Bangladesh e-Journal of Sociology

Volume 13, Number 1, January 2016

ISSN 1819-8465
The Official Journal of

Bangladesh Sociological Society

Committed to the advancement of sociological research and publication.
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ISSN 1819-8465

The Official Journal of Bangladesh Sociological Society

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Note from the Editor

In recent issues, there has been a plethora of articles published on empirical studies largely based on primary data sources, some with very high level statistical analysis. Most were typically micro level projects focusing either on a specific institution or on some geographical or political entity such as a province or a district. These studies do serve a very useful purpose of generating new data as well as substantiate previously thought out theoretical arguments. Most journals cater to these valuable contributions, so does BEJS. However, as I applauded these contributions over the years in the BEJS, I was also getting increasingly concerned at the lack of theoretical papers. Theoretical analysis do require such substantiations and often these micro level empirical studies herald in new theories but major theoretical work with high level of abstraction is largely missing from this journal as is also generally true of the discipline as such.

I do not wish to engage in a debate on the necessity of such theories in the discipline since I have dealt with this issue all my life on different occasions including the announcing of the “end of sociological theory” a decade ago. But I had always believed and felt confident that there are still a few hardy souls among us who do feel the necessity of theoretical discourse within the discipline and are quietly, often without much appreciation or even passing recognition, working out theories which may someday occupy the centre stage of the discipline and guide future empirical research and publications.

I am not alluding to “grand theories“ but look at works like Durkheim’s Suicide, a high level theoretical generalization based purely on secondary data. That study of suicide was based on data collected from 26,000 cases across the European countries and by simply the use of percentages and ratios. Just think how much more he could have achieved with the current technology. Such studies are very possible today with so much data available literally wherever you look. Numerous international and national agencies, including governments, are churning out unimaginable amount of data on a daily basis. The internet and other media are making these readily available to the public. All we need is to broaden our horizon and think out of our location in time and space and we can work out similar theories, including that of a new theory of suicide.

I am happy that some researchers are making an effort and few such papers are also finding their place in this journal too. This issue in particular contains a few theoretical papers, not necessary supported with huge data sets. But I am delighted nonetheless that some are bold enough to address theoretical issues. Soon I hope broad theoretical generalizations based on immense data sets that are at our disposal will be forthcoming. At the very least, regional or continent wise studies are definitely possible with the presently available data sets. I urge the young researchers to move out of their comfortable niches and micro level studies with primary data and attempt macro level theoretical generalizations with secondary data sets waiting for you out there. I shall always have space for such works in this journal.
Corruption and Citizen Participation: A Critical Analysis

Oliver Mtapuri

Abstract: This article examines the conditions under which corruption manifests and persists. As such, it also seeks to understand how corruption thrives in certain spaces and not in others. This article is conceptual in nature as it relies, to a large extent, on secondary sources of data. By contextualizing corruption and active citizenship, it opens up the possibilities to conceptualize them as it poses such questions as: Does context matter? Do citizens matter? Who and what else matters? Under what conditions? How active can the citizens be? And Under what conditions can their actions thrive? It then presents a hexagon of good governance which is its major contribution. The hexagon posits that for good governance to prevail, the following elements are necessary: a virtuous Constitution which protects the rights of citizens; a respectable Government characterized by an independent judiciary, and astute legal system including a parliament which exercises its oversight role with effectiveness as well as a well capacitated and trim bureaucracy; upright people characterized by a civil society with capacity and readiness to take action against corruption; a noble culture which loathes corruption; political will and leadership directed towards addressing corruption; and a free press to expose incidences of corruption, mal-administration and so forth. Active citizenship is about community, social cohesion, individual and collective decision-making, individual and collective action for the betterment of all who live in that community. The fight against corruption equally requires strong local leadership and strong social ties because these elements are crucial for social mobilization. Community readiness for change and collective efficacy remain crucial for collective action.

Keywords: Corruption, Good Governance; Free Press, People, Government, Culture

Introduction

The issue of corruption is contemporary and affects many countries. Corruption is bad to the extent that it can encumber efficient service delivery. The persistence of protest action is a manifestation of the discomfort of citizens with their circumstances. These (re)-actions by citizens cannot be wished

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away because they carry socio-economic, political and even psychological costs to society. In all corrupt circumstances, there is a corrupter and corruptee. As such, the contamination of society by corruption is a moral blemish on that society in which it’s ethical and governance structures come under question. This article is guided by the following research questions:

- Under which conditions does corruption persist?
- How active can the citizens be and under what conditions can their actions thrive?
- Who should spearhead the struggles against corruption and under what conditions?

Therefore, this article is significant because it informs policy (on corruption and Governance), practice (Government technocrats, politicians and others in terms of their (re)-actions), as well as the forms of citizen participation and actions possible under given conditions – the context.

**Methodology**

This article is based on secondary sources of data. These sources consisted mainly of academic journals which covered issues of corruption. The secondary sources utilized in this article were found to be adequate to characterise corruption and its manifestations and enabled the surfacing of a good governance model which embodies their antithetic properties. Of equal importance was the treatment of the notion of active citizenship and participation which also used secondary data.

**Literature Review**

*Corruption: a characterisation*

For Mauro, the term “corruption” represents “the abuse of public office for private gain”, while for Amoako (in Kyambalesa 2006: 105) corruption is “the antithesis of accountability and transparency”. Two scales of corruption are identified in extant literature, petty and grand corruption. Dike (in Kyambalesa 2006) termed the former, “corruption of need” characterized by such practices as payment of a bribe to a policeman a traffic infringement or bribing an immigration officer to cross the border of a country as they try to make ends meet especially when salaries do not meet day to day expenses. The latter was termed “corruption of greed” in which public servants and leaders who have incomes and properties which are more than enough to meet their daily and future needs engage in practices for self-enrichment and wealth accumulation through flouting of tender laws and regulations and giving tax allowances to undeserving people and so forth. This may include or be associated with fraud, extortion and embezzlement (Kyambalesa, 2006). van der Merwe (2006: 43) argues that corruption is supply-driven when initiated by civil servants and demand-driven when initiated by private citizens.

In order to measure corruption, Transparency International developed the Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) which assesses perceptions of corruption across countries; the Bribe-Payers Index (BPI),
which looks at the disposition of transnational companies and/or their executives to pay bribes to civil servants in foreign countries; and the Global Corruption Barometer (GCB), which measures attitudes and experiences of corruption among public citizens through a poll in a given country (Kyambalesa, 2006: 106).

Pillay (in Kroukamp, 2006: 208) argues that corruption in the case of South Africa is a result of ‘entrepreneurial politics’, bureaucratization coupled with excessive discretion and inadequate controls which breeds ‘inefficiency, mistrust of the government by the citizens, waste of public resources, injustice, discouragement of enterprise’ and so forth. For van der Merwe (2006: 37) the causes of corruption in South Africa include ‘poor checks and balances; greed; lack of ethics; poor salaries; politicization of the public service; inefficient management; poor education/training of officials; culture of paternalism; lack of trust by officials in colleagues; and public apathy. He also argues that bribery, theft, fraud are commonest forms of corruption experienced in the civil service of South Africa especially affecting departments such as Transport, Housing, South African Police Service, Public Works, Education and Health (van der Merwe 2006: 34). Tanzi and Dike (as cited in Kyambalesa, 2006: 106) observed that corruption is prevalent in all countries whether ‘developed or developing, large or small, and market-oriented or otherwise’ and as such ‘the scourge is not peculiar to any continent, region, ethnic group, or religious denomination’.

The same views are also shared by Transparency International, who maintain that ‘no culture or society sanctions the abuse of power for personal gain or the siphoning off of public resources into private pockets’. (Kyambalesa, 2006: 106). The late Julius Nyerere is cited as having said: ‘Good wages or salaries will not stop bad people from being corrupt; but miserable wages and salaries are not conducive to rectitude’. Kaufmann et al (as cited in Vyas-Doorgapersad, 2007) argue that corruption is widespread in developing countries is a result of widespread poverty and a paucity of strong watchdog agencies. Ariu & Squicciarini (2013: 504) observe that skilled people abandon their own countries to those where jobs are secured based on merit characterized by skillfulness and performance and therefore meritocratic; while expatriates shun countries where prestigious jobs are secured through nepotism, connections, string-pulling and political affiliations. They argue that in the long term, the effects are profound as reflected in the erosion of human capital, a net deficit of skills, reduced productivity and resultant deterioration in economic conditions (Ariu & Squicciarini, 2013: 504). Given such a backdrop, countries in Africa who suffer the scourge have been unable to tap into their abundant resources for the benefit of their citizens leading to unemployment, illiteracy, poverty, disease, crime and lawlessness (Kyambalesa, 2006: 107). The effects of corruption are, by and large, profound as it stifles investment, tarnishes the country’s image as well as that of its citizens and is a threat to both social justice and sustainable development.

Kyambalesa (2006: 113) argues that to curb corruption there is need for good governance, zero tolerance attitude to corruption, a trim civil service, decent pay to public servants, compulsory ethics education as well as the provision of anti-corruption hotlines. The UNDP includes citizen participation
as one of the key ingredients. After this exposition of corruption and its impact, the next section looks at active citizenship and participation.

**Active citizenship and public participation**

Putnam, Leonardi, and Nanetti (1993 in Schachter 2011: 704) defined participation as ‘trust, norms, and networks, which can improve the efficiency of society by facilitating coordinated actions’. Marinetto M (2003: 104) argues that ‘the genealogical approach, based on Foucault’s explorations of govern-mentality, makes the point that community involvement is an effective means of social regulation’. Brannan et al., (2006: 993) are of the view that active citizenship is concerned with the notions of citizenship, community and empowerment with associated ‘presumed intrinsic benefits’ emanating from citizen participation in decision-making: Stoker, (cited in Brannan et al., 2006: 993) argues that participation must be have a purpose to involve communities to make their places better for all who live in them. In the polity of a more active citizenry, Irvin and Stansbury (2004, in Schachter 2011: 703) argue that ‘with citizen participation the issue is not “how to” but “whether to at all.’

The world of the civic comes with rights and responsibilities and as such active citizenship demands involvement in both social and political action. (Brannan et al., 2006: 996). Murphy & Cunningham (cited in Foster-Fishman et al., 2007: 93) argue that igniting resident participation in activities of a civil nature which concern the neighborhood represents the ‘lifeblood of urban renewal’ to which Foster-Fishman et al., (2007) add that community-building initiatives should encourage the participation of residents because they are ‘the drivers of the change process’.

Brannan et al., (2006: 995) define social capital as ‘the social glue—the networks of ties, information, trust and norms—that binds people and enables them to co-operate more effectively’ and argue that successful economies and societies have grown on the basis of their strong social, financial, physical and human capitals. According to Brannan et al., (2006: 995), social capital benefits the participants of which there are two variants of social capital, namely, bonding and bridging social capital. Bonding social capital are shared ties in communities of the same economic and social status. Bridging social capital is important to policy makers because it is about connecting social groups and divides (Brannan et al., 2006: 995). However, Putnam argues that diversity limits the formation of social capital as this challenges policy proposals which aim at building social capital (Brannan et al., 2006: 995). Work-centred lives, migration and the growing reliance on multimedia sources for entertainment are weakening the social glue and as a result are leading to a decline in social capital (Brannan et al., 2006: 996).

Foster-Fishman et al., (2007) maintain that hope for a better future, capacity to bring about change as represented by strong social ties and neighborhood leadership; and the nature and magnitude of problems in the neighborhood were strong correlates of residents’ involvement in individual and collective action. Traynor, (cited in Foster-Fishman et al., 2007:93) is of the view that the involvement of residents is crucial to bring about sustainable change. Foster-Fishman, Nowell, Siebold, & Deacon
(cited in Foster-Fishman et al., 2007: 93) observe that citizens typically engage at three levels, namely, (a) in governance including planning and decision-making; (b) in neighborhood improvement projects and (3) mass mobilization. It is in these efforts that neighbourhood cohesion resides. According to Tocqueville (2004 in Schachter 2011: 704 ), ‘participation in voluntary associations is the force that would keep centralized tyranny at bay’. It is in the same efforts that this neighbourhood cohesion should be tapped in the fight against corruption. Residents or citizens have been characterized as both the lifeblood and drivers of change which encompasses urban renewal. This brings credence to calls for their active involvement in matters that affect them. As such, their actions should be pro-active rather than reactive. Therefore, it is pertinent to unpack the factors which impede or galvanise residents to participate in civic matters affecting their communities.

Impediments to participation

Sampson, Morenoff, & Gannon-Rowley (in Foster-Fishman et al., 2007: 93) observe that entrenched problems in neighbourhoods and neighbourhood conditions also make it extremely difficult for citizen participation due to weakened social ties and ‘low collective efficacy’). Coupled with unfulfilled promises made by outsiders in earlier initiatives, this makes residents reluctant to participate in new initiatives (Foster-Fishman et al., 2007: 93). It can also be inferred that deep societal problems have the potential to weaken social cohesion. Brannan et al., (2006: 1003) argues that people are less likely to get involved in projects which attempt to solve anti-social behaviour if there are chances to ‘free-ride’ and in a private cost benefit analysis the costs outweigh the benefits of participation especially when they feel no one else cares, hence the need for incentive-based schemes so that they will find some benefits in participation. These observations imply that while common problems can unite citizens, they also have the potential to dent that unity due to hopelessness in which the free-rider syndrome has equal effect.

Korbin & Coulton (in Foster-Fishman et al., 2007: 96) observe, with reference to crime, that a major reason why residents shun community action is because of fear of reprisals. Social disorder leads to withdrawal by community members from community life and this disorder is construed by criminals as fertile ground for more crime because chances of it being reported are slim (Foster-Fishman et al., 2007: 96). In terms of ‘broken windows theory, signs of disorder promote crime and subsequently further disorder in a downward spiral of neighborhood decay’ (Wilson & Kelling, in Foster-Fishman et al., 2007: 96). I postulate a corruption acceptance theory which states that chronic prevalence of corruption conditions residents/citizens to accept corruption and this in turn leads to its perpetuation.

Attrition and burnout in residents may also result and therefore sustaining interest for action is not easy (Foster-Fishman et al., 2007: 96). Sears and Hughes (cited in Foster-Fishman et al., 2007: 105) observes that different forms of participation invoke different types of people who are not interested in participating in certain forms of community action including governance, evaluation or programming decisions. It can be inferred that people are indifferent to certain causes and willing to participate in others depending on their individual appetite for collective action and the cause.
Factors in support of citizen participation

Neighbourhood conditions refer to neighbourhood capacity (for action), neighbourhood readiness (for change) and neighbourhood problems (Price & Behrens in Foster-Fishman et al., 2007: 93). Community capacity is ‘the interaction of human, organization, and social capital existing within a given community that can be leveraged to solve collective problems and improve or maintain the well-being of that community’ (Chaskin in Foster-Fishman et al., 2007: 94). For Felix, & Dorsey (in Foster-Fishman et al., 2007: 94), capacity includes skills, knowledge, relationships, structures, processes, leadership and resources for community mobilization for action/change. Garkovich (in Foster-Fishman et al., 2007: 94) gives prominence to local leadership and social networks/ties as enhancing community capacity to mobilise. By inference, the fight against corruption requires strong local leadership and equally strong social ties.

Cantillon, Davidson & Schweitzer (cited in Foster-Fishman et al., 2007: 94) maintain that social ties are characterized by the level of interactions in the neighbourhood and have a bearing on how communities share resources including favours; and how they develop trust, shared values, exchange information and cultivate social control albeit informally. Local leadership is important in the identification of societal problems and the mobilization of citizens (Norton et al., in Foster-Fishman et al., 2007: 94). This leadership emanates from neighborhood-based formal organizations including faith-based institutions as well as from informal associations (Foster-Fishman et al., 2007: 94). According to Brannan et al., (2006: 1001), argues that faith-based groups with their values and identities can bring together citizens to participate in activities in their communities because they offer ‘long-term local commitment, perspective and presence’ and policy-makers can leverage these groups in ‘remoralising’ public life and for the promotion of social cohesion based on common values (Brannan et al., 2006: 1002).

For Foster-Fishman et al., (2007: 95) community readiness encapsulates the belief in the necessity for change, its feasibility, desirability and prospects for success. Drawing from self-efficacy of Bandura, (1986), Sampson et al., (cited in Foster-Fishman et al., 2007: 98) define collective efficacy as ‘social cohesion among neighbors combined with their willingness to intervene on behalf of the common good’ while for Perkins & Long, (in Foster-Fishman et al., 2007: 98) it is ‘trust in the effectiveness of organized community action’. Sampson et al, (cited in Foster-Fishman et al., 2007: 98) also found that ‘communities with higher levels of collective efficacy experienced lower violence rates’. This implies community readiness for change as well as collective efficacy are important elements for collective action. It can be deduced that the fight against corruption should emanate from discomfort with the status quo within the community championed by the vanguards of the community (that is, their leadership) drawn from within their formal and informal organisations.

Hope for change

Hanna (in Foster-Fishman et al., 2007: 98) argues that hope for a better life is strongly associated with individuals taking action to improve their lot. Therefore, hopelessness can lead to apathy and
ultimately to inaction. March & Olsen (1995 in Schachter HL (2011: 715), argue that participation depends on ‘how various institutions in a given polity condition people to see their right to a role as participants’ because individuals and groups in a given political space, as informed by ‘identities’ created by existing institutions and processes, can take action if those circumstances permit such action. It can be inferred that institutions and processes do matter.

Neighbourhood problems
Perkins et al., (in Foster-Fishman et al., 2007: 96) argues that neighborhood problems may lead to citizen participation in voluntary organizations and thus problems can either motivate or demotivate individual and/or collective action. According to Foster-Fishman et al., 2007: 102) neighborhood conditions do MATTER and inform whether an individual resorts to individual or collective action. ‘While we found that perceptions of neighborhood problems was the strongest predictor of whether an individual became involved at all, we found that perceived strength of neighborhood leadership was one of the strongest predictors of how active an individual was (low versus high involvement)’ (Foster-Fishman et al., 2007: 102).

Therefore, the motives for inaction to action by individuals may be different from what makes them to become engaged residents in their communities but social ties mattered in the transition by individuals from inaction to action (Foster-Fishman et al., 2007: 103). Therefore, in a fragmented community, the space for action is constrained because of weak social cohesion. Neighbourhood conditions and social ties can inform decisions by individuals whether or to participate in individual or collective action.

Benefits of public participation
Burton (2003 cited in Brannan et al., 2006: 995) argues that there are four types of benefits which accrue to individuals when they engage in public participation: that individuals can have their interests addressed via participation (instrumentalist); that participation leads to collective public interest (communitarian); that participation allows citizens to learn more about policy (educative); that participation allows the individual to express their political identity (expressive). Intrinsic benefits of participation include ‘personal feelings of inclusion and self-esteem’ (Burton et al., 2004 cited in Brannan et al., 2006: 995)); capacity development (Barnes, 1999 in Brannan et al., 2006: 995)); and ‘generating innovative ideas’ (Dibben and Bartlett, 2001 cited in Brannan et al., 2006: 995) As such intrinsic benefits are earned when individuals participate and instrumental benefits are ‘those which impact on outcomes’ (Brannan et al., 2006: 995). For Fiorina (1999 in Schachter 2011: 703) civic participation can yield healthy outcomes ‘when those actively engaged represent the values of the entire community’.

Schachter HL (2011: 708) argues that an individual needs resources such as ‘money, time, and communication and organizational skills’ to be able to participate including speaking, writing and
ability to organize meetings but disposable money and disposable time favour people of higher socio-economic groups/status. The next section looks at the notion of governance.

**Governance**

Brannan et al., (2006: 994) argue that the concept of the civic goes beyond the state and the market by asking people to assume both individual and community responsibilities by not merely asserting their rights which may go against concepts of individual choice and self-determination. Brannan et al., (2006: 994) argue that ‘The world of governing has seen a revolution expressed in a shift from government to governance’ in which stakeholders such as the state, NGOs, private organisations and individuals come into partnerships to solve problems in new ways. Maloney et al. (2000 in Marinetto 2003: 105) argue that ‘there is an interdependency, or interpénétration between civil society and the state’. This implies that there should be a symbiotic relationship between institutions.

Pierre and Peters (2000 cited in Brannan et al., 2006: 994) are of the view that governance is about the ‘state learning to steer society in new ways …emerging through the development of complex networks and the rise of more bottom–up approaches to decision-making’. While for Bang, (2003 cited in Brannan et al., 2006: 995) ‘governance is a process of political communication in which both governors and governed negotiate a way forward,’ for Donahue and Nye, (2002 in Brannan et al., 2006: 995) it is about ‘public management through contracts’ and for Newman (2001 in Brannan et al., 2006: 995) it concerns an ‘increase in use of networks’. Governance is about learning to steer in complex networks, as it is about communication and negotiating future action through contracts between the governors and the governed via a process of public management.

Brannan et al., (2006: 999) applauds the introduction of ‘citizenship education’ in secondary schools in the United Kingdom covering ‘social responsibility, community involvement and political literacy’ in order to mould citizens who ‘who live by the values associated with citizenship. Brannan et al., (2006: 1000) argues that this behoves upon local authorities in the UK to capacitate communities with skills to build confidence, resources and time for citizen participation in the form of ‘civic education’ to ensure that citizen effectively participate in democratic processes (Brannan et al., 2006: 1000). Schachter (2011: 704) argues that to have an engaged citizenry requires that the polity has effective agencies to teach civic education. This implies that institutional capacity and culture should change to be able to engage citizens productively and may require extensive staff training (Brannan et al., 2006: 1000). This entails balancing of moral outlooks as well as private costs and benefits (Brannan et al., 2006: 1001).

**Discussion**

Corruption is a curse which needs to be addressed given its profound costs to society. These costs could be of a socio-economic, political and psychological nature. The fight against should be waged by citizens. While citizenship comes with rights and responsibilities, it should be undergirded by active
participation in a purposeful and purposive manner. As such participation may mean sacrificing individual values for the common good.

As the lifeblood of individual and collective action, citizens should be pro-actively engaged in matters that affect them. Neighbourhood cohesion is important in the fight against corruption or the common good. While I postulated a corruption acceptance theory which states that chronic prevalence of corruption conditions residents/citizens to accept corruption and this in turn leads to its perpetuation, this should not paralyse both individuals and communities to inaction against the scourge given its detrimental effect on the moral fibre and advancement of society.

Common societal problems have the potential to unite citizens. They also have the inherent potential to destabilise unity in the community due to hopelessness and the free-rider syndrome. Therefore, participation requires that individuals and the collective envision earning benefits following private or collective cost-benefit analyses. If the costs are greater than the benefits, individuals or collective action are threatened. Calls for using incentive schemes could be the answer in the fight against corruption. The fight against corruption equally requires strong local leadership and strong social ties because these elements are crucial for social mobilization. It should be noted that people are inclined to participate in different causes based on individual appetite for collective action. Therefore, not everyone will be drawn into ‘collective action’. However, community readiness for change and collective efficacy remain crucial for collective action. The more they are present, the likelihood of collective action to take place led by the local leadership from either formal or informal organisations. While literature supports coalescing community around faith-based organisations in which policy-makers support their leadership in the pursuit of a common fight against corruption based on faith-grounded values, this can happen only if the policy makers have the political will to fight the scourge and if there are upright and honest against corruption. If they are corrupt themselves, they will not be concerned with societal ‘remoralising’.

What matters?
Corruption should matter to galvanise action. Why do people not fight for the eradication of corruption in their midst? It can be argued that because corruption is experienced at the individual level, this makes collective action difficult to attain. Such fragmentation may result in collective inaction. Furthermore, some people are less inclined to be involved in all forms of collective or individual action. Hopelessness and apathy also contribute to inaction. It can be surmised that individual and collective ‘personalities and attitudes’ do matter.

Institutions and the processes and systems which they create do matter in abetting or stifling individual of collective action. Neighbourhood conditions and social ties do matter because they ignite or not ignite individual or collective action. Harnessing these forces of change may bring about positive change through collective action. Additionally, time, money and apposite skills do matter for public participation in whose absence participation is threatened.
Interdependency. This implies that there should be a symbiotic relationship between these institutions. A symbiotic relationship between stakeholders therefore matters because the state’s capacity is as good as the capacity of its partners. Table 1 below show the critical elements necessary to fight corruption and those which allow citizen participation. In the fight against corruption, for example, political will and leadership; a Constitution, a free press and a respectable Government are critical. For participation, purpose, strong social capital, culture, leadership, resources (of time, skills and money) and hope are very important. The list is not exhaustive.

Table 1: Critical elements necessary to fight corruption and for participation

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<th>For participation</th>
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<td>Government</td>
<td>People and purpose</td>
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<tr>
<td>Political and leadership will</td>
<td>Culture Literature reveals that corruption, for example, in SA is conditioned by values and attitudes, experience and political history. (van de Merwe 2006)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Free press</td>
<td>Social capital and hope</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constitution and laws</td>
<td>A common problem, leadership, institutions, systems and processes for participation</td>
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Towards the Good Governance Hexagon

In this section, I present the good governance hexagon (see Fig 1 below). It posits that for good governance to prevail, the following elements are necessary: a virtuous Constitution which protects the rights of citizens; a respectable Government characterized by an independent judiciary, and astute legal system including a parliament which exercises its oversight role with effectiveness as well as a well capacitated and trim bureaucracy; upright people characterized by a civil society with

![Good Governance Hexagon](image)

capacity and readiness to take action against corruption; a noble culture which loathes corruption; political will and leadership directed towards addressing corruption; and a free press to expose incidences of corruption, mal-administration and so forth.

Conclusion
This article examined corruption and reflected on its manifestations, its causes, its effects and so forth. Two scales of corruption were identified in literature, petty (corruption of need) and grand corruption (corruption of greed). It also looked at indices which assess perceptions of corruption and others which measure attitudes and experiences of corruption among citizens. The effects of corruption were found to be profound because it stifles both local and foreign investment, tarnishes the country’s image, and threatens both social justice and sustainable development. I also postulated a corruption acceptance theory which should be disobeyed in the best interest of society.

It also looked at active citizenship and the notion of participation. Active citizenship is about community, social cohesion, individual and collective decision-making, individual and collective action for the betterment of all who live in that community. Collective action requires strong local leadership and strong social ties to build community capacity for action. Collective action must promise more benefits over costs in a cost-benefits analysis in order to ensure citizen participation. Weak social ties and low collective efficacy dissuade participation. Skills, structures, systems, processes, knowledge, relationships, resources and leadership are critical for participation. Two questions still remain: Can faith and public policy mix happily with one another? Can anti-corruption be government-led? Or NGO led? Private sector led? Or can it be pursued through collective action, in whatever form it takes? Which form is ideal? These questions are a subject of further research.

It is pertinent to end this article with these perceptive words:

Generating civicness is perceived as a panacea for numerous previously intractable social, economic and political problems: social exclusion, community cohesion, crime, democratic deficit, political apathy and disillusionment, and unresponsive and underperforming public services. Evoking such concepts legitimises policies and programmes while devolving responsibility to citizens, thereby reducing costs and ensuring ownership which is central to success—or perceived success. (Brannan et al., 2006: 1005).

Reference


Community Participation in the South African Local Government Dispensation: A Public Administration Scholastic Misnomer

N.E. Mathebula

Abstract: The interpretation, application and understanding of community participation particularly in the South African local government discourse are obscured, thus, creating a more simplistic and superficial meaning for operationalization. This paper seeks to challenge the notion that community participation is a substitute in its ontological form and connotation with public participation. Many scholars in public administration have jumped into a dispensation of a bandwagon thus creating a misnomer in relation to a distinct nature of community participation and public participation which clearly undermines the authenticity of conception within the discipline and scholarship in general. Using a variety of qualitative secondary data collection and analytical techniques, this paper interrogates the misnomer in public administration scholarship in relation to the use and application of community participation specifically in local government. To successfully demonstrate this misnomer on the use, application and understanding of the concepts and the impact on scholarship, five selected articles on community participation and five others on public participation on local government published in the Journal of Public Administration (JOPA) were reviewed. The paper, therefore, concludes that public administration as a scientific discipline, with the influential role it has must seek to forge relations with public administration as a practice for the purposes of conceptualizing and operationalising concepts and terminologies. This will ensure conciseness and avoiding contradictions which have potency of denting both scholarship and practice.

Keywords: Community participation, Public participation, Public Administration, Scholarship, Local Government

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Introduction
The argument can be made that although public administration scholars tend to refer to community participation and public participation as synonyms with extrapolation to local government. The two are dissimilar in application and meaning. While community participation can be related to the Western ideology catering the elite (Midgley 1986), public participation is inclusive of the general public. According to Masango (2009), the elite are the people who occupy top positions in the highest and resource-rich political, government, economic, professional, communications and cultural institutions. He further alludes that such elites are different from the general public which have trust on the church and other social institutional settings rather than the processes of government. What creates the illusion in scholarship can be related to obscurity in the meaning of the concepts public and community. While van Dijk and Thornhill (2011) acknowledges challenges in conceptualising and finding a consensual definition of what comprises the public, it can be argued that there can be many publics within a public (Warmer 2002; Eriksen 2004). Similarly, there exist a number of definitions on community participation which can be misleading particularly in the discourse of public administration. This is so because of the failure to conceptualise the word community and its origin in relation to its operational use. It is as a result that scholars in the field have quickly jumped into a bandwagon and grapples with forging their own conceptualisations without a theoretical basis which have not particularly been identified or simply ignored.

This paper seeks to unpack different dimensions of conceptualisation by providing the ontological basis of the concepts of community participation and public participation in relation to public administration scholarship with a view of clearing the uninformed misnomer and scholastic-ills in the South African local government arena. This paper argues that, the authenticity of the discipline is somehow delegitimised by failure to relate theory with practice in the application of concepts with specific reference to community participation and public participation. With this in mind, the paper acknowledges the limited sources for conceptual theory to guide the development of the discipline particularly in a dispensation era where public administration scholarship in relation to local government is so dynamic and filled with complexities (Nkuna& Sebola 2012; Nkuna & Sebola 2014) while in the interim should be the constituent closer to the people (Mafunisa & Xaba 2008). This paper seeks to uncover the mischievous use, understanding, and application of community participation and public participation within the public administration discourse within local government by zooming into the ontological and epistemological origins of the terminology compared to the ideals and realities on the ground.

Drawing Differences between Community and Public
Drawing a convincing argument on the differences between what constitute a community and a public is a major challenge for the purposes of constructing and argument. Community participation and public participation further requires one to provide a basis by a way of contemplating and conceptualising the meanings of the terms community and public and relate them to the scholarship discourse of public administration. In the South African context which in nature is so dynamic and
complex due to a number of variety of tribes, races and languages, the connotation of the concept public is quarry to variety of meanings of the word public in general. The Oxford English Dictionary (2014) is so vague and abstruse in alluding to the ‘true’ and conceptual meaning of public as an exact opposite of private. This is a matter of contention and according to Martin (2004) it is a difficult qualification to understand why the ‘thing’ in question was named public in the first place. Coetzee (2010: 17) describe public as pertaining to, affecting the people at large or the community. It can be deducted from Coetzee’s assertion that communities are a component of the public and thus not to be equated with one another. In Greek, community refers to ‘fellowship’ or a group of people coming together for mutual support and fulfilling their needs. A community can be described as a set of people who have commonalities such as same age, sex, ethnicity, tribe, race, faith, experiences, interest and cause (Stets & Burke 2000; Gutiérrez & Rogoff 2003). Membership of these communities can, therefore, constitute the general public. With large municipal boundaries in South Africa comprising inhabitants of diversified race, language, colour, tribes etc., the concept community and let alone community participation is therefore irrelevant and lacks logic in relation to application and practice in local government as it possess the potential of excluding general members of municipal communities.

For operational purposes Tshabalala and Lombard (2009: 397) refer to a community as defined by a ward system, which is a geographical area into which a municipality is divided for, amongst other purposes, elections. However, the ontological origin of the concept is way beyond the limitations as imposed by the operational definition. This argument is based on the fact that community as a concept can be used to describe social organizations (Malena et al. 2004) and arrangements which are often regarded as natural groupings based on ties of shared blood, language, history, and most importantly culture (Upadhya 2006). However Nzimakwe and Reddy (2008) and Tshabalala and Lombard (2009) share the same sentiment that participation at a municipal level can be achieved through a smaller demarcated wards where there exists a population having the features of a community. With this being said, scholars of public administration (see Ababio 2004; Nzimakwe & Reddy 2008; Phago 2008; Tshabalala & Lombard 2009; Ndevu 2011; Vivier & Wentzel 2013) have studied the complex and complicated nature of community participation in local government as the concept of community lends itself to a variety of interpretations. It has become so prominent in the discipline to either suffix or prefix community with terms such as community development, community capacity-building, community economic development and of course community participation. This tendency has created a misnomer in the public administration discipline and scholarship as the original ontological meanings are blindly ignored to befit into the discourse by concepts such as community involvement, engagement and consultation. This paper analyses a trend whereby scholars in their writings tend to emphasise the synonymy between community participation and public participation. This is done by a way of reviewing articles on the subject matter under study.
Reviewed Articles Published in the *Journal of Public Administration* (JOPA)

To successfully demonstrate the misnomer on the use, application and understanding of the concepts and the impact on scholarship, five selected articles on community participation and five others on public participation on local government published in the *Journal of Public Administration* (JOPA) with no predetermined sequence or logic were reviewed. Following is the table of the journal articles:

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<th>Community Participation</th>
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With the reviewed articles having been identified, an analysis is sought to draw an analogy in application and comprehension between community participation and public participation with a view of identifying some of the trends in conceptualisation in the public administration discourse.

**Community Participation and Public Participation**

There is an existing need to clear the boundaries between the usage, definition, and application between the concepts community participation and public participation. This seeks to ensure the distinction or perhaps blending of the two while caution should be taken to undermine the legitimacy through a critique, analysis and the misnomer that it can create in public administration and the influence on practice. Clearly, with community and public being distinct terminologies, scholars particularly in the discourse are unenthusiastic to draw the line and at times refer to the concepts interchangeably. Ababio (2004) for instance, makes an uninformed mention to community-public-participation as a single concept without providing a theoretical base within which the assertion is supported. Similarly, Nzimakwe and Reddy (2008) tend to fiddle in-between community participation and public participation as if they refer to a similar phenomenon. This assertion is on the basis that the authors only focus on clarifying public participation while also referring to community participation,
involvement and engagement as principal themes of the paper. Commonly, articles reviewed for the purposes of this paper fail or somehow reluctant to provide a consolidated conceptualisation or at least elements of what community participation as opposed to public participation is. Muller (1994) and van Vuren (2002) (in Human Marais & Botes 2009) acknowledge the difficulties associated with defining community participation. The acknowledgement could be based on insufficient theoretical grounding of the concept.

However, McGee (2000) (in Human Marais & Botes 2009) defines community participation as a process through which the community can influence and share control over development initiatives, decisions and resources affecting them. On the other hand, Kotze (1997) (in Nzimakwe and Reddy 2008) defines community participation as the fundamental ethical principle for allowing people to control actions that affect them while promoting sustainable socio-economic development, aspects of empowerment, communication and gender imperative. The definition fails to inculcate important concepts such as a community as a basic component of the term and other essential elements such as participation and the area or loci within which such participation takes place. The inclusion of concepts such as engagement, involvement and consultation adds to the flavour of confusion. Vivier and Wentzel (2013: 240) tend to shift the focus of the debate from community participation and attempt to forge relations with public participation. Evidently, the conceptualisation is based on the concept of public participation rather than community participation without providing analysis on how the latter is indoctrinated to the former. In scholarship where authors of conceptual papers rely mostly on secondary data and theoretical analysis of articles, with the trend of mischievously providing ungrounded theories, the field of public administration is facing a storm of ‘sweeping’ uniformed contentions. In his article titled ‘Community participation during the 21st century South Africa: modes, attitudes and trends, Phago (2008) did not succeed in providing a convincing conceptualisation of community participation and unconsciously acknowledges the different societal sectors which form a community while failing to take into cognisance that such small segments make up a public in an environmental setting. Furthermore, he advocates the involvement of a community within a public realm which clearly should form part of the participatory process due to its inclusivity.

Moodley and Govender (2006: 831) in Phago (2008: 242) bring to the fore public consultation as a method of public participation and goals of public participation which theoretically shifted the focus from the discussion on community participation to public participation. Yet another misnomer in the public administration discipline? The answer to this question could be no, on the basis that scholars tend to make assertions and creating illusions by failing to demarcate, operationalise and conceptualise a subject under study. This is also evidenced by the interchange use between community-based participation and public participation in Ndevu (2011). What is interesting is the fact that the author does not provide a theoretical delineation of community-based participation in which he backs with the conceptualisation of public participation. To this end, the paper focuses on providing different conceptual angles on how public participation should be theorized with a view to clearing a misconception in relation to community participation.
The introduction of a democratic dispensation in South Africa came with opportunities for the previously excluded for public participation for all citizens (Masango 2009). The Draft National Policy Framework on Public Participation of 2007 (in Mafunisa & Xaba 2008) defines public participation as an open and accountable undertaking in which individuals and groups within selected communities exchange their views and influence decision making processes. It remains an ontological contention that communities within selected municipalities forming a public (Draai & Taylor 2009: 114) takes part in the whole integrated process of decision making. Midgley (1986) supports this argument by contending that community participation only appeals to Western educated middle-class activists which do not always conform to the expectations of the ordinary citizenry. Thus in South African municipalities characterised by high levels of poverty and illiteracy, ordinary municipal citizens stand no chance of influencing decision making through participatory processes. This assertion is supported by Masango (2009) who creates a demarcation between the elite which is a community by its own right and the general members of the public; which he holds that such a distinction in practice may bear negative implications and not promote public participation.

Public participation is a proactive rather than a predetermined process where education is necessary from the political elite to foster the public to take charge of their own development initiatives that would promote a new mandate for local government (Draai & Taylor 2009; Tshabalala & Lombard 2009). The African National Congress (1994) (in Masango, 2009: 128) state that development is not about the delivery of goods to passive citizens rather about active involvement and participation and growing empowerment. With all this being said, it can be deduced that a democratic process powerful as public participation which lend itself to public administration scholarship characterised by erroneous usage, definition, analysis and understanding and is beyond the juxtaposed limited scope of community participation in the local government context. Clearly the public is bigger and comprises of communities within a public could prove more effective with the positive influence of scholarship to practice. Above all, public participation could lead to enhanced local government, effective and accountable service delivery (Reddy & Sikhakane 2008; Draai & Taylor 2009; Masango 2009; Mzimakwe 2010).

Placing Public Participation in the South African Local Government Context

The South African democratic local government dispensation is founded within the developmental notion wherein all service delivery sectors need to be coordinated (Manyaka & Madzivhandila 2013). South African municipalities have therefore become the ‘development driver’ through service delivery, poverty alleviation, infrastructure and economic development (Patterson 2008). In a democratic dispensation such as that of South Africa, the participation of communities and public participation in general plays an integral role in ensuring that the developmental mandate of local government is fulfilled. Such participation could also ensure that the citizenry of municipalities develops trust and a sense of belonging to development initiatives of their own. According to Pasquini and Shearing (2014), local government is a sphere of government generally most directly responsible for planning
and implementing adaptation strategies suitable for the area in which they are located for benefiting the citizenry. Municipalities as government institutions in local government refers to a political portion that is established in terms of section 155 of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa of 1996, and has control of local matters including the authority to raise taxes. Such is also established in terms of Section 12 of the Local Government Municipal Structures Act, 117 of 1998. Under the apartheid system South Africans were classified by the law as whites, blacks, coloureds and Indians (Mabokela & Mawila 2004). Local government was therefore also classified in terms of the racial segregation and division. Such a division meant that the provision of services was centred among the dominant race which was at that time white. This system marginalized non-white population groups from most aspects of national life and effectively side-lined them (Nnadozie 2013).

Public participation in local government was introduced as a democratic principle to correct the imbalances and injustices inflicted by the apartheid government to ensure that all sectors of societies are integrated and receiving equitable services. The end of apartheid and the first all-race elections of 1994 marked a turning point in the socio-economic and political landscape of South Africa. It must however be noted that the post-apartheid government has not fully made great inroads in terms of closing the gaps opened by the apartheid government particularly on matters of service delivery in local government. Service delivery protests among other challenges are indicative of the fact that South Africa has not yet fully recovered from the apartheid legacy (Mpehle 2012). Having adopted the service delivery challenges imposed by the apartheid government, the new democratic dispensation was expected to deal speedily with those injustices and imbalances by ensuring that the public fully and actively participate in local government affairs in relation to service delivery and ensuring good governance and accountability.

Public Participation in the Integrated Development Plan: An Illustration

Public participation is erroneously used interchangeably with community participation particularly giving inference to the Integrated Development Plan (IDP). Ababio (2004) believes that community participation and public participation mean one and the same thing. According to Mafunisa and Xaba (2008), public participation in the IDP exists only if the affected stakeholders particularly the municipal community integrally take part in decision-making and the implementation process. The notion of public participation whereby communities are central to decision-making and development should thus be centralised to the IDP model. The IDP in local government is used to create a platform for sharing ideas with the public affected by such development initiatives as proposed in the plan. Fox and Meyer (1995) defines public participation as the involvement of municipal communities in the wide range of administrative policy-making activities including the determination of levels of service, priorities in the budget, and the acceptability of physical construction projects in order to position government programmes towards the needs of the community support building and encouraging society cohesiveness. It is for this reason this paper argues that public participation in the IDP accommodates and accepts views not of a particular class but of the general citizenry who can be affected as opposed to a community.
To this end, it can be attested that public participation is not only the mere presence of the municipal communities, but active participation in the affairs of such a municipality in order to ensure that development and service provision are driven within the interests of the public. Public participation is a strong mechanism in a democratic South Africa and particularly in municipalities as a government sphere mandated with developmental duties and constituents closer to the people (Draai& Taylor 2009). It is also a core value to South Africa and a way of protecting and strengthening a relatively new democracy (Phago 2008; Vivier & Wentzel 2013). Public participation in the IDP necessitates the involvement of the municipal general citizens in decision-making, needs-identification and the ability to influence decisions and objections in cases of varying opinions. This should not be conceived to mean synonyms between public participation and community participation as it is often the ills if modern scholarship in the discourse of local government and particularly in public administration.

The Discourse of Public Administration and Scholarship

In order to provide a contextual clarity on the demised state of the public administration scholarship, it is equally important to have a comprehensive view of the scholastic inputs in relation to other distinguishing features while aiming to outline its relevance in the current discourse and the state of the discipline. Scholarship is vital for addressing matters of the modern bureaucracy citizens are faced with in addressing the balance between good governance and creating ‘pure science’. It is also worth noting that P(p)ublic A(a)dministration as both discipline and practice influence the development of each other. Scholarship therefore has the potential of improving levels and the quality of practice. While public administration can be understood as processes, organizations, and individuals carrying out rules and laws adopted through the branches of government (Russel 2000; Berkeley & Rouse 2004), Public Administration is an academic subject of study which seeks to understand, develop, criticise and improve the professional practice (Phago & Thani 2014). The discipline is associated with Woodrow Wilson who was the first to consider the science of Public Administration as an area of study and became influential. With a diversity of subject areas within the discipline, public administration scholarship can be defined as the provision of theoretical and empirical answers through primary and secondary data by a researcher in the field with a view of coming up with the most difficult resolutions (Lynn 2007). With that being said, it can be deduced that public administration scholarship seeks to influence through secondary and primary data the activities of government institutions, parastatals and agencies (Phago & Thani 2014).

Even though public administration seeks to influence practice, current trends in scholarship bring to the fore the necessities for scholars to be acquainted with practice so as to avoid contradictions necessitated by ideals in theory and the realities on the ground. Of course public administration scholars should reconsider the area of study and engage in discussions with related disciplines in an effort to enhance knowledge base of the discipline and to improve the quality and service rendering to society (Thornhill 2006: 793). Hence public administration is fiddled with a misnomer in an attempt to unpack concepts such as community participation and public participation. The culture of dependency
on a source is traverse of scholarship in the discourse of knowledge-generation and dissemination. According to Stout (2013) the field of public administration stands for substantive contributions to public affairs and therefore it is necessary to skill and develops scholars. This will enable them to grasp critical qualitative methodologies which are scientifically informed. Such stems from the reality that scholars in the discipline are mostly engaged in intellectual communities unaware of the lessons that could be learnt in other literatures.

Candler Azevedo & Albernaz (2010) identifies challenges inhibiting the development of public administration scholarship hence concepts such as community participation and public participation lend themselves to various and sometimes confusing conceptualisations. The first challenge is Epistemic Colonialism which is a critical adoption of administrative structures and techniques from elsewhere, especially the former colonial or current hegemonic power. As alluded before, the concept of community participation is closely related to Western ideologies of excluding the general public and accommodating the elite in participatory processes. This is heavy and questionable penetration of inappropriate foreign theory in public administration literature. The concept however lends itself to various and confusing interpretations and application in the scholarship discourse. The second challenge in the development of public administration scholarship is Epistemic Nationalism which refers to an undiscerning rejection of lessons from elsewhere. This form of a challenge requires scholars to engage with literature at an international perspective which could somehow reveal dimensions at which one might probe a phenomenon at various organisational contexts. The last challenge is Epistemic Parochialism which is a self-absorption to the extent that the intellectual community is unaware of the lessons that could be learnt from other literatures.

Perhaps, South African scholars in public administration must start engaging and writing in trans-disciplinary research areas and journals which is a primary step towards scholarship. With this being said, it can be alluded that there is a lack of scholarly renewal and very little theory development (Chipkin & Menty-Gilbert 2012) in the discipline. Public administration scholars pay little attention to formal and informal norms and organisational networks and the nature of state-society relationships.

**Conclusion**

In terms of upper ontology which relates to concepts supporting development of ontology referred to as meta-ontology, tracing the original conceptual forms of the concepts community participation and public participation had to be conducted. If participation in local government is referred to as ‘community’, it poses a danger of implying lack of inclusiveness to the municipal general public. Having interrogated the original theoretical meanings of community and public would suggest that participation through ward committees within municipalities representing diversity, public participation through communities would be suitable for operationalization and ringing a bell in practice. Discussions are, therefore, necessary among scholars on matters of controversy to ensure the authenticity and avoiding contradiction in the discipline. This is so because the state of public administration in South Africa has with no doubt deteriorated and characterised by repletion of subject
areas in research and discourse. Although the argument as sustained in the paper, tracing the ontological foundations of hard-to-define and contextualise concepts is necessary. While participation is inclusive of all communities, community participation only accommodates for the few elites at the expense of the ordinary citizens.

References


Framing the BRICS of “Emerging States”: Economic Freedoms Panacea or Nuance Imperialism Hybrid?

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Abstract: This article demonstrates that the assumed relationship between economic freedoms and performance does not hold for the BRICs and BRICS sets. From a critical theoretical perspective, the article questions the conceptual foundations for the business and financial framing of these sets in order to explore political-economy realism and liberal institutionalism for transcendence towards nuance notions of imperialism. Framing this BRICs set of populous states with South Africa, whilst excluding Nigeria and Mexico, on the bases of sheer demographic and economic size projections should be demystified and dispelled as deeply illogical and irrational. The article concludes that the framing of the BRICS set is itself a function of the “geopolitical self-imaginary” and “civilizing” missions as conceptualized in the nuance imperialism hybrid.

Keywords: BRICs, BRICS, Emerging Economies, Economic Freedoms, Imperial Paradigm

Introduction

In analysing the relationship between economic performance and macroeconomic stability among the BRICs (Brazil, Russia, India and China) of the so-called emerging economies, de Paula (n.d., p.1) hypothesizes that their economic performance “is the result, at least partially, of the quality of the macroeconomic policy management adopted in each country, in which exchange rate policy, capital account convertibility and the degree of external vulnerability plays a key role”. At conception of the

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BRICs in 2001 and subsequent reviews in 2003, 2005 and 2010, Goldman Sachs framed four assumed “emerging economies” of Brazil, Russia, India and China as the prospective engines of future global growth, offering unique foreign investment opportunities (Wilson and Purushothaman, 2003; O’Neill, Wilson, Purushothaman and Stupnytska, 2005; Wilson, Kelston and Ahmed, 2010). Goldman Sachs used demographic projections as well as capital accumulation and productivity growth modelling to forecast GDP growth, income per capita and currency movements in the BRICs countries up to 2050 (Wilson and Purushothaman, 2003; O’Neill et al., 2005; Wilson et al., 2010). The original BRICs framing excluded South Africa, which according to some analysts had hoped to use the IBSA (India, Brazil and South Africa) to secure membership of the BRICs, which emerged after the failure of the 2003 World Trade Organization Conference in Cancun (Calland, 2013; Habib, 2013). Ultimately, it was South Africa’s relationship with China that became instrumental in securing its membership of the BRICS (Calland, 2013; Habib, 2013). Conversely, South Africa was included in the conceptions of CiBS (China, India, Brazil and South Africa) by the United Nations University’s World Institute for Development Economics Research (WIDER), and in the B(R)ICSAM (Brazil, India, China, South Africa and Mexico) of the so-called self-described G5 of “big emerging states”, wherein Russia was reservedly included because of its lack of fit of the concept of emerging economy/market, as well as its membership of the G8 of rich nations of the United States, Japan, Germany, Britain, France, Italy and Canada (O’Neill et al., 2005; Armijo and Echeverri-Gent, 2006; MacFarlane, 2006; Armijo, 2007; Cooper, 2009; Tandonand Shome, 2009; Glosny, 2010; Bell, 2011). Emerging from the ruins of the USSR, Russia’s conceptualization as “an emerging power” is, from a realism perspective, “distinctly odd” (Armijo, 2007, p.16). As MacFarlane (2006, p.56) put it, “Russia is not an emerging power in the conventional sense of the phrase”. Hence, the WIDER (cited in Armijo, 2007) conceived the emerging economies grouping of engines of global growth for the twenty-first century that would exclude Russia but include South Africa. Indeed, the framing of the BRICS with the latter country defies accepted economic neoliberal wisdom.

This article analyses the conceptual framing of the BRICs and the BRICS through the business, financial and economic neoliberalism perspectives in order to highlight the discrepancies in the sets’ foundational logic. It insinuates that the irrationality and illogic of the framing of the sets disguise the “civilizing” imperialist motif. There is expectation that by collective involvement in international governance structures, major democratic (led by the United States) and authoritarian (converging around China, notwithstanding this country’s self-description as socialist) powers would “promote political convergence on liberal democracy” (Armijo, 2007, p.34-35). This notion raises questions of whether South Africa’s membership of the BRICS was not a Western proxy to pacify the emergent economic powers of China and Russia, which are perpetually distrusted for their authoritarian, autocratic regimes. The article affirms Armijo’s (2007, p.38) contention that “the concept of the BRICs as a single useful analytical set is shattered” because, as neoliberal institutionalism mental model suggests, it has hoped to socialize the large emerging powers “into the hitherto cosy club of large industrial democracies”, dominated by the US. Based on the notion that “hard-shell neo-Westphalian states” which would reject key tenets of modern global liberalism and civil society (MacFarlane, 2006;
Armijo, 2007; Barma, Ratner and Weber, 2007; Gat, 2007; Glosny, 2010; Cameron, 2011), the article asserts that the BRICS is framed on “civilizing” imperialist missions, beyond mere liberal institutionalism. That is, the constellation is framed on “geopolitical self-imaginary” that may equally be embedded with nationalistic sentiments of pride, glory, cultures, histories and ideologies. Disciples of international relations would indeed identify with such inherently paradoxical and, temporally, inconsistent conduct of global actors, as severally typified in fragile coalitions and bloc-voting or exercise of veto in various United Nations agencies. The next section discusses and dismisses the claim that BRICs and BRICS are framed on business, financial and economic neoliberalism.

**BRICs and BRICS Framing: Economic Neoliberalism or Imperialism Motif?**

Far from the popularity of the acronym, the conceptual framing of the BRICs and establishment of BRICS appear to be underwritten by recurring “geopolitical self-imaginary” of global-actors polities. This article demonstrates that the business, financial and economic neoliberalism foundational conception of the Goldman Sachs does not hold for the set on all fronts. For instance, despite showing the greatest potentiality in the Growth Environment Score (GES) and the population/economic size, Mexico and Nigeria, respectively, have been excluded from the Goldman Sachs’ 2001 BRICs conception and establishment of the set in 2009. The inclusion of South Africa in the BRICS in 2011 should, therefore, raise philosophical and ideological questions relating to the sets’ foundational conceptualization. Armijo and Echeverri-Gent (2006) and Armijo (2007) provide enthralling theorization that is pertinent to unpacking the BRICS framing; however, the nuance imperial paradigm provides insight into the apparently irrational and illogical framing of the set, pointing therefore to the recurring theme or motif undergirded by the nuance hybrid of imperialism.

**Economic Neoliberalism: Business and Financial Framing of the BRICs**

The primary conceptual argument for the business and financial framing of the BRICs is that Brazil, Russia, India and China are emerging economies, and that they are populous and “large” in sheer size, allowing them economic dynamism as future engines of growth. That is, “the central organizing principle for the BRICs category is not growth rate, nor opportunities for investor profit, but rather sheer economic size” (Armijo, 2007, p.12). At conception in 2001 and during the decade thereafter, the BRICs set caught the imagination of investors largely because the member states are populous, expected to become the “engine of new demand of growth and spending power” (Wilson and Purushothaman, 2003, p.2; Armijo, 2007, p.8; Bell, 2011, p.22). The BRICs was viewed as holding the potential for exceptionally high future import demand and economic growth (de Paula, n.d.; Armijo and Echeverri-Gent, 2006; Financial Times, February 08, 2006; MacFarlane, 2006; Armijo, 2007; Glosny, 2010; Cameron, 2011), because foreign investors could only discern investment opportunities for profit under such circumstances.

To achieve the predicted growth by 2050, the BRICs economies are urged to deepen economic openness (O’Neill et al., 2005; Glosny, 2010; Wilson et al., 2010; Bell, 2011) because it is assumed that the US was made into “the most powerful in the world” through the same “policies that enhance
economic freedom” (American Thinker, 15 January 2014). Miller (2014, n.p.) notes that “Countries achieving higher levels of economic freedom consistently and measurably outperform others in economic growth, long-term prosperity and social progress”. In practice, though, China has outperformed the rest of the BRICs in macro-stability, institutions and education under the so-called “Red Capitalism”, leading the set in global competitiveness, innovation and sophistication whilst relying on restrictive controls on capital flows and exchange rate, as well as managing macroeconomic policies (MacFarlane, 2006; Glosny, 2010; Bell, 2011). Indeed, China, India and Russia have managed their exchange rate regimes and macroeconomic policies with restrictive capital account convertibility, and they have appeared to create stable environments for economic growth (MacFarlane, 2006; Glosny, 2010; Cameron, 2011), whereas Brazil with its chaotic liberal and orthodox economic policy of minimal interventionism in exchange rate policy and open current account, has experienced “higher exchange rate volatility, higher interest rates, and a more poor economic performance” (de Paula, n.d., p.18). South Africa too, which is the most open of the BRICS, has performed poorly on the economic front. On the contrary, Miller (2014, n.p.) believes that Brazil’s economy is performing poorly because of “heavy-handed government intervention”, which erodes freedoms and risk stagnation, high unemployment and deterioration of social conditions.

Importantly, Bernstein (2006, n.p.) examines the relationship between economic growth and foreign investment opportunities, finding that “growth nations have lower returns than value nations”. In practice, therefore, as Armijo (2007, p.11) argues, “high national growth rates do not necessarily result in high returns to private investors”. It is unsurprising that the fragility of the foundational conceptual framing of the BRICs was unintentionally exposed in Goldman Sachs’ revisions, which evidently were “peppered with subtle sales pitches” for Goldman Sachs securities (Glosny, 2010; Bell, 2011). Whereas the BRICs equity markets outperformed significantly during the 2000-2010 decade (Wilson et al., 2010), the question of whether BRICs performance influenced Goldman Sachs report or if the latter agitated for the former, remains a pertinent moot point. Armijo (2007, p.14), though, contests the logic of economic size because it has never been “a core concept within neoclassical economics”; and, drawing on it for framing the BRICs set should be inherently illogical and irrational.

Notwithstanding the fact that all other BRICs countries boost population sizes of over 140 million, Goldman Sachs too concedes that “demographic advantage is not sufficient” (O’Neill et al., 2005, p.3). The international economy does not provide evidence of larger size trumping faster growth rates, “good property–rights, or other economic or financial ratios of interest to private investors” (Armijo, 2007, p.14), whose business conduct is fundamental to the Goldman Sachs’ projections of the BRICs as the future engine of global growth. But O’Neill et al. (2005, p.7) excluded South Africa on the grounds that “without a substantial population, even a successful growth story is unlikely to have a global impact”. Goldman Sachs stipulates that demographic advantage alone or “miracle conditions” are insufficient (O’Neill et al., 2005; Wilson et al., 2010), yet South Africa ceded membership of the BRICs. To the extent that profitability cannot be determined solely through sheer population and economic size, the BRICs grouping, especially with South Africa (BRICS), remains “an odd and
Theoretically, therefore, business, financial and economic liberalism entails non-discriminatory openness, free trade and investment across borders, which is thought to create conditions necessary for rapid economic growth. Goldman Sachs economists too, who have continued to peddle and glorify the business and financial merits of the BRICs on the global scenario (O’Neill et al., 2005; Wilson et al., 2010), concede that whereas “generally progressing”, the set needs “considerable further policy improvement in each” member state. The irony is, therefore, in forecasting the set as potential future engines of growth whilst their ranking on the 2014 Index of Economic Freedom is far from being openness. Indeed, forecasts of the BRICs, now BRICS, are based on the assumption that the five countries would each deepen their economic freedom and openness policies. This article contests this proposition as the basis for the BRICS becoming the engine of future global economic growth on the grounds that the same economic freedom and openness policies have been associated with trenchant poverty and stark inequality in emerging states such as South Africa. On average, the BRICs economies were growing even before the Goldman Sachs report was published; and, those states that were relatively open were also poor economic performers. Inevitably, global geopolitics would have played a role in the Goldman Sachs' business, financial and economic neoliberalism framing of the BRICs; and, South Africa's membership is at best mysterious. To this extent, given Goldman Sachs' evident self-interests as well as those of this institution’s homeland state, the recurrence of the imperialism motif in the present international relations cannot be ruled out through control variables relating to the conception and establishment of the BRICs and BRICS set.

Russia, China, the BRICs and the BRICS: Major Powers or Hegemons Geopolitics?
Sovereign states operate within an international political-economy system; and, the international relations and geopolitics cannot be inconsequential to conceptualization of a set such as the BRICs (de Paula, n.d.; MacFarlane, 2006; Glosny, 2010; Bell, 2011; Cameron, 2011). Indeed, this set of so-called “big” emerging states would have been unrealistic for contemporary international relations if it was not equally clouted with paradoxes, contradictions, dilemmas and inconsistencies. Whereas non-discriminatory openness is often used in an economic liberalism proposition that suggest that trade makes for peace (Oneal, Russett and Berbaum, 2003), realism holds that “trade and investment” are subordinate to the “enduring structure of interstate relations” (Armiio, 2007, p.16). That is, rather than trade bringing peace, international peace “permits and enables trade”(Armiio, 2007, p.16). Assuming that sovereign states would not voluntarily yield to dominance by another, realism purports the international political-economy as “anarchy” where there is no single legitimate and effective central
authority whose decisions are backed-up by the weight of law and force (Armijo and Echeverri-Gent, 2006; MacFarlane, 2006; Armijo, 2007; Glosny, 2010; Cameron, 2011; Zielonka, 2012). Sovereign states are assumed to be guided simultaneously by self-interests and insecurity. For these reasons, realism portrays the international political-economy as “a self-help system of mutual distrust” that transposes the irrational actions for excessive defence expenditures, arms race, instability and war into rational pre-emptive moves (Mearsheimer, 2001; Zielonka, 2012).

Obsession with an unfounded linkage between liberal democracy and capitalist development could as well be at the heart of the global geopolitics and nuance imperialist civilizing missions relating to the contemplation of a G2 with distrusted authoritarian autocracy which has perfected state capitalism (de Paula, n.d.; MacFarlane, 2006; Glosny, 2010; Cameron, 2011; Lubman, 2012; Yi-Chong, 2012). In practice, the US has continued to hold a dominant position in world markets, the G8, International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank and such other global financial governance institutions (MacFarlane, 2006; Glosny, 2010; Zielonka, 2012). As Armijo (2007, p.24) puts it, the US’s seigniorage privilege accords it dominance of the international financial power capabilities; and,

“So long as foreigners are prepared to absorb dollars, the U.S. government can print, and spend, without restraint….Essentially freed from foreign exchange constraints by its control of dollar seigniorage, the United States has become a major international debtor. The United States’ enormous trade deficits are matched by equivalently large inflows of foreign capital as foreign central banks typically invest their dollars in U.S. Treasury securities”.

Only China appears to be consequential in respect of relative power capabilities of sovereign states, whilst India, Russia and Brazil are far less powerful (de Paula, n.d.; MacFarlane, 2006; Armijo and Echeverri-Gent, 2006; Cooper, 2009; Glosny, 2010; Cameron, 2011; Lubman, 2012; Yi-Chong, 2012). Whereas predicting with certainty that China would soon be the second major power to the US, Armijo (2007) proposes that there are reasonable prospects for Russia, India and Brazil to also become major powers. It can be expected that the perceived rise of China and re-emergence of Russia as major powers of the future, rather than with the BRICs itself, could raise global geopolitical concerns among capitalist liberal democracies. From a realism perspective, it is thought that “the (perceived) rise of a powerful anti-Western and anti-liberal values coalition, led by China but possibly also including Russia”, is at the heart of the increased Western fear (Armijo, 2007, p.27). Apparently, the real concerns with the framing of the BRICs involve “issues of political institutions and values, and the domestic political characteristics of states” (Armijo, 2007, p.29) rather than business, financial and economic neoliberalism or political-economy realism considerations.

Broadly, liberal institutionalism distinguishes between “soft” and “hard” capabilities for relative power of states (Nye, 2004; MacFarlane, 2006; Armijo and Echeverri-Gent, 2006; Armijo, 2007; Glosny, 2010). Soft power relates to polities’ cultural values, education, language, arts and political institutions, whilst hard power capabilities consist of military might and large domestic market that allow states to use threats and/or inducements to coerce others to cooperate (Armijo and Echeverri-Gent, 2006; MacFarlane, 2006; Armijo, 2007; Glosny, 2010; Zielonka, 2012). Soft power, which depends on reputation in the sphere of political stability, economic growth reliability, diplomatic
trustworthiness and public spiritedness in international relations, relies on persuasion to inspire emulation and cooperation (Armijo and Echeverri-Gent, 2006; MacFarlane, 2006; Armijo, 2007; Glosny, 2010; Zielonka, 2012). Neoliberal institutionalism, therefore, holds that “in addition to states’ relative capabilities”, together with domestic institutions and/or ideas and values, the incentives and opportunities created by international institutions influence state choices and global outcomes (Armijo, 2007, p.31). Hence, Cameron (2011, n.p.) observes that “the BRICs might almost have been chosen for their disparate abilities rather than their similarities”. Then, the question of why the BRICS is framed with starkly different states remains unattended. To this extent, civilizing imperialism missions appear to present useful insight for the framing of the BRICs and the BRICS. That is, theorization of major powers and hegemons do not account for the framing of these sets of polities. The nuance imperial paradigm appears to provide insight to understanding the evidently irrational and illogical business, financial and economic neoliberalism framing of these sets of the so-called “big” emerging states.

**BRICS Set Framing and the Recurrent Civilizing Imperialism Missions**

Contemporary global governance of international relations involves “historical anthropology of cultural confrontation ... of domination and reaction, struggle and innovation” (Comaroff and Comaroff, 1991, p.34 cited in Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2007, p.176). Contemporary international relations transcend conventional inter-state cooperation, conflict, negotiations and diplomacy, to encapsulate cultural, historical and ideological aspects of the actors’ nationalistic pride, glory, morality and religious zeal in positioning, position-making and shaping global governance itself (Chandler, 2006; Parker, 2010; Zielonka, 2012). Notwithstanding their utility, the concepts of global states, great powers and hegemons no longer provide adequate insight into the complex contemporary global (dis)order and agendas that are facilitated by state and non-state actors, who stand ready to interfere extra-territorially to serve nationalistic policy interests and objectives (Pomeranz, 2005; Zielonka, 2012). Global geopolitics involve complex processes of intentionality, irrationality, paradoxes and purposefulness which do not necessarily destroy the status quo of coloniality of the spatio-temporal matrices of being, power and knowledge (Grosfoguel, 2007; Maldonado-Torres, 2007; Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2013). The governance and conduct of international relations through nationalistic and religious sentiments of pride, glory and morality, which is equally evident in Olympic Games, constitutes the bases for civilizing imperialism missions that derive from, often, irrational paradoxical “complex historical, cultural and ideological processes” (Zielonka, 2012, p.519) embedded with fussy legitimizing imperial vision, purpose and policies (Pitts, 2005; Pomeranz, 2005; Kearns, 2009; Parker, 2010). Therefore, civilizing imperialism missions are inevitably contradictory and paradoxical because their underlying geopolitical self-imaginary is a function of the complexity of the diversity of cultures, histories and ideologies in international relations on the bases of which each global actor conceives its self-image for engaging in geopolitics (Pomeranz, 2005; Kearns, 2009; Zielonka, 2012). The BRICs and BRICS sets too harbour self-imaginary geopolitics because, like the struggles of coloniality, they are “purely ideological” for they necessarily involve efforts to control the “cultural
terms” by which the world is ordered and power legitimized (Comaroff and Comaroff, 1991, p.34 cited in Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2007, p.177).

Global governance is contested in many complex ways (Christensen, 2006; Carmody and Owusu, 2007; Gat, 2007; Foot, 2009; MacDonald, 2009; Gregory, 2010) especially because actors on the international stage are not only legal, formal, political and economic polities, they also include illegal and informal entities, whose primary defining features are distinct cultures, histories and ideologies that drive their sense of nationalistic and/or religious pride, glory and morality (Pomeranz, 2005; Parker, 2010; Zielonka, 2012; Kotze, 2013). The pursuit of internal interests beyond territorial borders of polities through foreign policies is now a common practice in international relations (Pitts, 2005; Chandler, 2006; Chua, 2007; Kearns, 2009; Parker, 2010; Zielonka, 2012; Kotze, 2013). Zielonka (2012) asserts that the conduct of present-day actors such as USA, China, Russia and the EU in the modern international system resemble empires; and, that imperialism does not necessarily entail the use of coercion, oppression or exploitation. Indeed, imperialist propensities are not preserves of states, great powers or hegemons alone because the conduct of international relations by polities such as the EU, BRICs and so on is equally driven through “geopolitical self-imaginary”, which manifest in “civilizing imperialism missions”(Pomeranz, 2005; Chandler, 2006; Chua, 2007; Kearns, 2009; Parker, 2010; Zielonka, 2012). Polities’ objectives for extraterritorial border expressions as captured in contemporary foreign policy are embedded with nationalist pride, glory, morality and religious zeal (Pomeranz, 2005; Chandler, 2006; Chua, 2007; Kearns, 2009; Parker, 2010; Zielonka, 2012). It is understandable that Bell (2011, p.24) asks the question of the motivation for the Goldman Sachs’ revisionist reportage on the future engine of global growth, the BRICs.

Contemporary recurrent “civilizing imperialism missions” purport to be serving the cause of freedoms and democracy, promotion of good governance, advocating for human rights and dignity, securing global order, stability and security, establishing a harmonious world, spreading enlightenment and reason, combating barbarism and terrorism as well as resistance of domination (Pomeranz, 2005; Chandler, 2006; Christensen, 2006; Zielonka, 2012; Kotze, 2013). Empires have always harboured “civilizing” missions around value-laden peace and wealth, founded in specific cultures, histories and ideologies (Pitts, 2005; Chandler, 2006; Chua, 2007; Kearns, 2009; MacDonald, 2009; Parker, 2010; Zielonka, 2012; Kotze, 2013). The latter trite (cultures, histories and ideologies) informs expressions of nationalistic sentiments of pride, glory, morality and religion. Thus, imperial preoccupation has always involved attempts, as it were, to “civilize” or “institutionalize” other territories and people (Pomeranz, 2005; Parker, 2010; Zielonka, 2012); and, a democratic South Africa has attempted the same through its foreign economic policy in Africa as evidenced through its African Renaissance and South-South relations drives (Kotze, 2013). South Africa has indeed “become more active on the international stage”, establishing “alliances with the potential to reform the regional and global order in ways that are more facilitative of their own agendas” (Habib, 2013, p.175). Importantly, extraterritorial borders interferences and “civilizing imperialism missions” of various polities are not necessarily
always “a product of rational calculations, but of complex historical, cultural and ideological processes” (Zielonka, 2012,p.519).

There is, indeed, expectation that through participation in international governance, major democratic and authoritarian powers would “promote political convergence on liberal democracy” (Armijo, 2007,pp.34-35). To this extent, Cooper’s (2009, n.p.) observation is compelling because:

“In many ways, nevertheless, the BRICs are more interesting for their differences than their similarities. Brazil and India are robust democracies. Russia is a managed democracy. China is a one party state. India has a fast rising population. Russia is in serious demographic trouble with a sharply reduced life expectancy. Brazil and Russia are resource rich. India and China are resource dependent”.

On grounds of its universally celebrated democratic dispensation, South Africa has been a global actor of note (Landsberg, 2005; Biko, 2013; Habib, 2013; Parsons, 2013). This country is perceived to hold a continentally transcendent “geopolitical self-imaginary” and self-selection of emerging markets such as BRICSAM, IBSA, BRICS and the Next-11. These groupings are global non-state actors in international management geopolitics, but their “geopolitical self-imaginary” is intricately intertwined with pride, glory, morality and religion, which are all subservient to specific nationalist cultures, histories and ideologies. Equally for states and non-state, formal and informal, legal and illegal global actors, they all hold normative agendas that variously “attach different meanings” to notions of free market, democracy or multilateralism, and resistance or domination, which manifest in their perpetual contestations of spaces (Christensen, 2006; Carmody and Owusu, 2007; Gat, 2007;Foot, 2009; Jiemian, 2009; Gregory, 2010; Parker, 2010; Zielonka, 2012). As Armijo (2007,p.38) notes, “the concept of the BRICs as a single useful analytical set is shattered” because, as neoliberal institutionalism suggests, it has hoped to socialize the large emerging powers “into the hitherto cosy club of large industrial democracies”, dominated by the US. For these reasons, the imperial paradigm appears to shed insight into the irrationality of the framing of the BRICs and BRICS sets.

**BRICS: A “Non-places” Framing for Nuance Imperialism Hybrid?**

In its 2001 framing, Goldman Sachs forecast that the BRICs economies would become engines of global growth by 2050, with the proviso that four conditions are met: macro-stability, especially price stability, development of good institutions, including legal systems, functioning markets, educational systems, financial institutions and so on, openness to trade and foreign direct investment (FDI), and improvement in the education of the population (de Paula, n.d.; Glosny, 2010; Bell, 2011). Collectively, these conditions describe the conventional “Washington Consensus” growth-focused development paradigm, policies and strategies (de Paula, n.d.; Glosny, 2010; Bell, 2011) commonly denoted economic freedom. That is, “the capacity of the BRICs to influence global dynamics turns on their ability to set and maintain growth-supportive policy settings” (O’Neill et al., 2005, p.3), revealing therefore the alleged business, financial and economic neoliberalism foundational framing of this set. For the four BRICs economies of Brazil, Russia, India and China to realize the forecast growth levels and attractiveness to foreign investors, they are advised to deepen the economic freedom policies (de Paula, n.d.; O’Neil et al., 2005; Tandon and Shome, 2009; Glosny, 2010; Wilson et al., 2010; Bell,
2011). At the core of these policies is openness to trade and FDI (MacFarlane, 2006; Bell, 2011); paradoxically, O’Neill, the economists who coined the BRICs acronym, paradoxically expressed fear of the dangers attendant to neoliberal globalization for emerging economies (Tandon and Shome, 2009). As already discussed, the neoclassical liberalism framing on which the BRICs grouping is alleged to be conceptualized emphasises economic growth rates, rather than the sheer size of population and economy. Besides, the BRICs economies have not been monolithic; and, the superficial commonality of some features of the BRICs economies should not distract attention from the stark discrepancies (Tandon and Shome, 2009). It appears that Russia with a population of 143 million, rather than liberal democratic India with 1.2 billion people, together with the most populous China (over 1.3 billion people), is the focus of the framing of the BRICs and, arguably, the Western fears of authoritarian, autocratic state governance. Pertinent questions of the criteria for the conceptual framing of the BRICs are bound to arise. O’Neill et al. (2005) and Wilson et al. (2010) argue that each of the four countries of the original conceptualization of the BRICs has since “grown more strongly” than the initial projections. But China pursued restrictive controls on exchange rates and macroeconomic policies (Lubman, 2012; Yi-Chong, 2012). Assessing the GDP, inflation rate and current account balance over the past decade, Tandon and Shome (2009) find that overall the BRICs consists of two sets, one with Brazil and Russia and the other with India and China. On the GDP growth rates, Russia was unrelated to the positive correlation of India, China and Brazil (Tandon and Shome, 2009). In respect of natural resources, Brazil and Russia are stronger, whilst India and China have “fast consuming populations” (Tandon and Shome, 2009, pp.273-274). Whilst dependent on oil, Brazil’s economy is more diversified than that of Russia; and, the latter’s economy is “completely pro-cyclic to the commodity prices” with the result that “any volatility in commodity prices is likely to impact its current account” balance, which is an indicator of economic health (Tandon and Shome, 2009, pp. 274-275).

During the first decade of the twentieth century, “the BRICs weakened as the members displayed differential rates of growth in most macro indicators” (Tandon and Shome, 2009, p.273). This observation invokes vexed questions of the business and financial conceptual foundations of the BRICs, and the requirement for deepening economic freedom policies. O’Neill et al. (2005, p.3) affirm that “the capacity of the BRICs to influence global dynamics turns on their ability to set and maintain growth-supportive policy settings”, implying the requirement to intensify the same old “Washington Consensus” policies. Encouraging membership of the BRICS, Hsing (2011, p.12), therefore, urges South Africa’s government to pursue the economic freedom and openness policies of “economic growth, fiscal prudence, a higher ratio of the money supply to GDP, a lower real interest rate, depreciation of the rand, and/or a lower inflation rate”. But BRICs member states are reported to have already attracted increasing inward FDI and to have become “more important in the global market”, which Duan (2010, p.46) describes as “out of imagination”. To this extent, the notion of the BRICs becoming a global economic growth engine or hegemon/power is contestable (Cheng, Gutierrez, Mahajan, Shachmurove and Shahrokhi, 2007) because the demand elasticity of this market set for goods and services produced in contemporary developed economies, on which the forecasts are
made, would have to be significantly “unlimited”. Indeed, Bernstein (2006, n.p.) demonstrates that the economic neoliberalism framing for the BRICs is founded on an unrealistic assumption of the relationship between economic growth and equity returns, because whereas “stock returns lead economic growth”, the converse does not hold. Furthermore, Bernstein (2006) makes reference to several analyses that establish a negative relationship between growth and returns. According to Ho and McCauley’s (2003, p.34 cited in De Paula, n.d., p.4) “capital controls, if properly designed and applied, can be helpful in protecting the economy against the destabilizing aspects of capital flows, supporting the implementation of other policies and even resolving certain types of policy dilemma”.

Whereas the Goldman Sachs economists find it overwhelmingly compelling to embrace the BRICs directly in global economic policymaking(O’Neill et al., 2005; Glosny, 2010; Wilson et al., 2010; Bell, 2011), the Standard and Poor reported that the BRICs should not be regarded as a group (Tandon and Shome, 2009). Indeed, the framing of the BRICs is irrational because the same economic freedoms have been associated with stark societal poverty and inequalities, domestically (de Paula, n.d.;Nattrass and Seekings, 2001). Analysing stock market and macroeconomic variables in South Africa as a BRICS economy, Hsing (2011) urges for robust deepening of economic freedom and openness policies anyway. However, De Paula (n.d.) emphasizes the value of restrictive controls on exchange rate regimes and management of macroeconomic policies in reducing external vulnerability for emerging economies.

The macro-indicators of the BRICS are deeply divergent; for example, South Africa’s 2011/2012 unemployment rate stood at 25.1%, compared to India’s 3.8%, China’s 4.1%, Russia’s 5.5% and Brazil’s 6.7% (BRICS, 2013). Furthermore, the BRICS set’s GDP growth rates reveal at least four categories: China on its own growing at rates above 7%; India in the 4%-5% range; South Africa and Russia in the 1%-2.5% range; and, Brazil below 1.5% (BRICS, 2013). China has not adopted the economic freedom policies for openness (Lubman, 2012; Yi-Chong, 2012); yet, it has been the fastest growing economy with the lowest inflation rates for the BRICS. Whereas the economies of China and India are growing faster than that for South Africa, the latter’s per capita GDP has been the third highest for the BRICS (BRICS, 2013). Brazil, whose GDP growth rate is the lowest of the BRICS, has one of the highest GDP per capita of the set, together with Russia (BRICS, 2013). The combination of low GDP growth rate and high per capita is understandable for South Africa whose population size is far below all of the BRICS. However, the same cannot be said about Brazil whose population size is the third largest in the BRICS, after India and China, respectively. Evidently, the BRICS set is a scrambled picture on development trajectories, GDP growth rates, per capita and population sizes.

Whereas the Chinese government reported the gini-coefficient of 0.474 in 2012 (The Economist, January 26, 2013; also see Trading Economics, n.d.e), Hu (2012) claims under-reporting and, in return, records a high of 0.61 for 2010. Russia’s gini-coefficient presented an image of an equitable society as it remained around 0.423 over the past decade (Trading Economics, n.d.a), India recorded 0.535 (Trading Economics, n.d.c) while Brazil hovered around 0.57 (Aris, 2010; also see Trading Economics, n.d.b) and South Africa at 0.67 (Trading Economics, n.d.d). If China’s and Russia’s
official statistics have to be believed, then an observation can be drawn that there are three sets of categories in the BRICS grouping, which are: relatively equitable societies of China and Russia, significant inequalities of India and Brazil, and stark inequality of South Africa. In this context, the BRICS conception is illogical because members that are evidently authoritarian with direct state control of the economies are relatively equitable, than liberal democracies with substantive economic freedom and openness policies. Regarding policy implications of South Africa’s stark and enduring societal inequality, Nattrass and Seekings (2001, p.60) state that taxation and social welfare expenditure may provide mitigation but that “other government policies, affecting the labour market and the overall rate and path of economic growth, serve to reproduce inequality …. (there are) truly poor … policies that inhibit a reduction in … inequality”.

Whereas Ferreira, World Bank Chief Economist for Africa, thinks that foreign investors are not just “looking at GDP statistics” (cited in Isa, 2014, n.p.), Lalor(2014, n.p.) notes firmly that “investment attractiveness is about far more than the size and growth rates of an economy”. According to Miller (2014, n.p.), “world economic freedom has reached record levels”. It is, however, worth noting that the only countries that are designated “economically free” in the 2014 Index of Economic Freedom are Hong Kong, Singapore, Australia, Switzerland, New Zealand and Canada (Miller, 2014). But Miller (2014, n.p.) concedes that “The 2014 Index of Economic Freedom documents a world-wide race to enhance economic opportunity through greater freedom”. The paradox of the relationship of the economic freedoms and growth is evident in the rating of the BRICS countries. In terms of the 2014 Index of Economic Freedom, South Africa is ranked 75th, followed by Brazil at 114th, India at 120th, China at 137th and Russia at 140th (Miller, 2014). These ranks would have suggested that South Africa would lead the BRICS states in economic growth performance, where Russia would be the least performer. As already demonstrated, South Africa does not meet the BRICs set framing criteria of being populous; and, its economy is not growing faster.

Other than the apparent self-interests of the Goldman Sachs securities, the emergence of a new sovereign wealth fund (SWF) private securities led by China and the rationale provided in the democratic peace theory, it remains hard to establish the most logical conceptual framing of the BRICs and BRICS. Analysis of the framing of the BRICs from the business, financial and economic neoliberalism perspectives suggests that the set is inherently irrational (de Paula, n.d.; MacFarlane, 2006; Glosny, 2010; Cameron, 2011). Also, varieties of capitalism, sometimes designated “capindialism” (India) and “Red Capitalism” (Russia), have send shock waves across the West because they meant that autocratic and authoritarian regimes could practice capitalism without transforming into liberal democracies (Lubman, 2012; Yi-Chong, 2012). Indeed, state capitalism melds state powers with capital in the nuance hybrid of state-owned enterprises (Lubman, 2012; Yi-Chong, 2012) to ensure that public administration supplements “the invisible hand of markets with a visible hand”, in order to foster “long-term common interests” of the state and capital (Glemarec and Puppim de Oliveira, 2012, p.201).
Overall, the BRICs has been questioned from the domestic politics and economic structure perspectives of the four member states, as “a forced set” (de Paula, n.d.; Armijo and Echeverri-Gent, 2006; Armijo, 2007; Tandon and Shome, 2009; Glosny, 2010; Bell, 2011; Cameron, 2011); and, membership of South Africa makes it untenable. As Armijo (2007, p.9) proposes, “it would seem more sensible to group Brazil with Argentina, Mexico, Chile, Colombia, or Venezuela; India with Pakistan and Bangladesh” and such other Asian emerging economies. Indeed, Goldman Sachs’ demographic, productivity growth and capital accumulation projections and modelling to 2050 have consistently excluded South Africa from the potentiality of being future engine of global growth (O’Neill et al., 2005; Wilson et al., 2010). Besides, Nigeria has been the most populous nation in Africa with almost 170 million people in 2013, far ahead of South Africa’s 50 million (Isa, 2014). Additionally, Nigeria’s economy in 2013 was almost $510 billion, almost double that for South Africa’s $343 billion; and, Nigeria’s average annual GDP growth rate has been around 7%, compared to South Africa’s 3% (Isa, 2014); yet, the former state was overlooked in the conceptual framing and formation of the BRICS. The conceptualization of the BRICs on the bases of impressive population sizes as the point of departure for framing the set as future engines of global growth with potentiality for fast economic growth and FDI investment attractiveness by 2050, amidst disparate macro-indicators of member states (Tandon and Shome, 2009; Glosny, 2010; Bell, 2011; Cameron, 2011) and exclusions of befitting countries, is illogical and irrational. Goldman Sachs concluded in subsequent modelling that South Africa does not fit the conceptual framing of the BRICs, especially in respect of the demographic preconditions, because even in 2003 this country was unlikely to “reach the size of any of the BRICs despite its own potential” (O’Neill et al., 2005, p.4). Their finding was that “by 2050 South Africa’s GDP would be much smaller than the smallest BRIC, making it difficult for the country to become a global economic heavy weight” (O’Neill et al., 2005, p.7). Nevertheless, South Africa ceded membership of the BRICS in 2011 making nonsense of the business, financial and economic neoliberal conceptual framing. It is this irrationality and illogic that entails nuance theorization of the framing of the BRICS beyond economic neoliberalism, political-economy realism and liberal institutionalism perspectives. In this context, this article draws from the cognitive authority of “civilizing imperialism missions” recurrent in the complex contemporary international relations.

As Cooper (2009, n.p.) observes, the extended framing of the BRICs to encompass the BRICS and the BRICSAM “brings diplomacy back into the centrality of the analysis”. Contrary to the popularity of the four-country BRICs, the set has appeared to be inconsequential on the global scale (Tandon and Shome, 2009), notwithstanding the “greater appreciation of the geo-political implications of the BRICs initiative”(Cooper, 2009, n.p.). But Goldman Sachs remained convinced of the potentiality of the BRICs on the global scenario even in 2010 (Wilson et al., 2010). South Africa appears to have been preferred into the grouping ahead of Mexico or Nigeria because of its assumed reputation on “soft” power. If demographic size is a necessary condition, then South Africa’s 2012 population size estimation of about 51 million is negligible in the face of that for Russia (143 million), Brazil (193 million), India (1.21 billion) and China (1.35 billion) (BRICS, 2013). Indeed, Goldman Sachs’ modelling of the BRICs grouping emphasises population size; and, South Africa’s is far below those of the other
four member states, hence it was excluded from all forecasting and modelling. To this extent, Cooper’s (2009) observation on the differentness of the member states is revealing of the irrationality and illogic of the BRICs and BRICS framing. As already argued, the business, financial and economic ideals of the framing of the set are questionable and, there is suspicion that the 2003 and 2010 Goldman Sachs Reports are equally “peppered with subtle sales pitches” for global securities related to the BRIC states (Bell, 2011). This questioning of the BRICS set insinuates the notion of underlying “civilizing imperialism motif” because, as the Financial Times (08 February 2006) concludes, “BRICs joined non-places such as Emea, Asean and Nafta in the acronym-crazed geography of international management”. The set’s “geopolitical self-imaginary” is described by the BRICS thus: “a group of leading emerging economies playing a key role in the world development platforms” (BRICS, 2013,p.vi). Five of the BRICS’s ten guiding principles include centrality of multilateralism on global issues; mutual respect for one another’s choice of the development path; openness; non-bloc nature; and, neutrality with regard to third parties. From a regionalism perspective, these principles capture the BRICS’s hope of global pluralism, diverse and divergent futures. Economically and politically, the BRICS would therefore remain non-cohesive because the set will lack unison conformity to “the body of ideas, values and concrete objectives” (Grant and Soderbaum, 2003,p.7), a paradox that is reminiscent of hidden “geopolitical self-imaginary” and “civilizing imperialism missions” of polities such as the permanent veto-wielding Members of the UN Security Council, G7 (formerly G8) and, to a lesser extent, the G20 in contemporary international relations. But this article does not insinuate, overtly or covertly, the notion of the BRICS as emerging economies mirror-image of the G8 or G20. If the BRICS is created in order to maintain the status quo, or the significance of the individual member states in the international relations, without transforming individual member states’ domestic structures, or altering the global power dynamics as a collective, which appears to be the case, critical theorization should cast the set as “nominal regionalism” of “non-places” harbouring recurrent “civilizing imperialism motifs”. Unsurprisingly, “the strength of the BRIC economies as a sustainable entity in the future is perhaps weaker” (Tendon andShome, 2009,p.276), questioning the business, financial and economic neoliberalism conceptual framing, forecasting and modelling of the Goldman Sachs modelling.

Conclusion
This article has affirmed the view that the BRICS is more striking for its “declaratory than operational force”; and, that its framing has appeared to paradoxically showcase the uniqueness of the challenge posed by China and, to a lesser extent, Russia, that is also propelled out of proportion by sensibilities about the perceived G2 of the US and China (Cooper, 2009, n.p.). Whereas the BRICs “concept’s intuitive appeal cannot be encompassed or understood within the mental model of decentralized global free markets”(Armijo, 2007, p.14), the grouping’s business, financial and economic conceptual framing remains irrational and illogical amidst it being enthusiastically repeated within the foreign investors and international policy fora with a sense of puerility. Whilst limited, the conceptual tools of political-economy realism and liberal institutionalism allow for cognitive transcendence that draws from insightful imperial paradigm notions of “geopolitical self-imaginary” and “civilizing” missions. This
article concludes that it is the irrationality and illogic of the business, financial and economic neoliberal framing of the BRICs and BRICS that entails imperial paradigm theorization through the “geopolitical self-imaginary” and “civilizing” missions embedded with the conceptualization and establishment of these sets of “non-places”.

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An Impossible Developmental State in the South African Context: A True Reflection of the Asian Tigers?

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ABSTRACT: The advocacy for a developmental state is in most instances associated with the capitalistic ideology that the state should be at the forefront of economic development while also expediting a modern and industrial society. A developmental state is conventionally understood in terms of East Asian developmental states and of course the significant contribution of Chalmers Johnson. This paper seeks to challenge the notion that South African local government must be used as an architect in comprehending a developmental state. If South Africa was to follow the Asian developmental states model, it would necessitate a pragmatic shift in amongst others; development policies, government structures and for the state to become autocratic. With limited financial and human capital that local government have, driving such an 'impossible dream' would seem to be a nightmare for South Africa. Using a qualitative secondary data and analytical techniques, this paper interrogates the notion of a developmental state to determine the space it has in the South African environment through the employment of local government as an enabler. To successfully question the conception of South Africa becoming a developmental state through the enablement of local government using the Asian model, the paper compares the those states in an attempt to assess the compatibility in the former. The paper then concludes that there is a need for South Africa to campaign for an alternative model towards the realisation of a developmental state other than that of the Asians.

Keywords: Developmental state, South Africa, Developmental local government, Asian developmental states

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Introduction

A developmental state has become a buzzword in the modern scholarship dispensation. As one of the most unequal countries in the world with high prevalence of slow economic growth, extreme poverty lines, inequality, unemployment, South Africa indeed needed to build a developmental state to correct these backlogs. This is a model used by Asian Tigers who successfully industrialised and led economic development and growth through the capitalism. With many states around the world having gained independence and democracy, features of a developmental state cannot practically be implemented. South Africa is such a state aspiring to become developmental using the same models of the Asian states. However, the approach is that of using local government as the ‘development driver’. This is so because the country is a regulator of markets and soft in characteristic (Dassah, 2011). This paper seeks to challenge the notion that South Africa has the necessary tools such as professional and highly skilled bureaucracies amongst others to become a developmental state. This situation is weakened by the fact that local government which is almost powerless compared to national government can be able to carry such a ‘load’. While the Asian Tigers were dictators and capitalist in nature. Can the approach work in the democratic state such as that of South Africa? To answer this question the paper starts by conceptualising a developmental state with a view of providing a theoretical background. The paper then briefly outlines some of the important contributions in the discourse with a view of soliciting debates in an attempt to place an informed angle of discussion. The paper then proceeds on to analyse the relationships between the model of the Asian developmental states and its viability in the South African context. This will be done through using local government as a tool to facilitate such a developmental state.

Placing a Developmental State in Context

A developmental state is one whose socio-political foundations are developmental and one that totally endeavour to deploy its administrative and political resources to the task of economic development (Mkandawire, 2001: 290). Ideologically, such a state in principle establishes legitimacy within its ability to promote sustainable economic development and steady high rates of growth. Not only that a developmental state should play a leading role in economic development, it should also be ‘able and willing’ to create a sustainable policy climate that promotes development by fostering productive investment, exports, growth and human welfare (Amuwo, 2010). The idea behind a developmental state as alluded by Johnson (1982) (in Gumede, 2009: 4) is that the states directly and effectively influence the direction, pace and developmental goals rather than leaving it to the uncoordinated market forces to allocate resources in the economy. A developmental state may also be defined as a state whose political have concentrated sufficient power, autonomy and capacity at the centre to shape, pursue and encourage the achievement of explicit developmental objectives, whether by establishing and promoting the conditions and direction of economic growth, or by organising directly, or a varying combination of both (Mbabazi & Taylor, 2005: 5). Most importantly, Chalmers Johnson defines a developmental state as one that is determined to influence the direction and pace of economic development by direct and active intervention to development initiatives rather than leaving the market to allocate national resources (Meyns & Musamba, 2010). In a contemporary discourse it
can be argues that dictatorship by the state to the market makes the orthodox notion that the state involvement inevitably leads to economic failure (Dassah, 2011). Ha-Joon Chang defines a developmental state as one that pursues policies focusing on coordinating investment plans with a national development vision and building institutions for growth, development and conflict resolution (Meyns & Musamba, 2010). In the South African context, a developmental state would mean a state where politics have assured that power, autonomy and capacity is centralised in order to achieve clear and measurable developmental goals. According to Taylor (2007) (in van Dijk & Croucamp, 2007) a developmental state should place its emphasis on economic growth.

A deduction can be made that a contradiction towards conceptualisation and the ideals of a developmental state exists. If political power needs to be centralised for the purposes of soliciting developmental goals, then coordination must be sought across all spheres of government than municipalities being the sole player. In building a developmental state, cooperative government should be tightened and developmental state being a collective responsibility (van Dijk & Croucamp, 2007). This is mostly because a developmental state places the responsibility of development as a state responsibility.

Important Contributions to the Discourse of a Developmental State

Engaging in a concept so elusive as a developmental state requires the recognition of important contribution in the development of the debates. Of course one is necessitated by nature to first brings to the fore the contributions made by Chalmers Johnson who is regarded as have being very influential in the discourse of a developmental state. The perspective towards a developmental state by Johnson is focuses on rapid post-war reconstruction and industrialisation by Japan (Abe, 2006). This was viewed by a way in which the states went through the transition through a sequence of events. The idealisation of a developmental state was based on the notion that there was a need to compete with the Western economies (Beeson, 2009; Kasahara, 2013). A state that aspired to becoming a developmental state has to recognise the fact that the market cannot act in isolation from the state and its politics. However, this model could prove difficult in any economy where the private sector need trading space at the absence of direct political control. However, a precondition for a developmental state would be to determine developmental agendas before bringing the market on board. Crucially Johnson advocated for a capitalist state which didn’t necessarily have to depend on the strength of its economic policy. Features of a developmental state must be small and affordable, professional and efficient state bureaucracy (Maphunye, 2009; Meyns & Musamba, 2010) perhaps elements that states aspiring to be developmental such as South Africa cannot have. Government in South Africa is characterised by large lines of bureaucracy that also lacks capacity to carry developmental mandates as defined by policy. A developmental state in nature has to be a capitalist state which is also free from excessive forms of corruption.

Johnson asserts that an effective developmental state requires a bureaucracy directing the economy to be protect from the highest form of power including civil society for the purposes of ensuring a
successful industrial policy. Also, the contributions by Ha-Joon Chang cannot be overlooked. He differs from Johnson’s approach of market intervention and identifies neo-liberalism elements such as; state, market, politics and other institutions. However consensus is made whereby he acknowledges the state dominance over the market as equally important to an effective developmental state. Ha-Joon Chang (1999) argues that free market systems and relying on regulation could prevent the construction of a developmental state and unsatisfactory development outcome. The argument made by Ha-Joon Chang differs in principle whereby he reiterates regulation between political power and industrialisation while Johnson calls for a more direct and influential domination of the state over the market. Dassah (2011) shares the same sentiments by positing that characters of a developmental state are different from a regulatory state. It must in this view be articulated that South Africa as a country thriving to be developmental applies regulatory measures to the market thus making it a free-market system. If the Asian model was to be used, the state need to develop predetermined developmental agendas while bringing the market on board. Another scholar Adrian Leftwich relates the success of a developmental state on politics dominance rather than development policies and market regulation as advocated by Johnson and Ha-Joon Chang. The analogy by Leftwich (1996) is that politicians are elites who in general are developmentally oriented. This is a matter of contention. The failure of many developmental states in Africa and elsewhere in the world is attributed to political flops characterised by highest forms of corruption. However Leftwich importantly acknowledges powerful, professional, competent and career base bureaucracy. He concurs with Johnson on the fact that a developmental state can suffice where there is a weak civil society. These however, in a democratic state as they grew to numbers in the twenty-first century could be deemed as oppression and undermining human rights.

The Asian Developmental States as an Example
In an attempt to forge in this jungle of interrogating the possibilities if South Africa becoming a developmental state, the question is posed by Dagut (2010):

‘Can South Africa become a democratic developmental state? Answer: ‘almost certainly…Not’.

His assertion is based on the fact that building a developmental state in South Africa would necessitate necessary conditions for growing the economy such as the reduction of high levels of poverty, inequality, unemployment and highly skilled bureaucracies (Dagut, 2010). Instead building a developmental state in South African using the Asian models requires dictatorship by state and the shifting focus from authoritarian top down approach to development which will see the state at the centre of development rather that the resource-less local government. Even if one was to copy and paste the East Asian state-directed industrial policy, which could prove daunting for South Africa, it wouldn’t help in moving the state up the development ladder as the world has moved on. Dassah (2011) posits that the Asian Tigers example is not meant to serve as a template towards a developmental state. Mbabazi and Taylor (2005) postulate that an ‘East Asian model’ may appear impracticable as the forms of developmental states were shaped in different shapes. Oni (1991: 13) in Mbabazi & Taylor, 2005: 5) argues that the developmental state is the ideology only applicable to
East Asia and nowhere else in the world as in reality they mean a ‘state capitalist’. Hence the argument of the paper that instead of South Africa following the Asian Tigers model, a more pragmatic approach that seeks to alleviate poverty, grow the economy and create jobs could be viable. In the Asian developmental states, the state have a dictatorship role in forcing the market to drive the developmental agenda through predetermined goals and pace while the South African only thrives through the regulatory role to the market. Having said that, it is clear that the lessons from Asia is that government intervention play a pivotal role in propitiating the development factors facilitating participation in the global market (Mbabazi & Taylor, 2005). This paper contends that a developmental state is far-fetched in South Africa. Scholars such as Dassah (2011) may however contend that a developmental state is eminent in any African continent and particularly in South Africa with the willingness. A democratic developmental model cannot work in isolation thus a need of a combination with some elements which were detrimental to the success of the Asian developmental states. This view is supported by (Gumede, 2009; Edigheji, 2010) (in Penderis, 2011:9) in which she holds that the construction of a developmental state must not only be influenced by a local context while authoritarianism must be underpinned by democratic principles. A deduction can be made that a model that relies on the Asian Tigers template while attempts are made to befit it to the South African context is eminent and necessary.

The South African Developmental Local Government
The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 created a notion for local government to become developmental. In terms of section 153 of such a Constitution, requires municipalities to manage and structure their budgeting and planning processes in order to give priority to the basic needs and also promote social and economic development of communities. In doing so, municipalities are expected to reverse service delivery challenges of the apartheid government while focus is also placed on previously disadvantaged communities. For the purposes of integration, municipalities in terms of section 153 are also expected to play their developmental role by participating in the planning processes of the national and provincial government. This seeks to ensure intergovernmental relations while also seeking to avoid multiplicity and confusion in delivering services. However, these developmental mandates placed on local government and municipalities in general are too limiting if South Africa is to use this sphere of government to facilitate a developmental state. The promulgation of the White Paper on Local Government in 1998 brought a new dimension and provided a different perspective of understanding a developmental state. This was to ensure that municipalities have a clear legislative mandate on what and how to conduct their affairs in an attempt to become developmental. The Whitepaper (1998) was promulgated with a view of enforcing while broadening the scope to the developmental mandates of local government as enshrined in the 1996 Constitution. It is in this notion that South Africa started to advocate for a developmental state through the facilitation of local government which should be developmental in nature. The White Paper on Local Government of 1998 explained that a developmental local government have the following distinguishing features:

- Maximising of social and economic growth;
Integration and coordination;
Democratization of development; and
Leadership and learning, which Madumo (2012:46) refer to as the building of social capital for enabling local solutions to development challenges.

Maximising social development and economic growth
Social development related to the delivery of basic services such as water, housing, sanitation and electricity. Municipalities also need to maximise economic growth by introducing radial Local Economic Development initiatives which are linked to the economic policies of the country. Although the role of municipalities in economic development cannot be equated to that of the national government, initiatives such as supporting small businesses within their area of jurisdiction can help to curb extreme poverty while also creating job opportunities for the locals.

Integrating and coordinating development
Coordination relates to the alignment of departmental plans and other sectoral organisations and ensuring integration for the purposes of enhancing local development activities. Service delivery sectors such as Eskom and the Department of Water Affairs must be taken into account during the local government planning processes. This seeks to ensure that tasks which are planned by each sector are clearly demarcated as such to avoid wasteful expenditures and unclear mandates. Municipalities that do not take into cognisance plans of the other sectoral service providers risks to being disintegrated and thus not becoming developmental.

Democratising development
This developmental objective relates to the involvement and engaging municipal communities on matters affecting their municipalities. Public participation is one of the democratic principles as promoted by the 1996 Constitution where government is encouraged to involve municipal citizenry in the planning processes and decision making. Although literature suggest that municipalities are not consultative and only subject communities to passive engagement. Public participation in local government is essential in ensuring that the citizenry are part of their own development. In ensuring this, members of communities have a sense of belonging and trust to the municipal council.

Leading and learning
A learning organisation with leadership prepared to engage in research is most of the times progressive. Workshops, short managerial courses and seminars will serve as a tool towards ensuring learning in municipalities. The South African local government is criticised for lack of capacity. Capacity building in a developmental local government is necessary in ensuring that municipal employees understand what to do to realise the developmental mandates they are expected to carry out. This seeks to also ensure the knowledge and understanding of how municipalities can facilitate a developmental state.
If South African municipalities could work towards realising the developmental mandate as requires
through various pieces of legislation, South Africa as a country could make strides in answering the
question posed by Nkuna (2011) earlier.

**Local Government in South Africa: A Facilitator of a Developmental State**

In terms of the White Paper on Local Government (1998), a developmental local government is a
local government committed to working with citizens and groups within the community to find
sustainable ways to meet their social, economic and material needs and improve the quality of their
lives (de Visser, 2009: 9). The developmental characteristics are maximising social development and
economic growth, integrating and coordinating development planning, promoting a democratic
development, and building social capital at the local level to enable local solutions to development
challenges (de Visser, 2009; Madumo, 2012). It is without doubt that local government have a
developmental role as envisaged by the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 and the
construction of a developmental state. Hence Nkuna (2011) posed a question: “if municipalities within
the whole country fulfil the requirements of being developmental, why would it be impossible for South
Africa to contextualise its notion of being a developmental state”? With South African municipalities
facing challenges to fulfil their developmental mandate, calling them to facilitate the realisation of a
developmental state is rather too ambitious, simplistic and a superficial notion. The Constitution of the
Republic of South Africa, 1996 in terms of section 153 requires all municipalities to promote
developmental duties through the execution of a developmental mandate to ensure effective and
efficient management of its administration, budgeting and planning in order to promote socio-
economic development. The primary focus should be on correcting the ills existing within the realm of
municipalities such as corruption, service delivery backlogs, unemployment, economic growth and
rural development. According to Madumo (2012), this can be achieved by arming municipal human
capital with the tools to enhance personal development. That would ensure that employees can play a
role in encouraging municipalities to implement particular characteristics associated with the
developmental state theory. However, the challenge confronting South Africa towards the realisation
of a developmental state according to Nkuna (2011) is the emulation where attempts are always
made to compare developmental states to the successes of Asian countries while the South African
contextualisation is ignored. As a sphere closer to the people, the role of local government should
focus on the delivery of quality services to the citizenry.

The most pressing challenge in a ploy to ensuring South Africa becomes a developmental state
through local government is the anomaly and little understanding of the institutional and societal
requirements of building such a state. In a constitutional democratic state such as that of society,
elements of a democratic state particularly those ushered through local government will infringe
constitutional rights (van Dijk & Croucamp, 2007). This would require authoritarian, silent, and weak
civil society in an era where the country has experienced an alarming rates of social protests
commonly labelled service delivery protests. There still exist a lot of inconsistencies on the advocacy
of a developmental state through local government due to the failure of municipalities to execute their developmental mandates. Pushing a developmental state in South Africa is contradictory as it calls for active and influential intervention of the state to the market and the requirements of powerful and insulated bureaucracies.

The National Development Plan (NDP) Aiming for a Developmental, Capable and Ethical State

The National Development Plan (NDP) as a policy to move South Africa foresees the accomplishment of a capable and developmental state. Developmental states are usually related with high economic growth, poverty reduction, and job creation. One of the questions that this paper can pose is; whether the ambitions of the NDP should be driven by local governments using the bottom-up approach? Or whether the NDP for the realisation of a developmental state should be a bigger project of the national government? Developmental states in the East Asia are seen as replicas for South Africa to imitate. The notion of the developmental state is protruding in policy deliberations regarding unemployment, inequality and poverty. In the African National Congress (ANC) led government the crucial guiding impression in debating the character of government in addressing these problems. In 2012 the NDP proposed the intent to transmute the South African state into a “capable and developmental state able to intervene to correct our historical inequities…” (Minister Manuel, foreword to the NDP).

It was necessary that the ANC and government through the National Planning Commission (NPC) came up with a different approach in the form of the NDP. The plan was therefore launched as a proposal for future socio-economic development policy for South Africa. The NDP bids for a long-term vision for a country to be realised by the year 2030 and aims to ensure amongst other things; safe and reliable public transport. A capable and a developmental state is only to be realised through the willingness and commitment by government to dedicate resources towards the course. Through the plan the government further aim for infrastructure investment to assist in the realisation of a developmental, capable and ethical state that treats the citizens with dignity.

The NDP which was presented in 2012 by the NPC aimed at addressing poverty and inequalities aimed amongst others; public transport infrastructure investment which is viewed as imperative in achieving the 2030 developmental objectives. The NDP in this regard realises the important of accessing economic opportunities and social services to previously disadvantaged groups. Massive government spending in an attempt to address the South African transport infrastructure backlogs by the NDP should explicitly identify role players and funding methodologies instead of reliance on the private sector and taxpayer’s money.

A Shift towards a Progressive Model

South Africa is undoubtedly a major actor in the global economy with substantial industrial capacity but fails to grow performance particularly in the 21st century democratic dispensation (Evans, 2011: 13). With the country having an industrial capacity necessary as a critical element in a developmental state, the bottom-up approach where municipalities are seen as facilitators, the state could not
succeed. This is on the basis that industries are controlled by the market with government that could be capitalist in nature only playing a regulatory role rather than direct influence, thus hindering progress towards development. However it should be acknowledge that not all state-led development succeed (Dassah, 2011). A developmental state in South Africa as Penderis (2012) puts it; should strive for a bottom-up or grass roots approach of inclusivity. A developmental state driven through local government needs power that is bequeathed to local communities so that they participate in decision making. This allows the citizenry to take charge and have a sense of belonging and ownership over developmental programmes of their government. Although a progressive model could be a capitalist and autocratic form of government (Amowa, 2010), South Africa only focused on remedying the historical injustices and inequality (Evans, 2011) rather than focusing on growing the economy.

Although scholars can see it as controversial, Gumede (2010) does not see any relationship between democracy and lack thereof and a developmental state. The fact that local government must play a developmental role for the facilitation of a developmental state connotes that democratic principles such as participation by citizens, human rights and social inclusion must be inculcated. However, a democratic state should one which have state dominance and a disobedient civil society (Penderis, 2012). Many scholars posits that for South Africa to become a developmental state, they should aim for a democratic developmental state. Is this an approach way too different from the Asian Tigers? The answer could be yes since the Asian developmental states were autocratic and dictators. Of course many scholars caution against the use of the Asian template as the model for attaining a developmental states. Johnson also cautioned that the path the Asian Tigers took is not a mirror of true reflection but merely guidelines in reflection. Dassah (2011) claims that Botswana is one of the developmental states in Africa that did not necessarily followed an Asian model. A deduction can be made that Botswana is referred to as a developmental state merely because of a steady growth and consistency in economic growth. However, that should not be enough because challenges such as poverty, unemployment and better governance need to be curtailed first.

Conclusion

It can therefore be concluded that a developmental state through local government is certain. However, the adoption of a distinct or combined model with that of the Asian developmental states is not far-fetched. It must be acknowledged that a strong-tie relationship between the South African three tiers of government present another possibility in an attempt to constructing a capable developmental state. The relationship is necessary because local government in South Africa is tormented by both structural and institutional challenges which could curb it from playing the facilitating role. Of course without a developmental template from Asia, South Africa can become a developmental state under the conditions of a democratic society.

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Blended Pedagogies for Modern Development in South Africa: Challenges and Prospects for Success

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Abstract: Educational transformation through the adoption of blended pedagogies has taken international centre stage with the hope of encouraging adoption of e-pedagogies. Arguably, blended pedagogies can be used effectively to acquire knowledge necessary for modern development and participation in the knowledge economy. In South Africa, the Western Cape Province invested in e-pedagogies rather than blending as part of its pursuit of modern development. However, evidence suggest that this educational transformation comes with challenges mostly associated with the inability of teachers and learners to use the e-infrastructure effectively due to absence of e-culture and e-skills. Often, the majority of teachers and learners lack the minimum levels of e-culture and computer and information literacy which are necessary requirements for successful adoption of blended pedagogies. This paper argues that the limited use or lack of e-infrastructure in teaching and learning is to a large extent blamed on absence of e-culture and e-skills necessary for blended pedagogies; and, that the Western Cape Province is not an exception. Theoretically, e-culture and e-skills, among others, are the necessary preconditions that determine the readiness of teachers and learners to adopt blended pedagogies. The paper concludes that e-infrastructure which is assumed to provide sufficient and necessary conditions for educational transformation through e-learning for modern development, is seldom used for the intended purpose due to challenges related to the absence of e-culture and e-skills among teachers and learners.

Keywords: Blended pedagogies; Modern development; Conventional didactics; Western Cape Province; South Africa

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Introduction

Overwhelmingly, literature attest to the notion that the production of services based on intellectual capacities has thrust knowledge economy at the centre of modern development (Powell and Snellman, 2004; Garrison and Vaughan, 2008; Youtie and Shapira, 2008; Deltsidou, Voltyraki, Mastrogiannis and Noula, 2010; Marginson, 2010; Ecampus, 2011; Farkas and Török, 2011; Garrison, 2011; Button, Harrington and Belan 2014; Gu, Shao, Guo and Lim, 2015; Ramoroka and Tsheola, 2015; Valtonen, Kukkonen, Kontkanen, Sormunen, Dillon and Sointu, 2015). Indeed, knowledge economy relies heavily on intellectual capabilities, rather than on physical inputs, that are predicated upon human capital and natural resources in order to shape industrial mass production necessary for the modern global development process (Powell and Snellman, 2004; Marginson, 2010; Farkas and Török, 2011; Pruet, Ang and Farzin, 2014). The intellectual capabilities needed for the knowledge economy include analytical, interactive and computing skills, among others, which take effect through the use of Information and Communication Technology (ICT). Therefore, flexible and multi-skilled human resources with high level digital skills and expertise, acquired through formal education, are necessary for the achievement of the goals associated with modern development. To this extent, global knowledge economy as well as advancements in educational ICT bear crucial implications for teaching and learning informatics (Garrison and Vaughan, 2008; Youtie and Shapira, 2008; Deltsidou, Voltyraki, Mastrogiannis and Noula, 2010; Marginson, 2010; Ecampus, 2011; Garrison, 2011; Mdlongwa, 2012; Button, Harrington and Belan, 2014; Gu, Shao, Guo, and Lim, 2015; Valtonen, Kukkonen, Kontkanen, Sormunen, Dillon and Sointu, 2015; Ramoroka and Tsheola, 2015). For all intents and purposes, ICT epitomizes educational innovation, globalisation, connectivity, global integratedness and national development (Peeraer and Van Petegem, 2015). But this strategic linkage is not automatic, it requires dedicated interventions for inculcation specific e-culture and e-skills among both teachers and learners.

Understandably, governments across the world, in both developing and developed countries, have made significant resources and effort investments in education technology (Teo, 2011; Al-Mansour and Al-Shorman, 2012; Ertmer, Ottenbreit-Leftwich, Sadik, Senddurur, and Sendurur, 2012; Kirkwood and Price, 2013; Peeraer and Van Petegem, 2015; Ramoroka and Tsheola, 2015; Webster and Son 2015). In South Korea, there has been substantial investments in ICT for teaching and learning especially between 1978 and 2001 as an attempt to “modernise and globalise the education system” (Webster and Son, 2015: 84). Investments were channelled towards ICT infrastructure, teacher training and research promotion in schools which enforcing change in the name of the Ministry of Education and Human Resources Development to the Ministry of Education, Science and Technology (Webster and Son, 2015). Notwithstanding the efforts and investments by the Korean government and universities, which are a reflection of the increasing interests in the improvement of pedagogy, the majority of trained teachers still did not use technology in their didactic methods (Webster and Son, 2015). The limited use of ICT in teaching and learning is to a large extent blamed on lack of support to teachers during the implementation phase as well as unavailability of time required for blended didactic methods preparation and application. Thus, one of the major challenges has been the
integration of ICT into the existing curriculum. Additionally, some challenges were associated with societal perceptions about the adverse effects of technology on learners’ psychological well-being and degrading of social and cultural morals (Webster and Son, 2015). Similarly, Vietnam aimed to go beyond ICT access and skills development in order to integrate digital technology in education as a tool to encourage creative learning (Peeraer and Van Petegem, 2015). However, the country faced challenges associated with the integration of digital technology in education despite efforts and guidelines invested for the same reasons for over a decade (Peeraer and Van Petegem, 2015). The ICT-related infrastructure and resources, which are assumed to provide sufficient and necessary conditions for educational transformation in most of the schools in Vietnam, are seldom used for the intended purpose. Instead of using ICT to promote blended didactic methods, the majority of teachers who are comfortable with the use of technology replace the traditional methods with the modern ones (Peeraer and Van Petegem, 2015). Thus, the adoption of digital technology in education for national development in South Korea and Vietnam has faltered regardless of investments in improving access to technologies and teachers’ and students’ informatics skills. With this experience in mind, questions should be asked of challenges and prospects of success in a democratic South Africa.

South Africa has jumped onto the bandwagon of blending e-learning pedagogies with conventional didactics (Bialobrzeska and Cohen, 2005; Jacobs, 2013) in the hope of engendering a knowledge economy-driven modern national development. As early as 2004, the South African government set ambitious targets that should be achieved by 2013 as a response to the need for integration of digital technology in education (Department of Education, 2004; National Planning Commission, 2012). The targets include, among others, that by 2013 “all schools will have access to a networked computer facility for teaching and learning, and to high quality educational resources”; and, that “all schools, teachers and learners will be confident and competent users of ICT, and ICTs will be integrated into teaching and learning at all schools” (Bialobrzeska and Cohen, 2005: 14). However, reality has not matched policy intentions, especially as some provinces embarked on substitution rather than blending. South Africa has not as yet met its “ambitious” national development targets and the majority of schools are still without educational ICT such as networked computer facilities, quality educational resources or confident and competent users (NPC, 2012). Following the adoption of the National Development Plan 2030 in 2012, some of South Africa’s provinces fervently pursued implementation of digital technologies in education in the hope of preparing society for participation in the knowledge economy and modern process of development. For instance, Gauteng Province took a lead on January 14, 2015 in the so-called the Big Switch-On Pilot Project, officially launched with the distribution of 88 000 tablets to seven schools (South Africa.Info, 2015a). This move appears to have agitated for provincial competition for championing South Africa’s integration of digital technology in education, as attested to by the recent pronouncement from the Western Cape. This paper seeks, therefore, to interrogate the challenges and prospects of South Africa’s establishing the necessary and sufficient e-skills and e-culture for engagement of the global knowledge economy for national development, amidst the evident rush towards substitution rather than blending of pedagogies. It is in this context that this paper consists of five section inclusive of the introduction and
the conclusion. The next section discusses the discrepancies of e-learning and conventional didactics that impact on blending pedagogies.

**E-Learning versus Conventional Didactics**

E-learning pedagogies are guided by a number of principles to ensure their success and appropriate contribution to national development and participation in knowledge economy. The principles include: matching and integrating of digital technologies with the existing curriculum, facilitating learners’ engagement and participation, encouraging collaborative learning and providing innovative approaches, coherence, consistency and transparency as well as practical application (Teo, 2011; Al-Mansour and Al-Shorman, 2012; Ertmer et al., 2012; Kirkwood and Price, 2013; Pegrum et al., 2013; Button et al., 2014; Peeraer and Van Petegem, 2015; Wolff et al., 2014; Glušac et al., 2015; Gu et al., 2015; Kearney et al., 2015; Valtonen et al., 2015; Webster and Son 2015). Whereas not a panacea to all knowledge acquisition, there is value in establishing e-learning pedagogies for participation in the knowledge economy and promotion of national development. However, e-learning pedagogies must have clear objectives aligned to subject content, in order to be appropriate to both teachers’ and learners’ didactic and knowledge acquisition activities as well as to complement assessments (Button et al., 2014; Peeraer and Van Petegem, 2015; Webster and Son 2015). Eventually, e-pedagogies are thought to encourage learners’ engagement and participation in ways that enhance personal control of knowledge acquisition (Gu et al., 2015; Kearney et al., 2015; Valtonen et al., 2015). They are assumed to be innovative and fit for purpose, giving both teachers and learners the opportunity to improve their creativeness, imaginativeness and analytical skills (Al-Mansour and Al-Shorman, 2012; Glušac et al., 2015; Gu et al., 2015). Further, e-learning pedagogies’ design, openness and accountability are presented as internally coherent and consistent in terms of the objectives, content, learner activity and assessment (Glušac et al., 2015; Gu et al., 2015). Whereas e-learning approaches and methods should be easy and fun to use for both teachers and learners, their practical application to knowledge acquisition cannot be left to chance; instead, it requires specific planning, governance, infrastructure and at most culture and skills.

Conversely, conventional didactics involve traditional routes of learning wherein learners are, generally, rendered passive whilst teachers professed all knowledge (Gu et al., 2015; Kearney et al., 2015; Ramoroka and Tsheola, 2015; Valtonen et al., 2015). Arguably, conventional didactics offer the level and standard of education that largely deny learners the opportunity to compete in the knowledge economy arena (Pruet et al., 2014). The intellectual capabilities needed for knowledge economy, inclusive of analytical, interactive and computing skills, among others, cannot be acquired through conventional didactics alone (Pegrum et al., 2013; Button et al., 2014; Peeraer and Van Petegem, 2015; Wolff et al., 2014; Glušac et al., 2015; Gu et al., 2015; Kearney et al., 2015; Valtonen et al., 2015). Apparently, conventional didactics engenders learners boredom and inattentiveness in class, poor performance in assessments, and even dropping out of school (Subramanian et al., 2012; Littlewood et al., 2013; Wolff et al., 2014; Gu et al., 2015). However, this claim should not suggest a complete replacement of conventional didactics and a remiss drift to the envisioned pureness of
digital pedagogies because the face-to-face model remains necessary for personal development. The subsequent section provides a brief background of the Western Cape’s Smart Classrooms Project. The reality though is that learners acquire knowledge in different ways which include seeing and hearing, reflecting and acting, reasoning logically and intuitively, as well as drawing (Pegrum et al., 2013; Button et al., 2014; Button et al., 2014; Peeraer and Van Petegem, 2015; Wolff et al., 2014; Glušac et al., 2015; Gu et al., 2015; Kearney et al., 2015; Valtonen et al., 2015).

The extent to which learners learn is largely influenced by compatibility of their learning styles and teachers’ didactic methods (Pegrum et al., 2013; Button et al., 2014; Button et al., 2014; Peeraer and Van Petegem, 2015; Wolff et al., 2014; Glušac et al., 2015; Gu et al., 2015; Kearney et al., 2015; Ramoroka and Tsheola, 2015; Valtonen et al., 2015). Additionally, lack of integration of digital technology in teaching and learning compromises ICT skills development of both teachers and learners which are now paramount in global capitalist development (Pegrum et al., 2013; Peeraer and Van Petegem, 2015; Wolff et al., 2014; Glušac et al., 2015; Gu et al., 2015). The bases for e-learning and conventional didactics are stalkily divergent; and, it is more convenient to replace rather than blend in reality. The infrastructure, culture and skills necessary for the application of each of these pedagogies are in some cases contradictory. For this reason, blended pedagogies invoke deliberate governance that seeks to bridge the apparent and deep discrepancies, beyond mere provision of the e-infrastructure, in order to create appropriate culture and skills. What are the prospects of a democratic South Africa’s attaining such as a culture and skills for blended pedagogies?

**Blending E-Learning with Conventional Didactics**

There is cognitive convergence on the idea that e-learning should not necessarily replace the conventional didactics (Button et al., 2014; Wolff et al., 2014), even among those digital technology fanatics. As a result, there has been a shift towards blended learning, which integrates conventional didactics with the online teaching and e-learning model (Garrison and Vaughan, 2008; Button et al., 2014; Wolff et al., 2014). But blending e-learning pedagogies with conventional didactics comes with challenges (Valtonen, Dillon, Hacklin and Väisänen, 2010; Valtonen, Pöntinen, Kukkonen, Dillon, Väisänen and Hacklin, 2011; Valtonen, Hacklin, Kontkanen, Hartikainen-Ahia, Kärkkäinen and Kukkonen, 2013; Noh et al., 2014; Glušac et al., 2015; Valtonen et al., 2015) because the preconditions impose rigid determinant for successful transformation. In the present world, the majority of educational systems are characterised by rigidities of adherence to conventional didactics (Peeraer and Van Petegem, 2015; Valtonen et al., 2015; Webster and Son, 2015). Hence, even developed countries that are endowed with state-of-the-art ICT infrastructure have equally continued to struggle to blend e-learning pedagogies with conventional didactics (Peeraer and Van Petegem, 2015; Valtonen et al., 2015; Webster and Son, 2015). That is, infrastructure is not necessarily a sufficient condition for precipitating successful blending of e-learning pedagogies with conventional didactics. Instead, the collective of preconditions, inclusive of planning, governance, infrastructure, culture and skills, is critical for successful blending of e-learning pedagogies with conventional didactics (Noh et al., 2014; Pruet et al., 2014; Gu et al., 2015; Mohammadi, 2015) as well as
productive engagement of the knowledge economy and global capitalism for national development. However, this paper focuses only one-culture and e-skills as preconditions for successful blending. These preconditions are discussed in the two subsequent subsections.

**E-culture for Blended Pedagogies**

The implementation of e-learning requires understanding of different contexts of both teachers and learners related to values, knowledge, experience, language and symbols, attitudes and notion of time collectively denoted culture (Warschauer and Ames, 2010; Mdlongwa, 2012; Viriyapong and Hartfield, 2013; Aesaert and Van Braak, 2014; Pruet et al., 2014). Evidence reveals that the main failure of the usage of digital technologies in education is mostly related to the ignorance of e-culture of both teachers and learners (Warschauer and Ames, 2010; Viriyapong and Hartfield, 2013; Pruet et al., 2014). Apparently, the focus is on delivery of the new technology without considering people's needs, e-culture and how they will use the technology (Warschauer and Ames, 2010). In education, it may be that teachers and learners in developed countries or urban areas use digital technology differently from those in developing countries or rural areas (Pruet et al., 2014). Thus, values, knowledge, experience, language and symbols, attitudes and notion of time towards the use of digital technology are important factors that can be used to determine the level of e-culture necessary for the implementation and success of the adoption of ICT in education (Warschauer and Ames, 2010; Viriyapong and Hartfield, 2013; Pruet et al., 2014; Aesaert and Van Braak, 2014; Erdogdu and Erdogdu, 2015; Glušac et al., 2015). To this extent, a specific degree of societal e-culture is necessary for successful blending of pedagogies because schools cannot transform in isolation from society itself. Such a broad societal culture instils specific values that are crucial to the prospects of blended pedagogies.

Values in terms of teaching and learning styles are crucial to the success of educational ICT for national development. Seemingly, teachers and learners who are in favour of auditory, visual and high competitive teaching and learning styles are more likely to use digital technologies in pedagogy than those who are not (Aesaert and Van Braak, 2014; Pruet et al., 2014; Glušac et al., 2015). Instead, access to and the use of ICT determines the level of knowledge and experience that the teachers and learners hold for the successful application of e-learning environment. Accordingly, teachers and learners who had the privilege to access and use ICT before are more likely to succeed in the adoption of educational digital technology due to the knowledge and experience they possess (Warschauer and Ames, 2010; Viriyapong and Hartfield, 2013; Pruet et al., 2014; Aesaert and Van Braak, 2014; Erdogdu and Erdogdu, 2015; Glušac et al., 2015). But these prospects are intricately dependant on the household culture as the values would be unsustainable if applied in isolation of the overall social milieu. Thus, language and symbols, which are reproduced through societal interactions and used in the digital world, are significant to the success integration of the educational ICT. Even though the e-language and e-symbols could potentially compromises learners’ ability to correctly spell words, it makes learning easy as they are more familiar with the codes used for communication (Erdogdu and Erdogdu, 2015; Glušac et al., 2015).
Teachers’ and learners’ attitudes towards ICT is another important factor to predict the successful adoption of digital technology in education (Pruet et al., 2014; Erdogdu and Erdogdu, 2015). Apparently, teachers and learners who “perceive computers and the internet as useful; who are less anxious to use computers and the internet; and who have more confidence about independent control with internet use” demonstrates high levels of acceptance of e-learning (Aesaert and Van Braak, 2014: 329). With regard to the notion of time towards the use of digital technology, most teachers and learners seemingly dedicate the majority of their time on personal communication to establish and maintain relationships, find information on various issues for entertainment and recreational purposes rather than formal education (Glušac et al., 2015; Erdogdu and Erdogdu, 2015). The time allocated for lessons and their preparations is then misused as a result of both teachers and learners’ cyberloafing. For these reasons, there is a need to question South Africa’s e-learning drive relating to the establishment of teachers’ and learners’ required levels of e-values, e-knowledge, e-experiences, e-language and e-symbols, e-attitudes and e-notion of time for blending pedagogies rather than replacement.

E-skills for Blended Pedagogies

E-learning requires, at the minimum, specific levels of computer and information literacy as well as pedagogic technological informatics. Computer literacy refers to “an understanding of the concepts, terminology and operations that relate to general computer use” (Computer Literacy USA, 2012 cited in Button et al., 2014: 1311). According to Bundy (2005 cited in Button et al., 2014: 1311), information literacy means the ability to recognize the need for information, to determine the extent of the need, to access it efficiently, to critically evaluate it and its sources, and to collect or generate, classify, store, manipulate, redraft and incorporate it into existing knowledge systems or base. Pedagogic technological informatics involve e-skills necessary for teachers to integrate teaching, computer and information sciences in their management and communication of data, information and knowledge in facilitation of learning (authors’ own formulation drawn from Button et al., 2014). Successful adoption of e-learning is, therefore, dependent upon the levels of computer and information literacy among teachers and learners (Button et al., 2014; Noh et al., 2014; Webster and Son, 2015). To be equipped with lifelong learning skills, teachers and learners need to be supported with ongoing education and informatics as current education methodologies and teaching strategies increasingly incorporate e-learning (Button et al., 2014; Gu et al., 2015). That is, the misplaced use of the ICT is a function of the degree to which society has developed the culture of lifelong learning. The latter will justify the costly investment in ICT.

The establishment of the e-learning environment requires among other things computer and information literacy related to internet skills and their use to retrieve information, which are largely conditional upon acquisition of costly personal computers and training (Elder and Koehn, 2009; Bond, 2010; Deltsidou et al., 2010; Button et al., 2014; Gu et al., 2015). Information literacy relating to e-skills of managing large volumes of data when conducting internet database searches are as important as
those for basic use of computer for information retrieval from the internet (Elder and Koehn, 2009; Bond, 2010; Deltsidou et al., 2010; Button et al., 2014; Gu et al., 2015). Thus, computer and information technology competences among teachers and learners are critical for the establishment of the e-learning environment (Button et al., 2014; Noh et al., 2014; Peerera and Van Petegem, 2015; Gu et al., 2015; Valtonen et al., 2015). For these reasons, e-learning entails costly interventions relating to financial, training and technical support for both teachers and learners (Moule, Ward and Lockyer, 2010; Nguyen, Zierler and Nguyen, 2011; Gu et al., 2015). Both computer and information literacy, which cannot be acquired by osmosis, are fundamental to technology informatics in teaching and learning (Bond, 2010; Button et al., 2014; Noh et al., 2014; Webster and Son, 2015). That is, teachers and learners alike require financial, technical and training support in order to acquire and improve their technology informatics, necessary for successful implementation of e-learning. Teachers and learners should be able to manage digital technology and information as well as being provided with the "opportunities for progressive development of ICT competence" (Button et al., 2014: 1320). More often than not, institutions prioritize acquisition and installation of computer hardware and software above teachers’ and learners’ technological training and incorporation in teaching and learning (Valtonen et al., 2010; Valtonen et al., 2011; Valtonen et al., 2013; Oyedemi, 2015; Valtonen et al., 2015; Webster and Son, 2015). Besides, e-learning informatics are in a continuous state of flux, implying that teachers and learners are challenged to keep up with the developments for the success of Smart Classrooms and Big Switch On Projects as driven by the Western Cape and Gauteng Province, respectively.

**Smart Classrooms: Replacement of Conventional Didactics Rather than Blended Pedagogies**

The recent e-learning hyperbole in a democratic South Africa and the apparent rush for substitution of conventional didactics with e-pedagogies, rather than blending, has to be rigorously examined for the readiness and appropriateness of the prevalent planning approach, governance model, infrastructure as well as culture and skills among teachers and learners. The adoption and implementation of e-learning pedagogies in South Africa cannot be tenably expected to be unproblematic. E-learning investments are driven through the National Development Plan 2030, which states that “by 2030 South Africans should have access to education and training of the highest quality, leading to significantly improved learning outcomes” (NPC, 2012: 296). Some of the requirements of this vision are that all schools must have well-functioning libraries, computer and media centres and high speed broadband which is readily available and incorporated into the design of educational systems (NPC, 2012). As a response to the aspirations of the NDP 2030, Minister of Finance, Nhlanhla Nene, proclaimed in his 2015 National Budget Speech that R29.6 billion and R1.1 billion is allocated for educational infrastructure grant and broadband connectivity, respectively (Nene, 2015). The allocated funds are meant to build and improve digital technology infrastructure and produce a future labour force that meets the requirements of the knowledge economy (Nene, 2015).

On its part, the Western Cape Province has invested in and planned to launch the so-called Smart Schools Project in July 2015 to improve the quality of teaching and learning through digital
technologies (Ramoroka and Tsheola, 2015; South Africa.Info, 2015). There is evidence that the provincial contestations for digital technology-champion in South Africa’s educational system is founded on replacement of conventional didactics with e-learning pedagogies, rather than blending (du Toit, 2015; Ramoroka and Tsheola, 2015; Rand Daily Mail, 2015; South Africa.Info, 2015). The dearth of conclusive affirmation of the success of blended pedagogies for participation in global knowledge economy and national development in other countries should be of concern to South Africa, especially given that the leading provinces have hoped for substitution rather than integration as provided for by the NDP 2030. Furthermore, effective adoption and usage of digital technologies for modern teaching and learning relies on several determinants that require adoption of specific planning approaches, governance models, infrastructure, and pedagogic technological informatics for both teachers and learners, especially transformation in societal culture and skills. These conditions are absent in a Democratic South Africa, implying that the challenges for implementation are greater than the prospects for success.

Conclusion
This paper demonstrated the linkages of blended pedagogies with modern national development through participation in knowledge economy. Internationally, evidence confirms that the use of digital technology for teaching and learning is not as unproblematic as South Africa appears to have assumed. The main concern remains the overdrive towards replacement of traditional didactics with modern technological ones instead of adoption of blended pedagogies. Seemingly, the replacement is due to lack of time allocated for lessons and their preparations as well as teachers’ and learners’ limited experience in the use of technology which leads to cyberloafing, among other challenges. Moreover, the absence of conclusive affirmation of the success of the adoption of digital technology in teaching and learning should also be of concern to South Africa. Theoretically, the adoption of digital technologies for modern teaching and learning is hindered by the absence of preconditions related to e-culture and e-skills. This paper concludes that the installation of e-infrastructure by itself does not serve the intended purposes when teachers and learners have e-culture and e-skills limitations. Installation of e-infrastructure by itself turns to encourage cyberloafing as teachers and learners use it for personal communication and search of private information rather than for the intended purposes in the absence of relevant societal values. To resolve these challenges, the paper suggests changes in the current e-culture and e-skills isolationism for teachers and learners, in order to embrace a broader supportive societal culture through language and symbols that are necessary and sufficient for the adoption of blended pedagogies, participation in global knowledge economy and the pursuit of modern development.

References


Abstract: This study empirically investigates the impact of human capital investment on export expansion in Indian economy over the period of 2000 to 2011. To examine the cause and effect relationship among selected dependent and independent variable, this study uses multivariable regression models. These models are estimated with the help of ordinary least square (OLS) technique. This study uses time series data from the period 2000-01 to 2011-12. The variables used in this study are primary product export, manufactured product export, total export, petroleum product export, investment on health and education. Investment on health and education are used as a proxy of human capital. The result indicates that Investment on human capital has positive effect on the export expansion of Indian economy.

Keywords: Export Expansion, Ordinary Least Square, Manufactured Product Export, Total Export, Petroleum Product Export, Investment, Education.

Human capital is one of the principal intangible assets of every developing and developed economy. To say, countries across the world vary due to the potentials and endowments of the quality of human resource. Investments on public education and health have positive effects on economic growth and it provides long term benefits for society. These positive results are in terms of long and healthy life, access to knowledge, decent standard of living, empowerment of women as well as the neglected

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poorer sections of the society etc. Though investments on education contributed indirectly to economic growth by reducing fertility, improving health and life expectancy, its positive outcome has major contribution in the path of sustainable growth of the economy. Low human capital is main obstacle for technology transfer and learning higher skills in developing countries. A higher educated and skilled workforce will able to adapt more quickly to the sophisticated technology which can bring rapid production changes and thereby higher exports of the country. It other words, higher capital stock is positively associated with the export capacity of domestic economy.

Investment on human capital increases the productivity, exports, foreign investment and gross domestic product. All these are significantly linked with economic development and it stimulate the future growth of an economy.

According to human development report prepared by UNDP the HDI value of India’s was 0.344 in 1980, it was increased to 0.547 in 2011 and a rank of 136 among 187 countries (Table 1). India lies in the medium Human development category.

**Table 1: Human development Indicators of India (2011)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Human Development Index Value (HDI)</th>
<th>0.344 (1980), 0.547 (2011)</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Literacy Rate (%)</td>
<td>74.04% (male 82.14%, female 65.46%)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Life Expectancy at Birth (in Years)</td>
<td>65.4</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Source: Economic Survey
Table 2: Trends in social services expenditure by central and state government (As Percentage to GDP & Total Expenditure)

<table>
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<tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total expenditure</td>
<td>26.37</td>
<td>28.41</td>
<td>28.59</td>
<td>27.52</td>
<td>28.07</td>
<td>28.28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Expenditure on social services</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>i). Education</td>
<td>5.91*</td>
<td>6.76*</td>
<td>6.89*</td>
<td>6.79*</td>
<td>6.89*</td>
<td>7.09*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>22.4</td>
<td>23.8</td>
<td>24.1</td>
<td>24.7</td>
<td>24.5</td>
<td>25.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ii). Health</td>
<td>1.27*</td>
<td>1.32*</td>
<td>1.36*</td>
<td>1.29*</td>
<td>1.29*</td>
<td>1.36*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>4.8</td>
<td>4.6</td>
<td>4.8</td>
<td>4.7</td>
<td>4.6</td>
<td>4.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>iii). Other</td>
<td>2.05*</td>
<td>2.56*</td>
<td>2.49*</td>
<td>2.37*</td>
<td>2.35*</td>
<td>2.42*</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>7.8</td>
<td>9.0</td>
<td>8.7</td>
<td>8.6</td>
<td>8.4</td>
<td>8.6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Economic survey 2012-13

* As Percentage to GDP

Above table shows that expenditure on social services as proportion of total expenditure has increased from 22.4% in 2007-08 to 25.1% in 2012-13. Expenditure on education as a percentage of GDP has increased from 2.59% in 2007-08 to 3.31% in 2012-13. Health expenditure as percentage of GDP increased from 1.27% in 2007-08 to 1.36% in 2012-13. Total expenditure on social services as percentage of GDP increased from 26.37% in 2007-08 to 28.28% in 2012-13. Apart from this introduction, this paper is divided into four sections. Section two discusses the previous studies related to relationship between human capital and export growth, source of data and methodology, while section three analyzes the impact of human capital and export expansion, section four discusses the conclusion and suggestions.

Review of Literature, Objectives, Hypothesis, Data Sources, Model Specification and Estimate Technique

Review of Literature
A lot of studies have been done on the different areas of human capital and export expansion at national and international level. A few studies have been taken for review: Tuomas (1993) examined the dynamic effects of trade on human capital accumulation in developing countries. This study found that a favorable change in the terms of trade, the rate of growth may still rise as compared to the autarky level. Trade has adverse effects on the production structure in the LDC. Trade changes the production structure toward low-tech goods and lowers the factor price of human capital. This, in turn, lowers the rate of investment in education which, over time, shows up in a decreasing level of human capital relative to the rest of the world.
Gould and Ruffin (1995) studied the impact of human capital into its role as an input to production and relationship between growth and the external effects of human capital. This study found that when literacy rates were relatively high, open economies experience growth rates about 0.65 to 1.72 percentage points higher than closed economies.

Chuang (2000), studied the direction of causality among human capital accumulation, exports and economic growth in Taiwan during the period 1952 to 1995. This study found that there was positive relationship between human capital accumulation and exports. There was unidirectional causality between these two variables and its run from human capital accumulation to exports growth.

Brempong, K. (2004), investigated the impact of health human capital on the growth rate of per capita income in African and OECD countries. This study used solow growth mode, panel data and dynamic panel estimator. The result revealed that the growth rate of per capita income was strongly and positively influenced by the investment in health human capital.

Narayan and Smyth (2004), examined the causality among exports, human capital and real income in China during 1960 to 1999. The result revealed that there was bidirectional causal relation between human capital and real exports of country.

Farok and Mudambi (2008) examined the performance of human capital and export performance. This study analyzed how the export performance of 25 nations, in services and manufactures, over a 14 year period, was affected by: Human capital indicators, IT infrastructure, business environment indicators, and wage levels. Testing the effect of human capital on exports led to a number of key insights. First, human capital investment has a significant effect on both services and goods exports. Secondly, contrary to conventional wisdom, human capital investment is not significantly more important for services exports than for goods exports. The argument about the relative effect of human capital on services exports and goods exports may be better addressed by examining regional differences and differences in the level of development.

Afzal et al. (2009), examine both the short-run and long-run dynamic relationships among economic growth, human development and exports in Pakistan. This study employed annual time series of real gross domestic product (RGDP), real exports (RX), physical capital (PC) and human development (HD) in Pakistan for the period 1970-71 to 2008-09. The statistical results and their analysis supported the ‘growth-driven exports hypothesis’.

Tsai and Harriott (2010), analyzed how the various compositions of human capital affect the economic growth during the periods 1999-2006 in 24 classified as developed and 36 as developing countries. Human capital measured in terms of percentage of tertiary graduates in agriculture human capital (AGR); high-tech human capital (TECH); the business and service human capital (SERVICE); the humanities human capital (HUMAN); and health and welfare human capital (HEALTH). The empirical results indicated that high-tech human capital was significantly positively correlated with economic
growth. This study also found that the tertiary education significantly influence economic growth in developed and developing countries.

**Objective of the Paper:**
The main objective of this paper is to investigate relationship between Human capital and export growth in India. We want to empirically investigate the effect of human capital on exports of primary products, manufactured products, petroleum products and total exports of Indian economy during the period 2000-01 to 2011-12.

**Hypothesis**
We have proposed the following hypothesis for this study:
H0: There is no significant effect of human capital on export growth.

**Data Sources**
This study employs investigative and empirical methods to analyze the relationship between human capital and export growth in India in the last 12 years. We use education expenditure and health expenditure as a proxy of human capital. The data from 2000-2011 has been collected from Economic Survey and Handbook of Statistics on the Indian Economy publication of the RBI.

**Model Specification**
The model for the study is specified as:

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{LOG (TOX)} &= \alpha_0 + \alpha_1 \text{EDU} + \alpha_2 \text{HL} + \mu_1 \\
\text{LOG (PRP)} &= \alpha_0 + \alpha_1 \text{EDU} + \alpha_2 \text{HL} + \mu_1 \\
\text{LOG (MANP)} &= \alpha_0 + \alpha_1 \text{EDU} + \alpha_2 \text{HL} + \mu_1 \\
\text{LOG (PEPT)} &= \alpha_0 + \alpha_1 \text{EDU} + \alpha_2 \text{HL} + \mu_1
\end{align*}
\]

TOX : TOTAL EXPORTS
EDU: EDUCATION EXPENDITURE
HL: HEALTH EXPENDITURE
MANP: MANUFACTURED PRODUCT EXPORTS
PEPT: PETROLEUM PRODUCT EXPORTS
PRP: PRIMARY PRODUCT EXPORTS

\( \alpha \) and \( \beta \) are the parameters of the intercept and slopes of the coefficients, while \( \mu \) represents other variables that could have lent further explanation to explained variables but not included in the model.

**Estimation Technique**
The modern econometric approach for analyzing the relationship is employed. We adopted ordinary least square regression (OLS) for analyzing above models.
REGRESSION RESULTS

The computation of the model parameter is based on the data shown in the table 3 to 7.

Table: 3 Descriptive Analyses of Data

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>PRP</th>
<th>MANP</th>
<th>PEPT</th>
<th>OTH</th>
<th>TOX</th>
<th>EDU</th>
<th>HL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mean</td>
<td>89563.77</td>
<td>404536.2</td>
<td>86671.58</td>
<td>26409.50</td>
<td>609083.0</td>
<td>79.18</td>
<td>469.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Median</td>
<td>80793.00</td>
<td>352761.0</td>
<td>68026.50</td>
<td>12518.00</td>
<td>514098.5</td>
<td>58.07</td>
<td>135.08</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maximum</td>
<td>218404.0</td>
<td>895125.0</td>
<td>265819.0</td>
<td>84633.00</td>
<td>1459281.0</td>
<td>166.97</td>
<td>2110.29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minimum</td>
<td>19322.19</td>
<td>156858.0</td>
<td>8542.000</td>
<td>5600.00</td>
<td>203571.0</td>
<td>41.86</td>
<td>53.07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Std. Dev.</td>
<td>57975.73</td>
<td>235451.9</td>
<td>81724.40</td>
<td>28439.05</td>
<td>398677.50</td>
<td>44.70</td>
<td>631.31</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Researcher's own calculation

Table 3 presents the descriptive statistics of the data used in the empirical analysis. This table shows the mean, maximum, minimum and standard deviation of PRP (primary product exports), MANP (manufactured product exports), PEPT (petroleum product exports), OTH (other exports), TOX (total exports), EDU (education expenditure) and HL (health expenditure). The value of PRP averaged 89563.77 crores between 2000-01 to 2011-12. It varied from a minimum of 19322.19 crores in 2002 to a maximum of 218404.0 in 2011-12. The value of MANP averaged 404536.2 between 2000 to 2011-12 and varied from a minimum of 156858.0 crores in 2000 to a maximum of 895125.0 crores in 2011-12. The value of PEPT averaged 86671.58 crores between 2000 to 2011-12. It varied from a minimum of 8542 crores in 2000 to a maximum of 265819 crores in 2011-12. The value of OTH averaged 26409.50 crores between 2000 to 2011-12 and varied from a minimum of 5600.0 crores in 2001 to a maximum of 84633.0 crores in 2010-11. The value of TOX averaged 609083.0 crores between 2000 to 2011-12. It varied from a minimum of 203571.0 crores in 2000 to a maximum of 1459281.crores in 2011-12.


Model : 1

\[ \text{LOG (TOX)} = \alpha_0 + \alpha_1 \text{EDU} + \alpha_2 \text{HL} + \mu \]

Dependent variable: TOTAL EXPORTS
Independent variable: EDUCATION EXPENDITURE(EDU), HEALTH EXPENDITURE(HL)

The regression results are presented in tables 4 to 7 respectively. All selected parameters of this study are in logarithms form. The result reported in table 2 indicates that education and health expenditure have positive association with total exports of country. The regression coefficient of
Table 4: Regression Result

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Coefficient</th>
<th>Std. Error</th>
<th>t-Statistic</th>
<th>Prob.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>C</td>
<td>9.689738</td>
<td>1.010661</td>
<td>9.587526</td>
<td>0.0000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LOG(EDU)</td>
<td>0.313429</td>
<td>0.414694</td>
<td>0.755809</td>
<td>0.4691</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LOG(HL)</td>
<td>0.386752</td>
<td>0.170394</td>
<td>2.269749</td>
<td>0.0494</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

R-squared | 0.842125 | F-statistic | 24.00353  |
Adjusted R-squared | 0.807041 | Prob(F-statistic) | 0.000247 |

Source: Researcher’s own calculation.

Education shows that a 10% increase in education expenditure leads to 3.13% increase in total exports. On another side 10% increase in health expenditure leads to 3.86% increase in total exports, the positive impact of health expenditure is more than education expenditure on total exports. The t-value of independent variables shows that the observed relationship between dependent and independent variables is significant at 5% significance level in case of health expenditure and insignificant in case of education expenditure. The F-test for the model also indicates it is highly significant, F = 24.00 at sig F= .0002. The R² value is 0.84 which shows that 84% of the variation in total exports is explained by the independent variables education and health expenditure.

Model : 2

\[ \text{LOG} \ (PRP) = \alpha_0 + \alpha_1 \text{EDU} + \alpha_2 \text{HL} + \mu_1 \]

Dependent variable: PRIMARY PRODUCTS EXPORTS

Independent variable: EDUCATION EXPENDITURE (EDU), HEALTH EXPENDITURE (HL)

Table 5 Regression Result

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Coefficient</th>
<th>Std. Error</th>
<th>t-Statistic</th>
<th>Prob.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>C</td>
<td>7.419545</td>
<td>1.492303</td>
<td>4.971875</td>
<td>0.0008</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LOG(EDU)</td>
<td>0.486838</td>
<td>0.612321</td>
<td>0.795070</td>
<td>0.4470</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LOG(HL)</td>
<td>0.313106</td>
<td>0.251598</td>
<td>1.244469</td>
<td>0.02448</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R-squared</td>
<td>0.705831</td>
<td>F-statistic</td>
<td>10.79731</td>
<td>0.004062</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adjusted R-squared</td>
<td>0.640460</td>
<td>Prob(F-statistic)</td>
<td>0.004062</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Researcher’s own calculation.

Table 5 shows the results of relationship among primary product exports and human capital in India. The regression coefficients of education and health expenditure both shows that there are positive impacts of these two independent variables (health and education) on primary product exports. The regression coefficient of education shows that a 10% increase in education expenditure leads to 4.86% increase in primary product exports. The regression coefficient of health expenditure indicates that a 10% increase in health expenditure leads 3.31% increase in primary product exports. The results of t-statistics show that only one independent variable is significant at 5% significance level. The value of coefficient of determination is 0.70, it implies that 70% variation in dependent variable occur due to independent variables.
Model : 3

\[ \text{LOG (MANP)} = \alpha_0 + \alpha_1 \text{EDU} + \alpha_2 \text{HL} + \mu_1 \]

**Dependent variable:** MANUFACTURED PRODUCTS EXPORTS

**Independent variable:** EDUCATION EXPENDITURE (EDU), HEALTH EXPENDITURE (HL)

**Table 6: Regression Result**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Coefficient</th>
<th>Std. Error</th>
<th>t-Statistic</th>
<th>Prob.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>C</td>
<td>9.766996</td>
<td>0.839109</td>
<td>11.63972</td>
<td>0.0000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LOG(EDU)</td>
<td>0.252527</td>
<td>0.344303</td>
<td>0.733444</td>
<td>0.4820</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LOG(HL)</td>
<td>0.352856</td>
<td>0.141471</td>
<td>2.494194</td>
<td>0.0342</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R-squared</td>
<td>0.858853</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adjusted R-squared</td>
<td>0.827487</td>
<td>Prob(F-statistic)</td>
<td>0.000149</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Researcher’s own calculation.

From regression coefficients of independent variables it is clear that there are minimum positive relationship between manufacturing product exports and human capital. According to the result, a 10% change in education expenditure led to 2.52% increases in manufacturing product exports while a 10% change in health expenditure led to 3.52% increases in manufacturing product exports. The positive effect is high and significant in case of health expenditure. The F-test for the model also indicates it is significant, \( F = 27.38 \) at sig F= .000. This result of the t-test for the significance of individual independent indicates that the t-test for the significance of individual independent variable indicates that only one independent variable is statistically significant at 5% significance level in the model. From the above regression result, it is found that coefficient of determination is about 0.85. This implies that about 85% of the total variation in manufacturing product exports is explained independent variables. The remaining 15% left unaccounted for by the model is attributed to the error term.

**Model : 4**

\[ \text{LOG (PEPT)} = \alpha_0 + \alpha_1 \text{EDU} + \alpha_2 \text{HL} + \mu_1 \]

**Dependent variable:** PETROLEUM PRODUCTS EXPORTS

**Independent variable:** EDUCATION EXPENDITURE (EDU), HEALTH EXPENDITURE (HL)

**Table 7: Regression Result**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Coefficient</th>
<th>Std. Error</th>
<th>t-Statistic</th>
<th>Prob.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>C</td>
<td>4.670794</td>
<td>2.423956</td>
<td>1.926930</td>
<td>0.0861</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LOG(EDU)</td>
<td>0.669512</td>
<td>0.994596</td>
<td>0.673150</td>
<td>0.5178</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LOG(HL)</td>
<td>0.607330</td>
<td>0.408671</td>
<td>1.486108</td>
<td>0.1714</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R-squared</td>
<td>0.729878</td>
<td></td>
<td>F-statistic</td>
<td>12.15916</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adjusted R-squared</td>
<td>0.669851</td>
<td>Prob(F-statistic)</td>
<td>0.002767</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Researcher’s own calculation.
The regression coefficient of independent variables are positive. This show that a 10% increase in health and education expenditure leads to 6.69% and 6.07% increase respectively, in petroleum product exports in India. The F-test for the model also indicates it is significant, $F = 12.15$ at sig $F = .002$. The $R^2$ value is 0.72 which shows that 72% of the variation in petroleum product exports is explained by the independent variables.

CONCLUSION AND SUGGESTIONS

The purpose of this study was to examine the impact of human capital on the export growth in India for the period 2000-01 to 2011-12. From the above results and analysis it is found that Exports of all three selected products has increased with increased in human capital (education and health expenditure). From regression results it was clear that there was high, positive and significant impact of health expenditure on total exports and manufactured exports of Indian economy. Education expenditure has highly positive impact on primary product exports and petroleum product exports during the study period. On the basis of above analysis, it is suggested that government should give more raise the amount of health and education expenditure. It should be range between 7% to 8% of GDP. It will generate more skilled, more efficient and more productive workforce in the economy. By this they can able to certainly handled productive assets in better way and enhance productivity, exports and growth of economy.

References


Public Health Seeking Behavior and Poverty Status of Rural Household Heads: A Case of Ijebu North-East Local Government Area of Ogun State

S. A. Oyekale¹, O.W.Olowa², O.A. Olowa³, and O.S. Aina⁴

Abstract: The study was embarked upon to determine the factors that influence public health care seeking behavior based on the poverty status of households in rural areas. Both Primary and Secondary data were employed. The primary data were collected with well-structured questionnaire while the secondary data was gotten from the local government records. Benefit incidence analysis and Multinomial Regression model used were to determine whether the poor benefit from government expenditure on health and the factors that influence household behavior in seeking health care. The results showed that majority of the households were male-headed with average age of 40 years, married, educated and live below the poverty line. The most preferred place of seeking medical services was government hospital and the common ailment among the household was malaria. The mean expenditure of the households was N9,398. Years of education, presence of hygiene facilities and registration cost increased the likelihood of households’ patronage of private clinics. Age of household head, family size, presence of hygiene facilities, communication access (GSM), drug and registration cost increased the likelihood of households patronage of chemist. Years of education of household head, registration cost and hygiene facilities increased the likelihood of household patronage of self-care. The result further showed that the average spending on health by households is N456.40 while the health subsidy accruing to household from government is N687.98. Benefit incidence analysis shows majority of government spending accrued to the poor.

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Keywords: Public health, Health seeking behaviour, Spending on health, Poverty

Introduction

Health is a state of complete physical, mental and social wellbeing merely the absence of disease of infirmity (World Health Organization (WHO) 1946). In 1986, this definition was reformulated as a resource for everyday life, not the objective of living. Hence the definition health is a positive concept emphasizing social and physical resources as well as physical and mental capacity (WHO 1986). As it is commonly said “Health is wealth” and it plays a major role in the life of every individual particularly the less privilege in the grassroots (rural areas). Whether or not illness can be cured or even mitigated, health care satisfies felt need, one to which the people are prepared to devote substantial manpower and financial resources in nearly all societies at all times. It is when the health status of every individuals in the society is good that they can contribute meaningfully their quota to the development of their society, thereby increasing the gross domestic earning accruable to the nation.

Health care in much of the developing country can be grouped into two tier system namely a sophisticated and expensive hospital care system in urban areas and a network of primary health care (PHC) clinics that complement the hospital system and offer basic, preventive services to low income families in both urban and rural areas. The latter concept gained widespread support following the Alma Ata Declaration of 1977 where an emphasis on prevention and basic care was put forward as an affordable and much needed approach to ensuring health care, it was widely embraced and PHC system have proliferated across the developing world. All over the world, health promotion programmes are gradually focusing on the idea that providing knowledge about causes of ill health and choices availability will go a long way toward promoting a change in individual and household behavior toward more beneficial health seeking behavior.

A range of factors would influence people’s health. Some of these may be fixed while many are informed by socio-economic circumstance. There is also a growing acceptance that a wide range of social, economic, cultural and environmental factors, including poverty, also affects health. These may relate to living and working conditions and include experience of unemployment, quality of accommodation level of education, social and community network and supports, the built environment and work environment as well as access to health care service.

Millions of people are trapped in a vicious circle of ill health and poverty. Over the past one and a half decades quality of life in Nigeria has received considerable attention in the literature. Such studies have examined the incidence and dimension of poverty in Nigeria. The major conclusion from these studies is that poverty is that poverty is intense and widespread in the country. For instance, the incidence of poverty increased from 28.1 percent in 1980 to 46.3 percent 1985. The poverty problem grew so worse in the 1990s that in 1996, about 65.6 percent of the population was poor, while the rural areas accounted for 69.3 percent (FOS, 1999). Recent data showed that in 2004, 54.4 percent of...
Nigerians were poor (FRN, 2006). Meanwhile, poverty increased from 54 per cent in 2004 to about 69 per cent and 72 per cent in 2010 and 2011 respectively (NBS, 2005;2010). Thus the way in which sick individual or their caretakers in the home perceive their illness could determine what type of health care they will seek and how much money and household member’ time is committed for seeking treatment. Also, while seeking care in the health sector, the sick face choices that vary from government hospitals and health centres of clinics, mission institutions e.t.c.

In Nigeria where less than 6% of the population has access to modern health care services (Idowu, et al, 2005), it suffice to say that health care delivered in Nigeria is in shamble and much serious effort needs to be exhibited by everyone involved in the health sector because it has taken many years of gross neglect, inadequate funding, poor management of limited facilities and resources, social depreciation and economic depression of the people who have become underprivileged and deprived of their due share to enjoy good health. Understanding the main determinant of health care demand behavior can be vital in furthering knowledge of how changes in government policy will impact on individuals and their demand of health care services.

Objectives of the Study
The broad objective of this study is to determine the factors that influence public health care seeking behavior based on the poverty status of households.

The specific objectives are:

1. Describe household access to public health services.
2. Compute the poverty status of the household in the study area.
3. Analyze the benefit incidence of government expenditure on primary health care
4. Determine the factors that affect public health-care seeking behaviour among households.

Literature Review
Health care seeking behavior pattern is describing who is getting which type of health services and is closely related to issues of equity of access to health services. Furthermore Ward, et al (1997) defined healthcare seeking behavior as activity undertaken by individuals who perceive themselves to have a health problem or to be ill for the purpose of finding an appropriate remedy. According to Diop, et al (1998) treatment and provider choice are key aspects of health seeking behavior whose patterns depend not only on the quantity and the composition of the supply of health services, but also on the quality composition of the supply of health services, financial and geographical access of these services and the information and perceptions that households and individuals have about their relative efficacy. Patterns among different segments of the population highlight key policy issues relating to who benefits form health services. Furthermore, utilization patterns of different levels of the health system may have broad implication for efficiency of the health sector, Choice of level may be influenced by a variety of mechanisms, including prices charged contingent on how responsive the use of health services is to prices.
Strategic policy formation in all health care systems should be based on information relating to health promoting, seeking and utilization behaviour and the factors determining these behaviours. All such behaviours occur within some institutional structure such as family, community or the health care services. The factors determining the health behaviours maybe seen in various context: physical, socio-economic, cultural and political. (Kroeger 1983). Factors which influence which treatment sources people seek when symptom occur include socio-cultural factors like beliefs and household decision-making to seek care, social networks, gender and economic status (puentas, 2000: Okejie 1994) Also, according to Katung (2001); Fatimi and alvan (2002), Uchudi (2001), Stephenson et al (2004), the utilization of the health care system, public or private, formal or non-formal, may depend on socio demographic factors, social structures, level of education, cultural beliefs and practices, gender discrimination, status of women, economic and political systems, environmental conditions and the disease pattern and health care system itself.

Researchers have long been interested in what facilitates the use of health services and what influences people to behave differently in relation to their health. There has been a plethora of studies addressing particular aspects of this debate, carried out in many different countries: they can simplistically be divided into two types, which roughly correspond with a division identified by Tipping and Segall (1995). Firstly, there are studies which emphasize the ‘end point’ (utilization of the formal system, or health care seeking behavior). There is often a tendency for studies to focus specifically on the act of seeking ‘health care’, although data are also gathered on self-care, visit to more traditional healers and unofficial medical channels, these are other seen largely as something which should be prevented, with the emphasis on encouraging people to opt first for the official channels (Ahmed, et al 2001). These studies demonstrate that the decision to engage with a particular medical channel is influenced by a variable, sex age, the social status of women, the type of illness, access to services and perceived quality of the service (Tipping and Segall, 1995). In mapping out the factors behind such patterns, there are two broad trends. Firstly there are studies which categories the types of barriers or determinants which lie between patients and services. In this approach, there are as many categorizations and variations in terminology as there are studies, but they tend to fall under the divisions of geographical, social, economic, cultural and organization factors.

Second, there are studies that attempt to categorise the type of processes or pathways at work. Bedri (2001) develops a pathway to care model in her exploration of abnormal vaginal discharge in Sudan. She identifies five states where decisions are made and delay may be introduced, towards adoption of ‘modern care’. She says there are four ‘sub pathways’ that women may follow, from seeking modern medical care immediately, to complete denial and ignoring of symptoms. This approach offers an opportunity, to identify key junction where there may be a delay in seeking competent care, and is therefore of potential practical relevance for policy development. For example, in order to optimize the pathways taken by women, Bedri suggests husband should be involved in health education programmes about vaginal discharge, and women should be enabled to conduct home vaginal swabs. Bedri’s study is particularly interesting as is compares health care seeking behavior
around vaginal discharge and malaria, revealing predominantly the role of the husband, social networks and cultural customs. This clearly has implication for health systems development.

The view is often that the desired health seeking behavior is for an individual to respond to an illness episode by seeking first and foremost help from a trained allopathic doctor, in a formally recognizes health care setting. Yet a consistent finding in many studies is that, for some illnesses, people will chose traditional healers, village homeopaths, or untrained allopathic doctors above formally trained practitioners or government health facilities (Ahmed et al, 2001). There are variations witnessed, and apart from differences according to type of illness, gender is a recurring one of them. For example, Needham et al, (2001) found women in Nepal were more likely than men to seek help from traditional healers first. The scale of this may be reflected in findings from a recent study by Rahman (2000) in rural Bangladesh where 86% of women received health care from non-qualified health care providers. This has implications for diagnosis and women have been found to have significantly longer delays to diagnosis then men (Needham et al, 2001). Despite the ongoing evidence the people do choose traditional and folk medicine or providers in a variety of contexts to enable individual preferences to be incorporated into a more responsive health care system. For example, Ahmed et al (2001) conclude: efforts should be made to raise community awareness regarding the importance of seeking care for trained personnel and the availability of services". Nonetheless there is now growing recognition of the need to be more sensitive to the realities of health care seeking behavior. For example, in Bangladesh there is a large and growing sector of non-qualified allopathic providers engaged in the traffic of modern pharmaceuticals. They provide an accessible means of reaching Western medicines to a wider range of the population, yet lack formal medical training. There is therefore the accompanying problem of bad, unregulated prescriptive practices. Incorporating these unqualified providers into more formal training may there be beneficial (Ahmed et al, 2001). Uzma, et al (1999) also suggest incorporating unqualified TBAs into training programmes for material health in order to improve the health status of women. Thus increasing health-care seeking behavior studies are coming to the conclusion that traditional and unqualified practitioners need to be recognized as "the main providers of care" (Rahman, 2000) in the relation to some health problems in developing countries. In acknowledgement of the fact that untrained non-Western practitioners remain a strong favourite, Outwater, et al (2001) interviewed traditional healers and unofficial sources of health care. Through this they recognized, as have others (Moses et al, 1994) that some group appears to "wander" between practitioners rather than seek carte though one avenue or provider. Similarly, (Rahman, 2000) found that different facilities will be frequented for different needs, according to a complex interplay of factors, sometimes regardless of the intended purpose of those facilities. Thus there is growing acknowledgement that health care seeking behaviours and local knowledge need to be taken seriously in programmes and interventions to promote health in a variety of contexts (Price, 2001; Runganga, Sundby and Aggleton, 2001). With this broader appreciation of behavior, some have suggested the need to improve integration of private sector providers with public care (Needham et al, 2001). Calls have been made for explicit recognition of the potential to combine the two worlds by involving unofficial providers in official training and service provision (Green, 1994; Outwater et al,
2001). However, Ahmed at al concede that whilst extending training to such providers may enhance their services, training in itself will not change practice. For this managerial and regulatory intervention is needed. Thus the provision of medical services alone in efforts to reduce health inequalities is inadequate (Ahmed et al, 2000). Clearly any research interest in health care seeking behavior, focusing on end point utilization, needs to address the complex nature of the process involved, cognisant of the fact that the particular 'end point' uncovered.

Of the previous micro econometric analysis which has looked at the main determinants of health seeking behavior there is relatively little which focuses on Sub Shaharan African countries, and that which does has produced quite mixed results, particularly in regard to the effects of direct costs on health care demand. For example, strong significant price effects have been found by several researchers, including; litvack and Bodart (1993) for Cote d'Ivoire. Furthermore, Ngugi (1994) for Kenya, all of whom found that the introduction of user fees reduced the usage of public health services, particularly for the poor. However, Lacroix and Alihonou (1982) for Benin, and non-African evidence from Akin and Hutchinson (1999), in Sri Lanka and the World Bank (1987) research on the Philippines, has suggested price to have relatively little impact on health care demand.

Evidence on the impact of the other main supplier specific variable, distance to health facility, is less mixed and has commonly been found to be an important factor associated with decreases in health care demand. For instance, negative impacts of the distance on usage of health services have been found by Lavy and Germain (1994), Lavy and Quigley (1995) in Ghana and also Appleton (1998) for Kenya. The latter of these also found distance to have a significantly if accessibility were easier. For income factors, Akin and Hutchinson (1999), found the by-passing of local facilities in favour of higher quality not to be income group sensitive and that the more seriously ill were likely to travel further than those less ill. However, analysis by income groups, by Li (1996) for Bolivia and Alderman and Gertler (1989) for Pakistan, found wealthier households to be more price inelastic. Nwabu, et al, (1993) found that distance and user fee were both factors that reduced demand for health care, but men were less constrained than women. Furthermore, Li (1996) found that Bolivian women were more likely to use medical facilities than men, whilst Chem, Huq and D'Shouza (1981) found that male children in Bangladesh under five years of age were more likely to receive treatment than their female counterparts. Male bias was also found in other parts of Asia by Das Gupta (1987), for rural Punjab, but rarely in the African context. For education there are mixed findings with Wolfe and Behrman (1984) for Nicaragua and Behrman and Wolfe (1987) finding a positive association with health care demand. However, Akin, et al. (1998) and Dor and van der Gaag (1988) found that education had no effect on the decision to choose a doctor. Of Uganda specific evidence, Hutchinson (2001) provides the only published micro econometric work. He pooled data from early Ugandan household surveys (1992) and found distance and government ownership all had significant negative relationships with seeking care. More specifically he found that for each extra kilometre travelled to the health unit, usage fell by approximately 1% and that the poor were more willing to pay a higher price to reduce the time price and those children in the lowest income quintiles demanded care the least. Deininger
and Mpuga (2003) also found user fees to be particularly important in determining access to health services, particularly for the poor and concluded that more than just the elimination of fees is required. There are a large number of models of health-seeking behavior which propose to explain why an individual chooses to use or not use different kinds of health ‘services’. Two well-known models include Andersen’s behavioral model (BM) (V. Andersen 1968, 1995) and the health belief model (HBM) (V. Rosenstock, 1974; Stock, 1987; Third & Andersen, 2002), through the use of ‘predisposing’ (demographic; social structure and health beliefs) enabling (personal and community-related; service availability) and ‘need’ factors (actual and perceived severity of illness, general health). ‘Enabling’ and in particular ‘need’ factors tend to explain most of the variation in health services use, although Andersen (1995) state that perceived need is itself a consequence of social structure and health beliefs. In the past the BM has been criticized for being too broad to be able to capture the complexity and dynamic nature of health seeking behavior, having neglected such factors as social networks culture, health beliefs and organizational factors (Pescosolido and Kronenfeld, 1991; Rogers et al., 1991). Newer versions of the BM however have attempted to incorporate these factors, including feedback loops to explain the dynamic nature of health service use as a function of consumer satisfaction with the service provided and health outcomes (Andersen, 1995). The HBM focuses on perceived susceptibility, severity, people’s believe they are susceptible to a condition, believe that it may have a serious outcome, believe that a particular course of action will prevent, reduce or ameliorate the perceived susceptibility or severity and believe that the perceive or curative (Janz et al., 2002). In an evaluation of the use of 46 studies using the HBM, Janz and Becker (1984) found that ‘perceived barriers’ was the most powerful predictor overall, perceived susceptibility was severity more important for preventive behavior than sick-role behavior, and preventive behavior. Overall, ‘perceived severity’ was the weakest predictor. The weakness of the HBM is that is limited to accounting for as much of the variance in individuals’ health related behaviors as can be explained by their attitudes and beliefs’ (Janz & Becker, 1984) and these are not always measured in the same way across economic status and past experience are known to have a strong influence on health seeking behavior and these are sidelined in the HBM (Kasper, 2000; Ogden 2004).

Methodology
The Study Area
The area of study is Ijebu North-East Local Government Area (LGA) headquartered in Atan, some 20km from Ijebu Ode and about 100km from Abeokuta, the capital of Ogun State. The local government came into being on the 13th of December 1996 having been carved out of Ijebu Ode Local Government. This was in line with the attempt to bring governance to the doorstep of the people by the defunct administration of Late General Sanni Anacha. The LGA is bordered by Ijebu East Local Government in the east, Ijebu North Local Government in the north, Ijebu Ode Local Government in the south and Odogbolu Local Government in the west.

The weather condition in the study area is characterized by fairly good rainfall experienced in the dry months of November to April with a range of 250mm and rainy season with a range of 500mm-1000mm in the wet month of May-October. The average temperature ranges between 25°C-27°C
coupled with humidity ranging from 75% to 115%. The main agricultural produce of the area are oil palm and cassava with arable crops such as maize. The predominant occupation of the people of the local government can be classified as farming trading and civil services. A Yoruba ethnic group fluent in Yoruba and Ijebu as the main dialect, has 26 health care centers, 33 primary schools, 9 secondary schools 1 school of health technology, 4 community banks, 8 guesthouses and hotels and over 10 local industries.

**Types and Sources of Data**
The study utilised both primary and secondary cross sectional and time series data. For primary data, simple random sampling technique was used to sample 10 households each in each of the 10 wards of the local government. Information were elicited through the use of well-structured questionnaire on the factors that influence the behavior of households in seeking healthcare and the choice of provider based on their poverty status, benefits accruing to individuals who utilize primary health centres, their expenditure, extent of usage and most importantly how well the government fund these centres. Data were also collected on socio-economic characteristics (age, gender, education, income family size, health profile (illness type), health facilities (type of care), access and utilization (physical proximity, transportation mode and cost, drug availability), choice of health service provider (self-care, private clinics, government clinics, home nurses, religious centers, chemist, drug hawkers, traditional healers, quacks and herb sellers), satisfaction and hindrance.

The secondary data were collected from the health department and finance department of the local government area to know government expenditure on health services.

**Analytical Technique**
Descriptive statistics such as percentages, mean, median and mode were used to describe the socio-economic characteristics of respondents. Multinomial logit regression model was used to isolate factors that influence household behavior in seeking health care and Benefit Incidence analysis was used to determined extent of Government expenditure and who benefit most (the rich or the poor) from such expenditure. The Multinomial logit regression model assumes the household chooses the provider that gives highest level of utility.

**Construction of Poverty Line**
Poverty line was constructed to categories households into different expenditure groups using Foster, Greer, Thorodecke (1984) poverty measure given by:

\[
P_{\alpha} (y, z) = \frac{1}{q^n} \sum_{i=1}^{q^n} \left( \frac{Z - Y_i}{Z} \right)^\alpha
\]

P = poverty status of respondents
Z = Poverty line
Y_i = per capital expenditure of each poor household
n = sample size
q = number of household below poverty line

This was done by taking the proportional shortfall in expenditure for each poor household, raising the shortfall to a power to reflect the concern for the depth of poverty, taking the sum of these for all poor individuals and normalizing the sum by the population size. The degree of concern for the poverty was fixed at $\alpha$ equals zero. This gave the headcount index the respondents were categories into core poor, moderately poor and non-poor based on the mean per capital household expenditure on basis needs. The relative poverty measure was used. The categories are.

1. Those that spend less than 1.3 of the mean household per capital expenditure are referred to as core poor.
2. Those that spent more than 1/3 of the mean household per capital but nor more than 2/3 of it are known as moderate poor group
3. Those that spend more than 2/3 of mean per capital household expenditure are classified Non poor.

**Benefit Incidence Analysis**

According to Castrol-Leal Florencia (1999), the group specific benefit incidence of government spending on primary health care is given as;

$$X_j = \frac{H_jS_i}{H_i}$$

Where, $X_j = \text{value of total health subsidy charged to group i.e expenditure groups}$

$S_i = \text{government net spending on health}$

$i = \text{primary health care}$

$H_i = \text{total number of registered patients}$

$H_j = \text{Number of registered patients of group j}$

$S_i = \text{Unit subsidy of providing health centre}$

$J = \text{groups (poor and non poor)}$

Household per capital expenditure = $\text{Total household expenditure}$

$$\frac{\text{Household size}}{}$$

The total household per capital expenditure is calculated by finding the summation of the entire household’s per capital expenditure for the sample household studied.

The mean per capital expenditure is calculated by dividing the total expenditure by the total number of household surveyed.

$$\text{Mean per capital household expenditure} = \frac{\text{Total household expenditure}}{\text{Household Surveyed}}$$

Deriving from the above, households can be categorized into three;
1. Core poor; those who spend less than one-third of mean per capital household expenditure (MPCHHE).
2. Moderately poor; those that spend equal to or greater than two-third of MPCHHE.
3. Non poor; those that spends equal to or greater than two-third of MPCHHE.

Therefore, the benefits accruing to each of the categories from government expenditure on PHC can be computed

**Multinomial Logit Regression**

The household’s choice of medical providers is a discrete decision, which is consistent with qualitative choice models. In this qualitative choice situation, we presume that an individual/household can choose several alternatives: to seek self-care treatment, private clinics treatment, government clinics, home nurses, religious centres, chemist, drug hawkers, traditional healers, quacks and herb sellers. In choosing to obtain medical services from whom, individuals and households consider a variety of characteristics of the alternative providers, such as proximity and quality. The decision is also affected by the characteristics of individual’s health status in the households, education, age, gender and so on. This can be elaborated upon with general descriptive with concepts from the standard micro economics theory of utility maximization. Utility in this instance, therefore depend upon the attributes of health care choice j which varies with both the choices and characteristic of the individual (What Greene, 2000 calls a mixed model)

An individual or household chooses among alternatives based on the utility of each alternative. More specifically, we can follow (Manshi and McFadden 1981) to posit that the utility of choice option j to individual or household I, U_ij is:

$$U_{ij} = V(M_{ij}H_{ij}) + \varepsilon_{ij}$$ (I)

$V(M_{ij}H_{ij})$ represents utility determined by observed data.

M is a vector of individual economic and health status.

$\varepsilon$ is a vector of unobserved components.

J denotes provider choice alternatives (Self-care treatment=0, private clinics treatment=1, government clinics=2, home nurses =3, religious centres =4, chemist = 5, drug hawkers =6, traditional healers =7, quacks= 8, herbs sellers= 9 and $\varepsilon$ which will be treated as a random variable).

Utility-maximizing behavior implies that an individual/household I will only choose a particular alternative j if $U_{ij} > U_{ik}$ is also random. The probability of any given alternative j being chosen by an individual/household can be expressed as:

$$P = P(U_{ij} > U_{ik}) \text{ for all } k <> j$$ (2)

By substitution of (9)

$$P = P(V_{ij} + \varepsilon_{ij} > V_{ik} + \varepsilon_{ij}) \text{ for all } k <> j$$ (3)

Rearranging
\[ P = P(\epsilon_i - \epsilon_j > (V_{ij} - V_{ik})), \text{ for all } k < j) \]

By knowing the distribution of the random \( \epsilon \)'s the distribution of each difference \( \epsilon_{ij} - \epsilon_{ik} \) for \( j \approx k \), and by using equation (3) calculate the probability that the individual/household will choose alternative \( j \).

Letting \( X_{ij} - (M_j - H_i) \) and assuming \( V \) to be a linear function of components of \( X \), we operationalize equation 3 as;

\[ U_i = \beta_j X_{ij} \]

(4)

Where \( \beta_j \) is a vector of coefficient values indicating the effect of the various \( X_{ij} \)'s on individual I's utility for option \( J \).

Assuming that each \( \beta_j \) for all alternative \( J \) distributed independently, identically in accordance with the extreme value distribution and given this distribution for the unobserved components of utility, the probability that the household will choose alternative \( j \) is

\[ Prob(\text{option}_j / X_{ij}) = \frac{Exp(\beta_j X_{ij})}{\sum \frac{Exp(\beta_k X_{ik})}{}} \]

Where \( K = 1 \)

The parameters of this model can be estimated straightforwardly using maximum likelihood method based on whether the household is poor or non-poor.

Result and Discussion

Descriptive Analysis on Socio-economic Characteristics of Respondents

Table 1 shows the descriptive analysis of various socio-economic variables on sampled respondents. Socio-economic factors have been observed to influence and affect household activities. Below are the identified socio-economic variable that influence the living standard of the sampled respondents.

<p>| Table 1: Socio-economic Characteristics of Respondents |
|-------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|
| Variables   | Number of Respondents/Frequency | Percentage Distribution (%) | Cumulative Percentage |
| Distribution of Household Head | | | |
| Male        | 82          | 82          |             |
| Female      | 18          | 18          |             |
| Total       | 100         | 100         |             |
| Distribution by Marital Status | | | |
| Married     | 78          | 78          |             |
| Not Married | 22          | 22          |             |
| Total       | 100         | 100         |             |
| Age of Household Heads | | | |
| &lt; 30 years  | 24          |             |             |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Age Group</th>
<th>Count</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>31 – 40</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40 – 59</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&gt; 60</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Distribution of Household Head by Education

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Education</th>
<th>Count</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Primary</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Secondary</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tertiary</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>None</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Distribution of Household Head by Occupation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Occupation</th>
<th>Count</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Trading</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Artisan</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civil Service</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Farming</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Private Establishment</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Distribution of Other Members of Household by Occupation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Occupation</th>
<th>Count</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>None</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Full Housewife</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trading</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civil Service</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Farming</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Distribution of Presence of Facilities Owned by Respondents

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Facility</th>
<th>Count</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Electricity</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Radio</td>
<td>96</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fridge</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TV</td>
<td>66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bicycle</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Motorcycle</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Car</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Phone</td>
<td>52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Generator</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pit Latrine</td>
<td>68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Flush Toilet</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Piped Borne H₂O</td>
<td>66</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 1 shows 82% of the household heads were male while only 18% were female; a confirmation of the male dominance in household headship. Female headship of household has always been attributed to widowhood, divorce or single individual, especially in this part of the globe. The headship structure of households is buttress by the fact that 78% of the household head sampled were married while only 22% were not married. Age-wise, more than 89% of the sampled households’ head were between 30 and 59 years while only 11% have their household heads above 60 years of age. This shows that the majority of the household heads in the study area were in their middle age are generally known to be productive. Table 1 further shows that majority of the households (34%) had secondary school education, 29% had tertiary education, 19% had primary education while 18% of the household head had no formal education.

Moreover, Table 1 shows that households’ head were productively active as 21% of were traders involved in buying and selling one thing or the other, Majority (27%) were Artisans such as engaged in tailoring, mechanics and so on. 25% were civil servant working in government establishments, 20% were farmers while 3% work with private establishments such as banks and telecommunication outfit. A delve into occupational status of the sampled household members revealed that 44% of them were dependants not involved in any kind of occupation while 8% of them were full time housewife keeping the home whom refrain from branding as dependants in order not to spark the ire of gender advocates. Since availability and ownership of facilities can improve or deteriorate the health status of households, table 1 shows that all household have access, possess and make use of electricity, radio
(96%), refrigerators (33%), access to telecommunication (52%), health information gingles, and promos on health issues that can enhance their health. However, only 30% of sampled respondent have access to piped borne water and means of transportation in addition danger posed by low means of food preservation (refrigerators -33%) and high number using latrine for toilet.

On the choice of health care venue, the table shows that 51% of the households patronize hospitals, 15% private hospitals and 24% visits chemist and over the counter stores for treatment when they are ill when dis-aggregated by marital status, households with married heads (47%) more than single (4%) patronized government hospital. This reveals households preference for government hospital when in need of treatment. However, a considerable number of household’s visiting chemist gives room for concern. The table further confirms malaria as the major ailment as 70% of the respondents indicated it as ailment that affects household while 39% constitute other ailments such as tuberculosis, dysentery and so on.

**Household Expenditure and Poverty Status of Respondent**

The level of household expenditure on basic needs is presented in Table 2. This was done by taking the average expenditure on the basis of household needs. It is apparent that more than half of the total average monthly expenditure is spent on food, which implies that for sound health, food is normally given priority by households. This is in concord with Adenegan et. al. (2002) and Idowu (2005) in their works on Analysis of Government expenditure on Nigeria Primary School and Primary Health Care respectively while Ojo (2006) reported same in his work on Economic analysis of Solid Waste Management.

Monthly expenditure on other basic items except health care constitutes about 20% of the average monthly expenditure. Health care accounted for a mere 4.8% of the total household expenditure.

**Table 2: Distribution of Respondents by Average Monthly Expenditure on Basic Needs**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item</th>
<th>Average Amount (₦/month)</th>
<th>Percentage Distribution (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Food</td>
<td>7,024</td>
<td>74.74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clothing</td>
<td>968.0</td>
<td>10.30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shelter</td>
<td>941.0</td>
<td>10.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Health</td>
<td>456.4</td>
<td>4.86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>9389.4</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Field Survey

The mean per capita Expenditure (MPCE) per month of the households is ₦7,003/month (with average of 4 members in each household) and within the context of the poverty lines set in the methodology, any household spending less than two-thirds of the MPCE per month is poor while the core poor spend less than one-third of the MPCE. This mean that each individual in the total household survey is expected to spend ₦7,003 per month as any individual who spend less is said to be poor.
Accordingly, 40% of the households belong to the non-poor group, 20% are in the core poor while 40% of the respondents are moderately poor (Table 3). This implies that about 60% of the total surveyed area are poor and do not enjoy better quality of the basic requirements. With more than half of the household survey being poor, it confirms the growing concern of the increase in the number of poor as reported by Adenegan et. al (2002) and Olowa et al (2013).

Table 3: Poverty Status Category

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Group</th>
<th>Amount (N)</th>
<th>Percentage Distribution (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Core poor</td>
<td>&lt;2,334.37</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moderate poor</td>
<td>2334.37-466878</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non poor</td>
<td>&gt;4668</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: Field survey

Table 4 presents the distribution of household heads by sex across the poverty groups. 21% of unmarried household head were non-poor, 19% of married households head are non-poor while 59% of married household heads are prone to be poor because of high responsibilities of taking care of many dependents.

Table 4: Distribution of Household Head Across Poverty Group

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Poverty status</th>
<th>Non poor</th>
<th>Moderate Poor</th>
<th>Poor</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Male</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>82</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Field Survey

Table 5: Distribution of Household Head Average Income across Poverty Group

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Income</th>
<th>Non Poor</th>
<th>Moderate Poor</th>
<th>Poor</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>&lt;7000</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The distribution of household head by income size across poverty group is shown in Table 5. 10% of household head income is less than N7000, while 17% of household heads have their income between N7000 and N25,000 while only 13% earn higher than N25,000. The Table also show that 27% of household heads whose income is less than N7000 are either moderately or core poor while 35% whose income is between N7000 and N25,000 are poor. This shows that many households head with income less than N25,000 are poor.

### Table 6: Distribution of Treatment Venue across Poverty Status

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Poverty status</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Non Poor</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moderate Poor</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poor</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| Sources: Field Survey |

In Table 6, the result of the exploration of patronage of different categories of health care facilities by household across poverty groups is presented. The Table shows the poor house heads which constitute more than half of the sampled household heads prefer to use government hospitals (50%) or resort to self-care method (15%). While 11% of the non-poor households patronize private clinic or resort to self-care or use government hospitals reluctantly. This shows that majority of poor households prefer government hospital because of the low cost of health services. It should also be noted that the level of use of public facilities determines to appreciable extent the benefit accrue to individuals from government subsidy on such facility.

### Determination of Government Subsidy in the Provision of Health Care

To determine government subsidy in the provision of health care, the government expenditure account is used in estimating unit subsidies. Unit subsidy is based on actual expenditures by government. Thus, government unit subsidy represents the total amount of government spending per patient. It is calculated using the \( X_{(poor)} = H_{(poor)} \times \frac{S_i}{H_i} \) formula where:

- \( S_i \) = Government Spending in the local government
- \( H_i \) = total number of required patients in the local government

From the data obtained from the local government health authority in Ijebu North East Area (2010)

Total expenditure of registered patient = 11,6144

Total expenditure on health P.a = N7,990,142,80
Therefore, using \( \frac{7,990,142.80}{11,614} \) to calculate government unit subsidy

Unit subsidy = N687.98

Average Amount spent by household on health/month = N456.40

Total spending on health = N687.98 + N456.40 = N1144.38

Table 7: Household and Government Spending on the Health Care

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Health spending</th>
<th>Amount (N)</th>
<th>% Distribution</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Average household spending</td>
<td>456.40</td>
<td>39.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Government unit subsidy</td>
<td>687.98</td>
<td>60.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>1144.38</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Author's Calculation from field survey

From the table, it shows that government health care spending is higher than household health spending in the local government area. The implies that for every N1 of government unit subsidy for providing health care to households, the household spend 0.60k in gaining access to the health care provided by the government.

Specific benefit incidence of government spending of health case according to group

According to Castrol-Leal florencia (1999), benefit incidence of government expenditure is given by

\[ X \frac{s_i}{H_i} \]

Where \( X_j \) = value of health subsidy charged to group

\( H_i \) = number of patients registered of group g at the group level.

Government subsidy = N687.98

Total number of patient \( = 11,614 \)

Total health subsidy = 687.98 \( \times 11,614 \)

\( = 7,990,199.72 \)

Hi = total number of patients (poor group)

\( = 11,614 \times 0.60 \)

\( = 6,968.4 \approx 6,968 \) patient

Hi = total number of patients (non-poor group)

\( = 11,614 \times 0.4 \)

\( = 4,645.6 \approx 4,646 \) patients

The benefit incidence of government spending on health care to the moderately poor group

\[ X_{(\text{poor})} = \frac{S_i}{H_i} \]

Where \( X_{(\text{poor})} \) = value of total health subsidy changed to the poor

\( H_{(\text{poor})} \) = Number of registered patients of the poor group

\( \therefore X_{(\text{poor})} = 6968 \times 687.98 \)

\( = 4,793,844.64 \)
Benefit incidence of government spending on health care to the non-poor

Where: \( X_{(\text{non poor})} = \) value of total health subsidy changed to the non poor

\[ H_{(\text{non poor})} = \text{Number of registered patients of the non poor group} \]

\[ X_{(\text{non poor})} = 4,464 \times 687.98 \\ \n= 3,223,874.28 \]

**Table 8: Benefit Incidence of Health Spending by Group**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Group</th>
<th>Benefit incidence</th>
<th>Percentage Distribution</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Poor</td>
<td>4,793,844.64</td>
<td>59.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non Poor</td>
<td>3,223,874.28</td>
<td>40.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>8,017718.92</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Calculated from field survey

From the table, it is observed that the higher percentage of government spending accrues to the poor group. This is so because this group utilizes the services provided by the government most since they have the highest number of patients. This supports the finding of Adenegan et. al. (2002) that the more the use of government provided facilities, the greater the benefit incidence of government unit subsidies accruing to the group.

**Multinomial Logit Regression Analysis**

The establishment of public health centres is a form of public spending by government aimed at improving the living standard of people and nations productive health. It is also a concurrent responsibility to which every citizen is entitled to. They live well and meaningfully contribute to the nation at large in the face of alternative: economic, social and health factors that may prevent patronage.

From the multinomial logit regression analysis carried out in determining preferred alternatives i.e. (government, self-care, private clinic and chemist) in which government health centers stands as the reference, the following observations were inferred.

It was observed that the factors that will make households to prefer private clinics (heath centers owned by individuals, groups and specialists) are number of years of education of the household head, ownership of means of transport e.g car, presence of hygiene facilities (flush toilet and piped water) and ability of afford transport cost.

It was observed that the total number of years of education of the household head exhibition a positive relationship with the patronage of private clinic in that the higher the level of education (access of further education form elementary to tertiary level) the higher the preference for private clinics to government owned hospitals. This can be attributed to increase in tastes exposure and knowledge due to education.
It was observed that the ownership of means of transport by household makes them patronize private clinics because distance to their choice of clinics that gives them the utility they want is not barrier. Though the present of hygiene facilities were significant, they exhibited a negative relationship with private clinics patronage i.e the lower and lesser in number of hygiene facilities, the higher the tendency to patronize private clinics for proper check-up.

Though, factors such as age of household head, household size, presence of communication facilities (GSM) and cost of drugs were not significant, they exhibited a negative relationship with the patronage of private clinics in that the older the household head, the less likelihood for him to take decision in patronizing private clinics because older people tend not to seek treatment like younger people who are growing and in the formative years of their lives. Also the higher the number of household size the lesser the patronage of private clinics due to cost. Higher cost of drugs will make households not to visit private clinics who are seen to charge a higher cost for their services.

Although severity of illness was not significant, it shows the higher the severity of illness to any members of the household, the higher the tendency to visit private clinics that are believed to have facilities to handle severe illness more than the government hospitals. Some household even fly such members of their household outside the country for better treatment.

It was observed that the significant factors that will make household to patronize chemist rather than government hospitals were age of household head, household size, presence of communication facilities availability of hygiene facilities in the house and cost of transportation and drugs.

The result showed that the younger household head will patronize chemist because of little experience in family management and may not see the need for proper medical attention due to lack of experience and the rush for career development for successful living. Household with small number of members will also patronize chemist because of cost effectiveness. The presence of hygiene facilities such as fridge, flush toilets and piped water makes the hygiene status of household higher and this makes household not to patronize government hospitals but rather chemists in times of mild ailments.

The higher the cost of drugs, the less likelihood of the patronage of government hospital and the higher the tendency to go to was chemists for dispensing because it will be cheaper.

It was observed that the factors that will make households patronize self-care (quacks, religious centers, traditional healers, hawkers, home nurses, and herb sellers) were the number of years of education household head, presence of hygiene facilities and cost of registration for health care needs.
The result showed that the lower the level of education of the household head, the more likely of the patronage of self-care. This is due to the low level of exposure and knowledge of the decision maker in the house. Many other households visit self-care medication due to the diabolical and mystical nature of their illness. High cost of registration will also make the patronage of self-care higher due to the inability of households to afford the cost.

**Table 9: Multinomial Logit Regression of a Health Care Provider**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Private</th>
<th>SE</th>
<th>Chemist</th>
<th>SE</th>
<th>Self-care</th>
<th>SE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>(7.2828)</td>
<td>5.9310</td>
<td>6.6094</td>
<td>3.2100</td>
<td>(0.7707)</td>
<td>4.2278</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Household Head age</td>
<td>(0.0648)</td>
<td>0.0972</td>
<td>(0.0898)</td>
<td>0.0481</td>
<td>(0.0392)</td>
<td>0.0709</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Year of Education</td>
<td>0.8921</td>
<td>0.4148</td>
<td>0.0584</td>
<td>0.1284</td>
<td>(0.4084)</td>
<td>0.2449</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Household size</td>
<td>(0.0199)</td>
<td>0.2799</td>
<td>(0.2579)</td>
<td>0.0118</td>
<td>0.1169</td>
<td>0.2096</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fridge</td>
<td>4.3983</td>
<td>2.6834</td>
<td>4.3833</td>
<td>2.4677</td>
<td>(2.4433)</td>
<td>2.0738</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Car</td>
<td>3.2739</td>
<td>1.4546</td>
<td>1.9678</td>
<td>1.4229</td>
<td>1.2812</td>
<td>1.6963</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GSM</td>
<td>(1.8527)</td>
<td>1.7029</td>
<td>(2.7144)</td>
<td>1.2545</td>
<td>0.8197</td>
<td>1.8455</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Flush Toilet</td>
<td>(5.4904)</td>
<td>2.9981</td>
<td>(4.8699)</td>
<td>2.7842</td>
<td>8.9537</td>
<td>4.2687</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transport Cost</td>
<td>0.0220</td>
<td>0.0130</td>
<td>0.0347</td>
<td>0.0114</td>
<td>0.0103</td>
<td>0.0317</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Registration</td>
<td>0.0040</td>
<td>0.0113</td>
<td>(0.0030)</td>
<td>0.0086</td>
<td>(0.0408)</td>
<td>0.0200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Drug</td>
<td>(0.0046)</td>
<td>0.0042</td>
<td>(0.0089)</td>
<td>0.0035</td>
<td>(0.0031)</td>
<td>0.0030</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Waiting time</td>
<td>(0.0811)</td>
<td>0.0564</td>
<td>(0.0042)</td>
<td>0.0122</td>
<td>(0.0285)</td>
<td>0.0362</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Severity of illness</td>
<td>0.1513</td>
<td>0.3561</td>
<td>0.2579</td>
<td>0.2930</td>
<td>0.5473</td>
<td>0.5771</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Maximum likelihood Estimate

**Conclusion and Policy Recommendation**

The paper set out to determine the factors that influence public health care seeking behavior based on the poverty status of the households. Secondary and primary data were collected from a total of 100 households randomly selected from the LGA. With MPCE of ₦7,003, 60% of the household surveyed live below the poverty line while only 40% are non-poor. Results from the Multinomial regression showed that years of education of household head, presence of hygiene facilities (flush toilet and piped water) and registration cost increased the likelihood of households to patronize private clinics. Age of household head, family size, presence of hygiene facilities such as fridge, flush toilet, communication access (GSM), drug and registration cost increased the likelihood of household patronage of chemist. Years of education of household head, registration cost and hygiene facilities will make household patronize self-care. The result further showed that the average spending on health by households is ₦456.49 while the health subsidy accruing to household from government is ₦687.98. This shows that health expenses contributed by household are only 40% while that by government is 60%. Benefit incidence analysis shows that 60% of government spending accrued to the poor while only 40% accrued to the non-poor, indicating that government unit subsidy was targeted at the poor but, they still spend more to gain access to the facility. The study showed that
poverty status is not a determining factor for patronage of alternative treatment venues for households.

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Reflection on the Principle of Best Interests of the Child: An Analysis of Parental Responsibilities in Custodial Disputes in the South African law

Lufuno Nevondwe¹, Kola Odeku² and Konanani Raligilia³

Abstract: Decisions about which parent to reside with after the parent's divorce have an enormous impact on children. These decisions are important not only in the short term, but also in the long term, as they may impact on the children's future prospects. The same applies to children born out of wedlock. In family law, the central principle relating to children is that any decision made should be in the best interests of the child. The Convention on the Rights of the Child provides that the best interests of the child must be a primary consideration in all actions concerning that child. South African Courts are also compelled to place particular emphasis on the best interests of the child, not only because of their role as upper guardian of all minors, but also because of the provisions of section 28(2) of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa which provides that 'a child’s best interests are of paramount importance in every matter concerning the child'. The question of the ‘best interests’ of the child has led to intensive debate in many reported judgments. What is best for a specific child or children cannot be determined with absolute certainty. The factors to be taken into account when determining the best interests of the child are unfortunately not comprehensively specified in our law.

Keywords: Best Interests, Child, Divorce, Parental Responsibilities, Custody.

Introduction

It has long been accepted that the best interests of the child is the guiding criterion that determines all decisions relating to custody of children following the divorce of their parents. In an effort to protect the children from as many of the negative consequences of divorce as possible, the law requires the courts to make the best decision possible at the time as to the custody arrangements for the children.

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of the marriage that is being terminated (Palmer 1996). Our common law and section 2 of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Act, 108 of 1996 provide that the child’s best interests must determine the outcome when a court has to make an order regarding a child. The Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) provides that the child’s best interests are paramount (Article 16(1) (d)) and that the Convention on the Rights of the Child requires that the best interests must be “a primary” consideration in all actions concerning the child (Article 3(1)). Thus, it is clear that the child’s best interests are the yardstick in respect of the position of a child of a divorcing couple. In addition, the Divorce Act 70 of 1979, and the Mediation in Certain Divorce Matters Act 24 of 1987 specifically protect the interests of children upon their parent’s divorce (Van Zyl 1997).

The Children’s Act 38 of 2005 also contains list of factors that must be considered in custody disputes when the best interests of the child must be determined.

Methodology
This study makes use of content analysis methods and it analyses the content of texts or document such as case laws, frameworks, and Constitution. Content analysis is therefore best suited to the purpose of this article because laws and legislation are analysed to determine the extent of the principle of best interest in the children. This paper further examines existing primary documents to determine the parental responsibilities in the custody disputes. Additionally, it analyses various legislations relating to Children’s rights in South Africa.

Problem Statement
In South Africa, there seems to be a trend which relegates the best interest of children by parents in their decision making. Divorce incidences bear the hallmarks of neglect in terms of the considerations of the principle of best interest of the child. It goes without saying that this also affects the division of the parental responsibilities post-divorce. Against this backdrop, this paper intends to validate the importance of both the principle of best interest and the parental responsibilities in the course of custodial disputes in South Africa.

Significance of the Study
This paper intends to examine the Children’s Act and the Constitution and further critically analyses the impact of the custody disputes in the parental responsibilities of the children. Furthermore, it is imperative to investigate the remedial measure to safeguard the best interest principle within the constitutional mandate.

Literature Review
According to the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), the term “best interests” broadly describes the well-being of a child (UNHCR Guidelines 2006). However, the Provisional document on UNHCR Guidelines on the Formal Determination of the Best Interests of the Child released on May 2006 contended it is not possible to give a conclusive definition of what is in the best interests of the child, as this depends on a variety of individual circumstances, such as the age and the level of maturity of the child, the presence or absence of parents, the child’s environment, etc (UNHCR Guidelines 2006).

Locally, and in particular our South African Constitution also do not provide a conclusive definition of the child’s ‘best interests’ but a clear description of the definition has been provided in the form of factors as provided in section 7 of the Children’s Act 38 of 2005 (McQuoid-Mason 2011). While international law obliges state parties to adhere to the best interest standard when children are involved, Article 3(1) of the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child (1989) describes the best interests of the child as a basic consideration (Davel 2007: 227). Davel (2007: 227) argued that the African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child (1990) phrases it in even stronger terms in article 4(1) because it is not merely termed a basic consideration, but the basic consideration.

According to Mahlobogwane, the central principle relating to children in South Africa is that any decision made should be in the best interests of the child (Mahlobogwane 2005: 31). This is the direct affirmation to the international instrument, Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC) which requires that the best interests be the determining factor, whereas for other actions it has to be a primary consideration, which does not exclude other considerations to be taken into account (UNHCR Guidelines 2006).

It goes without saying that South Africa has ratified the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child and the Constitution enshrines the protection of children’s rights (Clark 2002). As a result of that, therefore the South African case law must be analysed in the light of these two documents and the paramount of the best interests of the child, which will generally, but not always be in accordance with the individual rights of the child (Clark 2002).

The provision of section 28(2) of the Constitution Act, 108 of 1996, states that ‘a child’s best interests are of paramount importance in all matters concerning the child. ’Friedman and Pantazis (2006) argued that section 28(2) implies that in every matter where a child’s rights are substantially involved, those interests must be taken into account. Conradie (2003) further cemented this argument by contending that those children constitute the most vulnerable group in contemporary democratic South African society.

Arguably these and other entrenched beliefs about the place and position of children in our societies have left them vulnerable, making them susceptible to physical, psychological, emotional and sexual
abuse (Dausab 2009). However, the best interests’ principle is a constitutional right, a value, an interpretative tool or a rule of law which must be respected by all citizens (Bonthuys 2006).

The Best Interests of the Child as Paramount Consideration in Divorce Actions

What is in the best interests of the child is a question of fact which has to be established ad hoc in each individual case (Davel 2006). The facts and context of each case determine not only which interests, but also what factors are to be considered. Generally, the child’s interests include his or her physical, economic, emotional, intellectual, cultural, spiritual, social, moral and religious well – being. It is impossible to compile list of all factors which must be considered when a court has to decide on a child’s best interests. The list offered in McCall v McCall 1994 3 SA 201 (C) in respect of a custody dispute provides us with a starting-point, and has been accepted and applied in several subsequent decisions (Krasin v Ogle 1997 1 All SA 557; Madiehe v Madiehe 1997 SA 153 (B)). The following factors were listed in McCall v McCall:

a) The love, affection and other emotional ties between parent and child.
b) The parent’s compatibility with the child.
c) The parent’s abilities, character and temperament, and the impact thereof on the child’s needs and desires.
d) The parent’s ability to communicate with the child.
e) The parent’s insight into, understanding of, and sensitivity to the child feelings.
f) The parent’s capacity and disposition to give the child the guidance he or she needs.
g) The parent’s ability to provide the child with economic security, that is, the parent’s ability to provide the child with creature comforts, like food, clothing and housing.
h) The parent’s ability to provide for the child’s religious and secular educational well-being and security.
i) The parent’s ability to provide for the child’s emotional, psychological, cultural and environmental development.
j) The parent’s mental and physical health and moral fitness (See Fletcher v Fletcher 1984 1 SA 130 (A)).
k) The stability or instability of the child’s existing environment, having regard to the desirability of maintaining the status a quo (that is, the existing state of affairs).
l) The desirability or otherwise of keeping siblings together.
m) The child’s preference, if the court is satisfied that the child has the necessary intellectual and emotional maturity to make a well-informed judgment.
n) The desirability or otherwise of applying the doctrine of same-sex matching, that is, placing sons with fathers and daughters with mothers.
o) Any other relevant factor.
The Children’s Act 38 of 2005 also contains a list of factors that must considered when the best interests of the child must be determined (Cronjie 2007). That list applies only to proceedings, decision, and actions under the children’s Act, which do not, in the main, relate to divorce. The factors that are listed in Section 7 of the Act are as follows:

a) The nature of the personal relationship between the child and his or her parents, or any specific parent, and between the child and any other caregiver or relevant person.
b) The attitude of the parents, or any specific parent towards the child and the exercise of parental responsibilities or rights in respect of the child.
c) The capacity of the parents, any specific parent, or any other caregiver or person, to provide for the child’s needs, including his or her emotional or intellectual needs.
d) The likely effect any change in the child’s circumstances would have on the child. This includes the likely effects of the child’s separation from both parents, and either parent, a sibling, another child or any caregiver or any person with whom child has been living.
e) The practical difficulty and expense of the child having contacts with his or her parents, or specific parent, and whether that difficult or expense would substantially affect the child’s right to maintain personal relations and direct contact with that parent on a regular basis.
f) The child’s need to remain in the care of his parents, family and extended family, and to maintain contact with his or her parents, extended family, tribe, culture or tradition.
g) The child’s age, maturity, stage of development, background and any other relevant characteristics of the child.
h) The child’s physical and emotional security and intellectual, emotional, social and cultural development.
i) The child’s need to brought up a stable family environment or, if this cannot be achieved, in environment resembling a family environment as closely as possible.
j) Any family violence involving the child or family member of the child.
k) Which action or decision would avoid or minimize the further legal or administrative proceedings regarding the child.

When deciding what is in child’s best interests, the court must guard against relying on factors which infringe the constitutional rights of the child’s parent(s) unless it can be shown that those factors actually go some way towards establishing what is or what is not in the child’s best interests. For example, an order denying a parent guardianship purely because she or he is disabled, without it being shown that the disability is of such a nature that allowing the parent to exercise guardianship would not serve the child best interests, would be open to constitutional attack on the ground that it constitutes unfair discrimination on the ground of disability.

In French v French 1971 (4) SA 298 (W) the court sets out in order of impotence four categories of considerations to determine a child’s best interests. The primary test is how the sense of security of the child will be best preserved. Secondly, the suitability of the custodian parent is to be tested by
enquiring into his or her character, into the religion and language in which the children are to be brought up, and also into the fitness of the proposed custodian to guide the moral, cultural and religious development of the child. Thirdly, material considerations relating to the child’s wellbeing will be considered (See the case of Goodrich v Botha 1954 (2) SA 540 (AD)). In the final instance the wishes of the child will be considered – with young children as a constituent element in the enquiry as to where they will attain a sense of security, and with more mature children a well-informed judgment, albeit a very subjective judgment, of what their best interests really demand (Davel 2007).

In terms of section 6 of the Divorce Act 70 of 1979 the court is prevented from granting a decree of divorce until it is satisfied that:

‘the provision made or contemplated with regard to the welfare of any minor or dependent child of the marriage are satisfactory or are the best that can be effected in the circumstances’(Section 6 (1)).

The court is further empowered to cause an investigation to be carried out and can order any person to appear before it in order to ascertain that the arrangements are indeed satisfactory (Section 6 (2)). The court is empowered to make any order which it may deem fit with regard to the maintenance of the children, and to the question of guardianship and custody of, or access to, such children (Section 6 (3)). Furthermore, the court may appoint a legal representative for the children (Section 6 (4)).

It has long been recognized both in statute and in common law that the court is the upper guardian of all minors. This means that where necessary the court can intervene in a family situation if it is deemed to be in the children’s interests to do so. This is usually done in instances of abuse or gross neglect. Generally speaking society agrees that this kind of intervention is necessary to protect children who are powerless and vulnerable (Palmer 1996).

The Mediation in Certain Divorce Matters Act 24 of 1987 allows for the appointment of Family Advocates who may request the court’s permission to institute an enquiry and furnish the court with a report and recommendations on any matter concerning the welfare of minor or dependent children of the marriage concerned. The regulations of this Act require the plaintiff to submit a completed questionnaire (see Annexure A of the Regulations) which is filed with the other papers pending the divorce action. The defendant may, if he or she wishes, reply to the statements made in the completed form. This form is seen by the Family Advocate who may call for inquiry (section 4 (2) of Act, 24 of 1987) if, on the face of it, the arrangements appear to be less than satisfactory. As mentioned before it would seem that most arrangements are found to be prima facie satisfactory.

Where there appear to be arrangements that the Family Advocate feels will not be in the best interests of the children, she may hand in a memorandum to the court in which she sets out her misgivings and it is up to the court to decide whether to investigate more fully or not.
In Whitehead v Whitehead 1993 (3) SA 72 (SECLD), Burger AJ states that the function of the Family Advocate is to be of assistance to the court by placing before it a balanced recommendation based on facts and considerations, and not to prescribe to the court what its decision should be.

**Best Interests of the Child in Custody Disputes**

Most parents are usually highly motivated to protect their children's emotions. During divorce process, both parents will normally have emotions and they will end up compromising their responsibility of protecting their children's emotions. Those emotions will grow up to such an extent where parents failed to protect the best interests of the child when it comes to custody. Both of them will be demanding to have custody of the child, not on the best interests of the child, but on their own best interests. Children become the innocent victims of divorce, suffering from the conflict between the parents.

South African courts have in the past expressly favoured mothers when it came to the custody of their minor children (Meyers v Leviton 1949 (1) SA 203 (T)). This was especially true of young children. It was only if the mother's character or past conduct rendered her unfit in the court opinion to have such custody that preference would be given to the father (Mohaud v Mohaud 1964 (4) SA 348 (T)). In the case of adolescent boys, however the courts have shown greater readiness to award custody to the father, other factors being equally in favour of both parents (Stock v Stock 1981 (3) SA 1280 (A)).

The ‘maternal preference’ or ‘tender years’ principle could be seen as violating the equality clause in section 9 of the Constitution by discriminating between parents on the basis of gender. Judicial awareness of opposition to all forms of chauvinism and sexism, the striving for equality between the sexes, and the current changes (both nationally and internationally) in the traditional roles of parents and spouses led to value systems and societal beliefs underpinning the maternal preference principle being challenged (Van der Linde v Van der Linde 1996 (3) SA 509 (O)).

In Van der Linde v Van der Linde 1996 (3) SA 509 (O) the court deviated from the decision in Meyers v Leviton which advanced the ‘maternal preference’ principle, holding that for decades it has been accepted that the quality of a parental role is determined by gender and further that mothering was a component of a women’s being only. At the present juncture it is to be doubted whether that acceptance can still be accepted as a universal prevailing axiom.

The concept of ‘mothering’ is indicative of a function rather than a persona and this function is not necessarily situated in the biological mother. It includes the sensitive attachment which follows from the attention devoted from day to day to the child’s need of love, physical care, nutrition, comfort, peace, security, encouragement and support. Only the parent who can satisfy this need will succeed in forging a psychological bond with the child and it is in this parent’s care where the child can experience his existence as having meaning and in which he will be sheltered and protected with
affection. Mothering assumes the showing of unconditional love without necessarily expecting anything in return (Davel 2000).

In the past society men were expected to suppress that part of their personality because it did not fit the image of a man. Today the man has the freedom to reveal and live out his mothering feeling. A father can be just good a ‘mother’ as the biological mother and naturally a mother can be just as good a ‘father’ as the biological father. The quality of a parental role is not determined by gender.

In Van Pletzen v Van Pletzen 1998 (4) SA 95 (O) the court relied squarely on Vander Linde and concluded that the assumption that the mother is better able than the father to care for a child belongs to an era of the past. It reiterated the acceptance that ‘mothering’ is not only a component of a women being, but is also part of a man’s being and that a father, depending on the circumstances, possesses the capacity and capability to exercise custody over a child as well as the mother.

In terms of section 28 of the Constitution Act, 108 of 1996 the best interests of the child remain the paramount consideration. In principle if a father can be able to provide what a court considers to be in the best interests of the child, he is the proper person to be awarded custody of the child. Similarly, if the mother is better equipped, she should be awarded custody.

Even though section 6 (3) of the Divorce Act 70 of 1979 does not state so expressly, it is commonly accepted that indeed allows for orders of joint custody. However, it appears that the South African courts are reluctant to grant such orders. Relying on Heimann v Heimann 1948 (4) SA 926 (W), the court in Schlebusch v Schlebusch 1988 (4) SA 548 (EC) conveyed that it viewed with concern any trend towards the granting of joint custody orders. In Edwards v Edwards it was considered to be a legal impossibility that legal custody could be shared equally between two individuals. The general reason underpinning the reluctance of the courts is expressed as follows in Kastan v Kastan 1985 (3) SA 235 (CPD):

Orders for joint custody are rare. Such few examples as can be gleaned from the law reports would seem to point emphatically in a direction away from orders of this nature and the reason for this, I would think it is clear. Custody of children involves day to day decisions and also decisions of longer and more permanent duration, involving their education, training, religious upbringing, freedom of association, and generally how best to ensure their good health, welfare and happiness. To leave decisions of this nature to the joint decision of parents who are no longer husband and wife could be courting disaster, particularly where the divorce has been preceded by acrimony and disharmony between the parents.

It was decided in Venton v Venton 1993 (1) SA 763 (D&CLD) that the court failed to see why joint custody should be regarded as a legal impossibility. Joint custody can be in the best interests of the child, but it will depend on the circumstances of each case. One of the most important factors to be applied when dealing with custody of minor children is parental responsibilities and rights regarding the child. In terms of children Act 38 of 2005 parental responsibilities are divided into three.
Parental Responsibilities and Rights

According to Bekink (2012), today’s parental authority is concerned more with parental responsibilities and duties which should be exercised in the interest of children, rather than with parental rights and powers. Therefore, in terms of section 18 (1), a person may have either full or specific parental responsibilities or rights in respect of a child. The said parental responsibilities and rights that a person may have in respect of a child, include the responsibility and the right:

- to care for the child;
- to maintain contact with the child;
- to act as guardian of the child; and
- to contribute to the maintenance of the child.

The above mentioned responsibilities and rights are paramount important to the upbringing of the child. This was emphasised in V vV 1998 (4) SA 169 (C) where the court stated at paragraph 189 B–C that ‘[t]he child’s rights are paramount and need to be protected, and situations may well arise where the best interests of the child require that action is taken for the benefit of the child, which effectively cuts across the parents’ rights’.

The Act went further to say that a parent or any other person who acts as guardian of a child must:

- administer and safeguard the child’s property and property interest;
- assist or represent the child in administrative, contractual and other legal matters;
- give or refuse any consent required by law in respect of the child, including
  (i) consent to the child’s marriage;
  (ii) consent to the child’s adoption;
  (iii) consent to the child’s departure or removal from the Republic;
  (iv) consent to the child’s application for a passport; and
  (v) consent to the alienation or encumbrance of any immovable property of the child.

In the case of Mkoka v S (CA&R130/2007) [2009] ZAECGH 44 (10 June 2009) unreported, parental responsibility and rights were also taken into test when the court reviewed the magistrate’s decision. The court found that the trial magistrate, when he sentenced the appellant, did not take into account the fundamental rights of the appellant children to ‘… parental care, or to appropriate alternative care when removed from the family environment’ in terms of s 28(1)(b) of the Constitution and to the paramountcy of their best interests in terms of s 28(2) of the Constitution.

However, section 28(1)(a) of the Act, states that the a person referred to in subsection (3) may apply to the High Court, a divorce court in a divorce matter or a children’s court for an order –

(a) Suspending for a period, or terminating, any or all of the parental responsibilities and rights which a specific person has in respect of a child. Section (3) makes provision for an application for an order referred to in subsection (1) that it may be brought –

(a) by a co-holder of parental responsibilities and rights in respect of the child;
(b) by any other person having a sufficient interest in the care, protection, well-being or development of the child;
(c) by the child, acting with leave of the court;
(d) in the child’s interest by any other person, acting with leave of the court; or
(e) by a family advocate or the representative of any interested organ of state.
(4) When considering such application the court must take into account –
(a) the best interests of the child;
(b) the relationship between the child and the person whose parental responsibilities and rights are being challenged;
(c) the degree of commitment that the person has shown towards the child; and
(d) any other fact that should, in the opinion of the court, be taken into account.

Three Divisions of Parental Responsibilities and Rights

According to Clark (2003: 89), the quality of the parent and child relationship should influence the courts far more than any abstract conception of parental rights. Against that background are divided into three categories, thus;
a. parental responsibilities and rights of mothers
b. parental responsibilities and rights of married father
c. parental responsibilities and rights of unmarried fathers

Parental Responsibilities and Rights of Mothers.

In South Africa, care of children born out of wedlock has traditionally been women's sole responsibility (De Villiers 1998). This was confirmed by section 19 of the Act which states that the biological mother of a child, whether married or unmarried, has full parental responsibilities and rights in respect of the child.

This was also the position in the Roman-Dutch law which was also confirmed in the case of B v S 1995 (3) SA 571 (A), where it was held at paragraph 575G-H “that illegitimate child fell under the parental authority, and thus the guardianship and custody, of its mother…” Furthermore Mahomed DP in his decision on Fraser v Children's Court Pretoria North and Others 1997 (2) SA 218 comparatively referred to the British legislation on Children’s Act of 1989 which states that “a mother always has parental responsibility for the child, but if the father is not married to the mother at the time of the birth of the child, he only has parental responsibility if he acquires such responsibility by order of the Court or this is provided for by a parental responsibility agreement between the natural parents of the child” (at paragraph 40). Children’s Act of 1989, defines a parent to mean any parent who has parental responsibility for the child.
Parental Responsibilities and Rights of Married Fathers

In terms of section 20 of the Act 38 of 2005; the biological father of the child has a full parental responsibility if he is married to the mother, or he was married to the child’s mother at the time of the child conception.

However, Anne Louw (2010: 157) despite the increased recognition afforded to biological fathers as legal parents, the Children’s Act still does not treat fathers on the same basis as mothers as far as the automatic allocation of parental responsibilities and rights is concerned.

Parental Responsibilities and Rights of Unmarried Fathers

Unmarried fathers do not have parental responsibilities and rights to the child automatically. What transpired in Naude and Another v Fraser [1998] 3 All SA 239 (A) was Lawrie Frasier had a child with his partner and they were not married. By the time the baby was born the couple had separated. The mother of the child arranged for the child to be adopted by people that the father did not know and without getting his consent to the adoption. She also did not ask him whether he wanted to look after the child. In the case, Mr Frasier said he had rights as the father of the child even though they weren’t married. But the Child Care Act said it was not necessary for a mother to get permission from the father of an illegitimate child. If they had been married, then she would have to get his consent. It was as a result of Mr Frasier taking up this case with the Constitutional Court that the Child Care Act was changed and the Natural Fathers of Children Born out of Wedlock Act passed.

In terms of section 21 of the Act; the biological father of a child who does not have parental responsibilities and rights in respects of the child, acquires full parental responsibilities and rights in respect of the child if:

- At the time of the child birth he is living with the mother in a permanent life-partnership or if he, regardless of whether he has lived or living with the mother; consent to be identified or successfully applies in terms of section 26 to be identified as the child’s father or pays damages in terms of customary law.
- He has contributes or has attempted in good faith to contribute to the child’s upbringing for a reasonable period.

In Hendricks v Thomson [2009] JOL 23016 (T) The parties were the biological parents of a child, but were not married to each other. The applicant, the father, sought an order to the effect that the primary care and residence of the child be granted to him with immediate effect and also for ancillary relief. He based the application on the fact that the child had special needs, being diabetic, and that the respondent was acting contrary to those needs in that she was neglectful. Such allegation was denied by the respondent. Ebersohn AJ held that at the present stage, the court could make only an
interim order. It was in the best interests of the child not to disturb the status quo but to order that he be examined by experts and others, all at the expense of the applicant, and to have their reports put before the family advocate who was to mediate on an urgent basis in the matter in terms of the provisions of section 21(3) of the Children's Act 38 of 2005.

In the light of the above case, an unmarried father can automatically acquire parental responsibilities and rights, which include the right to guardianship if he meets certain requirements set out in section 21(1)(a) and (b) of the Children's Act 38 of 2005 (Domingo 2011).

Conclusion and Recommendations

This paper has successfully examined the principle of the best interests and further noted that indeed its criterion is workable. The paper further examined the subjective assessments of what would constitute the best interests of children. Several case laws and frameworks were examined and analysed. The paper further acknowledged that it is impossible for a court to determine the best factors when it comes to custody. This is mainly due to the fact there are no statutory guidelines to assist the courts in knowing which factors to consider. Furthermore, the paper remarked that it is now left to the individual court to decide which factors are relevant and important. The court will be task also to grant parental responsibilities and rights as contemplated in the provision of the Act.

Against this background, this paper recommends for the policies and enactment of the legislations which will protect the best interests of the child. The paper further recommends for the specific legislation which contains all factors which need to be considered by a court when determining best interests of the child. This will make the courts find it possible to consider the best interests of the child in a proper way and this will allows all the courts to give effect to our obligations under the Constitution and under the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child.

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Women and Aquaculture in Bangladesh: The Unpaid Labour

Jewel Das¹ and Md. Shakil Khan²

Abstract: Women labour is considered as unpaid in Bangladesh though they are involved with many income generating activities. Present study was conducted at the six districts i.e. Narail, Khulna, Bagerhat, Mymensing, Chittagong and Barisal of Bangladesh and aimed to assess the women role in aquaculture along with their socio-economic status and access to the resources. The methodological approach included data collection using a blending of techniques of focus group discussion (FGD) and a direct questionnaire survey of 88 respondents. The study reveals that most women’s are involved in fish poly culture. The analysis shows that the general tendency of women being involved generally by liming, feeding, regular supervision, medication, pond drying, harvesting, marketing, seed supply and trading processes. Current study concluded that women access to different options at the society is limited.

Key-Words: Women, aquaculture, fish, Bangladesh

Introduction
Aquaculture is the fastest growing food-producing sector and is found to be a functional and productive enterprise for both of the poverty alleviation and improvement of nutrition in the world (Bostock et al., 2010). But the sector is underperforming in many countries because of women, who are often a crucial resource in agriculture and the rural economy, face constraints that reduce their productivity. Women involvement in aquaculture and fisheries is common in different continents but the frequency varies based on local, socio-economic and location contexts. Women’s role in aquaculture and fisheries is greatly influenced by the caste, religion and position in the family hierarchy. Nandeesha (2004) mentioned gender is now considered as central issue for a number of development initiatives.

Fish farming in the Southwest (coastal zones) Bangladesh has spread rapidly within the last decade among agricultural producers that many of the agrarian institutions there have been carried over and adapted to the new production regime (Ito, 2002). Considering the aquaculture context of Bangladesh, homestead pond fish culture is one of the strongest candidates for small-scale or

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backyard aquaculture which is easily manageable by women besides their daily chores. Though women were engaged in fish processing and feed preparation earlier, there are potentialities to take lead in fish culture by them which will lead to increment of the household income. However gender inequalities comprised of relatively low attention to the work done by women and their limited access to resources, technologies, education, information and skills. Fisheries and aquaculture value chain in Bangladesh keep ample spaces for the women to contribute in the production and income.

The significance and processes of women empowerment are happening to vital in defeating women’s subordination. CARE and DANIDA projects in Bangladesh promoted women to maintain activities such as dike cropping, feed preparation and distribution, paddy, poultry, tree, vegetable cultivation and production in Bangladesh (Abedinet et al., 2001). Because of being nearer to homestead and low investment venture, small-scale fish farming can easily be carried out by rural women. Islam (2005) found that women’s participation in income generating activities has increased in recent years. In Bangladesh, men and women are not evenly distributed across all sectors and professions in comparison with their total involvement in the labor force. As a secondary earner or unpaid labor woman has a great potentiality to create opportunity for the household head or male farmers to think for more income for other profession apart from fish farming. Women’s growing involvement in aquaculture has been a noteworthy sign for the rapid development of fish farming in rural Bangladesh (Shirajeeet et al., 2010). Gender roles and responses are largely socially constructed and are the basis for the structure and organization of women and men’s differential relationship with their environments, the economy, their resource utilization patterns and strategies (Williams et al., 1997).

Women have access to the home gardening considering suitability of the rural chores. If their interaction with the fish culture increases, it will match the criteria and it will be highly sustainable and time saving to manage pond and dike. To ensure equitable benefits for both the men and women it is difficult if inadequate knowledge of the gendered dimensions in fish value chain. Gendered value chain analysis (Mayoux and Mackie, 2008) provides tools to assess the invisible dimensions of these supply chains where women’s livelihoods are located. This research looked in details on the status of women to carry out the fish farming activities to design more detail-oriented field intervention in future Bangladesh. Present study was conducted to identify the women roles in aquaculture in Bangladesh.

Materials and methods

Study area
The research was conducted in six districts of Bangladesh i.e. Narail, Khulna, Bagerhat, Mymensing, Chittagong and Barisal (Figure 1). Narail is famous for small-scale fish farming with active participation of male farmers, and Khulna and Bagerhat are renowned for shrimp aquaculture with white fishes and all the actors of fish value chain like, hatchery, feed mill, processing plants, market etc. are established. Mymensing is another aquaculture friendly zone where some sub-districts are
famous for fish culture. Barisal is the riverside area and mostly famous for fish aquaculture and Chittagong is for large-scale fish farming clusters.

Data collection and analysis
This study was conducted through a set questionnaire survey and interview of women farmers participating in fish cultivation following the approach of Pido (1995), Pido et al. (1996), Townsley (1996), IIRR (1998) and Hossain et al. (2009). Questionnaire interviews were conducted with coastal communities household to collect quantitative data. Before conducting the questionnaire survey, a list of local family from the selected study areas was prepared. Questionnaire interviews are suitable for producing perceptions, motivations and feelings (Scrimshaw, 1990). Random sampling was done in the fish culturing areas to select the samples from the above-mentioned location to justify the context. Information for the year 2014 to 2015 has been taken to realize the recent trends. A number of 88 randomly selected samples covering 6 districts namely Narail, Khulna, Bagerhat, Mymensing, Chittagong and Barisal were selected for the present study.

Results
Socio-economic status
Initially the socio-economic status of the interviewee is analysed (Table 1). The family structure of the respondent’s resulted in 64.77% of households consists of 5 to 7 members and 18.18% has below 4 members whereas remaining 17.05% belongs to household members 8 to above. Moreover the
educational status of the respondents are not so good where about 40.91% of the respondents are of educational level of class five to eight, about 35.23% of the respondents had studied up to primary school, about 19.32% of the respondent had education level of class nine to secondary level and only 4.55% of the total respondents had education after SSC level. Thus it represents the level of the education and self-soundness of the population due to educational lacking remains.

Further analysis also reveals that the respondents are long being involved with the fish farming practices. A majority of the population started fish farming about 5 to 9 years (38.64%) ago, 27.27% of the total respondents started fish farming more than about 15 years ago. Fish culture in Bangladesh is not intensive rather extensive and semi-intensive in some cases which is justified from the responses that about 93.18% farmers have poly-culture (i.e. various species in same water body) and 3.41% have monoculture (single species in a certain water body) and same percentage (3.41) for the farmers who have both of the practices.

| Table 1: ANOVA Table for Women’s Role in Aquaculture |
|----------------------------------|-----|----------------|-----|----------------|
|                                  | Sumsqrs | Df | Meansqr | F   | P   |
| Between groups                  | 0.000123 | 13 | 9.48E-06 | 5.24E-08 | 1   |
| Within groups                   | 9297.21  | 3  | 3099.07  | 17.1366 | 2.95E-07 |
| Error                            | 7052.95  | 39 | 180.845  |
| Total                            | 16350.2  | 55 |

Women in Aquaculture in Bangladesh

The concept of fish culture emerged from different viewpoints. The reasons of the turning towards the fish farming trend has been for formalized and framed in through conducting focus group discussion (FGD) at different sites and the resulted reasons are grouped for the questionnaire survey. The specification and reasons of women being involved in fish farming in Bangladesh has been generalized through the process. Majority (62.50% of Figure 2) of peoples has been involved in fish farming in the tendency of high economic gains, 31.82% began involvement in aquaculture to expand their business (another way to increase income), only 13.64% motivated by own motivation and remaining 6.82% had a reason for home consumption and convinced by surrounding ongoing culture or nurseries. It is clear through the analysis that due to the socio-economic conditions, women want to get themselves involved in such income generating sectors (aquaculture).

Further analysis resulted whether the helps or influence from other organization have been present to encourage women’s involvement. This study reveals that 44.32% of the women respondents collect seeds (Figure 2) from hatcheries and seed traders, 35.23% get it solely from hatcheries, 14.77% buy from seed traders and 2.27% buy it from hatchery and depot. In the whole context, 45.45% women answered that they purchase their fertilizers from trader, dealer and input sellers, 26.14% women mentioned they buy it from local bazaar, 12.50% women collect it from depot and the same
percentage claimed it from depot and/or traders, 3.41% women do not know about their fish farming fertilizer sourcing.

The study also revealed that 84.10% women in fish farming areas of the clusters purchase feed from the traders. 6.82% farmers buy it from both of the traders and depots. 4.54% farmers buy from input sellers and 2.27% fish farmers prepare feed in home and 2.27% women do not know about their feed sourcing. During the survey women were asked about their involvement in aquaculture activity. Responses from interviewee are shown in Figure 4. Women are diversely involved with liming, irrigation, pond drying, embankment, seed management, feeding, daily supervision, medication, harvesting, sorting and grading, packaging and transportation sectors of the aquaculture process (Figure 2).

**Figure 2: Reasons for Starting Fish Culture (a) and Different Available Input Suppliers (b)**

About 61.36% women have involvement in liming issue whereas 23.86% women has medium involvement and 22.73% and 14.77% women have high and medium involvement in this regard respectively. 38.64% women do not participate in the liming processes. About 45.45% women take part in irrigation whereas 23.86% involve as medium level, 12.50% low and remaining 9.09% has high involvement, and 54.55% women have no participation in this process. Present study found that 50% of the women involved in pond drying where 22.73% is medium, 14.77% low and 12.50% has high level involvement. About 54.54% women give effort in embankment. 23.86% has medium level of involvement, 17.05% has low and 13.64% has high rank of partaking in this activity. 52.14% women whereas 23.86% low, 15.91% medium and 11.36% high portion involved in this technical activities handling. A significant portion (40.91%) of women has to manage feeding issues at a medium scale in contrast with 21.59% as high and 12.50% as low. On the other hand 79.55% women supervised their pond daily. Among them 37.50% women is in medium scale, 21.59% highly and 20.45% has low
involvement. 20.45% women are in low level whereas 14.77% in medium and 12.50% is highly involved with medicine application. Almost 47.73% women stated that they take part in medication of their pond (Figure 3).

![Figure 3: Women Involvement in Different Activities Related to Fish Culture](image)

Beside that 60.23% women claimed that they work in harvesting process, 29.55% have medium level of involvement, 17.05% works at low level and 13.64% women of the whole context have high involvement in fish harvesting processes. 63.64% women are involved in sorting and grading process. 26.14% women involved at a medium level, 23.86% is low and 13.64% women have high involvement in fish sorting and grading activities. Among all the respondents 22.73% women has low involvement, 18.18% has medium and 9.09% women involved highly with packaging.
Figure 4: Women’s Involvement in Different Fish Culture Activities

About 37.50% women answered positively to the question of taking part in carrying fish to the transport. 29.55% women have low involvement in this issue and only below 9% women have high and medium rank of involvement in fish carrying. Analysis of variance (ANOVA) in table 2 shows no significant difference exist for different levels of involvement but significant difference found among different types of women roles in aquaculture.

Table 2: ANOVA Table for Women’s Access to Knowledge and Information in Society

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sum sqrs</th>
<th>df</th>
<th>Mean sqr</th>
<th>F</th>
<th>P</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Between</td>
<td>71.7401</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>6.52183</td>
<td>0.010949</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Within</td>
<td>31234.1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>15617.1</td>
<td>26.2177</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Error</td>
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<td>22</td>
<td>595.668</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>44410.6</td>
<td>35</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Women Aqua Farmers in Society
To succeed in fish culture the initiator and his associates should have some technical knowledge—how along with a definite level of information and knowledge source. The women were asked about their access to information and knowledge (Figure 5 a). The tendency to have an access towards husband was seen the highest (73.9%) and it is always done by the women. Sometimes (31.8%) they seek information and knowledge from the lead farmers and fellow farmers (30.7%), nursery (30.7%) sometimes for both, NGO (27.3%), hatchery (19.3%) sometimes, retailer, depot and trader (14.8% sometimes), govt. office (13.6%) sometimes. They always seek information and knowledge from peer and/or fellow farmers (15.9%) and lead farmers (11.4%), 3.4% from nursery, 3.4% from local NGOS and 1-2% from govt. office, retailer, depot and traders. ANOVA in table 3 shows that there is no significant difference exists among different levels of access to information but significant difference found for different types of access options. The clusters of the context stated that most of the time they take their decisions for household needs jointly (Figure 5 b). But, only two issues such as for clothing and other necessities (52.27%) and for family food related expenditure (44.32%), the women take decision by themselves. 34.05% women in the whole context ranked as second in case of purchasing jewellery and gold items if any. ANOVA in table 3 shows that there is no significant difference exists among different levels of decision making but significant difference found for different types of options.

(a) (b)

Figure 5: Women’s Access to Information and Knowledge (a) and Reasons for Decisions (b)

| Table 3: ANOVA Table for Women’s Independence for Decision Making |
|-----------------------------|-----|-------|------|-----|
|                         | Sumsqrs |  Df | Meansqr |  F   | P   |
|---------------------------------------------------------------|
| Between              | -1.21E-11 | 11  | -1.10E-12 | -3.83E-15 | 1   |
| Within               | 18042.6   | 2   | 9021.29   | 31.38  | 3.60E-07 |
| Error                | 6324.68   | 22  | 287.486   |        |      |
| Total                | 24367.3   | 35  |          |        |      |
Discussions

Kabeer (1988) pointed out that women are quite literally a residual category in the distribution of food, eating after men and usually after children, and making do with what is left. But women contribution in society is undervalued found by Sharma (2003). Currently the women are involved in various facets of aquaculture activities, including stocking of seeds in ponds, feeding of fish, pond management, fertilisation, liming, and fish harvesting and marketing (Shirajee et al., 2010).

General findings are women at the present study area involved in pond preparation which is basically preparing fish culture area by removing wastage soils, weeds and application of lime, fertilizer in the pond bottom and sun drying for water intake. Moreover they are also involved with irrigation and engaged themselves during fish culture to maintain optimum water level or to control physical parameters. Prior to water intake it is done to free pond bottom from toxic gas and to destroy microbial contamination in fish culture. It is a big work and generally done by hiring labour. The pond dikes are constructed to save it from water flow, flood etc. Sometimes it is done in the mid stage of culture if required. Though it is a prerequisite of fish farming, there are some continuous works throughout the culture period for embankment. Management of seeds whether it is fry or post-larvae in case of prawn and shrimp or juvenile, it is essential to stock quality seeds in a quality manner. Prior to stocking it is essential to acclimatize the seeds and fingerlings in pond water. Even nursery is needed in some cases. Seeds should be fed quality-graded feed to get good results which are a part of seed or fingerling management. Pond itself contains some natural feeds which are not enough for a commercial farming. So, feed should be supplied to the fish as floating or sinking, commercial or homemade etc. The fishes have different food habit considering their habitat in different level of the pond. So, commercial packet feeds have different criteria to add value in fish diet.

Women can broadcast commercial or packet feed and can make some feed in home if she has technical know-how. Feed management along with feed preparation, maintaining feeding regime and fixing feed amount etc. are some crucial issues in fish culture. Daily supervision is mainly keeping eye on the pond condition and fish health to ensure the process is going well. Women can easily manage it beside their daily works. If women are engaged with dike vegetation, they have to visit pond daily in regular interval. Routine supervision of pond to protect the fish from predators and monitoring water colour, fish health etc. is also important factors in fish culture. Harvesting is mainly done at the end of the fish cultivation process. Apart from some partial harvesting it is done to catch all the fishes for selling. It is done by hiring daily labour or by participation of all the male members of the family. This is mainly done by male members of the household. Sorting and grading is done after harvesting the fishes. In this regard, it is done in the home yard or on the dike. Women can play role in sorting. Grading is vital in prawn and shrimp farming. In case of fish like *Anabas testudineus*, *Oreochromismossambicus*, *Pangasius pangasius* and *Cyprinus carpio* (locally known as koi, tilapia, pangus and carp respectively), sorting is done where women have role to play. Fish carrying in transport is mainly carrying the fishes through container to the van; to the vehicle near farm gate, or in some cases carrying to the local market. Considering Bangladesh social context woman’s mobility
is not too wide in rural areas. They usually use bucket or container to carry the fish. It is to mention that the women were asked about taking part in only carrying fish not to take it in market.

Women are thought as co-builders of civilization yet they are underprivileged in many parts of the globe, especially in developing countries such as Bangladesh (Biswas, 2002). Gupta (1990) reported that in Bangladesh, rural women engage in subsistent aquaculture, which has helped in improving the quality of their families’ lives. In Bangladesh, women have proven to be competent in adopting aquaculture technologies, despite the fact that their role in aquaculture growth has not been sufficiently recognized and remains inadequately addressed (Shelly and Costa, 2002). Special efforts have not been made to integrate women into aquaculture extension and training programs (Acharya and Benneth, 1982). This research is an example of a comprehensive study using a methodological approach to assess the status of the women involved fish farming community. Through gender lens this study tried to find out issues to the way of aquaculture sustainability. It also revealed economic return and degree of freedom and control over the income of the poor rural women in Bangladesh. The study documented the socio-economic status of fish farming practiced women. Recognizing women’s important role in aquaculture development, efforts need to be crafted to design more gender-sensitive projects in Bangladesh. A general sense is that if women can control the aqua-venture fully, man will able to think about something new in outside which will ultimately benefit household. Rural enterprises, microcredit organization and input suppliers can become powerful and sustainable by linking the women with credit, technology, infrastructure, training and trade, such enterprises in improving the livelihoods and economic security of the rural poor. The findings and views from different desks give a conception to establish more gender friendly environment to ensure women’s participation in fisheries and aquaculture sector. Building up strong base of gender-disaggregated data for future research is a paramount important point. Supporting the range of function women plays in this sector with appropriate advocacy can bring a positive change to the way of sustainable aquaculture in Bangladesh. Institutional development to linkage women in capacity building could be another important issue in this regard. Policy, planning and programs should be established to ensure women access to resource and services. Strengthening women’s role in terms of social, economic and political issues and raising voice and influencing through human capital by developing strategic framework could be the way in forward thinking. Vertical integration of gender mainstreaming in micro-level can bring up women empowerment. Gender issues should be well addressed in education, training and extension along with policy-making. Community-based and participatory rigorous research tool could be effective for further penetration in gender in development issues. Finally, strong gender centric research methodology should be developed to ascertain a strong gender-based aquaculture in Bangladesh.

References


Stakeholder Debate in Policy Implementation: An Evaluation of Bangladesh Leather Processing Industry Relocation Policy*

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¹ Authors are grateful to Dr. Maria Kaika, Professor of Human Geography, School of Environment, Education and Development, University of Manchester for her comments on its earlier draft’s. The authors also express their thanks to the unknown reviewers for their insightful comments and direction.

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Abstract: This paper focuses on stakeholder debate and conflict during policy implementation. In doing so it analyzes the reason behind the implementation snag of Bangladesh leather processing industry relocation policy, which is extreme stakeholder negotiation. Relevant stakeholders have been identified and their influence over the policy measure has been formulated. Underlying interactions among the stakeholders has been conceptually depicted to retrieve an image of the extreme stakeholder dispute behind this policy failure. Finally, based on the empirical evidence this policy measure has been evaluated in light of the effective participation of the concerned stakeholders.

Keywords: Stakeholder Conflict, Stakeholder Debate, Stakeholder Negotiation, Policy Implementation, Tannery Relocation, Leather Processing Industry.

Introduction

“Environmental problems are typically complex, uncertain, multi-scale and affect multiple actors and agencies. This demands transparent decision-making that is flexible to changing circumstances, and embraces a diversity of knowledge and values. To achieve this, stakeholder participation is increasingly being sought and embedded into environmental decision making processes, from local to international scales” (Reed, 2008). Additionally “stakeholder participation needs to be underpinned by a philosophy…[that] participants have the power to really influence the decision…If a decision has already been made or cannot really be influenced by stakeholders then participation is not appropriate”

On the other hand, Goodland (2004) states, “effective participation means agreement on precautions, mitigation and compensation[and] ‘meaningful participation’ if properly implemented, can achieve free, prior informed consent (FPIC); [whereas] FPIC might be achieved by guaranteeing benefits to the impacted communities through insurance, performance bonds, or escrowed trust funds”. Furthermore, Goodland (1995) claims that “environmental sustainability of a project concerning city development should include the decision made by the social community involved as major stakeholders”.

The above two calls for ‘effective participation’ of stakeholder during environmental decision making form the backdrop of this study, which aims to evaluate the ‘Bangladesh Leather Procession Industry Relocation Policy’, from a specific angle of “stakeholder debate” during policy formulation and implementation.

Bangladesh government undertook this policy option to relocate its noxious tannery industry from city center to outskirts dated back in 2003 (Rabbani, 2009) to ensure environmental compliance under increasing pressure from local and international communities (Bhowmik, 2012) and to comply with in country broader strategies (MoEF, GoB 1995, 2010, 2013). Its 2013 now and the new target of implementation is within June, 2013 (Saha, 2013) due to extreme debate and negotiation between different stakeholders over the course of time (Al-Muti and Ahmad, 2013). Specifically imposing the decision (introduced earlier by Reed, 2008) by government during policy design on the ‘impacted
social communities’ (prior stated by Goodland, 1995) which is the tannery owners in this case study, without considering its detrimental consequences during implementation stage.

This essay will shed light on the prior mentioned dispute in course of the finding reasons for this prolonged implementation snag. Literatures on stakeholder debate for this specific case study are scarce and there’s still much more to explore. But it is a worthwhile topic containing the potential of high research impact. Authors partially relied upon several studies concentrated to judge the sustainability of this policy but more on cautious assimilation of grey literatures and media reports.

**Bangladesh Leather Processing Industry Relocation Policy**

**Background**

Dhaka the capital of Bangladesh has emerged along the river bank of Buriganga and so also its industries following the basic rules of urban growth water availability and transportation facilities (Hossain, 2008; Banglapedia, 2012). First tannery in Bangladesh established dated back to 1940 (Hossain, 2012) which have now reached at 243 among which 95 percent are located in Hazaribagh (Figure-1 A)(Paul et al., 2013). This 50 acre (approx.) leather processing industry is surrounded by some of the prestigious residential areas of Dhaka (Dhanmondi, Rayerbazar, Llabag). This sector contributed 3 percent of the country’s export during the financial year 2010-2011 (Ibid.)

In contrast, from the beginning to date no environmental protection measure (i.e. Effluent Treatment Plant) has been taken for this high risk industry (Human Rights Watch, 2012). Liquid effluent and solid waste eventually find its way to Dhaka’s main river Buriganga (Biswa and Hamada, 2013) through sewers and its adjacent areas (Figure-1 B). Numerous studies have been undertaken to assess the pollution level and health risk of this area (Asaduzzaman et al., 2006; Karim et al., 2013; Sunny et al., 2012; Hoque and Clarke, 2013). All echoing the same notion of disastrous impact on surface and ground water and health of exposed population. Recently this area has been ranked within world’s top ten worst place for toxic threat (Blacksmith Institute and Green Cross Switzerland, 2013)
In response to the criticisms from local community, scientific group and international and local environmental watchdogs, government began to think about the relocation of this industry from city center towards outskirts since the 1991 (Table 1). Which was further pushed by a high court ruling in 2001 (Human Rights Watch, 2013, p.32). Followed by a formal announcement of relocation in 2002 and a writ petition in the Supreme Court by Bangladesh Environmental Lawyer’s Association (BELA) in 2003 (ELAW, 2012). Under these circumstances, Bangladesh Small and Cottage Industries Corporation (BSCIC) under the Ministry of Industries signed a trilateral agreement with Bangladesh Finished Leather, Leather Goods and Footwear Exporters Association (BFLLEA) and Bangladesh Tanneries Association (BTA) on 23rd October, 2003 (Rabbani, 2009). According to that, tannery industry is supposed to be relocated to Savar (outskirt of Dhaka and more upstream) for ensuring planned development through establishment of Common Effluent Treatment Plant (CETP) within a “Tannery Industry Town”. Near about 400 acres of land acquired for this purpose among which 200 acre is for future expansion (Sheltech, 2009 cited in Bhowmik, 2013). Total 205 plots have been developed over 200 acres of land and distributed among 155 tanneries (Paul et al., 2013). Whereas government has a plan to redevelop the present location as a residential and recreational area (Bhowmik and Islam, 2009).

Table 1: Timeline of Bangladesh Leather Processing Industry Relocation Policy

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Event</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1940</td>
<td>Establishment of first tannery</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1965</td>
<td>30 tanneries most of which were owned by the West Pakistani businessmen</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1972</td>
<td>All tanneries were nationalized under the nationalization decree</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1973-1981</td>
<td>Due to management crisis all tanneries were brought under Bangladesh Chemical Industries Corporation (BCIC) and three among them three under Bangladesh Freedom Fighters Welfare Trust</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1982</td>
<td>Failing to make profit, government transferred the ownership to private body</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1986</td>
<td>Government ordered 903 polluting factories (including the Hazaribagh tanneries) to adopt measures to control their pollution within three years</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1991</td>
<td>The question of relocation began to be discussed among policy makers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1993</td>
<td>It was decided that tanneries will shift to Savar and 17.30 acres land were acquired</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998</td>
<td>An inter-ministerial meeting was held on August regarding the relocation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>High Court of Bangladesh ordered polluting factories (including the Hazaribagh tanneries) to adopt adequate measures to control pollution within one year</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>Relocation policy announced by that time prime minister of Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Year</td>
<td>Event</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------</td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| 2003 | - Government and tannery owners signed an agreement  
- Government (BNP) pledged to provide financial assistance where tanneries would finance 60 percent of the costs and the rest by government  
- “Tannery Industry Town-Savar, Dhaka” Project was initiated to be completed by December, 2005  |
| 2005 | The project was revised to be completed within May, 2009  |
| 2006 | - Government allocated 205 plots on 199.40 acres of land among 155 industries and proposed Tk 2.5 bn as compensation as it was estimated that the owners would incur a loss of Tk 11 bn  
- No firm participated in the first tender for CETP  
- Second tender for CETP, only one firm responded  |
| 2007 | - Two firms responded to the third tender, among them WBDC, JV a Bangladesh-Singapore joint venture, got the job  
- Executive Committee of the National Economic Council (ECNEC) passed the first revised proposal of relocation  |
| 2008 | - Cabinet purchase committee cancelled the deal on allegations that the WBDC-JV had submitted false documents about its experience  
- WBDC-JV then went for a legal battle on cancellation of awarding the deal to it; government stuck to go for a fresh tender until it was over  
- A 14-member committee headed by the joint secretary of the Ministry of Industries was held on September and resolved that all the tanneries shall shift within February, 2010  |
| 2009 | - The government in that time (*Bangladesh Awami League*) said it would not bear the cost of CETP, the owners will have to pay for it  
- High Court ruled government to ensure relocation by February, 2010, “failing of which [they] shall be shut down”  |
| 2010 | - The relocation plan revised for the third time to be achieved by December, 2012  
- The tender of CETP was floated for the fourth time  |
| 2012 | Chinese joint venture JLEPCL-DCL was awarded the contract of CETP  |
| 2013 | - European Union (chief buyer of Bangladeshi leather exports) threatened to boycott the country's products as of 2014 if the CETP is not completed  
- ECNEC passed the second revised proposal  
- Government targeted to complete the project by June, 2016  
- It will now bear 80 percent of the core project cost, the rest will be beard by the tannery owners by installments (15 years)  
- The relocation of the tanneries, however, still remains uncertain as the factory owners are yet to sign the memoranda of understanding (MoU) with the government, due to their discontent about the allotment costs  |


**Ruling Government Party:**
- Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP)
- Bangladesh Awami League (BAL)
- Non-elected Caretaker Government

Though its 2013 now this relocation is yet to occur. This relocation plan has been revised several times targeting December, 2005 then December, 2006; May, 2009; February, 2010; August, 2010; April, 2011; June, 2012; December, 2012 and now June, 2016¹ (Human Rights Watch, 2012, p.32; Saha, 2013; Sarker and Siddique, 2013). Timeline of events of this protracted relocation policy has been illustrated chronologically in Table 1. Different disputes and their consequences rose during this time period have been also mentioned to explore the reason behind this prolonged policy implementation.

¹ End of February, 2016 has recently been agreed as the final date - Editor
Evaluation

The main factor played behind this lengthy policy implementation procedure is extreme stakeholder debate and negotiation considering various economic and socio-political issues (Al-Muti and Ahmad, 2013; Bhowmik, 2012) among the actors which are depicted in Table-2. Influence of the different actors over this policy measure and the inherent interaction between them is portrayed through a conceptual diagram (Figure-2). The subject policy will be evaluated in the coming section from different perspectives of stakeholder debate.

Economic loss and benefit (i.e. compensation, project cost bearing etc.) played a vital role behind this extreme negotiation between the three key stakeholders - BSCIC, BTA and BFLLFEA (Bhowmik and Islam, 2009). In the agreement of 2003 government approved to bear 40 percent of the total cost (TK175.75 crore) whereas tanners had to bear the rest (Lanteigne, 2010). This imposed decision gave rise to the issue of extreme negotiation regarding compensation, CETP cost bearing and other financial aids (Bhowmik, 2013, p.110). In the last so called consensus (Jibon, 2013) the new target of relocation was set for June, 2016 resulting project cost spiralled to near about 100 percent (TK1078.71 crore) in comparison to the starting point (Saha, 2013). Now government is willing to bear 80 percent of the liability but the deal is still to be agreed by the tanners because of the new debate about increase in the per square feet allotment cost (TK197 to 376.15) of project raised due to inflation, time value of money and price increase of construction materials and technologies.

![Figure-2: Conceptual Diagram of the Actors and Stakeholders of the Policy](image-url)

**Source:** Bhowmik and Islam, 2009; Bhowmik, 2012, 2013; Al-Muti and Ahmad, 2013; Sarker and Siddique, 2013; ELAW, 2012; Bryson, 2004 & authors own representation

**Notes:**
- Area of the Rectangle Represents the Operational Scale or Number of the Actors
Ash Color (Rectangle) Characterizes Negative Consent towards the Policy Tool and Black Color (Rectangle) Symbolize the Opposite
- Width of the Arrow (Ash) Denotes Influence upon the Policy Measure (i.e. thick arrow = higher influence)
- Arrows in Black Represents the Relationship Between the Actors: Direction Represents the Orientation and Width Symbolizes the Significance

Table 2: Type of Actors and their Interests in the Policy

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Issue/Perry: Bangladesh Leather Processing Industry Relocation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Actors/Stakeholders</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>European Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Human Rights Watch</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Nations Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bangladesh Small and Cottage Industries Corporation (BSCIC)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bangladesh Environmental Lawyers Association (BELA)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asociación Cluster de Industrias de Medio Ambiente de Euskadi (ACLIMA) &amp; Khulna University</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bangladesh Tanners Association (BTA)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bangladesh Finished Leather, Leather Goods &amp; Footwear Exporters’ Association (BFLLFEA)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Workers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Exposed People</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Tanners from the beginning were negotiating about the compensation package as well as running business in the current location, considering further risk of pollution in Savar, cost-effectiveness of providing CETP in Hazaribagh, production loss during relocation and other ‘pull factors’ of the current location (i.e. transportation, utilities etc.). Their willingness to pay for ensuring compliance in current location, cost-benefit analysis of the project for two scenarios (Hazaribagh and Savar) and sustainability from the perspective of urban planning has been well documented by Bhowmik (2012, 2013).

Politically biased perspective hampered this relocation in various ways. When the first agreement was reached about relocation (2003) the ruling government party was Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP), who agreed to bear the cost of CETP (Table-1). During 2003-2009 the bargaining from tanners was about increased amount of cost bearing by the government itself (from its predetermined 40% share). But during 2009 when Bangladesh Awami League (BAL) came to the power they refuse to bear the substantial cost of CETP (Table-1) and the bargaining started again from the beginning resulted in nothing but delay. This has been termed as the usual biasness and unethical practice of Bangladeshi politics by Al-Muti and Ahmad (2013). On the other hand tanners are divided among themselves according to political beliefs and place of origin within the country. Al-Muti and Ahmad (2013) states, “significant portion of the leather entrepreneurs bear allegiance to the opposition party, and thus apparently had an interest in delaying the relocation project beyond the 2014 national election in order to prevent the ruling political actors from being able to claim it as a success during its tenure”.

Lobbying strongly by tanners due to their favorable economic, social and political position affected the implementation of the policy further. Due to their financial position they got strong linkages within government and negotiated with top level of the country throughout these years without suffering any penalties from its inception till date (Leather International, 2013). Human Rights Watch (2012) in its study elaborated how tanners continuously extended the time of relocation along with the government in the face of several ruling from High Court between these time periods (2003-date). This has been possible with strong lobbying actors or representatives on behalf of the tanners within government. One of the example is the ‘lawyer’ “who represented the tannery associations in one petition to the High Court in February 2010 for an extension was ‘a member of the government’. He is also the nephew of in that time Prime Minister”, representing strong conflict of interests (Ibid., p.12).
Regulatory chill and glacier pace of the government bureaucracy has been observed for the tanneries which has been extrapolated during the study of Human Rights Watch (2012) and others. According to a Department of Environment official “there is a de facto policy not to monitor or enforce environmental laws because the Ministry of Industries is preparing a site in Savar for relocation of the tanneries. In the words of one official who requested anonymity, since the plan to shift, the Department of Environment has been inactive” (Ibid., p.33).

Disregard of alternatives and imposing decision under the pressure of powerful (i.e. European Union) while decision making is another aspect for this implementation delay and stakeholder debate. ACLIMA (2007) along with Khulna University, Bangladesh conducted an extensive research on the pollution of Hazaribagh and recommended to install CETP within it other than relocation. Because the recovery of present land after relocation for any further use will be extremely resource and time consumptive (cited in Bhowmik, 2013). Absence of which can impose serious health risk. Align with that research findings, earlier UNIDO proposed (Hasnain et al. 1999) an initiative to install CETP in Hazaribagh, but government opposed it with the help of local political leaders (Bhowmik, 2012; Human Rights Watch, 2012). Motivation behind governments’ stern attitude towards relocation can be explored if the study of Paul et al. (2013) and the objectives of the project (Bhowmik,2012, p.4)is critically analyzed, which is simple revenue earning for governments side and profit making for EU. When the tanneries will move towards new location, they can expand their existing production scale (Paul et al. 2013) which in turn will result more cost-effective supply for EU and more revenue for government. It will make more profit for the tanners also but they are concerned about their huge investment in Hazaribagh and production loss during transition period, which cannot be neglected in a resource constraint country like Bangladesh.

Failure of top-down approach, in other countries during tannery relocation due to owner’s strong unwillingness should be also taken into consideration while judging this policy. Three case studies has been summarized by Bhowmik (2013), which have been adopted here and presented below (Table 3). Critical analysis and insights from them has not been performed by the author due to the scope of this study. Only the summary has been presented here showing how stakeholder’s unwillingness and debate in those cases resulted in failure of the respective policy measure.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Projects that have Failed</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>India</td>
<td>Tamil Nadu</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Egypt</td>
<td>Cairo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mexico</td>
<td>Leon</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of Tanneries</td>
<td>577</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The River Polluted</td>
<td>Palar</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Causes of Failure of Relocation Projects</td>
<td>Appeals from social communities including tannery owners</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
transfer issues

|---------------------------|----------------|-----------------------------|-----------------|

Source: Adopted and Reproduced from Bhowmik (2013, p.115)

**Conclusion**

Bangladesh Leather Processing Industry Relocation Policy is an imposed decision on relevant stakeholders (especially on tannery owners). It failed completely to address Goodland’s (2004) suggestion for taking consent from the community affected before undertaking any project for the sake of its success and Reed’s (2008) proposition to ensure that stakeholder can affect the decision making. Government had taken the decision to ensure environmental decision which is also crucial but selected the policy options without considering other alternatives and proper research about further risk and sustainability. Recent agreement about the relocation within June, 2016 is questionable by the concerned people of this industry (Human Rights Watch, 2012) due to new debate about the increased allotment cost and failure of similar attempt in other countries.

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