 2016) and education (e.g. Akpan, 2013). Similarly, job insecurity has been examined outside Nigeria (Camgoz, Ekmekci, Karapinar & Guler, 2016; de Beer, Rothmann Jr., & Plenaar, 2016; Haynie, Svyantek, Mazzei, & Varma, 2016; Vujičić, Jovičić, Lalić, Gagić, & Cvejano, 2015). But research on job insecurity and factors that are associated with it among workers in the oil and gas industry is underexplored, despite the mass retrenchment in the sector in the recent past. Therefore, the present study aimed at bridging the knowledge gap by examining the

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relationship between pay satisfaction, psychological climate and job insecurity in employees who survived forced dismissals in the downstream oil and gas industry in Nigeria.

Most definitions of job insecurity relate it to the subjective feeling of high level of uncertainty about the sustainability of one's present job in view of current happenings (Greenhalgh & Rosenblatt, 1984; Hartley, Jacobson, Klandermans & Van Vuuren, 1991). Previous studies showed that feelings of job insecurity result in negative work attitudes that can adversely affect employee performance (Cheng & Chan, 2008; Sverke, Hellgren, & Näswall, 2002; Wang, Lu, & Siu, 2015). Specifically, the finding of a recent study showed that job insecurity is indirectly related to volitional behavior (citizenship and counterproductive behavior) through the perception of psychological contract breach (Piccoli, De Witte, & Reisel, 2017). The finding suggests that employees who felt threatened by a job loss may give interpretation that references a violation of the 'lifetime employment' which they believed they were promised by the organisation.

Remuneration issues affect work attitudes with pay being of significant importance in work organisations (Chng & Wang, 2015; Rynes, Gerhart, & Minette, 2004). Pay satisfaction assesses an individual's overall positive and negative feelings that are associated with pay. Findings have shown that pay is positively related to employee attitudes and behavior (Baroudi, Fleisher, Khapova, Jansen, & Richardson 2017; Chng & Wang, 2015; Gupta & Shaw 2014). A direct test of the relationship between job insecurity and pay satisfaction established that both were negatively related (Haynie, Svyantek, Mazzei, & Varma, 2016).

Interestingly, Haynie et al. finding suggests that pay satisfaction may not be of much importance to an employee who is gripped by fear of dismissal, as the security of the job itself, as losing the job may mean loss of important personal and social valuables that may compromise the individual’s wellbeing and mental health (Mauno, Cheng, & Lim, 2017; Bolton & Oatley, 1987; Kessler, Turner, & House, 1988). Surprisingly, positive association between pay satisfaction and job insecurity has been reported (Brockner, 1988; Sutton (1987). The authors explained that employees tended to increase their effort when they were notified about an impending job loss. It may be that perceived job instability coupled with limited access to job alternative opportunity compelled a positive reevaluation of current earnings. An indirect support for this argument emanate from finding that the fear of loss can strong attitudinal and behavioral responses to maintain the relationship choosing from a variety of individual and organisational means (Li & Ahlstrom, 2016).

The process of restructuring within an organisation is also related to the psychological climate. The psychological climate is a reference to the degree of satisfaction associated with an individual's subjective appraisal of organisational practices, procedures and outcomes (Baltles, 2001). Organisational practices that are associated with involuntary job losses may have a strong impact on the perception of psychological climate of surviving employees. The reason is that, to the surviving employees, such forced job losses communicate the fact that the organisation no longer reciprocated
hard work, loyalty and dedication with lifetime employment as might be expected. In addition, witnessing a downsizing sends a signal to workers that job security is no longer guaranteed and this belief is capable of instilling a constant fear of job insecurity in existing employees (Appelbaum & Donia, 2000).

Elman and O’ Rand (2002) reported that highly educated and less educated employees perceived job insecurity but that this occurred in different ways. The finding underscored the fact that educational attainment is a factor that deserves to be examined when assessing job insecurity. Furthermore, Zemsky (1998) posited that education and technical knowledge played critical roles in organisational restructuring. Findings suggested that possessing cutting-edge skills and credentials improved job marketability such that a skilled employee are retained in their current employment or could easily find a new one (Laserson, 1998; Murphy & Welch, 1993; Salsman, 1998).

From the foregoing discussion, it is hypothesized in this study that perception of job insecurity will be negatively related to pay satisfaction and perception of psychological climate.

The theoretical framework for the present study is social exchange theory. Bultena (1998) suggested that social exchange theory be applied to the understanding of the effects of job insecurity on employee outcomes. This means that as employee outcomes, SET could be used to further the understanding of the relationship between pay satisfaction, psychological climate and job insecurity. SET is based on the idea that receiving something of benefit from a party to a relationship obligates the recipient to reciprocate in kind in future exchanges (Goudner, 1960). It further argued that consistently receiving and reciprocating benefits strengthened the felt obligations to reciprocate between the parties in an exchange relationship (Blau, 1964; Homans, 1961). In work organisations, employees expect they would be rewarded with continuous employment if they contributed meaningfully to organisational functionality. Thus, it is assumed that the expectations of both parties are met in a situation of continuous employment. But when the organisation ‘reneges’ to fulfill its own aspect of the obligation (e.g. by involuntary termination of appointment), the employee will in turn perceive the organisation as untrustworthy and assess everything about it negatively.

Respondents and procedure
Participants in this study were selected among employees in the downstream oil sector in Ibadan. The sector was adversely affected by the recent fall in oil price occasioned by a weak global oil demand. As a result, the sector experienced a lot of uncertainties that culminated to business closure, and the drop in revenue led to salary fractionalization and arrears, suspension of benefits, promotion freeze and massive rationalization. In consultation with management of the participating oil company, the study questionnaires were distributed to employees, to which 189 were completed and returned.

Instrument
The data for this voluntary survey were collected with structured questionnaires that contained existing standardized scales that measured pay satisfaction, psychological climate and job insecurity. Respondents indicated demographic characteristics such as sex, age, education, marital status and experience in the questionnaire.

Pay satisfaction was measured by the 18-item version of the pay satisfaction questionnaire developed by Heneman & Schwab (1985). The respondents expressed their degree of satisfaction with each statement on a 5 point scale in which respondents checked 1 = ‘very dissatisfied’ when they disagreed with a statement, and 5 = ‘very satisfied’ when they agreed with the statement. Total score on the scale was used as a measure of high and low levels of pay satisfaction. Judge (2006) reported coefficient alpha reliability estimate of .89 for the overall scale. The Cronbach Alpha of the scale in the present study is .94.

Psychological climate was assessed with the scale developed by Furnham & Leonard (1997). It is a 42-item questionnaire adapted to measure perceived psychological climate in workplace. Responses were based on a 5-point rating scale with strongly disagree scored 1, and strongly agree scored 5. Two sample items in the scale were: ‘I receive all the information I need to carry out my work’ and, ‘People in this company do not spend too much time on inessentials’. The Cronbach Alpha of the scale in the present study is .94.

Job insecurity questionnaire (De Witte, 2000) was used to assess job insecurity. The JIQ is an 11-item scale in short format that assessed cognitive and affective aspects of job insecurity. The responses were rated on a 5-point scale such that strongly agree was scored 1, and strongly disagree was scored 5. Sample items in the scale are: “I am sure I can keep my job”, and, “I am worried about keeping my job”. Higher scores on the scale were interpreted as an indication of higher levels of perceived job insecurity.

Data analyses

Data generated in the study were analyzed with Statistical Package for Social Sciences (SPSS - version 22). The analyses performed included simple percentages, bivariate correlation to test relationship between the variables, and hierarchical multiple regression analysis to test the prediction of the independent variable.

Results

Preliminary analyses

The study had two main independent variables which were deemed acceptable for a sample size of 189 respondents (Tabachnick & Fidell, 2001). Normality was tested using z-test for skewness and normal Q-Q plot. Inspection of the Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests showed the computed significance level to be greater than 0.05 (.074). Therefore, normality was assumed. The inspection of the normal Q-Q plot showed adequate normality for the job insecurity variable. Lastly, both pay satisfaction and
psychological climate were established as independent variables, and therefore the assumption of singularity was not violated (Tabachnick & Fidell, 2007).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item</th>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Age (in years)</td>
<td>20-25</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>18.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>26-30</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>14.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>31-35</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>31.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>36-40</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>19.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>41 and above</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>16.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>88</td>
<td>46.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Female</td>
<td>101</td>
<td>53.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marital status</td>
<td>Never married</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>34.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Married</td>
<td>119</td>
<td>63.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Divorced</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>No formal education</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>3.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>High school certificate</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>8.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>National diploma</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>22.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>First degree</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>36.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Master’s degree</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>13.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Ph.D. degree</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>16.4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The results in table 2 showed that there was significant correlations between the variables: pay satisfaction and psychological climate ($r = .38, p<.01$); pay satisfaction and job insecurity ($r = .43, p<.01$); psychological climate and job insecurity ($r = .36, p<.01$); pay climate and age ($r = .15, p<.01$); job insecurity and education ($r = -.15, p <.05$); age and education ($r = .31, p <.01$); age and experience ($r = .51, p<.01$); education and experience ($r = .23, p <.01$). All of these relationships...
showed weak to moderate correlations that ranged between $r = .15$ and $r = .51$. It was therefore concluded that the assumption of multicollinearity was not violated in the study (Tabachnick & Fidell, 2007).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>PS</th>
<th>PC</th>
<th>JI</th>
<th>Age</th>
<th>Education</th>
<th>Experience</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>PS</strong></td>
<td>-</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>PC</strong></td>
<td>.38**</td>
<td>-</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>JI</strong></td>
<td>.43**</td>
<td>.36**</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Age</strong></td>
<td>.05</td>
<td>.15**</td>
<td>.01</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Education</strong></td>
<td>.15*</td>
<td>-.09</td>
<td>-.15*</td>
<td>.31**</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Experience</strong></td>
<td>-.04</td>
<td>.05</td>
<td>.03</td>
<td>.51**</td>
<td>.23**</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 2  Correlations among Study Variables

**p<.01, *p<.05, PS = Pay satisfaction, PC = Psychological climate, JI = Job insecurity**

The results in table 3 showed that in Step 1, control variables (age, education, and experience) had non-significant combined influence on job insecurity, but they jointly accounted for 3% variance in job insecurity [$R^2 = .03$, $F(3,167) = 1.73, p ns$]. The results further showed that education predicted job insecurity [$\beta = -.17$, $t = -2.22, p < .05$]. The result indicated that the higher the level of education, the lower the level of perception of job insecurity. In Step 2 of the model, introducing the psychological climate variable into the relationship explained an additional 11% variance in job insecurity and this change in $R^2$ was significant [$R^2 = .14$, $F (1,166) = 23.23, p < .01$]. This means that the addition of psychological climate led to an incremental prediction of 11% in perceived job insecurity.

The result further showed that psychological climate independently predicted job insecurity [$\beta = .35$, $t = 4.82, p < .01$]. This means that the more favorable the psychological climate, the higher the level of perceived job insecurity. Finally, the addition of pay satisfaction in Step 3 explained an additional 13%
variation in job insecurity and this change in $R^2$ was significant [$R^2 = .28, F (1,165) = 30.20, p<.01$].

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variables</th>
<th>$B$</th>
<th>$T$</th>
<th>$P$</th>
<th>$R$</th>
<th>$R^2$</th>
<th>$Adj\ R^2$</th>
<th>$\Delta R^2$</th>
<th>$\Delta F$</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>.04</td>
<td>.46</td>
<td>ns</td>
<td>.17</td>
<td>.03</td>
<td>.01</td>
<td>.03</td>
<td>1.73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>-.17</td>
<td>-2.22*</td>
<td>&lt;.05</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Experience</td>
<td>.05</td>
<td>.64</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Step2

This means that the addition of pay satisfaction led to an incremental prediction of 2% in perceived job insecurity. The result further revealed that pay satisfaction [$\beta = .40, t = 5.49, p<.01$], perceived psychological climate [$\beta = .18, t = 2.49, p<.05$] and education [$\beta = -.21, t = -2.97, p<.05$] independently predicted job insecurity in Step 3. The independent predictions suggested that the higher the level of pay satisfaction, the higher the level of perceived job insecurity. Also, more favorable perception of psychological climate was associated with higher perception of job insecurity. Similarly, the result showed that the higher the level of education, the less the perception of job insecurity.

Table 3: Hierarchical multiple regression analysis predicting job insecurity
Discussion

Against the background of the growing feeling of job insecurity among employees and the consequences of threatened job loss on employee attitudes, the present study examined the relationship between job insecurity, psychological climate and pay satisfaction in a sample of workers in the downstream subsector of the oil and gas industry in Nigeria. It was hypothesized that job insecurity would have significant negative relationship with employee outcome, specifically with respect to pay satisfaction and psychological climate. The results showed that although pay satisfaction and psychological climate influenced job insecurity, however, the hypotheses were not confirmed in the direction predicted in the study.

The finding showed that pay satisfaction and job insecurity are positively related. It indicated that levels of satisfaction with pay increased as the fear of possible job loss increased. The finding did not support Haynie, Svyantek, Mazzei, & Varma (2016) who found a negative association between pay satisfaction and job insecurity. It also contradicts past studies from across settings that reported negative relationship between pay satisfaction and job insecurity. But it is supported at least, indirectly by past studies (Brockner, 1988; Li, & Ahlstrom, 2016). The finding in the present study suggests that the negative consequences of job insecurity may be context dependent. The positive relationship between pay satisfaction and job insecurity in the present sample may reflect the fact that employees reevaluated their remuneration more favorably in the light of a threatened layoff. The postulation is relevant because employees in the oil and gas industry earn higher wages on the average compared to other employee groups in Nigeria. It is therefore not unlikely that the value of their pay may have being magnified by the perceived job insecurity.

**p<.01, *p<.05. PC=Psychological climate, PS=Pay satisfaction**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Age 1</th>
<th>Education 1</th>
<th>Experience 1</th>
<th>PC 1</th>
<th>PS 1</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Age 1</td>
<td>-0.03</td>
<td>-0.38 ns</td>
<td>0.38</td>
<td>0.14</td>
<td>0.12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>-0.12</td>
<td>-1.62 ns</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Experience</td>
<td>0.06</td>
<td>0.75 ns</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PC 1</td>
<td>0.35</td>
<td>4.82** &lt;0.01</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Step 3</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age 1</td>
<td>-0.02</td>
<td>-0.28 ns</td>
<td>0.53</td>
<td>0.28</td>
<td>0.25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>-0.21</td>
<td>-2.97* &lt;0.05</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Experience</td>
<td>0.10</td>
<td>1.38 ns</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PC 1</td>
<td>0.18</td>
<td>2.49* &lt;0.05</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PS 1</td>
<td>0.40</td>
<td>5.49** &lt;0.01</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Similarly, the finding that psychological climate and job insecurity are positively related suggests that higher job threats results in more favorable perception of the psychological climate. In other words, employees threatened with a dismissal assessed their work environment more favorably. The finding is consistent with Sutton (1987) who found that employees exhibited more positive attitude towards the organisation in order to increase the chance that they would be retained when the organisation downsized. The finding is possible in Nigeria because employees are known to make favorable comments that portray the organisation in good light to increase the likelihood that they would be retained in unpredictable economic conditions such as staff rationalization.

Lastly, the finding showed that education was negatively related to job insecurity. This indicated that higher levels of education results in reductions in perception of job insecurity. The finding concurred with Elman & O’Rand (2002) who reported that highly educated and less educated employees perceived job insecurity differently. An explanation for the finding in this study is that highly educated employees more likely possessed relevant technical knowledge and skills such that they were less preoccupied with thoughts about losing their current employment (Salsman, 1998; Zemsky, 1998).

**Conclusion**

Major conclusions that can be made from the findings of this study are that employees who perceived job insecurity reported higher pay satisfaction and favorable perception of psychological climate. Furthermore, a sense of job insecurity was higher among individuals with lower education, while those with higher education reported less job insecurity.

The limitations of this study can constrain the generalizability of its findings to employees in organisations other than the oil and gas industry. The first concerned the sample size of 189 respondents which is considered insufficient to be representative of the employees in the oil and gas industry in Nigeria. A larger sample size might be more representative of workers in this industry. Another limitation relates to the exclusive use of self-report questionnaires only for data collection. Findings suggest that the exclusive use of self-report measures increased the likelihood that method variance would contribute to shared variance between measures (Schaufeli, Enzmann, & Girault, 1993).

**References**


Prevalence of Herdsmen and Farmers Conflict in Nigeria

Oli, Nneka Perpetua; Ibekwe, Christopher Chimaobi and Nwankwo, Ignatius Uche

Abstract: The quest for protection and preservation of secured economic sources of livelihood appears to be the bane for continued conflict between herdsmen and farmers in different places. The paper examined the prevalence of herdsmen and farmers conflict in Nigeria. The study is anchored on the frustration-aggression and conflict theories. Data were extracted from secondary sources like journals, textbooks, newspapers and online organizational publications. Evidences indicated that herdsmen-farmers conflict is prevalent in the country. It also showed that some of the factors that usually led to clashes were destruction or grazing on crops, long-standing disagreements, lack of access to farm or grazing fields and scarcity of fresh water. Consequently, loss of human and animal lives, destruction of crops and properties, displacement of persons and animals, rising anti-Fulani sentiment and breakdown of peaceful relationship with many communities in some parts of the country were amongst the gross effects of the conflict. However, the study concluded that until this issue is amicably resolved and absolute cooperation among the conflicting parties enhanced; food and national security would continue to be threatened. Therefore, the study recommended amongst others that government should establish cattle grazing fields in the six geo-political zones of the country and outlaw open grazing of cattle. This must be done through due consultation, dialogue or appeal to some aggrieved regions of the country which may oppose or resist the move. Poor water management practice in the country should be improved by the Federal Ministry of Water Resources. This is in view of the fact that climate change cum water shortage and drought are the major reasons herdsmen are migrating southward in search of fresh water and grass for their cattle.

Keywords: conflict, farmers, herdsmen, nomadic, pastoralists.

Introduction

The quest for protection and preservation of secured economic sources of livelihood appears to be the bane for continued conflict between herdsmen and farmers in different places. In West Africa, conflicts between farmers and nomadic cattle herders have been a common feature of economic activities for ages (Tonah, 2006). The Northern region of Ghana has recently experienced increased clashes between the two groups over access to land resources (Olaniyan, Francis & Okeke-Uzodike, 2015). The struggle for the use of agricultural land for planting and grazing is becoming fiercer and increasingly widespread in Nigeria, largely due to intensification of production activities that are necessitated by rising human population (Fasona & Omojola, 2005).

Prior to 20th century, cattle rearing was prevalent in the Guinea, Sudan and Sahel Savanna belts where crop production was carried out on small scale only during the short rainy season. This gave

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cattle herders access to a vast area of grass land. However, the introduction of irrigated farming in the Savanna belt of Nigeria and the increased withering of pasture during dry season has made pasture less available for cattle. The herders had to move southward to the coastal zone, where rainy season is longer and the soil retains moisture for long, in search of greener pasture and fresh water for their cows (Ofuoku & Isife, 2009). As the herders migrate southward where the grass is much lusher and often intrude into spaces long claimed or cultivated by settled farmers, conflicts usually ensued (Olaniyan, Francis & Okeke-Uzodike, 2015). This conflict is believed to have existed since the beginning of agriculture and either increased or decreased in intensity or frequency depending on economic, environmental and other factors (Aliyu, 2015).

In many places, herders have clashed with farmers and their host communities over cattle destruction of crops; farmers’ encroachment on grazing reserves and indiscriminate bush burning by nomads which normally leads to loss of crops (Adeoye, 2017; Ofem & Inyang, 2014; Olaleye, Odutola, Ojo, Umar & Ndanitsa, 2010). The seeming boldness of the perpetrators and mystery surrounding the real cause has continued to attract mixed perceptions. While many perceive it as mere farming, grazing land and water dispute; others see it as reprisals in defence of livestocks from banditary in farming communities (Eyekpimi, 2016; Mikailu, 2016). In recent times, there have been prevalent cases of herdsmen-farmers clashes in Nigeria. Ofuoku and Isife (2009) noted that in Densina, Adamawa State, 28 people were killed; while about 2,500 farmers were displaced and rendered homeless in a clash between them. Similarly, Idowu (2017) submits that the violence has displaced more than 100,000 people in Benue and Enugu States and left them under the care of relatives or in makeshift Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) camps while many are still struggling to rebuild their lives.

However, among the Tiv and other farmers in the North-Central, South-South, South-East and North-Eastern regions, cases of conflicts with herdsmen are endless. The resultant effects are usually loss of lives and crops, destruction of properties, displacement of persons, decline in income/savings; as well as threat to food and national security. Beside, the Global Terrorism Index (GTI) recently placed the Nigeria’s Fulani herdsmen as the world’s fourth deadliest militant group for having accounted for about 1,229 deaths in 2014. While Boko Haram was associated with about 330 casualties in the first quarter of 2016, the Fulani herdsmen accounted for nearly 500 deaths and have shown no sign of slowing down. As such, it has been predicted that the Fulani herdsmen might well surpass Boko Haram as Nigeria’s most dangerous group (Burton, 2016; GTI, 2015). In view of the aforementioned issues, this paper examines the prevalence of herdsmen and farmers conflict in Nigeria.

**Conceptual Clarifications**

**Historic Background of Herdsmen**

Herdsmen are owners or keepers of herds of animals like cattle. They usually move their herds from one place to another in search of pasture and fresh water. In Nigeria, it is predominantly the occupation of the Fulani ethnic group. In other words, they own and rear cattle for commercial purposes.
According to Idowu (2017), the Fulani (also called Peul or Fulbe) are people of obscure origin that expanded eastward from Futa Toro in Lower Senegal in the 14th century. By 16th and 19th centuries they had established themselves at Macina (upstream of the Niger Bend) and Hausa lands, notably, Adamawa (in the northern Cameroons). Many of the Fulanis continued to maintain pastoral lives; some, however, particularly in Hausa land gave up their nomadic pursuits, settled in existing urban communities and were converted to Islām. This has often made it difficult to differentiate them from the Muslim-Hausas of Nigeria (Idowu, 2017). They are concentrated principally in Nigeria, Mali, Guinea, Cameroon, Senegal and Niger. Their indigenous language is known as Fula and it is classified within the Atlantic branch of the Niger-Congo language family. They constitute the fourth-largest ethnic group in Nigeria with an estimated population of over seven million (Burton, 2016).

However, Abass (2012) noted that they are the mainstay of the meat and milk industry, accounting for about 90% of cattle ownership in Nigeria. They rear different species of cattle such as the Keteku, Muturu and Kuri, but the Zebu is identified as the most common and they are also the major suppliers of skins, bones and horns (Adeoye, 2017). Fulani herders can travel hundreds of miles in large numbers with their cattle in search of pasture. They are often armed and visibly move about with weapons (like daggars, matchets, arrows etc.) to protect their livestocks. Due to their violent nature and associated killings, the group was recently described as the world’s fourth deadliest militant group (GTI, 2015; Mikailu, 2016).

Prevalence of Herdsmen-Farmers Conflict in Nigeria

Table 1: Herdsmen-Farmers Conflicts in Nigeria between January 2016 and May 2017.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>S/n</th>
<th>Place</th>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Immediate cause(s)</th>
<th>Death toll/Casualties/Degree of Destruction</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A.</td>
<td>Incidences of 2016</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.</td>
<td>Udeni Ruwa, Nasarawa state</td>
<td>January 6</td>
<td>Destruction of farm crops</td>
<td>Between 12 and 38 people were killed and many wounded.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.</td>
<td>Gareji village in Taraba State</td>
<td>January 17</td>
<td></td>
<td>3 people were killed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.</td>
<td>Demsa, Wunamokoh, Dikajam and Taboungo of Adamawa State</td>
<td>January 23</td>
<td></td>
<td>Between 30 and 60 people including a police DPO were killed and properties destroyed.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.</td>
<td>Agatu, Benue State</td>
<td>February 2</td>
<td>Reprisal attack</td>
<td>7 people were killed and the community</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No.</td>
<td>Location</td>
<td>Date</td>
<td>Event Description</td>
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<tr>
<td>5.</td>
<td>Tom-Anyiin and Tom-Ataan</td>
<td>February 7</td>
<td>Clash between Fulani herdsmen and farmers</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>communities, Tombu in Buruku</td>
<td>LGA, Benue State</td>
<td>10 persons were killed and the community was raided.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.</td>
<td>Abbi, Enugu State</td>
<td>February 11</td>
<td>2 persons were killed and some were declared missing.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.</td>
<td>Agatu, Benue State</td>
<td>February 24 &amp; 28</td>
<td>Reprisal attack against the alleged killing of a prominent Fulani man by the people of Agatu in 2013.</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Between 300 and 500 persons were killed and wounded. Others were displaced.</td>
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<td>8.</td>
<td>Ossissa, Ndokwa, Delta State</td>
<td>March 2</td>
<td>Some people were wounded and residents were forced to flee their homes as houses were destroyed.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9.</td>
<td>Mbaya-Tombo, Benue state</td>
<td>March 7, 8</td>
<td>Dispute and destruction of farm crops</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>13 &amp; 17</td>
<td>Over 35 persons died and properties were destroyed.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10.</td>
<td>Ugwunesi in Aawgu LGA, Enugu</td>
<td>March 26</td>
<td>A reprisal attack by Fulani herdsmen after armed farmers killed a Fulani traditional ruler- Ardo of Kardorko- Alhaji Habibu Domo, and four others.</td>
<td>2 Soldiers, 18 others were killed. Thousands were displaced and more than 1000 homesteads were destroyed.</td>
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<td></td>
<td>State</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>11.</td>
<td>Ohali-Elu, Rivers State</td>
<td>April 3-7</td>
<td>Clash with communities</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>About 7 to 16 people were killed.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12.</td>
<td>Ilado, Ondo State</td>
<td>April 9</td>
<td>Hon. Olu Falae, former SGF, was attacked by herdsmen and they killed his security guard.</td>
<td>Herdsmen attacked and killed the security guard of Chief. Falae.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
13. Angai, Dashole, Dori and Mesuwa villages of Taraba State April 10 Farm land dispute Between 15 and 44 people were killed.

14. Agatu, Benue State April 20 Policemen attacked Some persons were injured and a policeman was declared missing.

15. Ndiagu Attakwu, Nkanu-West LGA, Enugu State April 25 Herdsmen were alleged to have entered the heart of the community that afternoon and a woman sounded a gong, after which the cows scattered: the herdsmen gathered the herds and left, only to return in the night and raided the village. Many were murdered, including a catholic church seminarian and a pregnant woman whose stomach was cut open. Also houses were destroyed,

16. Nimbo Community of Uzo-Uwani LGA, Enugu state April 25 Herdsmen were said to have earlier disagreed with the villagers over the use of farmlands as grazing fields. 46 people were killed and 10 houses were burnt, including Christ Holy Church International during the invasion.

17. Dungun Mu'azu, Sabuwa LGA, Katsina State November 25 Reprisal attack 8 people were massacred (7 men and 1 woman)

B. Incidences of 2017

18. Abraka and Obiaruku, both in Ethiope East and Ukwuani LGAs, Delta State January 9 No fewer than 5 persons were killed.

19. Zango-Kataf Local Council of Kaduna State January 17 Herdsmen opened fire in Samaru Kataf market 3 persons were killed and five injured.

20. Ipiga village in Ohimini LGA, January 24 Benue State Grazed cattle and destroyed farmlands 15 persons were killed. A bloody fight that took the lives of two of the herdsmen and about
21. Jema’a LGA, Kaduna State January 24 Commercial car taking students to school from Kafanchan was waylaid by alleged herdsmen 5 students of the College of Education, Gidan Waya were shot dead.

22. Rukumawa Tsafe LGA, Zamfara State February 10 Clash between community members and suspected herdsmen 8 people were confirmed dead.

23. Southern Kaduna, Kaduna State February 21 Fulani herdsmen launched attacks on four communities About 21 people were killed.

24. Mbahimin community, Gwer East LGA, Benue State March 2 Renewed hostilities between herdsmen and farmers in Mbahimin community No fewer than 10 persons were killed.

25. Omumu community, Ika South LGA, Delta State March 6 Clash between suspected herdsmen and residents of Omumu community 6 persons died.

26. Tiv community, Mkgovur village in Buruku LGA, Benue State March 11 Renewed hostilities between herdsmen and farmers in Mbahimin community 7 people were killed.

27. Umuobasikwu, Ozuitem community in Bende LGA, Abia State March 14 Clash between herdsmen and the people of Umuobasikwu 1 person was killed and several others injured.

28. Adam Village, Kwande LGA, Benue State March 27 Herdsmen farm attack 1 killed, 1 injured, women raped in their farms.

29. Emuhu community in Ika South LGA, Delta State March 28 Attack by suspected herdsmen 3 persons were killed while six others sustained injuries.

Obio Usiere in Eniong Abatim, Odukpani LGA, Cross River State April 1 Raid a community killed no fewer than 10 persons
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Event Description</th>
<th>Casualties</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>30</td>
<td>Tse-Akaa village, Ugondo Mbamar District of Logo LGA, Benue State</td>
<td>May 8</td>
<td>Clash with herdsmen</td>
<td>3 persons were killed.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31</td>
<td>Ossissa community in Ndokwa East LGA, Delta State</td>
<td>May 12</td>
<td>Farmers who worked with Ugo Farm were ambushed on their way home</td>
<td>Suspected herdsmen beheaded a commercial motorcycle rider and six farmers.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>32</td>
<td>Afam Uku, Oyigbo LGA, Rivers State</td>
<td>May 18</td>
<td>Herdsmen attack</td>
<td>2 persons lost their lives.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>33</td>
<td>Ewu community, Esan Central LGA, Edo State</td>
<td>May 22</td>
<td>Herdsmen entered farmland raped two women and strangled them to death</td>
<td>2 people were killed and 1 was wounded. Crops were destroyed and lots of persons sacked from their farmlands.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Authors compilation from Vanguard (2017, June 1st) and Kalu (2017, June, 3rd).

Theoretical Orientation

The study is anchored on frustration-aggression and conflict theories. The theories are suitable, relevant and best explain the phenomenon leading to the prevailing issues of conflicts between herdsmen and farmers in Nigeria.

Frustration-Aggression Theory

This theory was originally conceived by Dollard and Miller (1939) but later substantially refined by Berkowitz in 1969. The theory states that aggression is an outcome or result of blocking or frustrating a person’s efforts towards a certain goal (Dollard, 1939; as cited in Myers, 2007). The theory further posits that frustration caused by interference in goal-directed activity produces a ‘readiness’ for aggression which if ‘triggered’ can result in aggressive response. According to Rationis (2014), the trigger could be an insignificant element of behavior, such as a casual joke, gesture or mild criticism which would normally be overlooked, but to the frustrated individual who is already waiting for an opportunity to show his frustration it may provoke aggressive response or reprisal.

In application to this study, the goal or aim of every farmer during planting season is to have bountiful harvest, then sell the farm produce and make profits. On the other hand, the herdsmen would always want to have well fed and healthy cattle and be able to make profits as well. When any of these expectations was not realizable, either by the herd (cattle) eating up and destroying the farmers’ crops or that the farmer encroached on grazing reserves or use water reserved for cattle to irrigate their
farms, aggression would be triggered. Either of the parties that felt frustrated to achieving their economic goals may decide to reprise as to show their displeasure and as a result conflict will occur.

Furthermore, a clear readiness for aggression could be likened to the Fulanis’ justification on why they attacked ten Agatu communities of Benue State on February 10th 2016 and massacred hundreds of persons. According to the leader of the Gan Allah Fulanis Association, the conflict was a reprisal attack against the killing of their prominent son by the people of Agatu who stole his cattle in April 2013 (Mayah, Tukur & Adebayo, 2016). This scenario depicts three years of frustration or grudge against the Agatus and perhaps repeated unsuccessful plots for attack, until the farmers’ reaction on crops destruction by the herds triggered the aggression from the herdsmen.

Conflict Theory

The lead proponent of this theory is Karl Marx (1818-1883). He was a victim of marginalization due to his revolutionary ideas and the misery of his alienation was seen through his two radical most famous works: The Capital and Communist Manifesto (Charles, 2005). Marx’s conflict ideology is “an analysis of inequality under capitalism and how to change it through confrontation” (Ritzer & Stepnisky, 2014:43). They argued that in capitalism, there is an inherent conflict of interests between two opposing classes. Rex in Kirby, Kidd, Koubel, Barter, Hope, Kirton, Madry, Manning and Triggs (1997:32) submits that “the most basic cause of the conflict between two groups is usually over access to material resources”. However, the basic tenet of the theory is that two opposing groups in the society always struggle for limited or scarce resources. Each group struggles to attain or acquire more resources and because they are scarce, struggle ensues between them. Every group tries to protect its own interest, thus blocking the progress of another in accessing that (Idowu, 2017).

The land resources (such as farm lands, crops, grass/pasture, fresh water etc.) are scarce in Nigeria and needed by both farmers and herdsmen for sustainance of their various sources of livelihood. Conflict, however, would not only occur between herders and farmers as both strive with another in pursuit of these resources; but as either of the groups tries to intrude or exploit another’s already secured and long acquired resources.

Again, as the herdsmen who usually trave miles without their wives or certain about grazing fields in the various communities they visit, could possibly obtain sexual gratification forcefully or have their cattle fed in farm crops and would normally face confrontation for violation and destruction of crops. Similarly, conflict would likely arise when farmers who are in need of arable farm lands encroach into grazing reserves or criminals in the host communities try to steal cattle for economic gains. This is in tandem with Gbehe in Ofem and Iyang (2014) who pointed out that the pursuit of access to a variety of limited resources such as grasslands and water spots for animals gives rise to conflicts.
Factors influencing Herdsmen-Farmers Conflict in Nigeria

Empirically, evidences have revealed various reasons for the continued conflict between herdsmen and farmers in Nigeria. Some of the factors that influence the conflict include:

**Damaging or Grazing on Crops:** The damaging or intentional grazing on crops has been pointed out as the most predominant cause of conflict between farmers and herdsmen (Adebayo & Olaniyi, 2008). In a recent study, Adeoye (2017) found deliberate grazing of cattle on crops, farmers’ encroachment on grazing reserves, water holes and cattle paths and indiscriminate bush burning by herdsmen as notable causes of conflict between the groups in parts of Kano, Yobe and Borno States of Nigeria. In another study by Adelakun, Adurogbangba and Akinbile (2015) in Oyo State, about 34.2% of the farmers and 6.7% of the pastoralists indicated that crop damage always triggers conflict between them.

**Changing Climatic Conditions:** The encroaching desert to the traditional abode of the pastoralists in the Sahel region has been identified as a factor for the continued clash as herdsmen migrate southward where the grass is much lusher and often intrude into spaces long claimed or cultivated by settled farmers (Olaniyan et al., 2015). In Nasarawa State, the situation has been exacerbated by the phenomenon of climate change which dynamics tend to have been aggravating natural resource conflicts across the region (Okoli & Atelhe, 2014). Climate change and desert encroachment have made southward movements even more inevitable and confrontations with southern farming communities more frequent (Nwosu, 2017).

**Long-Standing Disagreements:** Burton (2016) noted that many of the recent attacks perpetrated by the Fulanis have stemmed from long-standing disagreements with various communities. For instance, Mayah et al (2016) reported that a Fulani leader alleged that the massacre of Agatu people by Fulanis was a reprisal attack against the killing of their prominent son by the people of Agatu in April 2013 who stole his cows. Mostly in the middle-belt, the conflict was found to have stemmed from a long history of feud over farm lands and herding. Preexisting communal conflicts have sustained the violence as herdsmen turned militants in the face of urbanization, desertification and the indifference of the Nigerian government to their plight (Burton, 2016).

**Scarcity of Fresh Water:** Fresh water scarcity seems to be an under-estimated and under-discussed resource issue facing the world today. It is obvious that the world’s water demand grows every year in order to meet up with increasing population. Exacerbated by climate change, fresh water scarcity is creating security concerns in some parts of sub-Saharan Africa, especially in the semi-arid region (Audu, 2013). He argued that availability of water which is a major resource needed for agriculture is decreasing as a result of changes in global climatic conditions. Farmers and pastoralists who are the main agricultural practitioners in Nigeria depend on water resources to sustain their vocations. In recent times, access to water and grazing land have become more competitive and has led to violent conflicts on a regular basis between farmers and herdsmen. Jacobs (1980) noted that fresh water scarcity and insufficient rainfall are causes of social and economic ruins which have left the
pastoralists at the mercy of sedentary farmers’ communities. Ofem and Inyang (2014) observed that contamination of stream by cattle have led to clashes in Yakurr, Cross River State, Nigeria.

Lack of Access to Farm or Grazing Fields

The Institute for Peace and Conflict Resolution in conjunction with United Nations Development Programme (IPCR-UNDP, 2012) traced the cause of the conflict in Guma and Makurdi LGAs of Benue State to the material needed for existence or survival which is the green of the land and fresh water. As the pastoralists need this for grazing and drinking purposes; the Tiv farmers at the same time need it for farming activities; thus they usually clash.

Negligence: This has been identified on the part of both groups as a cause of the conflicts. Yahaya (2008) observed that the herdsmen often left a large number of cattle in the care of children who do not know the consequences in the event of destruction of farm produce. On the other hand, he posits that most farmers usually left their harvested crops on their farm unprotected while others who had poor yield intentionally left them un-harvested for cattle to graze so that they could claim heavy compensation.

The Nigerian government is as well indicted in this accusation. Burton (2016) noted that government’s silence or negligence on the need for increased grazing space has influenced the conflict. He also argued that the request is not new as the Fulani herdsmen have previously called on the government to rectify the situation. He maintained that there has been little action on the part of the government to resolve these problems and some quarters believe that it is just being politicized for selfish gains. The herdsmen therefore have grown restless and their impatience has culminated into violent actions.

Disrespect of Traditional Authorities: According to Ofem and Inyang (2014), many communities usually collect levies from local crop and livestock (poultry) farmers in their domain and herdsmen normally refuse to pay. This is often perceived as disregard and insult to the traditional authorities. The youth who constitute the local security are usually sent to collect that and the assignment is often met with strict resistance that results to clashes. Similarly, Ofuoku and Isife (2009) equally noted that one of the major causes of the conflict in Delta State communities is the disregard for the host traditional authority by the herdsmen.

Increasing Urbanization: The quest to join the league of developed societies has continued to pose a threat to certain agricultural activities in Nigeria. There is increasing erosion of farm and grass lands mostly needed by farmers for planting and herdsmen for grazing. This has deprived the pastoralists of valuable grassland, again forcing them to attempt to expand their “grass kingdom” (Burton, 2016).

Other issues identified were indiscriminate bush burning, sexual harassment of women by nomads, harassment of nomads by host youth, theft of cattle and indiscriminate defecation by cattle along the road (Ofem & Inyang, 2014). It is worthy of note that indiscriminate bush burning can lead to low productivity as a result of poor quality of farm lands. However, sexual harassment and rape of women
by nomads may lead to contraction of STDs, HIV/AIDS and high rate of unwanted pregnancies among the victims. Also, the defecation by cattle can cause environmental pollution which can pose a health hazard to the inhabitants of the affected areas.

**Socio-Economic Effects of Herdsmen-Farmers Conflicts in Nigeria**

Clashes between cattle herders and crop farmers have been a major cause of increasing violence and general insecurity in Nigeria. There has been increasing economic adverse effects and social or relational implications such as;

**Loss of Human and Animal Lives:** In most of these encounters, human and animal lives were regularly lost (Aliyu, 2015). According to Burton (2016), on April 5th, 2016 Fulani militants killed four individuals in Benue State. Again, between 10 and 11th of the same month they killed about 17 persons in Taraba and 40 people were massacred in Enugu State on the 25th of that same month. Following a rivalry between the Tiv and Fulani ethnic groups, a total of 853 people have lost their lives since June 2014.

While the Fulani herdsmen claimed to have lost 214 people in addition to 3,200 cows, the Tiv people reportedly killed are estimated to be 633 excluding children and women who died in ramshackle camps in 2014. Moreso, six soldiers attached to the 72 battalion in Makurdi were said to be killed in the cross-fire that ensued between the two groups during the period (Abdulbarkindo & Alupse, 2015). They emphasized that five of the soldiers were killed in Agatu in January 2015 while one, a captain, was beheaded in Guma LGA of Benue State. So far, the Tiv people in Guma, Gwer-West, Makurdi and other towns at the border with Taraba state have recorded about 458 deaths and over 350 communities have been sacked and are now living in IDP camps.

**Destruction of Crops:** According to Ofuoku and Isife (2009), more than 40 million worth of crops are usually lost annually due to invasion of cattle in the South-South region of Nigeria, especially Delta and Edo States. This has not only created an impediment to the survival of the host communities but has forced many crop-farmers to abandon farming for lesser occupations like Okada (commercial motorcycling) riding and other artisan work. Aliyu (2015) argued that the conflict has continued to lead to destruction or loss of properties and crops in Katsina State leaving an already endangered populace even poorer.

The food security welfare of urban dwellers especially residents of Calabar that depend on these farmers for food supply has been negatively affected since the incessant clashes in Yakurr, which is predominantly a farming community and the prices of available food supply skyrocketed (Ofem & Inyang, 2014). A study conducted by Umeh and Chukwu (2016) in Ebonyi State indicated that the economic loss on both conflicting parties was huge and that the herders seemed to have incurred more in monetary terms than the farmers. While the farmers lost lots of crops and farms to the conflicts, herdsmen lost several cattle and sheep. The reverse was the case in Oyo State, as Adelakun, Adurogbangba and Akinbile (2015) found that farmers were worst hit by the conflicts as it
affects their family farming and has led to reduction in farm output, loss of properties and scarcity of food.

Reprisal Attacks: Due to the failure of security agencies to control the excesses of the herdsmen, the youth in various communities of Ekiti State have on several occasions launched reprisal attacks on the cattle rearers’ abodes (“Gaa”), sacking them and destroying their properties (Olugbenga, 2013). There are similar reports in various places in the country. Reports equally indicate similar reprisals in different farming communities.

Displacement of Persons and Animals: There were reports of displaced farmers and herdsmen alike. In the host communities, nomadic herdsmen relocate as a result of conflict. Host farmers especially women who stayed behind stop going to distant farms for fear of attack by nomads in the bush (Ofouku & Isife, 2009). Such displaced farmers have become a source of liability to other farmers whom they have to beg for food for themselves and their families. This has created a vicious cycle of poverty in such communities. In Yakurr, Cross River State, Ofem and Inyang (2014) observed that herdsmen-farmers conflict has not only resulted to internal displacement of herdsmen and farmers, especially women; but also led to reduction in income/savings and crops output.

Distrust between Herdsmen and Farmers: Burton (2016) noted that majority of the members of the expanse Fulani ethnic group are solely pastoralists without connection to militant violence. Even these peaceful ones, however, are largely viewed with suspicion and anger by the sedentary communities on whose land they take their cattle, largely as a result of the actions of the violent group. This has created distrust and altered the mutual relationship that has existed between them and most of their host communities.

Anti-Fulani Sentiments

It has been observed that the violent disposition of the Fulani herdsmen have given rise to anti-Fulani sentiment in some parts of the country and has also continued to instil hatred against them (Idowu, 2017). Some persons have cited a Fulani expansionist agenda as being behind these attacks. A Twitter hashtag to that effect, #MAFO (Movement Against Fulani Occupation) has been launched and there have been allegations of possible government collusion in this perceived expansionist agenda (Nwosu, 2017).

In Ebonyi, the conflict was found to have led to loss of peaceful co-existence, breakdown of established friendship, perpetual fear of attack and loss of family means of livelihood (Umeh & Chukwu, 2016). According to Burton, cooperation between innocent citizens, aggrieved Fulani herdsmen and the government is appearing hard to come by, hence, he suggests that the conflict will require multi-level cooperation if it is to be resolved peacefully.

Disruption of Academic and other Activities: The pupils and teachers of Ohonvbe Model Primary School in Ikpoba Okha LGA of Edo State were seen scattered in the premises under intense fear as
herdsmen left their cattle to invade class rooms during learning session (Channel News Live Report, 2017, June 8th). That day’s academic activities were not only truncated but also the psychological trauma experienced by the pupils that forcefully ran out of classrooms for fear of harm may not be quantified. The herders were seen roaming the school premises and they left their cattle to move freely inside classrooms until the late intervention of some security personnel.

Conclusion

The recurrent clashes between herdsmen and farmers in Nigeria portray a conflict of interests over resource acquisition or control. This is exarcebated by the climatic changes that continued to force the herdsmen out of their Northern abode to the Southern region in search of pasture and fresh water for their cattle. Hence, it has been observed that herdsmen-farmers conflicts are prevalent and the persistence of these conflicts leads to loss of lives and properties. Until this issue is amicably resolved and absolute cooperation enhanced among the parties; food and national security will continue to be threatened in Nigeria.

Recommendations

The following recommendations are made for possible policy implementation:

1. Government should establish cattle grazing fields in the six geo-political zones of the country and out-law open grazing of cattle. This must be done through due consultation, dialogue or appeal to some aggrieved regions of the country which may oppose or resist the move.
2. Poor water management practice in the country should be improved by the Federal Ministry of Water Resources. This is in view of the fact that climate change cum water shortage and drought are the major reasons herdsmen are migrating southward in search of fresh water and grass for their cattle.
3. Herdsmen should be properly educated or re-oriented on the sanctity of human lives, and taught how to use better channels of communication to convey their grievances than resorting to conflict.
4. Any form of aggression as a result of past issue(s) should be discouraged and anyone found wanting in that respect be prosecuted.

References


Digital Inequality in Rural and Urban settings: Challenges of Education and Information in South African Youth Context

ME Choung and MG Manamela

Abstract: South Africa is experiencing the sting of Information and Communications Technologies (ICTs) that result in digital inequality; thus, it impairs the efforts in a quest to deal with socio-economic issues, particularly quality of education. ICTs in the twenty first century are perceived as necessary tools to enhance the speed of information dissemination and communication among youth. ICTs provide necessary information that can lead to edification of skills and knowledge in different communities, predominantly in rural areas. Therefore, this paper argues that lack of ICTs in the context of digital inequality, particularly in relative majority of rural areas, impairs the speed at which the process of bridging the educational gap between rural and urban areas should occur. Thus, lack of access to ICTs and usage increase the existing digital inequality gap in education between rural and urban areas. The purpose of this paper is to engage ICTs focusing on digital inequality in education in a South African youth context. Theoretically, the paper intends to explore factors in education that contribute to the gap between rural and urban areas in respect of ICTs. The paper concludes that ICTs are the carriers of all sorts of information serving different purposes.

Keywords: ICTs, education, information, digital inequality, South Africa

Introduction

In the advent of democracy, the South Africans have and are still facing socio-economic challenges, where there is lack of quality education, social exclusion and inequality that are dire and unabated. Within the context of education, digital inequality poses as one of the factors, among others, that affect the quality thereof. South Africa is experiencing the sting of lack of ensuring equal Information and Communications Technologies (ICTs), predominantly in remote rural areas (Ntolwana, 2013; Chigona, Chigona, Kayongo & Kausa, 2010). Thus, it impairs the efforts in a quest to deal with socio-economic issues holistically, particularly quality of education. Therefore, that results in digital inequality; ultimately affecting the quality of education and success of young people employment and being well informed about issues that are affecting them; acquiring skills, information and knowledge is one amongst the other. DiMaggio and Hargittai (2001) define digital inequality as a result that is portrayed between the haves and the have-nots, segregated by the split measures for access when one needs to make use of technologies. Digital inequality is also defined as not only differences in

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terms of access but also inequality between individuals with proper internet access (Robinson, Cotten, Ono, Quan-Haase, Mesch, Chen, Schulz, Hale & Stern, 2015). Basson, Goetz & Tustin (2012) perceive digital inequality as a gap that exists within the society between those who have the capacity to completely use ICTs for their benefit and for those who do not have or have but unable to use them. Van Dijk (2012) distinguished the dimensions of digital inequality focused on usage, skill, access together with motivation and the aim. In essence, the definitions of digital inequality complement the argument of this paper, looking at access to information, acquiring of employment and achieving quality of education. Thus, the usage, access and skill are highlighted in this paper to portray the gap betwixt rural and urban areas in respect of digital inequality.

The process of addressing socio-economic challenges involves the application of communication technologies in the modern era. Accordingly, digital skills are inadequate as levelled with the skills of using and managing hardware and software (Dijk, 2002). The paper looks at the opportunities youth can take advantage of when they have skills and access to technological resources. The paper emphasises more on the quality of education and how lack of resources, skills and usage can have an impact on their education; and how that can limit youth to participate fully in some of the various sectors of society. Digital inequality amongst the youth is accepted to be an element that frequently prevents them to reach their potential (Czerniewicz & Brown, 2010). In this information age, innovative ways of doing things like learning are discovered daily through research and access to information (Czerniewicz & Brown, 2010). It is expected for the youth to be using the ICTs for connecting with peers from other side of their countries, being familiar with new methods of how business is done or even getting to know the norms of other people living in different states from where we are situated (Czerniewicz & Brown, 2010). The success thereof, is often associated with the cognitive part of access to ICTs; having digital skills will help one to access information through alternate formats or strategies such as, digit format, braille or mental mapping and use the hardware (Hargittai & Hinnant, 2008; Chigona et al., 2010). ICTs in the twenty first century are perceived as necessary tools to enhance the speed of information dissemination and communication among youth; and provide access to relevant digital educational services (Chigona et al., 2010). ICTs provide necessary information that can lead to edification of skills and knowledge in different communities, predominantly in rural areas.

**Paper Framework and Method**

This paper assembles theoretical/desktop data that is available in respect of digital inequality in rural and urban areas, particularly focusing on youth; that is, to arrive at a summative notion in terms of the premise of the argument of the paper. Data were gathered through using extensive literature and internet searches. The opinions of other scholars across the issues of digital inequality are included to substantiate the argument of the paper. The conceptual framework of the paper is solely relying on literature to support the argument thereof. Literature review revealed data that is based on the following categories:
• Issues of digital inequality in terms of gadgets and skills of utilization that are based on the have and have not's.

• Lack of access to digital repositories and internet to gather information.

• Factors that instigate digital inequality.

Several studies that focused on digital equality guided the work and argument of the paper (DiMaggio, Hargittai, Celeste & Shafer, 2004; Oydemi, 2012; Van Dijk, 2012; Robinson et al., 2015). Thus, scholars have provided the analyses that radiate the distinction between the rural and urban youth in terms of skills, knowledge and access to information among others. The concept digital inequality concerning rural and urban areas provides the analyses and results that determine the challenges of education and access to information in the context of South African youth.

**Digital inequality among South African youth**

Youngsters seem to be early adopters of technologies and some have the skills to make use of such technologies (Barkker & De Vreese, 2011). Most youth use technologies as their basic form of communicating and remaining connected with the people close to them (Barkker & De Vreese, 2011). This section intends to highlight the extent at which youth have access to digital technologies in and around the areas where they live. However, the section focuses solely on digital inequality in education and access to information as the contributing factors to digital inequality but not limited to other aspects.

**Digital inequality in education**

Having little or no access to technology can limit young people into finding and exploring information related to education. Thus, education can be distinctive among youth because of digital inequality. For example, Czerniewicz & Brown (2010) purposefully selected two students, classified as part of the digital elite (a digital native) and a digital stranger (had very little experience of ICTs). Furthermore, the experiences of the students who are both at higher institutions but have different experiences of technologies can portray an educational gap due to lack of skill (Czerniewicz & Brown, 2010). In the study, it emerged that the student who came from a moderate-richer family background had more experience of technology and had easy access to them than the other student who have just been exposed to the modern technology just a year before varsity (Czerniewicz & Brown, 2010). This means that even in terms of the skills level, there will be a great variance. Student from poor backgrounds cannot have access to these technologies as much as they want and that limits them to reach their potential (Robinson et al., 2015). The student with less access will not be able to pursue other educational interests on the internet due to limited time allocated at the computer centre. Therefore, that highlights the fact that having access to internet through cell phones, personal computer *inter alia* at home as well is advantageous.

Research by Herselman & Britton (2002) investigated the nature of digital divide focusing on the native viewpoint. The study was conducted at four schools and one adult education centre in South Africa
regarding access to ICTs (Herselman & Britton, 2002). Information required was achieved through answering of questionnaires by Grade 12 learners (Herselman & Britton, 2002). Among other findings, the results showed that only 11.25% of all learners who lacked resources tested that they accessed a personal computer on a regular basis, whilst 21.25% used one a few times with 60% of learners who had never used a computer before (Herselman & Britton, 2002). The study further showed that only 5% had frequent access to the internet and 22% of them had seen it a few times, while 73% had no idea of what the internet are (Herselman & Britton, 2002).

As internet is a very scarce and useful resource, it is very important for youth in education to have as it can provide with meaningful information that will help them excel in their grades and have better knowledge and understanding of things. Presently, cell phones appeared to have enormous potential to provide the internet at regulated charges which are affordable to most people. Youth Research Unit at the University of South Africa (UNISA) conducted a survey to show how cell phones are predominant among high school learners of South Africa. Survey revealed that 98% of high school learners in different schools were in possession of a cell phone. Robinson (2012) estimates in South Africa, there is roughly about 12 million WAP-enabled cell phone utilizers. Additionally, a study by youth marketing agencies (Student Village and Interact RDT) further attested that 78% of SA pupils have entrance to internet through using of cell phones (Czerniewicz, 2011). Cell phone assists in bridging the gap that relates to lack of internet among youth and it poses to be one of the most affordable means to access internet conveniently. Halewood & Kenny (2008) suggest that broadcast technologies are useful tools in formal and continuing education and the internet may play a key role in vocational and further education.

Limited or lack of access to the internet indeed poses a disadvantage to those affected; in this case, the most affected group will be disadvantaged rural people. Oyedemi (2012) postulates that students coming from families earning high incomes tend to ensure access to internet at householdas compared to students from families earning low income who have the limited access. This echoes the fact that students as of families earning low incomes might rely on using computer repositories frequently to access the internet because of not having them at home. As a result, if computer centres closes for holidays, recess, and/or for other purposes, they often affected and forced go to internet cafés to access information and do school work. Unlike youth from high income families, they have a wide range of options available to access the internet for educational purposes. For example, they have a privilege of using their cell phones or personal computer at home to access internet for educational purposes.

Access to information

Writings on internet usage and youth commitment that focuses on online updateingestion and access to information are no exception (Hargittai & Hinnant, 2008; Ekström & Östman, 2015). New media tools and technology are swiftly becoming main mechanism for conveying courtesy to the matters of civic distress and access to info is about quality of education (Middaugh, 2012). According to Zickuhr
(2010) whether there is a discovery and distribution of information, structure and retaining social networks, sharing view, or accruing money, digital technologies are more frequent tool that enables students and unemployed youth to explore opportunities in education and searching for employment. In essence, the digital technology provides people with information easily through tools such as computers that connects to internet. The internet is an interactive space where large files of information are uploaded for the consumption of the user (Lenhart, Purcell, Smith & Zickuhr, 2010). However, accessibility of these resources can be costly for most of the people who cannot afford to use them (Batane, 2013). As a result, mobile digital libraries can bridge the gap thereof. It becomes important for the user to scrutinize the information found on the internet before they decide to use it or not. Anyone who has the capabilities can upload what have been accessed through internet. Though, information pursuing and news ingestion is nowadays brought to people by digital technologies. Other practices of the internet such as social relations and participation in other sorts of user-generated content provide youth skills that are vital for fruitful socialization into vigorous methods of citizenship (Bakker & De Vreese, 2011).

**Factors that contribute to digital educational gap in urban and rural areas**

**Race**

When putting race under analysis, it is important also to look at how digital inequality affect individuals based on it. Oyedemi (2015) shows evidence that in South Africa, race in most cases influences the design of admission to technology and it determines the discrepancies in computers available to use and internet access in the household. African pupils are less privileged to access computers at home with only relative minority having desktop computer, individual laptop or both. However, White students are in possession of desktop computer at home, an individual laptop or both (Oyedemi, 2012). Considering those who do not have access to computers at home, African students stood at a staggering 47%, with Coloureds at 5.3% and white students at only 1.7%. With respect to the internet accessibility, 76.9% of African pupils do not access internet in their households as compared to only 11.4% of white students who does not have it (Oyedemi, 2015). This has led to more African student relying on computer centre or repositories to access the internet and computer.

**Gender**

Gender too has an impact on whether one is affected by the digital inequality or not because it also considered in the demographics. About 60% of schoolgirls and 60.3% of schoolboys regularly utilise computer labs on campus to access internet (Oyedemi, 2012). Nonetheless, only 32.1% of schoolboys do not have a computer at home whereas 40.4% of female students reported that they do not have computers at home (Oyedemi, 2012). Respectively, 65.4% of schoolboys do not have household internet access related to 61.5% of schoolgirls; whereas 52.3% of schoolgirls access an internet frequently using cell phones as equated to 41% of schoolboys accessing internet using cell phones (Oyedemi, 2012).
Geographical Location

Pupils who live in rural areas are most likely to be underprivileged when it comes to access to technology. Oyedemi (2012) revealed that 66.7% of pupils who reside in rural areas have no access to home computers, compared to 13.9% that reside in urban areas. Pertaining access to internet, 60.9% of students residing in cities access the internet at home as compared to 16.3% of persons residing in rural areas (Oyedemi, 2012). Therefore, learners residing in rural areas are likely to count on internet that is provided on campus than learners from the cities/urban areas (Oyedemi, 2012). The findings further show that 66.5% of students in rural areas utilize computer repositories more frequently to access internet as equated to 46.9% of students coming from the city and urban areas (Oyedemi, 2012). Consequently, 87.1% of pupils in urban areas access internet even during recess, whereas 49% of learners in rural areas have no access to internet during recess (Oyedemi, 2012). Moreover, 60% of pupils residing in cities/urban areas access internet from their homes while others access it from friends’ places, parents’ works and can go to computer centres when schools are closed (Oyedemi, 2012). Access to information by people coming from the rural and urban areas is different and is often determined by their geographical location. In this context, the geographical location is in respect of relative majority of rural areas that are non-electrified as well as electrified urban and some rural areas. Thus, it creates a gap in urban and rural areas as well as becomes more problematic mostly for those living in those rural areas in accessing information. Considering the aforementioned, the reluctance of computer academies and repositories to reach rural people is delayed due to lack of electricity in some rural areas. As a result, rural people are unable to acquire digital skills to use technology.

Skills inequalities

Digital skills are important to get one ahead in terms of using the new ICTs and understanding how they should be handled. The rates at which education and skills are developed have gradually improved but this seems not to influence the rate of rural skilled youth as compared to urban youth. Dijk (2002) defines digital skills merely as not the skill to manoeuvre computers and network connections, however as the skill to search, select, process and smear information from sources. It is the capability to utilize information strategically to advance one’s status in the public; these are referred to as skills that are instrumental, informational and strategic (Van Dijk, 2012; Molefi, 2015). In South Africa, the skills gap is juxtaposed with educational qualifications, concentrating more on young people (Molefi, 2015). It is an imbalance showing lack of skills development among the youth, particularly young people in rural areas. This raises a question that does higher institutions and technical institutions offer technological skills to students or not? It becomes a very huge issue when one begins to separate the youth unemployment in terms of those who have skills and qualifications but still are unemployed together with those who do not. Ntolwana (2013) studied skills inequalities with the purpose of understanding the level of skills shortages around the under developed areas of the Eastern Cape to apprise helpful measures. Findings reflected that there is lack of basic ICTs skills
among the participants with contributing factors changing from absence of knowledge around ICT vocations, to absence of access to ICTs tools (Ntolwana, 2013).

Usage inequality

Having no access, lacking skills and the incorrect usage of the ICTs would lead to the negative impact of the digital inequality on youth in many ways. Hargittai & Hinnant (2008) articulated that empirical tests on usage inequality have been identified in social demographic features that limit ICTs access and usage. The aspect of usage is one of the essential elements to be considered by the users of the ICTs for accessing educational content. The ability to use a range of programmes, applications and internet protocols is very important as well. According to Oyedemi (2015), previous studies focused more on the physical access of ICTs and put less attention on the patterns of usage inequality whereas present studies explore a range of inequality in designs of usage and skills. This indicates that their level of usage will be different from someone who has been using these technologies for quite some time. Being able to use computer application can be useful when one needs to manipulate some information for personal benefit. Daily usage of the internet enhances collective capacities to acquire and store information, search through high volumes of information and retrieving instantly (Robinson et al., 2015). It expands opportunities to access information, education, decent occupations; and, creating new premeditated platform for discussion of issues that directly affects the society (DiMaggio & Hargittai, 2001). As a result, people in rural areas are forced to travel lengthy distances to access basic and other services such as the library and internet café (Raju & Raju, 2010). Additionally, they are unable to use digital technologies for educational purpose.

Approaches to address digital inequality

To bridge digital inequality, it is essential to consider the following discussions. The level of ICTs amongst school learners began improving in 2010 through the initiatives such as iSchoolAfrica, Thutong Education Portal and Mindset network (Cortoos, Jeans & Levec, 2015). iSchoolAfrica is an Apple project that supports young people with hardware and software in each participation (Cortoos et al., 2015). The success of these projections however, requires the ICTs skill of learners in schools to be at a certain level. These projects are implemented at Gauteng, North West, Eastern Cape and Limpopo provinces respectively. It is therefore ironic that such kinds of initiatives are implemented in other provinces not considering them as the approach to the whole provinces of South Africa. This is with the fact that South Africa is still a developing country that has relative majority of rural areas (Raju & Raju, 2010).

Another intervention to assist in bridging digital inequality and bringing ICTs services is the establishment of Universal Service and Access Agency of South Africa (USAASA). It is a government entity owned by the state which has been implemented through the Electronic Communications Act, no 36 of 2005, to ensure that everyone living in rural or urban areas can connect, explore, speak and study using ICTs. USAASA is a fast placement project that is planned to permit sector to publicly bid for grants to deploy public access of technologies (USAASA, 2016). Thus, addressing the issues of
disparity and inconsistency of digital inequality, the agency aims at engaging in a process of evolving a national strategy on access to digital services (USAASA, 2016). USAASA guarantees the suitable identification of the needs in rural areas, underdeveloped, under-serviced and un-serviced areas, considering the levels of affordability (USAASA, 2016). It proposed a model that is appropriate enough to ensure both basic and advanced ICTs services are available, accessible and affordable to all people in South Africa (USAASA, 2016). It is a great and innovative approach which gives hope for South Africans but limited to the specific areas.

There are other portions of the South African country that can be categorised as developing areas and other parts that can be categorised as developed areas (Raju & Raju, 2010). There is an excess of information and resources in the developed areas while in developing areas there is a shortage thereof (Raju & Raju, 2010). As a result, libraries should have a role to play to mediate and provide information in that regard. There is no adequate access to information in the minority sector of South Africa; the challenge is how to manage and where to provide information (Raju & Raju, 2010). In the early years, public libraries were perceived as the pivotal role players in balancing access to computer and internet (Becker, Crandall, Fisher, Kinney, Landry & Rocha, 2010). When the use of public computers and internet capabilities are put under an evaluation, they demonstrate that people belonging to groups characterised as digitally disadvantaged are more likely to utilise computers in libraries more regularly than privileged (Becker et al., 2010). There are still extensive discrepancies among library systems even when there is availability; however, access on its own is not enough to preserve inequities amongst numerous demographic groups (Becker et al., 2010). Kinney (2010) addressed the importance of internet for public libraries, in respect of impacts on the public, predominantly the digitally disadvantaged. The author analysed changes of library systems based on growth of public terminals which is a served sections of diverse degree in respect of the socio-economic issues between the non-white and non-English-speaking households (Kinney, 2010). Kinney (2010) used census database to assess library efforts to bridge the digital inequality. As a result, there isa disparity when it comes to number of public computers available looking at incomes (Becker et al., 2010; Kinney, 2010). In essence, it is alleged that the low income utilizes public computers as compared to the high earning income.

In the Western Cape, access to public libraries is said to be progressing very well. Currently, there is an initiative called Smart Cape which intends to offer computers and free internet access to Cape Town citizens (City of Cape Town (CCT), 2016). This programme was implemented to equip public library with internet linked terminals, for users to conduct research, access and send e-mails, and apply for jobs online (CCT, 2016). The city is having 101 libraries, 2 satellite libraries and a traveling library service (CCT, 2016). Services provided are lending books and access to digital resources, magazines and journals, programmes in data retrieval skills, lifelong learning and storytelling (CCT, 2016). Additionally, city libraries serve as cultural cores and locations for activities and events within the community (CCT, 2016). In Free State, Mzansi Libraries Online project was launched by the Department of Arts and Culture in 2015 in partnership with the Bill and Melinda Gates
Foundation and the National Library of South Africatooffer computer equipment to libraries throughout the country (SANews.gov.za, 2015). The project aimed at improving quality of libraries and access to information services for the South African (Kinney, 2010; SANews.gov.za, 2015). The initiative intends to impart citizens with knowledge that can assist in the meaningful participation in the democratic era. Notably, each library received 20 computers, 10 tablets, 10 electronic readers, one document scanner and a room for public use (SANews.gov.za, 2015). To eliminate digital inequality, it is important to establish how much access do young people have to the internet and what exactly do they like using it for. In a study which was done in Botswana, it emerged that student’s access internet largely for communiqué purposes and entertainment, then school work and lastly for other uses (Batane, 2013). Therefore, there is a need for initiatives to urge young people to priorities educational content when it comes to utilization of internet.

Discussion
Through literature analytical review, the paper discovered that relative majority of scholars paid less attention on the issue of ICTcentres such computer labs and digital repositories in terms of availability and access. For case in point, some scholars have provided the analyses that highlight the distinction of rural and urban youth in terms of skills, knowledge and access to information without considering ICT centres thereof. Conversely, the issue of ICTcentres is a major aspectthat reflects the problem of digital inequality between rural and urban settings amongst youth. The results thereof, show a gap based on education and access to information; evidently, that is perceived through lack of ICT centres and/or gadgets. Accordingly, that is with the fact that most urban households are perceived to be high and middle-incomeearners as compared to rural households. Therefore, high or middle-income households can possess gadgets or home computers for children to do school related activities and other purposes.

Based on literature, the paper discovered that issues of digital inequality are in terms of lack of access to ICT tools, in most cases if not all, gadgets are highlighted as the main issue in that regard. Moreover, for some who are in possession of those gadgets there is an inept in respect of utilization. Notably, that led to the paper interrogating the haves and have nots based on digital inequality. Furthermore, the dichotomy considering urban and rural areas in terms of digital inequality radiate that underprivileged rural areas have limited digital repositories or do no have repositories at all and internet to gather information as compared with urban areas. Thus, title and the crux of the paper have been formulated looking at the factors that instigate and exacerbate digital inequality between rural and urban areas. Factors such as race, gender, geographical location and skills inequality among others reflected to be the dire concerns in most of the rural youth. Overall, the concept digital inequality provides analyses and results that determine the challenges of education and access to information in the context of South African youth. Hence, the paper is adamant to the fact that digital inequality contributes to problems in education and access to information for South African youth.

Conclusion
The discussions above support the idea that digital inequality amongst youth has a significant impact on their personal educational growth. The quality of education youth receives will be affected by the digital inequality. Thus, the quality of education that can be determined by the accessibility of digital resources can have permanent consequences to the youth who does not have access. This shows just how digital inequality can affect the future of the youth, as they do not have access to the resources that can assist to enhance their quality of education. The examples given show how the use and access to ICTs can bring positive results for the youth in a developing country such as South Africa. One important thing that emerged from the literature is how ICTs can be used by youth to participate at various levels. The potential of ICTs has been perceived as one of the curriculum delivery through technologies for a success. The paper highlighted that the use of internet requires a platform where an internet user will be able to share their information. Websites are no longer the only platforms where users exchange information but there are also social media where data are shared among users easily. Social media make it easy for youth to participate and make their voices and opinions heard. With the use of social media, they can now share information and participate in the interactive groups/chats for educational purposes.

Recommendations

- The education system should embrace ICTs in all diverse groups and locations to produce exceedingly skilled persons to bridge digital inequality.
- All South African rural areas should be considered when establishing the approaches to provide young people with repositories and skills of ICTs.
- There should be adequate government interventions or donor to fund ICTs projects to accommodate disadvantaged communities; for computer repositories in schools and community libraries.
- The South Africa's universities and colleges graduates should be imparted with skills and knowledge of ICTs to meet the demand of technology in the present dispensation and in the future.

References


